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OF TH 
Stellingen 
1. "Property is not a relationship between people and things but one between people 
about things" (Sabean, D. (1990) Property, production, and family in Neckerhausen, 
1700-1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 18). 
2. Imagination, reflective talk, and story-telling are essential elements of the organizing 
process (this thesis). 
3. In Mexico there is much more freedom than in the USA since in Mexico rules can 
always be bent or "bought", whereas in the USA rules are applied much more strictly 
(ejidatarios of La Canoa, this thesis). 
4. Brokers do not necessarily have a role in effectively connecting communities or 
peasants to the "state", of in effectively 'Tilling the gap" between local and higher 
levels, but they do certainly play a central role in the "imagination of state power" 
(this thesis). 
5. One can give practical suggestions for developing certain forms of organization but 
one should be aware that one may influence but can never "control" the organizing 
process (this thesis). 
6. "If we want to understand the mechanics of power and organization it is important not 
to start out assuming whatever we wish to explain" (Law, J. (1992) Notes on the 
theory of the actor-network: ordering, strategy and heterogeneity. In: Systems 
Practice. 5(4) p. 380). 
7. Much of the literature on the "empowerment of the poor" and "consciousness raising" 
has a "disempowering" effect since it denies the "poor" the capacity to judge their 
own situation and develop their own organizing strategies (this thesis chapter 10). 
8. Governmental techniques and procedures do not necessarily lead to the creation of 
subjectivities and identities in line with existing dominant orders but may develop in 
routines and rituals with their own "re-enchanted" meanings (this thesis). 
9. Modernity has its own enchantments, rituals, and mythologies (this thesis, cf. 
Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J. (eds) (1993) Modernity and its Malcontents: Ritual and 
Power in Postcolonial Africa. Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press). 
10. Most organizing develops as the side-effect of formal rules and institutional structures 
and takes unintended forms (this thesis). 
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CHAPTER 1 
ORGANIZING PRACTICES IN THE MEXICAN EJIDO: 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction: the Coming into Being of a Research Object 
Make sure that they never create ejidos in your country! The ejido is a complete failure. It 
is not enough to give the people a small plot of land. What is necessary is education. The 
ejido only produced laziness! 
(fragment of an interview with Federico, coordinator of government projects in the villages 
of the municipality of Autlan) 
The problem with ejidos is that the ejidatarios do not read newspapers, they do not come to 
the meetings, they are ill informed. This phenomenon of the ill informed ejidatarios is a 
general phenomenon, it is not specific to one ejido. 
(fragment of an interview with Jos6, head of the SARH in the region of Autlan) 
These two fragments show the frustration of officials who have been working extensively 
with ejidos and who consider it to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to raise the 
enthusiasm of ejidatarios for new government programs and local projects. Although these 
quotes refer to ejidatario smallholders in the valley of Autlan in western Mexico, they are 
similar to the way officials elsewhere tend to express themselves about smallholders who do 
not seem to make any effort "to develop themselves''. They characterize these smallholders 
as lazy, uneducated and disinterested people. In this book, however, it is shown that the 
organizational characteristics of the Mexican ejido and the stereotypical way in which the 
relation between ejidatarios and officials developed, has little relation to laziness, a lack of 
organizational skills or a deficiency in education but has everything to do with the strained 
relation between ejidatarios and the Mexican state. It is also argued that, while government 
officials see land only as a means of production, for ejidatarios who live in an increasingly 
transnationalized setting ejido land has acquired different meanings. 
I carried out research in an ejido in Mexico and in several government agencies during 
several periods of fieldwork from mid 1991 to mid 1995. Let me explain the rationale of this 
study by providing more information on the history of the ejido. The ejido form of land 
tenure was established at the beginning of this century as a result of the Mexican revolution 
(1910-1920) in which masses of landless peasants demanded "land and liberty" from the 
state. Large landholdings were expropriated and ejidos were created to receive and administer 
these confiscated lands. The way in which the land had to be distributed among the landless 
peasants as well as the organizational structure of the ejido at the local level were all dictated 
2 Chapter 1 
by the agrarian law. 1 The Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) 2 played a central role in the 
procedures for the establishment of ejidos but also remained heavily involved in the local 
administration of ejido matters and in land conflicts. This continuing interference by the state 
made analysts claim that the agrarian insurgents who had fought for tierra y libertad (land 
and liberty), in the end had got tierra y el estado (land and the state) (Tutino 1986: 8). 
Yet, despite the strict agrarian law and interference by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, 
practices developed which were different from what the law prescribed. For example, the 
agrarian law permitted the division of the arable land into individual plots but prohibited the 
selling of these plots, renting them out or leaving them unused. In practice, however, these 
became common practices in ejidos throughout Mexico. With respect to the local 
administration of the ejido, things also worked out differently. The agrarian law stipulated 
that ejido meetings should be held every month and that decisions had to be taken by a 
majority of votes of the ejido assembly, in which all ejidatarios are represented. Yet, it 
became a common phenomenon that no decisions were arrived at at these meetings and that 
the head of the ejido, the commissioner, took decisions on his own. Furthermore, in many 
ejidos the monthly meetings were not held and if they were held, few ejidatarios attended. 
Likewise, the rules were also seldom applied in the resolution of land conflicts by the MAR. 
It has often been commented that the Mexican agrarian law essentially furthers the interests 
of the rich and powerful, meaning that the person who can pay the highest bribes or has the 
best political contacts wins a land conflict. At the same time, land conflicts between 
ejidatarios and private land owners abound and many have never been resolved. As the 
official rules concerning the use of the land and the administration of the ejido are seldom 
followed, and the ejidatarios themselves show little interest in formal procedures, the ejido 
system has often been labeled as highly "disorganized" and "corrupt". The Ministry of 
Agrarian Reform is seen as a central element in the fostering of such corruption. 
In my research I wanted to find out how these practices in the ejidos have developed. I 
argue that the labeling of these practices in a functionalist way as "disorganized" or 
"corrupt" does not bring us any nearer to an understanding of these dynamics, nor to an 
insight into the precise role played by the official rules and procedures. I contend, that these 
practices are the result of active organizing by ejidatarios, as well as officials and other social 
actors (Long 1990). A central argument of this book is that in the myriad of activities which 
are labeled as "illegal", "disorganized" and "corrupt" we can also distinguish certain 
organizing patterns. For example, it is obvious that so-called "disorganization" in the ejido 
goes hand in hand with forms of organizing outside the formal structure. The fact that no 
decisions are taken at the general ejido meeting is related to the way in which important 
matters are decided by small groups around the ejido commissioner and at the offices of the 
MAR. The fact that people know where they have to go to have their affairs settled, what 
language and arguments they have to use in negotiations with the officials of the agrarian 
bureaucracy, and how much they will have to pay for certain services, is also an indication 
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of a certain patterning in organizing practices. In order to understand ejido dynamics, the 
question then becomes that of distinguishing the central resources and sets of social 
relationships that influence the development of these arrangements. 
In my research I set out to study these forms of organizing related to the ejido and to find 
out what the central factors in their development had been. In order to enter into these 
intricacies I conducted in-depth research in one ejido, La Canoa in Jalisco. In 1938 the 
village of La Canoa received lands to establish its own ejido. This land was immediately 
divided into individual plots and distributed among the households of the village. Yet, over 
the years the number of households has increased substantially and today most households 
in the village have no access to ejido land. Today there are 196 households in the village La 
Canoa, while the ejido La Canoa has only 97 members (ejidatarios). Many villagers combine 
their life in the village with migration to the United States. 
I approach the study of ejido organizing practices by looking at the significance of the 
ejido in the livelihoods of different social actors and by studying their relation with the wider 
socio-political context. It should be remarked that I avoid a conceptualization of the ejido 
merely in institutional-legal terms. As Barth puts it, "I am in no way arguing that formal 
organization is irrelevant to what is happening - only that formal organization is not what is 
happening" (Barth 1993: 157). By studying the intimate social worlds of the ejidatarios as 
well as the wider force fields in which forms of organizing develop, one automatically enters 
into the complicated debate on the relation between ejidatarios and the Mexican state. 
Although this is a difficult subject, the peculiarities of local forms of organizing cannot be 
understood without taking this relation into account. 
In this introductory chapter I lay out the theoretical framework of the study. After a 
critique of conventional views of the ejido, I set out my views on the Mexican state. I then 
present an approach to the study of the ejido which focuses on organizing practices within 
determinate force fields. Finally, some methodological implications of this approach are 
discussed. 
The Ejido in Academic Debates 
A rich literature on the ejido and peasant forms of organization in Mexico exists (for an 
overview see Hewitt de Alcantara 1984). In many studies the ejido is analyzed from an 
economic perspective. These works concentrate on the productive aspects of ejido agriculture 
and the problems encountered (Duran 1967, Appendini and Salles 1975, 1983, Barkin 1988, 
Crummett 1985, Hewitt de Alcantara 1994, de Janvry et al. 1995, Dewalt 1979, Reyes et 
al. 1974). Here we also find debates about the differentiation of the peasantry, typologies of 
agricultural producers, and how the development of capitalism in rural areas may finally lead 
to the proletarianization and disappearance of the Mexican peasant (Bartra 1979, Pare 1984). 
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Sociologists and anthropologists have above all focused on local and regional power relations 
and the effects these had on the operation of the ejido. For example, much has been written 
on the problem of the frequent emergence of non-democratic and non-accountable leadership 
within ejidos (Bartra et al. 1975, Warman 1976) and corruption and mal-administration with 
respect to ejido plots and communal resources (Eckstein and Restrepo 1975). Others have 
discussed the difficult path towards the establishment of ejidos, the continuing struggles for 
legal land titles to land, and the dynamics of ongoing negotiations between government 
agencies and ejidatarios (Gordillo 1988, Winder 1979, Rincón 1980, Esteva 1980, Binford 
1985, Schryer 1986, 1988). Reyes et al. (1974) and Zaragoza and Marias (1980) present 
valuable studies about the legal and political intricacies which surround the ejido. 
In most of these works on the ejido we find a tendency to adopt (often implicitly) neo-
marxist models, emphasizing the exploitation of the peasantry by the state. This political 
economy type of analysis is especially evident in the work of Stavenhagen et al. (1968), 
Stavenhagen (1969, 1970), Huizer (1970) and Bartra (1974, 1975), who espouse a strong 
"revolutionary commitment" and interest in peasant mobilization and organization. Debates 
on the ejido and local forms of organization have mainly, within this political economy 
framework, been centered on the extent to which local patterns are linked to, and have been 
shaped by, the wider framework of the political economy. For example, it is often argued 
that the peasantry today is dominated by a new agrarian bourgeoisie which controls their 
labor and impedes the development of the ejidos (Rello 1986: 21). It has also been stressed 
that through the ejido system of land tenure, the supply of credit via the state rural banking 
system BANRURAL and the marketing of various agricultural products, the state controls 
the peasantry and "forces rural people into the role of petitioners of the state" (Hewitt de 
Alcantara 1987: xv). 
The ejido has also been analyzed in relation to Mexico's political system, which in the 
view of many authors is characterized by the dominance of the PRI (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party) and corporatist mechanisms. The ruling PRI includes three main 
sectors: labor, peasant, and popular, and many organizations are linked to one of these three 
sectors. For the peasantry the most important official organization linked to the ruling PRI 
has been the National Peasant Confederation CNC which was created under the presidency 
of Cardenas (1934-1940). The CNC was set up to represent ejido petitioners and ejidatarios 
in their relations with the state bureaucracies and is said to have provided the bulk of rural 
support for the PRI. This has "led many analysts to conclude that the agrarian reform - and 
the ejido in particular - was a cornerstone in the building of Mexico's corporatist and 
authoritarian one-party regime because it secured the ejidatarios' political submission to the 
state" (Zendejas 1995: 25). 
Another analytical framework for the study of state-peasant relations and for 
understanding ejido administrative and political practices centers on patron-client relations 
and practices of brokerage (de la Pefla 1986, 1992, Salmerón 1988, Tapia 1992). Special 
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attention has been given to the figure of the local bosses, the caciques (Bartra 1975, Levya 
1992, Par6 1975, Schryer 1986, Warman 1972). The general view is that the caciques 
"mediate between the needs of the national state (or private corporations) and the actual on-
the-ground situations of peasants and workers, that they derive power from this relation of 
mediation, and that this power takes on very complex cultural qualities because of the diverse 
natures of the caciques' mediating roles" (Lomnitz 1992: 297). The ejido has been depicted 
as the ideal institution for these intermediation processes. As Grindle puts it, "gradually, as 
the machine-like clientele networks of the PRI expanded, ejido commissioners were 
transformed into brokers between government and peasants, trading their ability to deliver 
the votes of ejidatarios for the patronage and protection of the regime" (1995: 42). This leads 
to a gloomy picture in which groups of peasants could try to organize themselves 
independently but "were generally coopted or repressed by the formidable power and 
resources available to the various power brokers throughout the system" (ibid.). It is claimed 
that many rural caciques actually "find their origin in the process of agrarian reform, which 
they were the initiators of and which they obtained their power from through a complex 
network of compradazgo (ritual kinship), friendships, debts, favors and threats which made 
it possible for them to control the agrarian communities" (Bartra 1980: 29 own translation). 
It is often stressed that the state itself has fostered the emergence of systems of 
intermediation by caciques. It was a common strategy to enrol these men especially in 
regions where the state was weak. Although it is often said that this all-pervasiveness of 
caciques enables the Mexican state to exert control over different populations, even in the 
smallest villages, at the same time this dependence by the state on the cacique is seen as a 
sign of the weakness and ineffectiveness of the Mexican state as it makes it impossible to 
implement government programs without giving a central role to regional powerholders. 
Limitations of the Existing Debates 
Underlying much of the literature on the ejido we find a strong commitment to the dire straits 
of the Mexican peasantry. However, for a study of the development of organizing practices 
in the ejido the existing literature presents serious theoretical limitations. First of all, with 
respect to the organizing strategies of peasants, these works tend to concentrate upon the 
"great" peasant movements, "progressive" forms of collective action, and on "revolutionary 
change", not on the everyday organizing practices of peasants. The ejidatarios' perspectives 
and the ejidatarios' own organizational capacities are not fully elucidated. More generally, 
they do not show how ejidatarios process social experience and devise their own ways of 
coping with life (Long 1990: 8). In the same way they do not show how the relations 
between ejidatarios and officials have influenced the organizing practices in the ejido. For 
example, what has been the precise role of officials in the illegal renting out and selling of 
plots and in the illegal division of the common lands in the ejidos? 
Secondly, in these works the state is analyzed as an instrument of class interests. While 
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acknowledging the fact that in rural Mexico it is common to find prominent families which 
combine economic and political power, in my opinion, we simplify the dynamics of the ejido 
by analyzing them in terms of a model of social class differentiation. In addition, in many 
of these works "the state", "the peasant" and "the ejido" are presented as relatively 
homogenous and uniform entities involved in a continuous unequal power struggle in which 
the peasants or the ejido always - 1 would say by definition - emerge worse off. As Zendejas 
points out "in the majority of research on peasants, the figure of the State has obscured the 
other social actors, institutions and classes as peasants' interlocutors" (Zendejas 1988: 101, 
own translation). This has led to a situation where conclusions were often reached without 
the actual mechanisms of processes of domination having been fully unraveled. 
Indeed, even if it were possible to demonstrate that the provision of credit and other 
government programs is geared to effectively controlling the peasantry, it is at the same time 
possible to argue that these practices are not necessarily successful since they confront modes 
of resistance that encompass a multiplicity of forms of strategic peasant activity (Scott 1985). 
In addition, ejidatarios may be very capable of developing their own ways of manipulating 
state programs and appropriating resources (de Vries 1997). In effect, as Long and van der 
Ploeg (1989) argue, it is at this level that - through negotiations between different producers 
and officials - significant policy transformations take place. 
Finally, the corporatist and intermediation analyses of the Mexican regime need thorough 
revision. As Rubin puts it, "since the 1970s, accounts of politics in postrevolutionary Mexico 
have assumed that ongoing domination has resulted from centralized, relatively homogenous 
power transmitted outward through corporatist mechanisms" (Rubin 1996: 85). I agree with 
Rubin that too much emphasis has been placed on the power of the all-mighty state and on 
mechanisms of corporatism and patron-client relations in studies on rural Mexico. As 
becomes clear in this study, in certain ejidos the CNC did not play any role in the 
organization of ejido matters at the local level. Although it is certainly true that mechanisms 
of intermediation have played an important role in linking rural areas with the "state 
system", I seriously doubt the usefulness of a unilateral focus on caciques or patron-client 
relations for understanding local level practices in ejidos. Let me explain this on the basis 
of my own research experience. 
Soon after settling in La Canoa I started doubting the usefulness of traditional models of 
brokerage and caciques. Although some ejidatarios deployed this discourse of cacicazgo and 
liked to talk in terms of exploitation by local bosses, I could not discern any influential boss 
or broker in the village. Certainly, there were influential people in the region and there had 
even been a very famous regional cacique who became the Minister of Defence, General 
Marcelino García Barragán. But the General, as well as the lesser caciques in the region, had 
had no all-embracing control of local affairs or ejido politics. They did not even aspire to 
gaining such a control. They were more interested in the central political and economic 
resources in the region, such as municipal politics, sugarcane production, or the irrigation 
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system. In fact, most organizing activities in the villages and the ejidos took place beyond 
the influence of these men. Hence, local organizing practices and the relation of the 
ejidatarios to the state cannot be conclusively explained by a vertical intermediation model 
with the cacique occupying a nodal point within the system. On the basis of the research, I 
arrived at the conclusion that patron-client relations have been exaggerated as a central 
organizing principle in rural areas. Although personal relations and the exchange of favors 
are central in socio-political life, we should not automatically assume that these are 
expressions of vertical patron-client relations. 
Authors who concentrate on Mexican politics have recognized the limitations of an 
analysis based on caciquismo as there exist many different types of caciques and their basis 
of control and their style of intermediation has changed through time. Lomnitz, for example, 
argues that "the phenomenon of 'caciquismo' is so diverse-in terms of the kinds of power 
relations involved, in terms of the economic and ethnic characteristics of caciques, in terms 
of their position in society - that the utility of the term itself can be doubted" (Lomnitz 1992: 
296, see also Tapia 1992). Gledhill (1994) offers an analysis of the phenomenon of 
caciquismo in terms of complex sets of changing socio-political alignments which structure 
the relations between people and the state. Following Gilsenan (1977), Gledhill argues that 
we should explain what particular kinds of social agents fill the gap between local and higher 
levels and how they do so (Gledhill 1994: 125). Yet, as we will see in this study, it is also 
necessary to ask ourselves the question why in certain situations the gap cannot be filled. 
What was striking during the research in La Canoa was precisely the lack of effective 
intermediaries. In the land conflict between the ejido La Canoa and several private 
landowners, in particular, the ejidatarios had great difficulty finding reliable brokers and 
found themselves in the position of desperately seeking "the right connection". Yet, although 
they invested much energy in this case, they never found the intermediaries who could 
effectively operate on their behalf. I argue that we perhaps need a conception of the state 
which centers on this idea of the gap between people and the state that can be filled. This 
entails developing a perspective that takes into account how people's representations of state 
power is shaped by this continual search for intermediaries. 
In sum, although I realize that the state apparatus has considerable influence on local 
organizing practices, I refuse to be pulled into the dominant and, in my view, mystifying 
debates on state-peasant relations in Mexico. In my view, this belief in the "mighty actor" 
called the state, has prevented social scientists from studying the complexities of socio-
political life. In Abrams' words, "we have come to take the state for granted as an object 
of political practice and political analysis while remaining quite spectacularly unclear as to 
what the state is" (Abrams 1988: 59). The central limitation of these approaches for my work 
is that by assuming beforehand the existence of certain classes, political figures and socio-
political mechanisms, they impede the in-depth study of organizing practices which may show 
a different dynamic. Furthermore, these theories obviously do not offer tools for the analysis 
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of situations and processes which show divergent dynamics. Authors who in the past wrote 
within a strong neo-marxist framework have also started to look for new forms of analysis. 
Esteva, a former neo-marxist who wrote about the peasantry, for example, argues that 
conventional wisdom in the social sciences about peasant problems and the categories used 
in these studies "inevitably reduced the peasant world to a mechanical structure, and, in the 
process, lost the keys to understand that world" (Esteva 1987: 131). 
Coming to Grips with "the State" 
Experiences During Fieldwork 
Although I tried to keep my distance from dominant debates on state-peasant relations, at a 
later stage I concluded that what I saw as an "obsession" with the state in Mexico certainly 
has its reasons and therefore needs to be taken seriously. It is related to the feelings of awe 
and powerlessness of a great part of the population (including academics) towards a 
bureaucratic machine characterized by opaque politics. Hence, following Abrams, I argue 
that "we should abandon the state as a material object of study whether concrete or abstract 
while continuing to take the idea of the state extremely seriously" (Abrams 1988: 75). 
My experiences during the research made me realize that more than the state's actual 
presence (in whatever form) the "idea of the state" was extremely important. While living 
with the ejidatarios for a long time and following them in their struggles with the MAR and 
in their fight against private landowners who had invaded parts of their land, many things 
struck me. First of all, there were many aspects of the ejidatarios actions which I perceived 
as contradictory. Although a certain degree of "contradiction" and "inconsistency" was an 
important element in my views on social life and organizing, it assumed quite dramatic forms 
in the field. For example, while ejidatarios could one day theorize about how land conflicts 
in Mexico were always resolved by elites to their own advantage through political networks, 
the next day they could spend an enormous amount of energy and money to set into motion 
the legd-administrative process carried out by the bureaucracy. But why did they spend all 
this energy on a bureaucratic process when they themselves said that these matters were 
decided by political influence? I was also amazed to see that in their legal-administrative 
struggle to recover the land that had been invaded by private landholders, over and over 
again the ejidatarios paid large amounts of money to intermediaries who in the end always 
vanished. If one day they had been deceived by one intermediary, the next day they would 
start working with another one who offered his services. I was also amazed by the fantastic 
stories that were told to them by officials and intermediaries and which they seemed to 
accept. Was this perhaps a form of false consciousness? Definitely not, for when I talked 
these things over with them, they appeared to be well aware of the situation. They knew that 
it was highly improbable that land would be taken from mighty private landholders, they 
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realized that they were paying money to an intermediary who would probably disappear, and 
they were well aware of the fact that the fantastic promises made by officials probably were 
lies. However, although they realized that they were being deceived, they still went on 
working with the same bureaucracy. This phenomenon caused me terrible confusion during 
the research. At the same time I realized that it was precisely this phenomenon that was 
essential for understanding the nature of the relationships between the ejidatarios and the 
Mexican state. 
This peculiar relation of the ejidatarios to the state bureaucracy is linked to forms of 
theorizing by the ejidatarios about power and politics in society. Failure or conspiracy 
theories thrived as many things did go wrong in their relation with bureaucracies. These 
theories provide explanatory schemes for their lack of success with officials and for the fact 
that their plans always seem to be sabotaged. In particular, in serious conflicts, which occur 
in an atmosphere of insecurity and opacity, one would hear the most fantastic conspiracy 
theories. This constant theorizing and reflecting is used to rationalize and explain their own 
actions or those of other people. Through these experiences I realized that this phenomenon 
of theorizing about power and politics in society had also to be taken into account as an 
important part of state-peasant relations and that it was central to the organizing practices in 
the ejido. This would take the study "of the state beyond the apparatus of government to 
show how the magic and power of the state are formed in everyday discursive practice" 
(Tsing 1993: 25). It must be added that this theorizing and construction of conspiracies is not 
typical of the Mexican peasantry, but can be found in all social circles and especially within 
the bureaucracy itself. 
An Alternative Approach to the State 
I will shortly explain my main theoretical notions on the state. The state remains a difficult 
concept to work with in anthropology. As Smith puts it "while communities and domestic 
groups lie at the heart of anthropological investigation, for unions and the state, one is 
inclined to turn elsewhere" (Smith 1996: 4). It will be obvious that I argue against a view 
of the Mexican state as an almighty apparatus with almost absolute top-down control through 
corporatism and intermediary structures. I do not adhere to the notion of the state as a 
coherent and homogenous entity with deliberate projects and strategies to exploit and deceive 
certain groups of the population. Instead, I think that we should conceive of the state as a 
collection of decentered practices without a central agency, or core project. I prefer to use 
decentered notions of the state in the tradition of Foucault. Ferguson, following Foucault, 
argues that "the state" "is not the name of an actor, it is the name of a way of tying 
together, multiplying, and coordinating power relations, a kind of knotting or congealing of 
power" (Ferguson 1990: 273). Rubin, in the same line of thought, applies Foucauldian 
notions of power to the Mexican case and argues that "what appears to be ongoing and 
unchanging domination ... is the overall result not of an all-controlling center of particular 
10 Chapter 1 
structures of political bargaining and rule but of numerous changing forms and locations of 
domination and resistance" (Rubin 1996: 88). This is a notion of the state that is, in my 
view, extremely useful. Yet, this decentered idea of the state needs to be combined with 
ideas about the cultural dimensions of power and domination (see Dirks, Eley and Ortner 
1994). Fortunately, more works have recently appeared which stress the necessity "to 
decenter the regime and place culture and everyday experience squarely within discussions 
of power" (Rubin 1996: 90, see also Aitken 1997, Gledhill 1994, 1995, Lomnitz 1992, and 
Joseph and Nugent 1994, Pantsers 1997). We should not then view the state as a set of 
institutions and procedures whose political significance is obvious without reference to 
cultural categories but, instead, study the magical and meaningful aspects of concrete political 
practices (Tsing 1993: 72-73). For that reason I introduce three notions, which deal with 
these aspects and which are central to this work, namely the idea of the state, the culture of 
the state and the hope-generating bureaucratic machine. 
Following Abrams, the belief in the existence of a strong, coherent state system is what 
I call the idea of the state. According to Abrams, the state-idea is "an ideological artefact 
attributing unity, morality and independence to the disunited, amoral and dependent workings 
of the practice of government" (Abrams 1988: 81). This belief in the state "conceals the 
workings of relations of rule and forms of discipline in day to day life" (Alonso 1994: 381). 
However, such an "idea of the state" is not peculiar to the peasantry. In a similar way, the 
wide-spread belief among certain groups of academics that there is a center of state control 
in which power is concentrated is illustrative of how this "idea of the state" is reproduced. 
Both are misrepresentations which lead to forms of State fetishism (Taussig 1992). Hence, 
contrary to traditional approaches to intermediation, I argue that brokers do not necessarily 
have a role in effectively connecting communities or peasants to the state, or in effectively 
"filling the gap", but play a role in the imagination of state power. By searching for the 
"right intermediary" and by presenting themselves as the "right connection", ejidatarios as 
well as brokers are implicated in the construction of this "idea of the strong state". 
With the culture of the state I refer to the practices of representation and interpretation 
which characterize the relation between people and the state bureaucracy and through which 
the idea of the state is constructed. It is present in the "reading" and interpretation of 
speeches, official acts, programs, and documents by the ejidatarios. It is manifested in the 
lost map which becomes a fetish in a land conflict and in official stamps and documents 
which acquire symbolic meanings beyond their administrative functions. The culture of the 
state is expressed in the numerous letters written every day to the Mexican President. An 
important aspect of the culture of the state is the atmosphere of opacity, distrust and 
conspiracy which always surrounds conflicts, negotiations and dealings with the bureaucracy, 
especially in conflictive cases. The practices of "impression management" (Morgan 1986: 
177) in which officials and brokers exaggerate their importance in order to convince the 
ejidatarios that they have the necessary "access" and connections to make the bureaucracy 
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work are also elements of the culture of the state. In sum, the culture of the state is the 
construction of the idea of the Mexican state through techniques of mapping, fetishization, 
interpretation and speculation or, in other words, it is "the cultural inscription of the idea of 
the state" (Alonso 1994: 381). 
It must be stressed that my notion of "the culture of the state" differs strongly from the 
way in which "political culture" is used by political scientists (Almond and Verba 1980, 
Camp 1986, 1993, Cornelius and Craig 1988, 1991). In the studies of political scientists the 
notion of political culture refers to the cultural elements which are characteristic of a certain 
political system. The analysis of a political culture is related to political processes such as 
elections, faith in the government, and the legitimation of the state. In contrast, recent works 
on political culture focus less on the legitimacy of the political system and distance 
themselves from a one-sided focus on political culture as a study of attitudes. Instead they 
focus more on political practices (see the volume edited by Pantsers 1997). Although this 
latter approach is more interesting, my focus is a different one. My central interest is not the 
legitimacy of a political system, nor the working of a political system. In my use of the 
culture of the state, I am concerned with the role of symbolism in the everyday interactions 
between ejidatarios and state bureaucracies. 
The bureaucratic hope-generating machine is similar to what Abrams calls the state-
system, "a palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure centered in government and 
more or less extensive, unified and dominant in any given society" (Abrams 1988: 82). 
Because of the specific characteristics of the Mexican bureaucracy I decided to call it the 
hope-generating machine. Ferguson (1990) talks about the "anti-politics machine" referring 
to the depoliticizing effects of "development" institutions in Lesotho. Yet, as we will see, 
in Mexico one of the most remarkable aspects of the bureaucracy, rather than its tendency 
to depoliticize the relationship between people and the bureaucracy, is its hope-generating 
capacity. In part, this generation of hope is related to a presidential system in which a new 
president takes office every six years, heavily criticizes former programs and introduces new 
projects often together with new institutions (see chapter nine). But this hope-generating 
characteristic of the bureaucracy is also based on the fact that the bureaucracy offers endless 
openings, and that officials are always willing to initiate procedures. The bureaucracy never 
says no and creates great expectations. On the other hand, many promises are never fulfilled. 
Organizing Practices 
How to Approach the Organizing Process 
Considering my research interest, in finding out how certain organizing practices had 
developed around the use and transfer of land plots and administration in the ejido, in the 
first instance I was interested in organizing as a verb, as a process. We saw that the 
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academic debates on the ejido and the peasantry in Mexico do not offer an analytical 
approach for dealing with the complexity of these organizing practices in the ejido. Although 
there has always been considerable discussion and interest in peasant forms of organization, 
there is a striking lack of empirical understanding of how villagers and smallholders organize 
their lives, their problems, and their relations with government institutions. 
We would expect that approaches focusing on the relation between organization and 
development are better able to analyze local organizing arrangements. There is, for example, 
a strong empowerment perspective which attributes a central role to local or peasant forms 
of organization in development (Esman and Uphoff 1984, Uphoff 1986, Harris 1988, 
Bebbington et al. 1993, Berkes 1995). However, in this perspective the discussion focuses 
on the possible role of different types of organization in development and not on analyzing 
existing forms of organizing. 1 argue that this lack of analytical understanding of existing 
forms of organizing is, in large part, due to the persistence of notions of formal bureaucratic 
rationality which hold bureaucratic organization to be one of the underlying principles of the 
success of "western modernization" (see Clegg 1990 for a critical discussion of Weberian 
models of organization). This view precludes further inquiry into forms of organizing which 
do not fit with these ideal-typical models but which are central to the lives of peasant 
smallholders. 
Mainstream theories in the sociology of organization offer us some ideas for the analysis 
of organizing practices, but their limitation is that they focus on the management of people 
and social processes. Although many organization theories stress the fluid boundaries of 
organizations and the importance of informal networks for organizational dynamics, their 
focus remains the entity of the organization and how to improve its efficiency. In a recent 
work Burrell, a well-known author on organization theories, recognizes that conventional 
organization theory has neglected and suppressed whole categories of human beings such as 
women and the peasantry (Burrell 1997: 12). Burrell asks himself if it might be that "in the 
absence of any disciplinary concentration upon this numerically massive group [the peasants] 
we miss 'a history of the hidden'; a history of those who live like troglodytes below our eye 
level?" (ibid.: 14). He also argues that by ignoring the role of all kinds of emotions in the 
organizing process many organization theories are artificial. "There is little mention of sex, 
yet organizations are redolent with it; little mention of violence, yet organizations are 
stinking with it; little mention of pain, yet organizations rely upon it; little mention of the 
will to power, yet organizations would not exist without it" (ibid.: 52). Yet, it is a pity that 
Burrell himself does not offer any conceptual ideas for the study of these "invisible people" 
and emotions in the organizing process. 
Post-structuralist organization theories offer interesting insights. In these works attention 
is paid to the ideas that guide people's organizing behavior and "the conceptual means by 
which social actors come to an understanding of their own interests and the strategies they 
pursue to realize the former" (Reed 1992: 114). The forms of discourse available to and used 
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by social actors in assessing their organizational situation and deciding on their courses of 
action are a central object of study in this approach (see Law 1994a and 1994b for an 
example of this perspective). However, post-structural organization theories also have 
limitations. It seems that in their adherence to multiplicity and fluidity they have relinquished 
the study of power relations within determinate socio-political force fields. Why ejidatarios 
choose to organize in different ways can only be explained by inquiring into their experiences 
with various types of authorities in the past. The discursive practices through which social 
actors decide upon certain courses of action, the social conditions in which they are 
formulated and implemented, and the outcomes that they produce are embedded within fields 
of power. 
The best starting-point for the development of an analytical framework for organizing 
practices is the much quoted article by Wolf Facing power; old insights, new questions in 
which he makes a connection between organizing and power. In this article he stresses that 
"it is a pity that anthropology seems to have relinquished the study of organization" (Wolf 
1990: 590-1). He argues that we should get away from viewing organization as a product or 
outcome, and move to an understanding of organization as a process. Wolf suggests that we 
could make a start by following "Conrad Arensberg's advice (1972:10-11) to look at the 
'flow of action', to ask what is going on, why it is going on, who engages in it, with whom, 
when, and how often" (Wolf 1990: 591). Yet, he adds that when we study "the flow of 
action" we should also ask the questions: "for what and for whom is all this going on, and -
indeed - against whom?" (ibid, emphasis added). These questions require a conceptual 
approach capable of analyzing "the forces and effects of the structural power that drives 
organizing processes" (ibid.). Wolf makes the point that most anthropological studies that 
deal with issues of power and politics neglect the question of organization. This point is also 
made by Long (1984, 1988, 1990) who stresses the importance of understanding organizing 
as a process shaped by the interactions between different social actors. At the same time, 
Long points out the importance of combining an actor-oriented perspective with historical-
structural approaches "since many of the choices perceived and strategies pursued by 
individuals or groups will have been shaped by processes outside the immediate arenas of 
interaction" (Long 1990: 17). 
In addition to approaching organization as a process I argue that we should not define 
organizing in terms of collective action, but rather in terms of different action patterns (see 
also Verschoor 1997). People often follow fragmented organizing strategies, without 
collective projects ever becoming crystallized. They work with one set of actors and then 
another, develop strategies and change them in the course of action. Another important point 
is that collective action has the notion of common goals and well-defined objectives. 
However, in many cases common goals do not exist and the objectives develop in the course 
of the organizing process. People may be constantly reflecting, theorizing, and debating 
about the proper course of action. As we will see in the subsequent chapters, good reasons 
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may exist for people not to work in collectivities with a more or less established structure. 
Good reasons may exist to work in changing constellations of people and develop new 
strategies and projects. However, although these fragmented forms of action are much harder 
to grasp and difficult to put in place, they form an important part of the organizing process. 
Hence, when I talk about organizing practices, I refer to the manifold forms of organizing, 
whether they be individual or more collective. Yet, my ultimate interest lies not in the 
isolated organizing actions, strategies, and performances in themselves, but in understanding 
their logics in specific socio-political contexts. I ask myself, for example, why ejidatarios 
when dealing with determined problems operate in changing constellations of people instead 
of in stable enduring groups. 
But I am also interested in organizing practices in another way. Besides the action 
patterns and strategies which we can distinguish when individual people or groups try to 
achieve certain things, there is another way in which organizing practices are analyzed in the 
present study. I try to distinguish forms of structuring or patterning in organizing practices. 
In other words, I study the organizing "processes that arise from particular combinations of 
ideas, material circumstances, and interactional potentials and have patterning as their 
consequences" (Barth 1993: 4). For example, in chapter five I show that in the many 
"illegal" or "informal" arrangements with respect to ejido plots we can distinguish certain 
regularities. We find a certain pattern in the way in which the sale of ejido plots is settled 
and that in these arrangement other ejidatarios, officials of the MAR , the ejido commissioner 
and the ejido assembly play specific roles. In chapter six a different form of patterning of 
organizing practices is discussed. There I show, among other things, that the executive 
committee does never render accounts of their activities at public ejido meetings, but that 
there exist other effective mechanisms by which the ejidatarios exert control over the 
members of the committee. In my view, this patterning of organizing practices in unexpected 
and often "invisible" ways always occurs around the management of resources, and in 
relation to institutional settings. For that reason, I stressed that organizing practices can also 
be distinguished in the apparently "disordered", the "corrupt", the "chaotic", the 
"unexpected". 
For this second focus in which attention is paid to the structuring or patterning which can 
be distinguished in organizing practices, Bourdieu's work (1977, 1984, 1991, 1992) is 
interesting since he develops a practice oriented approach with attention to creative human 
agency. In his Outline of a theory of practice Bourdieu (1977) argues that a great part of our 
actions are routine and that practical knowledge organizes a great part of our daily actions. 
This practical knowledge "functions like a self-regulating device programmed to redefine 
courses of action in accordance with information received on the reception of information 
transmitted and on the effects produced by that information" (Bourdieu 1977: 11). Habitus 
is for Bourdieu the taken-for-granted part of culture. Although Bourdieu leaves room in his 
analytical framework for improvisation and flexibility, he is above all interested in the 
regularities of structure and processes of domination and in his work he concentrates on the 
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political culture of the dominant classes. 
Although his stress on regularities and practices is interesting for my study, there are 
several limitations in Bourdieu's notion of habitus. The most important limitation is his 
tendency to conceive of human agents as socialized in unconscious ways. Criticizing 
Bourdieu's approach Gledhill points out that "it is surely of some importance that there is 
communication within social groups about the extended experiences of 'being-in-the-world'. 
Human beings are not, in fact, windowless nomads, even if the habitus does play a crucial 
role in structuring the meanings social collectivities ascribe to changing experience" (Gledhill 
1994: 138). I concur with this critique which immediately indicates the limitation of 
Bourdieu's theoretical framework for the study of "small politics" and the creativity in 
"everyday organizing practices". For these themes we need an approach which leaves room 
for mdeterminateness, fragmentation, and the complexity of human consciousness. As will 
be explained next, in my approach to organizing practices, continuous critical reflections by 
human agents, their theorizing on politics and power in society, and their story-telling are 
central elements. Organizing practices, how structured they may be, are the subject of 
constant critical reflection. 
Reflective Talk and Discourse 
In my approach, social theorizing, reflexive talk and story-telling by social actors are a 
central part of the organizing process. Therefore, I would add to Wolfs point about the 
importance of following the "flow of action", the necessity of following the "flow of ideas". 
In post-structuralist organization theories it is argued that the creation and re-creation of 
stories are a way of ordering the world around us and are central to the organizing process 
(Reed 1992: 114, Law 1994a: 52). The continuous dialogues and discussions I had with 
people on their courses of action, decisions or events were not meant to provide material for 
a sort of decision-making model. Instead, these reflections were used to show "how people's 
consciousness engages with the world precisely within the incomplete processes of everyday 
social practices" (Smith 1996: 7). This is a point that Rosaldo also elaborates forcefully when 
arguing that "not only men and women of affairs but also ordinary people tell themselves 
stories about who they are, what they care about, and how they hope to realize their 
aspirations" (Rosaldo 1989: 129-130). Rosaldo furthermore argues that such stories 
significantly shape human conduct and therefore cannot be ignored by social analysis (ibid.: 
130). The study of consciousness is central to any analysis of human actions "because people 
always act (however imperfectly) relative to their desires, plans, whims, strategies, moods, 
goals, fantasies, intentions, impulses, purposes, visions, or gut feelings" (ibid.: 103). The 
fact that people everywhere are in a critical, reflective dialogue with the world in which they 
live, with themselves and with the researcher is also very well shown in the works of Pigg 
(1992, 1996, 1997). 
An important implication of this perspective is that one should not be "afraid" of 
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inconsistencies and contradictions in the stories and versions people present. On the contrary, 
"shifting, multistranded conversations in which there never is full agreement" may show 
important areas of contestation and struggle (see Tsing 1993: 8). Tsing argues that we should 
situate local commentaries within wider spheres of negotiation of meaning and power while 
at the same time recognize the local stakes and specificities {ibid.: 9). Hence, story-telling, 
reflective talk, and imagination are essential for the analysis of the force fields in which 
organizing occurs. 
As I have emphasized the importantce of reflective talk and dialogue, it is necessary to 
be more precise about my position towards the concept of discourse. It is obvious that people 
tend to express themselves through discourses which are socially and historically constructed. 
In the case of the ejido, for example, people tend to use a "revolutionary discourse" in order 
to explain the ejido system. However, we will see that the "discourse of corruption" and the 
"discourse of accountability" are also pervasive. Some people use discourse in the broad 
meaning of "a cluster of ideas and images which provide ways of talking about a particular 
topic, social activity or institutional site in society" (see Hall 1997: 6). Many authors, 
however, follow Foucault by not defining discourse in terms of language but as forms of 
knowledge produced in the context of power relations and institutional practices (see Foucault 
1980, 1991). Foucault argued that through discursive practices and institutional rituals human 
subjectivities are created. In his view discourses in different organizational settings play an 
important role in processes of discipline and control (see also the section on 
governmentality). Many authors have followed Foucault's ideas and have studied the role 
of discourse in politics and bureaucratic practices and have shown how particular discourses 
play a role in the construction and legitimizing of particular sets of rules, roles and policies 
(Apthorpe 1986, Ferguson 1990). 
Although these are valuable insights, I distance myself from approaches that place too 
much stress on the power of dominant discourses. It is obvious that languages are never 
innocent nor ahistorical and influence the formation of identities. However, in my opinion, 
we should not consider subjects to be "captured" within discursive formations. Discourses 
do not necessarily shape human minds and cognitive processes in a fixed way (see Said 1978, 
Young 1995, Bhabha 1991 and Spivak 1987 for an interesting discussion on the effects of 
colonialism on the subjectivity of colonial subjects). For example, Bhaba has illustrated well 
the hybridization of authority and decentering of discourses from their position of power and 
authority (Bakhtin 1981) in the case of European colonial discourse. Hence, we may find that 
powerful and influential discourses exist in relation to organizing processes. Yet, we should 
not assume that the use of these discourses means that people's consciousness is 
automatically shaped by them. Instead, we should study the way in which these discourses 
may be used and challenged by situated social actors. 
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Force Fields as Fields of Power 
As I have explained above, in my view, we should not assume beforehand the existence of 
certain power relations and forces in society that can automatically explain the organizing 
process. Instead of assuming that certain powerful positions determine the characteristics of 
the organizing process, it may sometimes be more fruitful to study how "patterning generates 
institutional and organizational effects, including hierarchy and power" (Law 1992: 380). 
Yet, the difficult point remains as to how to relate organizing practices with power relations. 
As Sabean points out, "words such as 'power' are too amorphous to be of much analytical 
value" (Sabean 1984: 24). For that reason, I introduce the notion of the force field as a field 
of power. 
In anthropology the concept of the social field has a long history. The concept was 
especially developed by the Manchester school in anthropology (Turner 1974, Kapferer 1972, 
Long 1968: 8-10, Mitchell 1969). Turner, for example, defines the political field as "the 
totality of relationships between actors oriented to the same prizes or values" (1974: 127). 
The process-oriented field approach of the Manchester school broke away from functionalist 
approaches in which social behavior is viewed as governed by fixed norms or rules. Instead, 
these authors concentrated on the dynamics of social action and interpretation in which norms 
are subject to manipulation and negotiation. Yet, in my opinion, there are problems with the 
assumption that a social field can be characterized in terms of norms and values which -
though subject to negotiation - are shared by the various actors. Long's approach is more 
interesting as he defines the social field not in terms of norms but in terms of "an area of 
social life defined in relation to certain types of action" (Long 1968: 9). Hence, Long defines 
the social field more in terms of action and argues that the main point of the social field 
analysis is that "individuals and groups do not operate in clearly defined institutional 
frameworks but rather construct fields of action which often cross-cut formal organizational 
boundaries and normative systems" (Long 1989: 252). My use of the notion of force field 
resembles Long's notion in the sense that the force field is not based on normative values 
but on organizing practices. Yet, unlike Long's approach, I use a concept of field which 
emphasizes struggle and power differences between different sets of social actors. 
In legal anthropology the notion of field has also been widely used, especially after the 
publication of Moore's famous article on the semi-autonomous field (1973). This article 
offers interesting insights for the analysis of patterns which develop in organizing practices. 
Moore analyzes, among other things, how in the garment industry in New York, within a 
specific institutional setting (with designers, retailers, workshops with laborers, the union, 
etc.), strict government regulation, and official agreements with the union, a semi-
autonomous field develops with its own "extralegal givings" and "moral obligations" based 
on "a series of binding customary rules" (Moore 1973: 62-79). She also shows that although 
the official rules and labor laws are not followed in these arrangements, they do determine 
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the bargaining position of the key figures in the social field. Despite her original analysis, 
her notion of semi-autonomous field has several limitations for my work. First of all, 
although Moore takes the influence of the larger society into account, she treats the semi-
autonomous field as a clearly distinguishable entity with boundaries. She argues that the 
semi-autonomous field can "generate rules and customs and symbols internally" and "has the 
means to induce or coerce compliance" (ibid.: 56). However, in her own case studies it is 
very clear that the rules in the semi-autonomous field develop in direct relation to the official 
rules and thus are not simply "internally generated". Furthermore, in many situations we will 
find that fields are loosely structured and may not be identified so neatly as in Moore's 
examples. Another limitation is that she emphasizes the mutual agreements in the semi-
autonomous field and does not pay sufficient attention to conflicts and tensions within the 
field. Yet, the strong point in her analysis is that she identifies the most important actors and 
central resources which led to the development of a certain patterning in the organizing 
process and that she shows the role that official rules played in this development. 
The specific term force field, which I use in this work, has above all been employed in 
historical works and different authors give the concept different meanings (see Jay 1993 on 
the work of Benjamin and Adorno, Thompson 1978, Roseberry 1994). Roseberry, for 
example, uses the concept "field of force" to analyze "the complex and dynamic relations 
between the dominant and popular, or between state formation and everyday forms of action" 
(Roseberry 1994: 358). Although all definitions refer to processes of power and domination, 
the basis of these processes differ according to the author and not all are explicit about it. 
The notion of force field which I use in this work, most resembles Bourdieu's notion of 
a field (1992: 94-115). According to Bourdieu the field is the locus of relations of force and 
not only of meaning. The coherence that may be observed in a given state of the field is born 
of conflict and competition and not of some kind of immanent self-development of the 
structure. Every field has its own logic, rules and regularities which are not explicit and 
which make it resemble the playing of games. However, it always remains a field of 
struggles aimed at preserving or transforming the configuration of forces. These struggles 
and activities in the field always produce differences. Bourdieu argues that the active forces 
which produce the most relevant differences in a field define the specific capital (cultural, 
economic, social, etc.) of the field. In this way a field cannot exist without a certain capital 
and a capital does not exist or function except in relation to a field. In Bourdieu's field, 
agents and institutions constantly struggle, according to the regularities and the rules 
constitutive of this space to appropriate the specific products at stake in the game. Those who 
dominate in a given field are in a position to make it function to their advantage but they 
must always contend with the resistance, the claims, the contention, of the dominated. The 
coherence, ruling, and regularities that may be observed in a given state of the field, or even 
its apparent orientation toward a common function, emanate from conflict and competition, 
and not from some kind of immanent self-development of the structure. 
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Most of these ideas are very useful for the notion of force field I use. A difference between 
Bourdieu's approach and my use of the term is that he establishes a direct link between one 
form of capital and one type of field. Furthermore, he focuses on fields which develop 
around specific professional groups such as artists, medical doctors, intellectuals, and so on. 
In contrast, for the study of the ejido I do not define one type of capital around which a force 
field develops but instead try to distinguish the fields of force around certain resources or 
problems which influence the organizing process and can have a certain degree of patterning 
as its consequence. Furthermore - in the same way as Moore (1973) - Bourdieu talks about 
the autonomy of fields. He argues that some fields may be more autonomous than others in 
terms of being capable of imposing their own logic. For the same reasons as I set out in the 
discussion of Moore's semi-autonomous field, I argue against the idea of the autonomy of 
fields. However, in most other aspects I use elements of Bourdieu's field. 
I define a force field as a field of power and struggle between different social actors 
around certain resources or problems and around which certain forms of dominance, 
contention, and resistance may develop, as well as certain regularities and forms of ordering. 
The assumption is that all forms of organizing, even the most "private" or "illegal" ones, 
develop within wider fields of power. In this view, the patterning of organizing processes is 
not the result of a common understanding or normative agreement, but of the forces at play 
within the field. 
As we will see, in the patterning of organizing practices we can distinguish different 
social actors with specific roles, different access to resources and differing rights. For that 
reason organizing practices are closely related to forms of inclusion and exclusion of socio-
political categories. This also explains that organizing practices are related to the production 
of meaning, or in other words to the development of "structures of feeling" (Williams 1977: 
132). By studying the reflective talk and dialogue around different forms of organizing it is 
shown how these express forms of struggle, contention and resistance in relation to existing 
organizing practices and relations of power. The culture of the state is important in almost 
all forms of organizing but especially in force fields in which the government bureaucracy 
is strongly present. 
For the sake of clarity, I use the concept of force field as a contextual notion to explain 
the development of organizing practices, and possible regularities, and ordering. It is a 
working concept and should not be seen as a "reality" out there or an entity with boundaries. 
The ultimate aim of my study is not the definition and demarcation of force fields but the 
explanation of the development of organizing practices. As we will see, the law and official 
procedures often form an important element of the force fields around forms of organizing, 
but their role and influence differs greatly. In this book, for example, the organizing 
practices around both the management of village projects (chapters three and six) and the use 
and distribution of the commons (chapter six) are analyzed. We find that the resources at 
stake, the social categories that play central roles, and the role of the law and official 
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procedures are very different in the two cases. The government bureaucracy and the culture 
of the state play a much stronger role in the village projects than around the commons. So, 
we deal with multiple force fields with different dynamics. Organizing practices which are 
studied in the book are, among others, those around: inheritance and sale of ejido plots 
(chapter five); the renting out of ejido plots by migrants (chapter five); the adrrunistration of 
the ejido, and the continuous fight for a tract of land (chapters seven and eight). 
Some Notes on Hegemony 
Several people would suggest that in talking of the patterning of organizing practices and the 
production of meaning in force fields shaped through relations of power and dominance, I 
am actually talking about hegemony. In Gramsci's (1971) view hegemony is not synonymous 
with either culture or ideology, but hegemonic practices create cultural formations and 
ideologies which serve the interests of the leadership they represent. Different theoretical 
orientations have been developed around the concept and several people argue that hegemony 
can be an important notion once we rethink the concept and redefine it for different historical 
situations. More recent approaches have "taken a focus on the partiality, the eternally 
incomplete nature of hegemony, with its implication of the cultural as a contested, contingent 
political field, the battlefield in an ongoing 'war of position'" (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 
5 commenting on recent interpreters of Gramsci like Williams (1977) and Stuart Hall 
(1986)). Roseberry also proposes to "explore hegemony not as a finished and monolithic 
ideological formation but as a problematic, contested, political process of domination and 
struggle" (Roseberry 1994: 358). He proposes to use the concept to understand "the ways 
in which the words, images, and symbols, forms, organizations, institutions, and movements 
used by subordinate populations to talk about, understand, confront, accommodate themselves 
to, or resist their domination are shaped by the process of domination itself. What hegemony 
constructs, then, is not a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework 
for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination" 
{ibid.: 361). This seems an interesting approach to hegemony. But one of the central 
questions becomes: what then are the socio-spatial referents of hegemony? Are we talking 
about regional hegemonic discourses, national hegemonic discourses or hegemonic discourses 
within deterritorialized social fields? And how then do we distinguish between these fields? 
Is it possible for different fields of domination to overlap each other? In this book I set out 
to show that ejidatarios live in a world in which socio-spatial referents are increasingly 
deterritorialized, transnational and fragmented. How can we then distinguish the relevant 
field of domination in which hegemonic processes occur? Another limitation of this approach 
for my study is that it cannot account for the contradictions, conflicts, and conspiracy 
theories that develop in the relation of the ejidatarios to the Mexican state. In this sense I am 
not so much interested in distinguishing a "common material and meaningful framework" 
that people use in their dealings with domination, but in explaining the contradiction and 
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inconsistencies that make up the culture of the state. 
Lomnitz's work is interesting as he sets out to develop an analytical framework for 
analyzing cultures in regional spaces and their relation to national Mexican culture. He wants 
to analyze "the cultural heterogeneity that arises in spaces of hegemony" (Lomnitz 1992: 4). 
He defines regional culture as an internally differentiated cultural space with both a common 
regional cultural framework and distinct sets of understandings that are specific to the groups 
that compose the region. Lomnitz uses the term intimate culture "to represent the real, 
regionally differentiated manifestations of class culture. Intimate culture is the culture of a 
class in a specific kind of regional setting" {ibid.: 28). He claims that this way of dealing 
with culture will stop the endless literary publications on the Mexican character, or lo 
Mexicano as it will show how culture is actually produced in different spaces. The work is 
interesting for several reasons. First of all, Lomnitz pays attention to the enormous diversity 
in regional power structures and the cultural manifestations that go along with it. This is an 
important contribution to discussions on regional politics in Mexico and on the relation 
between power and culture. He shows well the diversity in the forms of articulation between 
different social groups, as well as the cultural heterogeneity that results from these relations. 
His concept of intimate culture is appealing as it does not define beforehand the dominant 
groups in a certain region. In that sense it is a flexible concept that can be used to study 
different situations. However, the work can be criticized for several reasons. 
One of the limitations of his approach, for my work, is the fact that he only focuses on 
the interaction between the state bureaucracy and regional elites. What about the daily 
dealings between thousands of government officials and thousands of peasants? How do we 
analyze the interactions between ejidatarios from the state of Jalisco and officials of Mexico 
City and what sorts of intimate cultures interact in these situations? When we study the 
interactions of ejidatarios with officials we certainly notice specific cultural practices, but 
should we call this the distinct intimate culture of the agrarian bureaucracy? It is here that 
I introduce the notion of the culture of the state. I differ here from Lomnitz who uses quite 
different concepts of the state and the culture of the state. According to Lomnitz the state 
represents national society and as such is a major player in the construction of the culture of 
social relations. In this line of minking the culture of the state is the "intimate culture" of 
the state apparatus. This differs from my approach. As I explained before I do not conceive 
of the state as an actor or entity with its own culture. In my analytical framework, the culture 
of the state is the way in which this "mighty actor" or "neutral arbiter" is imagined through 
administrative procedures, stamps, maps, theories about power, and the belief in the "right 
connection". This culture of the state manifests itself in the relation between ejidatarios and 
officials. 
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Some Notes on Govemmentality 
I want to discuss some approaches to the state which focus on governmental techniques and 
which offer interesting ideas but also have limitations for the study of organizing practices 
in the ejido. In their famous book The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural 
Revolution (1985) Corrigan and Sayer, analyze the process of state formation in England. In 
their analysis they argue against the notion of state hegemony and instead maintain that the 
power of the state rests in the creation of subjectivities and identities by the "routines" and 
"rituals" of state. These are to be found in the government agencies, in the official 
paperwork, use of official procedures, stamping, taxing, and so on. They draw upon the 
work of Foucault (1979) who argues that govemmentality is a complex aggregate of 
institutions and procedures through which power is exercised over people. Although Corrigan 
and Sayer's work has been much praised for their novel approach to processes of state 
formation, it has been criticized for a "tendency to overemphasize the symbolic dimension 
of state activity" and the "tendency to overemphasize the unity of the state, domination, and 
its consequences" (see Dean 1994: 151). 
Works on govemmentality conceive of culture as the constitution of subjectivities through 
discursive rituals and administrative practices. Thus Miller and Rose (1992) develop an 
approach to govemmentality by looking at specific governmental technologies, such as 
"techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of examination and 
assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys and presentational forms such as tables; 
the standardization of systems for training and the inculcation of habits; the inauguration of 
professional specialisms and vocabularies; building designs and architectural forms- the list 
is heterogeneous and in principle unlimited" (1992: 183). Although Miller and Rose certainly 
make an important contribution to the debate on governing techniques, one can question the 
usefulness of this approach in regimes of domination which are not so much based on control 
through governing bureaucracies and where practices of personalism, speculations, and the 
use of images and symbols seems to be pervasive. How does a theory focused on governing 
techniques deal, for example, with speculation, coercion, and the generation of hopes by a 
labyrinthine bureaucracy? 
Thomas (1994), who provides an interesting analysis of colonialism and culture, argues 
that Miller and Rose make a valuable contribution in their study of economic policy and 
accounting systems by drawing attention to the necessary role of language and the 
conceptualization of inscription. However, he adds that it is not apparent that the 
"governmentalization" of culture, is equally productive, because colonial discourse cannot 
be construed as a unitary or stable archive in the fashion of a set of official statistics or 
reports. Thomas makes an interesting point about the inconsistent use and lack of coherence 
in the application of governmental accounting systems in the colonial context, due among 
other things to the "corruption" of govemmentality in colonial contexts (Thomas 1994: 45-
46). But the same point can probably also be made in postcolonial contexts. Although 
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practices of "governmentalization" are certainly important everywhere in the world, we 
should not assume their effectivity beforehand. The point is that governmental techniques 
always encounter populations who have already been integrated within political systems in 
a variety of ways. State rituals and discourses are multi-interpretable and social actors "read" 
and use them according to the problems they are facing and experiences they have had in the 
past. In other words, state rituals and discourses recombine with representations of the state 
that are already in circulation (Pigg 1997: 281). So, they do not necessarily constitute an 
effective means for controlling and disciplining populations. As we will see, in the case of 
the ejido most regulations have not been applied and to a certain degree ejidatarios have 
managed to remain outside the control of the bureaucracy. In this sense, Thomas is right in 
pointing out the limitations of an approach focused on practices of governmentality. On the 
other hand, this does not mean that governmental techniques do not play an important role. 
On the contrary, governmental techniques play a central role in the relation between the 
ejidatarios and the bureaucracy. Maps, stamps, and documents are all extremely important, 
but it is not their official meaning that matters. In the relation between ejidatarios and the 
hope-generating bureaucratic machine, all these artefacts acquire different meanings and we 
find a "re-enchantment of governmental techniques". 
Methodological Considerations 
It would be impossible to present here all of the many methodological choices made during 
the research but I wish to pay special attention to a number of them. In the different 
chapters, other methodological choices are discussed. Here I address the more general 
principles underlying the research. The approach of organizing as a practice, that I adopted 
for the study of the ejido, has important consequences for the methodology of the research. 
One of the consequences is that, although the broad lines of the methodology are set out 
before the fieldwork period starts, an important part has to be developed during the research 
itself. For that reason, frequent periods of analysis are part of the research project. In these 
periods the research material is analyzed and the research scheme can be adapted and 
developed further. 
As I explained above, I had specific reasons for not studying the ejido from the 
perspective of official models and of instead working "from the ground". Other 
anthropologists have made similar points. Barth points out that "it is by attending 
systematically to people's own intentions and interpretations, accessible only if one adopts 
the perspective of their concerns and their knowledge of the constraints under which they act, 
that one can start unraveling the meanings they confer on events, and thereby the experience 
they are harvesting" (Barth 1993: 105). Long also stresses the importance of "identifying the 
problems and concepts as presented by particular social actors" (Long 1989: 247). Yet, this 
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working "from below" had the consequence that I arrived at an image of the ejido which was 
rather unusual. This became particularly clear during presentations of my research material 
in academic circles. While I presented the dynamic of ejido practices which I had found at 
the local level, the audience always referred to the official and established academic views 
of the ejido and wanted to divert the discussion towards the role of the CNC, the caciques 
or the nature of the political system, in what was, in fact, a search for a particular kind of 
theoretical closure. However, working "from below" more often than not, means postponing 
such closure, and often searching for other modes of interpretation and explanation which 
do not privilege key actors or structures such as the CNC, the cacique, capital, or the state. 
Choice of the Research Location 
Considering the detailed material I wanted to gather and the fact that agrarian issues in 
Mexico are a rather politicized theme, I decided to study only one ejido. As Silverman and 
Gulliver put it: "the intensive focus on the small scale allows a deep understanding of the 
phenomena being analyzed, and which constitute the true purpose of the study. This permits 
the inclusion of 'real people' along with an exploration of the interdependencies of socio-
political patterning, economic conditions, and cultural belief" (Silverman and Gulliver 1992: 
23). La Canoa is in no way a special ejido or village. I had lived in this ejido for a short 
period in 1987 when 1 participated in a research project on the relation between irrigation 
organization and peasant strategies.3 La Canoa is one of those many small places which do 
not call the attention of academics because of some special forms of local organization, well-
known revolutionary history, or agrarian problematics. However, the study of these 
"ordinary" places may give us important insights into local ejido organizing practices. As 
Scott argues: "One might ask; why are we here, in a village of no particular significance, 
examining the struggle of a handful of history's losers? ... The justification for such an 
enterprise must lie precisely in its banality - in the fact that these circumstances are the 
normal context in which class conflict has historically occurred" (Scott 1985: 27). I concur 
with Scott that the detailed study of one village or ejido gives insights into broader 
phenomena. 
It must be recognized that the scope of the study is not defined by saying that the 
research concerns one ejido. "The focus on a particular place allows anthropologists to 
expand in a wider area as they follow the relevant processes, networks, or constraints 
outward from the particular locality" (Silverman and Gulliver 1992: 23). For example, 
different offices of the MAR in Mexico City, Guadalajara and Autlan are involved in "local" 
transactions of ejido land. Furthermore, the dynamics in the village and ejido can only be 
understood by taking into account migration to the United States and the increasingly 
transnationalized lives of ejidatarios. In other words, the relations that affect the production 
of locality are fundamentally translocal and we should try to find the means to study the 
production of locality in a world that has become deterritorialized, diasporic, and 
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transnational (see Appadurai 1997: 188). So, the research also included fieldwork at different 
government offices in different cities, the study of archives at different places, the study of 
governmental propaganda, fieldwork in the regional city of Autlan, and a visit to people from 
La Canoa in Los Angeles. 
Conflicts and Tensions 
From the start of the research I tried to find areas of contention, struggle, and conflicts in 
the ejido or the village. The critical importance of conflicts for anthropological studies was 
developed explicitly by authors of the Manchester school (Gluckmann 1955, 1965, Turner 
1969). Authors in legal anthropology have also made important contributions to the study of 
conflicts (Gulliver 1979, Nader 1969, Comaroff and Roberts 1981, Starr and Collier 1989). 
In contrast to several of these authors, however, I focus on conflicts not because I am 
interested in the constitution of normative orders, or the study of mechanisms of conflict 
resolution, but because in my view conflictive situations give insights into the central 
resources at stake, and the power struggles and practices which develop around them. The 
study of conflicts shows how social actors organize themselves, how groups are formed and 
split up, what is important for different categories of people, and how they talk about this. 
In this way it provides a point of entry for the study of organizing practices, ideological 
processes, and forms of ordering which develop in certain force fields. An additional reason 
to study conflictive situations was that they offered me the possibility of studying in more 
detail the role of agrarian procedures and "how individuals and groups in particular times and 
places have used legal resources to achieve their ends" (Starr and Collier 1989:2). In this 
way I could "analyze the relationship of the law to wider systems of social relations" (ibid.). 
The fact that conflicts were an important part of the research does not mean that I only 
studied the visible, the crucial, and most dramatic events. In reality, most of the organizing 
around serious land conflicts was "invisible", in the sense that it was done in small groups 
outside formal arenas, and at places and moments that most people were not aware of. 
Furthermore, I did not only focus on conflictive situations (see Holleman 1973 for a 
discussion of how a unilateral focus on disputes may be a misleading guide for the study of 
forms of ordering) and also studied the development of "non-conflictive" organizing 
practices. 
Studying Public Events and the Social Interface 
Another focus of the research were public events. I realized that important questions and 
conflicts were hardly ever spoken about or settled at the official meetings and that most 
issues were resolved in private settings. However, although official meetings may have little 
to do with their formal function, they may be illuminating in other respects. First of all, 
formal meetings may give important clues about what is happening "behind the scenes", from 
the ironic remarks, the conversations and discussions in the back of the room, and the 
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discussions afterwards. Furthermore, these public meetings show the ways in which matters 
are formalized. They may show how issues which have been resolved informally are formally 
presented, challenged, and negotiated. Public debates also give an indication of the most 
powerful political or administrative discourses (see Bloch 1975 and Parkin 1984 on political 
language). A central aim of mine was to study these official events in relation to other kinds 
of gatherings and encounters. I wanted to find out what the role of formal meetings and 
gatherings was in the organizing practices at the local level. Did people organize these formal 
events in order to attain certain ends? Did they use these meetings for other purposes? Or 
had these meetings perhaps attained certain unintended characteristics and roles through time? 
Were there different types of public meetings? 
The interactions between officials and ejidatarios formed a different object of study. Long 
(1989) develops the concept of the social interface for the study of the interactions between 
peasants and officials. He is especially interested in the relationship between policy, its 
implementation, and the final outcome. He argues that "development interface situations are 
the critical points at which not only is policy applied but at which it is 'transformed' through 
acquiring social meanings that were not set out in the original policy statements" (Long 1989: 
3). The study of direct interactions between bureaucrats and "clients" can be especially 
interesting in situations of new government programs and changing institutional contexts, 
such as the transformation of Mexico's agrarian law. These interfaces reveal, for example, 
the role of institutional discourses, the expectations and perceptions of officials and 
ejidatarios, and the different contexts and processes of negotiation. In these interfaces we can 
also study the role of professional jargon and if, for example, legal language indeed "renders 
powerless the ordinary language of the uninformed" (Parkin 1984: 360). 
Case Studies and Context 
Specific case studies (Mitchell 1983, Walton 1992) and situational analyses (van Velsen 
1964, Long 1968) were elaborated during the research. These detailed studies of conflicts, 
people and events are central for the research as only in this way can the complexity of 
different organizing processes be revealed. I agree with Scott when he says that "any 
carefully detailed empirical case is always far richer than the generalizations that can be 
extracted from it" (1994: ix). Among other things, detailed studies were made of one big and 
several smaller land conflicts in the ejido (chapters five, seven and eight); of the election of 
the executive committee of the ejido in 1991 (chapter six); of the extended family life of one 
household (chapter four), and of the implementation of a new government project for the 
ejido (chapter nine). Obviously, the cases should be chosen on the basis of their importance 
for the theme of the research. Walton elaborates on the use of case studies and argues that, 
"the seemingly innocent terms 'case" and 'case study' are really quite presumptuous" 
(Walton 1992: 121). He discusses the duality that lies beneath the use of the term "case". 
On the one hand, he argues, cases imply particularity as they are situationally grounded and 
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provide a specific limited view of social life. On the other hand, cases pretend to be 
something more. "When researchers speak of a 'case' rather than a circumstance, instance, 
or event, they invest the study of a particular social setting with some sense of generality. 
An 'instance' is just that and goes no further. A 'case' implies a family; it alleges that the 
particular is a case of something else" (ibid.: 121). This "pretension" we have with our 
"cases" makes it all the more important to present an elaborate study of the "context" from 
which the cases are taken. In reality, the interesting thing about case studies is that at the 
moment one selects the case studies one is (implicitly) making statements about the context. 
For example, we may present the extensive case study of one land conflict as an example of 
how these cases are "normally" dealt with. However, we may also present two contrasting 
case studies of land conflicts to show the different elements that may be decisive in the 
resolution of these conflicts. This makes it clear that the choice and presentation of case 
studies and situational analyses "require theoretical judgments about causality, necessary 
connections and abstraction. Consequently they are not a rationale for naive empiricism and 
make great demands of analytical rigor" (Rogers and Vertovec 1995: 10-11). 
Interviews, Dialogues and Active Participation 
Talking to people and getting information through interviews or informal conversations is one 
of the main sources of anthropological fieldwork. Yet, in this study talking with people has 
not only been used to acquire "information" but also to study story-telling, reflective talk, 
and the use of certain discourses. As Cohen points out, "we could begin by paying attention 
to the ways in which people reflect on themselves, and then see in what ways these 
reflections are indicative of social and cultural context, or require such contextualisation to 
be intelligible to us" (Cohen 1994: 29). I looked for theories people construct about history, 
society, and the things that happened around them. I analyzed the way in which villagers and 
ejidatarios tended to express themselves about themselves, the ejido, their society, the history 
of their community, and other topics they came up with themselves. Attention was also paid 
to expressions which were frequently uttered, standard ways of talking about certain themes, 
and distinctions and categories people employed. I also tried to pursue the more difficult task 
of distinguishing differences in expressions people used in different settings, topics which 
were avoided, and parts of reality which were made invisible by their way of talking (see 
Silverman 1993, Alasuutari 1995). It is important to stress that the significance of certain 
ways of talking can only be determined in relation to other research material. For example, 
only in relation to the rest of the research material may one draw conclusions about, why 
ejidatarios always mention certain ejido rules and not others, why officials always start 
talking about corruption in the institutes they work for and at the same time stress the 
importance of formal procedures, and why officials and ejidatarios use completely different 
languages when they talk about the same land conflict. 
The manifold conversations I had with the same people over the course of several years 
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were the most important source for my research. With these people I entered into elaborate 
debates as I became a sort of discussant for them, "someone who was not party in the petty 
and hard struggles ... but who was, nevertheless, to some extent part of the picture" (de 
Vries 1992: 70). Especially towards the end of the fieldwork period, these interviews took 
on more and more the character of critical dialogues. I challenged people on certain ideas 
they held and deliberately confronted them with what I saw as contradictions in their 
statements and actions. I myself had also developed certain ideas about the ejido and the 
difficult relation of the ejidatarios with the state bureaucracies and I discussed these ideas 
with the ejidatarios. It was interesting to see how they reacted to my theories and doubts, but 
they themselves also started asking me questions about my personal views on the matter. This 
resulted in interesting research material that helped me to develop further my ideas about the 
most striking phenomena I found during my fieldwork. With officials I discussed my ideas 
about the workings of the Mexican bureaucracy. While with some people this resulted in 
interesting discussions with others this kind of dialogue was not possible at all. Some officials 
liked to be challenged on their views and they themselves liked to discuss what they saw as 
problems of the agrarian bureaucracy and the rural sector, but others held on strongly to their 
official role and formal discourse and gave standard bureaucratic answers. 
Towards the end of the fieldwork period, the research acquired some elements of action 
research as I myself became actively involved in ejido matters. This active participation had 
not so much been a decision on my part as a decision on the part of some ejidatarios who 
thought that I could be of use to them in their troublesome relation with the agrarian 
bureaucracy. In this way I became enrolled in their 50 year old fight to recover a piece of 
land that is in the hands of private landowners (see chapter seven and eight) and I became 
a member of the local committee that had to formulate internal ejido rules (see chapter nine). 
A Census and Genealogies of People and Plots 
During the research I worked on three data-bases: a census of the village, genealogies of 
families of the village and genealogies of land plots of the ejido. The decision to work on 
these three data-bases was taken during the research. For this part of the research I worked 
with two young people from the village: a girl whose father is landless and a boy whose 
father is ejidatario of La Canoa. The census was a relatively easy endeavor. On the other 
hand, the genealogies of land plots and the genealogies of families were an enormous 
investment of time. Yet, there were several reasons for making this investment. First of all, 
kinship relations seemed to be very important but at the same time extremely confusing to 
an outsider. Everybody seemed to be related to each other in different ways. I felt that 
genealogies could help me to disentangle these webs of kinship relations and to estimate the 
role that kinship relations played in social life and politics. Secondly, with respect to the 
ejido plots I wanted to find out more precisely what had happened with the land over the 
years. In the end, the more quantitative material which was the result of the genealogies of 
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land plots was crucial for the contextualization of some parts of the qualitative field material. 
An additional methodological advantage of working on genealogies is that it proved to be an 
excellent way to make people talk about things that happened in the past, and about people 
who had disappeared or were never mentioned but who appeared in the genealogy. During 
more than two years I worked on the genealogies of land plots and families. Although these 
genealogies were very labor intensive they gave invaluable insights about movement of 
people, kinship relations, and land histories. 
Conflicts During the Creation of the Text 
The process of writing in general and of anthropological writing in particular goes together 
with many doubts, frustrations, and decisions during the creation of the text. One of the most 
difficult decisions for me during the writing process was when to write in terms of 
generalizations and when to let in the richness and diversity of social life. When to talk in 
a summarizing way, presenting only my own analysis, and when to leave out my analysis and 
let the reader judge for herself from the material presented. When one decides to present 
more detailed ethnographic material the danger always exists that the reader loses sight of 
the theoretical or analytical points one wants to make. On the other hand, the ethnographic 
material presented should not be so thin as to become pure illustration either. I finally made 
the decision to present a lot of ethnographic material in the book in order to substantiate the 
points I want to make. Several of my own doubts, surprises, and theoretical struggles during 
the research are also included, since this gives insights into the creation of the ethnography. 
As Smith argues, we should try to "self consciously defamiliarize particular moments in the 
social world we are studying - a life history, a dispute, an element of panic, humor or 
despair - in order to bring into focus the work of interpretation, not just the actors' but also 
our own" (Smith 1996: 6). 
Organization of the Book 
The book deals with many different themes related to the ejido and with diverse forms of 
organizing. For this reason no single set of concepts is central to all chapters. For example, 
the concept of force field is most important in chapters five and six as I there discuss the 
strong forms of patterning which have developed in ejido organizing practices. The concepts 
of the culture of the state, the idea of the state and the hope-generating machine play more 
important roles in the close analysis of the relation between ejidatarios and the state 
bureaucracy, sometimes mediated by brokers (chapters seven, eight, and nine). The first 
three chapters (chapters two, three, and four) discuss themes which are central for 
understanding and contextualizing the lives of the ejidatarios. 
In chapter two the background of the Mexican land reform and the establishment of 
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ejidos in Mexico is discussed. This is followed by an account of the agrarian history of the 
region of Autlan and the village La Canoa. The fragmentation and diversity in local story-
telling about the past show the divisions between and within families in the village and 
indicate that the establishment of an ejido was not necessarily the result of a "collective 
project" of struggle for land. In this chapter the success of the cultural project of the 
Mexican post-revolutionary state to transform peasant popular consciousness is also a topic 
of debate. 
In chapter three the relation between the ejido and the village La Canoa is discussed. 
Here the tense relation between ejidatarios and landless villagers is analyzed and the way in 
which ejidatarios have been able to dominate village projects. The possession of an ejido plot 
is shown to be important not only for economic production but also, among other things, as 
the basis of peasant identity. These processes are analyzed in relation to the transnational 
networks in which many villagers and ejidatarios are today embedded. 
In chapter four a case study of one transnational ejido family is presented. In this way 
the interrelation between households in La Canoa and in the United States is analyzed and 
the way in which ejido land may be central to sustaining transnational support networks is 
demonstrated. Attention is paid to a neglected theme in the literature: the return of migrants 
to their "home village". The forms in which the income and political relations provided by 
the ejido may become crucial in sustaining unsuccessful migrants are analyzed. In this 
context the contested relations of authority between generations are discussed as well as 
changing gender relations in the transnational context. 
In chapter five an analysis is presented of the history of the arable ejido plots in La 
Canoa. On the basis of genealogies of families and genealogies of ejido plots an overview 
is given of the different types of transactions and the fragmentation of ejido plots since the 
1940s. The way in which a patterning of organizing practices around inheritance, renting out 
of land by migrated ejidatarios and the selling of ejido plots developed is analyzed. The force 
fields around these different practices are discussed, as well as the different roles played by 
officials, official procedures, and local power relations. 
Chapter six sets out to explain how a patterning of organizing practices developed around 
the administration of the ejido. It is shown that over the years the ejido commissioner has 
acquired considerable autonomy in his decisions but at the same time has little influence on 
what happens. This is related to several informal mechanisms of accountability. The way in 
which ejido meetings have developed into an arena of quarreling or of "playing the formal 
game" towards other institutions instead of for discussion and decision-making is explained. 
Attention is also paid to the reflections of the ejidatarios themselves on organizing processes 
in the ejido and their use of two contrasting discourses: the "accountability discourse of 
organization" and the "personal politics discourse of organization". 
Chapters seven and eight deal with the struggle for the "lost land". This concerns a 
conflict over land that officially belongs to the ejido but which since the forties has been in 
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the hands of several private landholders. Chapter seven describes how under the influence 
of the democratic, liberalization discourse of president Salinas (1988-1994) several ejidatarios 
of La Canoa thought that the time was ripe to recover this land. The actions of this group 
of ejidatarios and their relations with several intermediaries, among others a lawyer and a 
priest, are followed for several years. Their reflections about this problem are studied as well 
as the way in which they organize themselves in relation to it. 
Chapter eight concentrates on their experiences with several MAR engineers who arrived 
at the ejido to investigate the problem of the "lost land". Their many visits to offices of the 
MAR are analyzed and their desperate search for brokers. In these two chapters we see 
clearly the practices of representation and interpretation in the relation between ejidatarios 
and the bureaucracy, which I have called the culture of the state. We find the continuous 
theorizing of the people about power relations, and the role of conspiracy theories, dreams, 
and fantasies. 
Chapter nine follows with an analysis of the world of the officials. Attention is given to 
the ways in which the officials reflect on the politicized nature of their institution and the role 
of the discourse of corruption in the bureaucracy is discussed. In this chapter the introduction 
of the new agrarian law of 1992 is also presented as well as the introduction of a new 
institution, the Procuraduría Agraria. The implementation of the "project of the internal ejido 
rules" in La Canoa is followed, in which the relation between ejidatarios and officials of the 
different agrarian bureaucracies is analyzed. 
Chapter ten finally presents the main results of the research and their theoretical 
implications. I return to the initial discussion of organizing practices in wider force fields and 
some points will be further elaborated. I then discuss what the implications of this theoretical 
approach and the results of this research are for debates on "organization for development". 
Notes 
1. The Mexican agrarian law has been changed several times this century. However, the main characteristics 
of the ejido regime were not changed between 1917 and 1992. In order not to cause confusion I use the 
term agrarian law throughout the book and I refer to the Federal Agrarian Reform Law (FARL) of 1971 
if I want to comment on specific articles of the agrarian law. 
2. In order to avoid confusion I use the term Ministry of Agrarian Affairs (MAR) whenever I refer to the 
institution that took care of ejido land affairs. For the majority of ejidatarios the name of the institution was 
of little importance, nor the fact that it had become a ministry in 1974; it simply was the institution that 
interfered in ejido affairs. 
The authorities in the implementation of the land reform were: the President of the Republic, the Governors 
of States and the Military Heads. Furthermore the following agencies were especially created: the National 
Agrarian Commission, a Local Agrarian Commission in every state and Special Execution Committees. 
The main institution that took care of agrarian affairs and the procuration of agrarian justice has been 
renamed and reorganized several times since 1915. It was called successively, the National Agrarian 
Commission (Comisión Nacional Agraria), the Agrarian Department (Departamento Agrario), the 
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Department of Agrarian Affairs and Colonization (Departamento de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización) and 
finally in 1974 the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (Secretaría de la Reforma Agraria). In 1992 art. 27 of the 
Mexican Constitution was changed again and together with the new agrarian law a new bureaucracy was 
introduced alongside the MAR, the Office of the Attorney General for Agrarian Affairs (Procuraduría 
Agraria). A political debate started on the abolition of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. For the time being 
it continues to exist. 
3. This research project was entitled Contrasting patterns of irrigation organization, peasant strategies and 
planned intervention: comparative studies in western Mexico and was directed by Norman Long. Several 
Ph.D. theses and books were the result of this project: Brunt 1992, González 1994, Guzman 1995, Torres 
1994a, Villareal 1994, and van der Zaag 1992). 
CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY, STORY-TELLING, AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY 
Introduction: History, Master Narratives, and Story-Telling 
In this chapter I present a short history of the agrarian reform in Mexico in general and in 
the region of La Canoa in particular. This is followed by a discussion of life in the ejido La 
Canoa since its establishment in 1938. This information is important as a historical 
background for the discussions in the following chapters. However, in addition to providing 
the reader with "context" information, this journey into history also allows us to open the 
debate on the relation between the master narrative of the Revolution and agrarian reform 
in Mexico, on the one hand, and, individual story-telling on the other. In my view, individual 
stories about this period from the agrarian reform onwards call into question the much 
proclaimed success of the state hegemonic process of indoctrination of the Mexican 
peasantry. As Knight points out, that there was a state project of cultural transformation 
seems undoubtable, but the question remains how successful it has been (Knight 1994a: 60). 
In this chapter I also argue that the history of the ejido played a central role in the 
construction of a situated community. I do not conceive of community as a "homogenous 
group of people who collectively fought for the land and conquered the hacendados". As we 
will see, the success of the village La Canoa in establishing its own ejido is accompanied by 
conflicts, struggles, and new forms of dominance in a diversified village. This is well 
reflected in the diversity, fragmentation, and contradictions in local stories. Yet, the 
establishment of the ejido, as well as the conflicts around it, have strongly influenced 
relationships between people and in this way have contributed to "the production of what we 
might call local subjects, actors who properly belong to a situated community of kin, 
neighbors, friends, and enemies" (Appadurai 1997: 179). 1 
Within this context of a situated community of friends and enemies, and in relation to 
these new forms of dominance, the local "discourse of cacicazgo" is analyzed as well as the 
"idiom of kinship" which are widely used to explain local politics and loyalties and conflicts 
between families. 
About the Presumed Success of a National Cultural Project 
The initiation, after the revolution, of a populist cultural project in which the diffusion of a 
national ideology was linked to the formation of the post-revolutionary nation-state is 
frequently commented on in the literature. Alonso speaks in this respect of "a selective 
tradition of nationalism, which is key for the consolidation of the idea of the state" (Alonso 
1994: 389). The federal schooling system and the creation of the film industry in the 1930s 
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were important pillars of this project. "It was through film images, as Carlos Monsivais has 
pointed out, that the popular masses in Mexico saw themselves, their own faces and gestures, 
represented in the new public space of the nation, their previous sense of identity being 
confined to regional or local communality" (Rowe and Schelling 1991: 232). 
The master narrative of the agrarian reform, in which the Mexican peasantry is presented 
as bravely fighting against the hacendados and in this way opening the way for the 
establishment of the ejidos, was part of the institutionalization of the revolution. As Katz 
points out, "in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution of 1910-20 the revolutionary peasant 
became a subject not only of historical study, but also of literature, films, and paintings. 
With his sombrero, his machete, and his rifle he has marched or ridden through countless 
Hollywood or Mexican films, killing brutal overseers, hacienda owners, corrupt officials, and 
federal soldiers" (Katz 1988: 3). 
Many academics have pointed out that despite the fact that the Mexican peasant became 
a central figure in the official national history of the revolution, the ejidatarios and landless 
peasants were in fact brutally exploited by the state. The peasants never received all the land 
they were promised, the ejido sector received little support for agricultural production and 
the support that was given was monopolized by the elite which could establish better relations 
with the bureaucracy (Warman 1972, 1976, Bartra 1974, Esteva 1980, Paré 1984). As 
Warman put it, the peasants (campesinos) "have been declared the favorite sons of the nation 
and have been sacrificed in its name" (Se les han declarado hijos predilectos de la patria, 
y en su nombre han sido sacrificados) (Warman 1972: 13). These authors claimed that the 
national cultural project, in which the peasants played a heroic role and were said to have 
received the support of the state against the hacendados, was central in securing the loyalty 
of the Mexican peasantry to the state and the PRI even when they were actually betraying 
them. 
However, on the basis of my study of La Canoa I have doubts about the "success" of this 
national cultural project. Knight asks the following questions with respect to the state project 
of cultural transformation implemented by the revolutionaries: "Did they transform popular 
consciousness, legitimizing the revolutionary regime? ... Or was the revolutionary project 
a failure, a gimcrack facade behind which the common people, the peasants especially, 
grumbled and prayed to old gods, untouched by the new legitimation?" (Knight 1994a: 60). 
In my view, powerful symbols, narratives, and discourses never have an unquestioned 
authority and people will always "respond, reinterpret, and challenge even as they accept and 
are shaped by these forms of knowledge" (Tsing 1993: 8). Alonso also points out that the 
production of a selective tradition by the state system is part of a powerful hegemonic 
process which, however, "is always challenged by alternative and oppositional traditions that 
dispute dominant articulations of space, time, and substance" (Alonso 1994: 389). On the 
basis of the research in La Canoa I conclude that the impact of this project on people's 
consciousness has been less than is generally claimed. Instead of detenmning people's 
consciousness these national discourses may have played more instrumental roles. I also 
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argue that an analysis of local story-telling and reflective talk about events and processes in 
the past is essential to give further insights into these processes. In the next section I discuss 
the difference between master narratives and story-telling. 
Master Narratives and Story-Telling 
After many years in which "people treated the past as largely irrelevant to an understanding 
of how people came to do what they did" (Burke 1992: 12-13), since the 1980s there has 
been a return to historical perspectives in sociology and anthropology (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1992, Cooper et al. 1993, Silverman and Gulliver 1992, Dirks et al. 1994). There 
has also been "a growing recognition that a historical anthropology is not just a narrativized 
anthropology, not just a matter of giving the present some sort of ancestral pedigree" (Dirks, 
Eley and Ortner 1994: 6). There is a strong tendency to move "from the ideal of the Voice 
of History to that of heteroglossia, defined as 'varied and opposing voices'"(Burke 1991: 
6). 
In order to be sensitive to "varied and opposing voices" I make a distinction between 
master narratives and story-telling. The master narrative is told in the third person and 
pretends to tell a "true story". As Whyte (1987) argues, by its mere form as a sequence of 
events and processes with a well-defined beginning, middle, and end, the narrative gives a 
seemingly natural structure and order of meaning to the events presented. This gives the 
narrative a strong explanatory value and perhaps an authoritarian nature. These characteristics 
are especially clear with respect to the master narratives of the Mexican revolution and 
agrarian reform as presented in school books and films. The narrative does not tell personal 
life histories or at least only those that are considered crucial to the process. In contrast, 
story-telling is much more actor oriented. Stories can tell individual, personal histories in the 
first person. They are related to family and individual biographies. They are often anecdotal 
and not necessarily intend to make points. While the master narrative of the revolution and 
the agrarian reform are coherent, have beginnings and ends, winners and losers, the stories 
local people tell about these periods can take many different forms. As we will see master 
narratives and stories can play different roles in the lives of people. 
In this chapter I want to discuss certain aspects of historical story-telling and its relevance 
for socio-political analysis. In my view, story-telling about the past forms part of more 
general forms of "social theorizing". "Histories and stories are ordering resources for 
working on and making sense of the networks of the social" (Law 1994a: 71). Social actors 
normally have opinions and ideas about what happens in the world around them and always 
search for explanations for the things that happen to them. These reflections and stories do 
not necessarily take the form of a narrative with climaxes, dirning-points, and crises (Rosaldo 
1989: 141). In addition, stories about past events or periods are not fixed but may change 
according to new elements and new experiences. In other words, "the past" acquires meaning 
in the light of present-day problems. For that reason story-telling and representations of the 
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past may be related to political struggles and processes of identity formation in the present. 
In this way, we may discover that certain generally accepted historical images or expressions 
have different meanings for different people, or that they are expressed and "used" for 
different purposes. 
The first part of the chapter discusses the period of the revolution and agrarian reform 
in Mexico and how the villagers of La Canoa talk about this period. The second part of the 
chapter presents an analysis of life in La Canoa after the establishment of the ejido and how 
this is related to story-telling by the villagers. The focus then shifts to the divisions in the 
village and the role that the discourse of cacicazgo and the idiom of kinship play in the 
reflections of the villagers on local politics. Finally, the way in which festivities and scandals 
contribute to the construction of the local situated community is discussed. 
Agrarian Struggle and Land Reform in the Valley of Autlán 
The Mexican revolution which began in 1910 has been extensively documented and discussed 
in different circles. New versions and analyses of the years of revolution (1910-1920) and 
its consequences still appear with great frequency (see Buve 1988, 1993, Knight 1986, 1990, 
1994a, 1994b, Meyer 1991, Tutino 1986). This makes any general summary of these events 
a tricky endeavor. The same holds for the background and implications of the agrarian 
reform which was implemented from 1915 to 1992. The common - although contested - view 
of the Mexican revolution, is that it was a broad popular movement with strong agrarian 
demands. It is generally presented as a reaction to the authoritarian regime of Porfirio Díaz 
(1876-1910) during which the process of concentration of the land in the hands of a small 
group of large landowners had intensified. The Indian communities which had been granted 
communal property rights in colonial times by the Spanish Crown, saw their properties 
gradually diminished by the expansion of the haciendas and by agrarian laws issued in the 
second half of the 19 t h century. 2 In this way a process of land concentration that had already 
started centuries ago, was carried to extremes. As many rural communities were robbed of 
their lands the majority of rural people were forced to work on the large landholdings under 
dreadful circumstances. Agrarian grievances of the masses of landless peasants were 
intensified by economic crisis and severe food shortages between 1908 and 1910. So, in 1910 
the regime of Porfirio Díaz was finally overthrown with mass support from the rural 
population.3 
The agrarian law of 1915 formed the legal basis of the agrarian reform program. In 1917 
this law was turned into the famous article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. The Constitution 
of 1917 defined the three principal forms of land tenure in Mexico: small private property 
{pequeña propiedad), ejidos, and agrarian communities (see appendix 1 for more 
information).4 Large landholdings could now legally be expropriated and the land granted 
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to peasant groups. The peasant groups who received land were organized in ejidos. Violent 
seizures of haciendas also took place which were later legalized by official agrarian 
procedures. 
The revolution also implied a power struggle between the Catholic church and the state. 
"The local priests preached against agrarismo and - it was said - even violated the secrecy 
of the confessional in order to keep their landlords allies well informed. Thus, as the Church 
- significantly but not anonymously - aligned with the landed interests, so the anticlericalism 
of the agraristas became more virulent" (Knight 1994b: 16). As a product of this growing 
tension between the church and the state, a bloody Cristero war broke out in midwestern 
Mexico, a part of the country were clerical Catholicism was deeply rooted (see Jean Meyer 
1974). The Cristiada raged from 1926 to 1929 and to a lesser degree in the 1930s. Although 
the Cristeros lost their fight against the state army, this certainly did not mean that 
Catholicism had lost its influence in the Cristero regions. 
In the 1930s, matters calmed down. During the presidency of Cardenas (1934-1940) the 
greatest amount of land was expropriated and the greatest number of ejidos established 
throughout Mexico. Today there are 28,000 ejidos, occupying more than half of Mexico's 
arable land and including over 3 million ejidatarios.5 However, agrarian reform has been full 
of irregularities and many large landholders have been able to avoid the expropriation of their 
lands. 
In 1992, article 27 of the Constitution was changed and the program of land reform to 
establish ejidos was officially abolished. The rules for the use and transfer of individual ejido 
plots were also drastically changed and the possibility of making the transition from the ejido 
form of land ownership to private land ownership has been opened. 
Land Reform in the Valley of Autldn 
The valley of Autlan, in Jalisco, western Mexico, covers 22,300 hectares. It lies at an 
altitude of 900 meters above sea-level and is surrounded by mountains. The valley has fertile 
soils and the several rivers that cross the valley have made the construction of small 
irrigation systems possible in certain parts. The town of Autlan is 450 years old and has 
34,073 inhabitants.6 It is an important regional commercial and administrative center and a 
"gateway" to the sparsely populated coastal zone of Jalisco. It is 180 kilometers from the 
state capital Guadalajara.7 At the other end of the valley lies the village of El Grullo. Many 
smaller villages and isolated hamlets litter the region. There are 37 ejidos in the 
municipalities of Autlan and el Grullo and 3,906 ejidatarios in the region as opposed to 441 
private landowners. Of the total amount of arable land, 75 per cent is in the hands of 
ejidatarios and 25 per cent in the hands of private landowners.8 The village La Canoa is 15 
kilometers by road from Autlan. 
The agrarian structure of the region of Autlan at the beginning of this century was 
dominated by a large number of small haciendas or landholdings. There were 33 haciendas 
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in the Autlan region with an average size of 2,500 hectares (Muria 1982: 110). The 
haciendas not only occupied the valley plain but also large extensions of mountainous lands, 
which were used for herds of cattle. The owners of the haciendas normally lived in Autlan 
or in Guadalajara and had an administrator taking care of the work on the hacienda. Some 
hacendados also had other properties closer to the coast of Jalisco. Although several 
haciendas were known to have irrigation systems, most arable land was rainfed and most 
landholdings depended on one, insecure rainy season a year (from May to November). 
Well-known haciendas in the valley of Autlan - El Grullo were Ahuacapan of the Michel 
family and Ayuquila of the Rivera family. Both were haciendas with private irrigation 
systems and a well organized production system. They worked with teams of laborers from 
both inside and outside the hacienda and had a corresponding physical structure: the hacienda 
house, barracks for the laborers, storage buildings, mills, a chapel, and so on. However, 
most properties in the valley that were called haciendas did not correspond to this image. 
These haciendas consisted only of the land, sometimes with a storage building. These 
properties had no irrigation and did not have work to offer during the whole year. For that 
reason they did not work with teams of fixed hacienda laborers. Often they did not have a 
hacienda house, a church, or installations for laborers on the property. In the rainy season 
they worked with the labor drawn from villages nearby. 
The hacienda La Canoa was small and poor. Within the walls of the property the only 
construction was a storage building for maize. The last owner of La Canoa was known as 
"not a bad man". This, in contrast to the owners of bigger haciendas such as Ahuacapan who 
were known to be very despotic and cruel. The village, which had 258 inhabitants in 1921, 9 
did fall within the limits of the hacienda property, but the relationship between villagers and 
the hacienda was much more flexible than in highly organized haciendas like Ahuacapan or 
Ayuquila. As La Canoa did not have enough work for the villagers during the whole year, 
people were allowed to work on other haciendas, as laborers or as sharecroppers. Only in 
the rainy season did they have share-cropping arrangements with the hacendado of La Canoa. 
The relative independence of the village is also reflected in the high rate of migration of 
villagers. Families arrived at La Canoa, while others left to find a living elsewhere. This free 
mobility was not possible in the other haciendas. People in the region remember that there 
people had to stay put (and generally were indebted for life) and when they left it was 
because they were thrown out (because of a robbery, or other crime). 
The man who initiated the agrarian struggle in the region of Autlan in the years of the 
revolution was Casimiro Castillo. He was a vegetable seller in the marketplace and organized 
secret meetings in Autlan. People from the surrounding hamlets also joined his group and 
came to the meetings. Among them were several men from La Canoa. In 1916 Casimiro 
Castillo started the official procedures to request land for Autlan, the way having been 
opened by the law of 1915 and later the Constitution of 1917. Autlan was the first village 
in the region to present a request for land. The ejido of Autlan was established in 1924 by 
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the expropriation of parts of 11 different properties (see Federal Gazette, 15th November 
1927). 1 0 In 1924 Casimiro was elected to the state congress of Jalisco as the representative 
of the Autlán district. There his actions became a nuisance for the state governor Zuno. It 
is said that Zuno himself ordered Casimiro Castillo's assassination in May 1925 in a village 
on the coast of Jalisco. 1 1 This village was later named after Casimiro Castillo. 
One of the most important and most remarkable men in La Canoa at that time was 
Filomeno Romero. He is the great grandfather of the majority of the people who live in the 
village today. Don Filomeno was a very rich man and well-known in the region. He had 
arrived with his wife and children in La Canoa from another village. He did not own lands 
in the village but he rented lands and established very good relationships with the owner of 
the hacienda La Canoa. He had large herds of cattle on the lands he rented. Don Filomeno 
supported the men in La Canoa who worked with Casimiro Castillo. Among other things, 
he paid for their trips to the offices of the agrarian authorities in Mexico City. The owner 
of the hacienda La Canoa did not cause them much trouble. Some people said that this was 
because his title to the land was not in order and he realized that he would lose his land 
anyway. However, ejidos were mostly established by the expropriation of lands of various 
haciendas not just one and the other landowners around La Canoa were feared enemies. La 
Canoa residents requested the establishment of their own ejido in 1923 before Autlán was 
endowed with its ejido. However, a large number of people from La Canoa were already 
included in the group of beneficiaries of the ejido of Autlán which was established in 1924. 
In the documents of the Land Reform Institute (later the Ministry of Agrarian Reform), this 
fact was presented as the reason why the people of La Canoa could not receive land to form 
their own ejido. So, for many years a group of people of La Canoa were members of the 
ejido of Autlán. 
Then the Cristero war struck the region. Although the Cristero movement was not very 
strong in this area, there was a regional Cristero army and two serious battles were fought 
between the Cristeros and the army in 1927 and 1928. Between 1926 and 1929 the Catholic 
churches in the region were closed. The man who derived regional power from successfully 
fighting the Cristeros and pacifying the region was General Marcelino García Barragán. He 
came from Autlán and was without doubt, the most important and influential person in the 
region for several decades. In the 1940s the General became the Governor of Jalisco. In this 
position he could influence many affairs in his home town and region. In 1947 he was 
removed as state Governor and for a long period the General lost influence in national 
politics. However, he made a political come-back and in 1964 became Minister of Defence. 
As he was still Minister of Defence in 1968 he is held responsible for the killings of 
hundreds of students in the plaza de Tlaltelolco of Mexico City during the student protests 
then. 
The General has had considerable influence in the region of Autlán even when he held 
positions in Guadalajara or Mexico City. Torres describes how the General appointed the 
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candidates for the presidency of Autlan and how he kept visiting the region every month to 
talk to his followers about necessary regional projects and public services, such as drinking 
water and roads (Torres 1994a: 109-122). The role of the General in land reform was 
variable. He supported the establishment and extension of ejidos in the region of Autlan when 
he was Governor of Jalisco in the 1940s. However, he was not really interested in agrarian 
issues and his position on specific land conflicts depended on the people involved. Although 
he agreed with the expropriation of landholdings for the establishment of ejidos, he also 
helped friends who were private landholders in their efforts to keep certain lands. One of the 
most famous cases in which he was involved concerns the ejido of Autlan where he opposed 
the expropriation of lands that were necessary for the extension of the ejido of Autlan. 1 2 
The General is also named as having been responsible for killings in the region and the 
illegal invasion of ejido lands. This explains the diversity of opinions about the General. A 
local historian Gregorio Rivera commented on these two sides of the General: I think that 
the General did perhaps help Casimiro Castillo in his agrarian struggle, he must have given 
him directions or helped him with contacts with people in the Agrarian Institute, but the truth 
is that the General also acquired properties by force; some of the properties he possessed, 
he acquired in a way that was almost dispossession (despojo). The General is a very 
controversial person, opinions about him differ, to some people he was "el gran Mexicano", 
the great hero and for others, the worst thing one can imagine. In the ejido Ayutita they love 
the General very much. There they say that they received the ejido lands thanks to the 
General (Gregorio Rivera, interview May 1994). 
A Disconcerting Experience with Local History 
My first experiences in La Canoa seemed to confirm the theories about the success of the 
state project of indoctrination of the peasantry. I was struck by the recurring statements of 
the ejidatarios about the struggle for the land at the beginning of this century. Revolutionary 
expressions such as "land to the tiller" were frequently uttered in their explanation of the 
ejido system. 1 3 The ejidatarios proudly told me that their fathers and grandfathers had 
fought against the landowners to get their ejido established and often referred to national 
figures as Pancho Villa and Cardenas to explain their agrarian history. I felt strong feelings 
around concepts such as ejido land, ejidatario and also "sons of ejidatarios". The ejidatarios 
used to say that the government and the PRI had supported them in the struggle against the 
hacendados and given them the land. I interpreted this as an indication of a continuing 
revolutionary spirit and as a proof of the success of the national cultural project in rural 
Mexico. Many of their comments appeared to come directly from school books, political 
propaganda talks, the government party discourse, and Mexican movies. 
Yet, when I started asking more explicit questions about the experiences of their fathers 
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and grandfathers who had so bravely fought for the land, I came to the disconcerting 
conclusion that the ejidatarios could not tell me anything about this. Very few people in the 
village could give me information or any stories about the period of the agrarian reform. 
People also presented a very vague image of society before land reform. In their stories, 
society before the agrarian reform was divided into ricos (rich people) and pobres (poor 
people). The ricos owned all the land and the landless poor people had to work for them. 
Yet, hardly anybody knew the name of the last rico (hacienda owner) of La Canoa. Actually, 
very few people in La Canoa knew the more precise agrarian situation in La Canoa or the 
valley of Autlan before agrarian reform. Some said that there was only one rico in the whole 
region; others claimed that there were several. They generally did not know the names of the 
different landowners or only of one of them. The names they remembered differed from one 
ejidatario to another. 
Only old men (of 80, 90 years) who were gifted with a good memory and had followed 
the activities of their agrarista fathers and uncles with special interest could give me more 
detailed information about this period and insights into the underlying processes. People who 
were younger and had not been young men or adults themselves during this period, 
sometimes remembered their fathers and grandfathers talking about these affairs. But they 
used to add that there fathers did not speak with them about these matters. A young 
ejidatario, in his thirties, for example, told me that he did not know anything about the time 
of the haciendas or agrarian struggle in the region as his grandfather, who could have told 
him about it, died when he was six years old. Although there are many women ejidatarios 
and some play an important role in the ejido, the women could not give much information 
either. Women generally used gender as a reason for not knowing more about the period of 
the revolution and agrarian struggle. They said that the land and agrarian struggle had been 
a man's affair. So, in the village, they explain their little knowledge about the situation 
before the agrarian reform and the establishment of the ejido by the fact that it was before 
they were born, that their fathers and grandfathers were uncommunicative or that it was a 
man's affair. 
Yet, the interesting point here is not the "transfer of knowledge" from one generation 
to the next but the fact that apparently no local mythification of revolutionary and agrarian 
heroes has occurred. There are no detailed stories about local men, who fought against the 
cruel hacendado and are remembered by name and actions. The ricos and pobres are 
nameless and are not listed together with national figures. I had expected local histories to 
be going around: stories that had developed into a form of "local collective memory" 
connected to the national narrative. 
Some people might analyze this absence of a strong local history in terms of the 
neutralization or suppression of local histories and memories for the sake of a nationalist 
project. The frequent repetition of the standard discourse on agrarian reform and the 
revolution (as expressed in school books and movies) could be seen as a sign of the success 
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of the national cultural project. However, I would object to such a conclusion as there are 
many other local stories which bear little relation with the "master narrative" of the national 
agrarian history. There are, for example, fascinating personal life histories and an abundance 
of stories concerning land conflicts and problems within and between families in the village. 
As Friedrich points out, "peasants themselves are deeply preoccupied with factionalism, 
political violence, land disputes, and some subset of the diverse historical details that bear 
on today's situation. Any one peasant spends far more time, energy, and thoughts on 
agrarian questions than one would guess from anthropologies and histories" (Friedrich 1986: 
xviii). Naturally, one can argue that discrepancies always exist between national historical 
narratives and stories at a local or personal level. Yet, as I said, these were no local versions 
of the master narrative. I will now turn to the themes that most recurred in the stories about 
those times. 
Collective Themes in Story-Telling 
An important recurring theme is the treasure of the revolution, which is mentioned in many 
other works on Mexico as well. People in those times are said to have hidden their 
belongings for fear of theft. In La Canoa people expect the gold and other valuable objects 
to be hidden in the cerro (mountainous terrain) since that was the place people fled to. 
However, the oldest houses in the village are also looked at with special interest. For 
example, the six daughters of Cayetano Lomelf the oldest man in the village (who died in 
1992 at the age of 102) are sure that their father buried gold in their paternal house. He 
himself told his daughters so (though without indicating the exact place) but they have never 
found it. Naturally, people also speculate about the possibility that somebody already found 
the treasure and secretly took it. The topic of treasure evokes a lot of story-telling. A man 
told me that as a young boy he accompanied his father to a place in the cerro where certainly 
money was hidden, but he cannot find the place anymore. There are also details about what 
certain treasure places look like, for example, it is a place with snails in the wall. Stories 
about treasures are also linked to stories about ghosts and fear of the dead who guard the 
gold. Interestingly, I also heard people use the belief in treasures to explain the wealth of 
Emilia Romero, a detested money-lender in the village. Emilia and her husband do not 
possess land, they have many children and they have never worked in the United States. 
Nevertheless, they are one of the most prosperous families in the village. Although they 
engage in many activities, their wealth is apparently suspicious and some people relate this 
to Emilia having found a treasure from the revolution. According to some villagers, an 
indication of the fact that Emilia found a treasure of the revolution is that at the same time 
as Emilia's sudden prosperity her mother fell seriously ill (see Taussig 1980 for a debate on 
wealth originating in contracts with the devil). 
Another event which is much commented on in the village is that the houses of La Canoa 
were once set on fire by the Cristeros. A nearby village was a known breeding ground of 
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Cristeros and attacks were organized from there. One day it was La Canoa's turn. The 
houses were burnt down, but nobody was killed. Some people relate how they fled to the 
monte (hills with woodland) to escape. Others explain how they tried to hide their horses and 
weapons. One ejidatario told me that when his parents returned to La Canoa, after having 
lived somewhere else, they were shocked to find their village burnt down. The Cristeros are 
depicted as allies of the hacendados who fought against the landless people and the 
agraristas. It is a serious insult to suggest that a member of a certain family was a Cristero. 
Interestingly, the Cristeros are much less described in terms of their relation with the 
Catholic church. As one ejidatario said: The Cristeros were the hacendados. The agraristas 
fought to have their own land. The agraristas fought together with the government and won 
the battle. The fact that people generally do not stress the connection of the Cristeros with 
the Catholic church may be related to the fact that people in the ejido today are very Catholic 
and re-define categories of the past in this context. However, it probably also has to do with 
the fact that situations and categories were complex and very much locally defined. As a 
regional historian in Autlan explained: I was 8 or 9 years old at that time. I remember that 
during the mass the vicar told us that the church was going to be closed. Everybody was very 
sad. The people organized pilgrimages to the cerro. But to take up arms and join the 
Cristeros, no... (E. Medina Lima, interview July 1995). 
Another important theme with respect to the agrarian history of the village is the 
repeatedly mentioned wealth of don Filomeno, the great grandfather of most ejidatarios and 
originator of the fight for the ejido. All the people in the village who remember him or recall 
the stories told about him, say that he was very rich. He had hundreds of goats and pigs and 
large herds of cattle. In other villages in the region don Filomeno is also remembered as a 
very rich man. Several men in La Canoa related the story of one of Filomeno's sons who 
stole money from his father but was startled by the fact that the money he had taken was 
pure gold. One of his grandsons (himself in his seventies) says that Filomeno owned a great 
many books which, according to him, proves that he was of Spanish origin. Most of his great 
grandchildren do not show much interest in the reason for his wealth or the fact that he did 
not fit the image of the "traditional landless peasant" who fought against the hacendados. 
Whatever the exact personal history of don Filomeno, he certainly disturbs the picture of 
poor landless villagers fighting against rich hacendados. Here was a landless but very rich 
cattle owner, a friend of the hacendados, who guided and helped his poor fellow villagers 
in the establishment of their own ejido. He himself did not receive land, but many of his sons 
did. 
These were the three themes concerning the village that recurred most often in the local 
stories about this period and which contribute to the construction of a situated community. 
However, there were also more personal stories about this time. 
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Personal Histories 
What is most striking in the personal stories about this period, is the violence, hardships, and 
the movement of people and the splitting up of families. Many people begin their stories by 
telling that they were made orphans by the loss of one or both parents. It was common for 
families to split up after the death of one or both parents and for everyone to go his or her 
own way. People also recall the harsh times and that they often had nothing to eat. People 
migrated in search of a living but also in order to avoid violence and disease. Many murders 
or "war casualties" are mentioned in these personal histories. They give an image of the 
revolutionary period as characterized by violence, banditry, hunger, disease, and movement. 
The political or heroic part of the revolution is much less commented upon. This is also 
related to the fact that some of the leaders in the revolutionary fights were notorious bandits. 
Pedro Zamora, for example, a villista leader in the region was better known for his 
plundering of villages and abducting of women than for his political projects. So, what to 
some people were periods of political fights with meaning and ends, to others were periods 
of pointless killings and violence. There were many sad stories about this period. Roberto 
Sanchez, for example, an ejidatario in La Canoa, who was born in 1922, remembers the sad 
history of the man Julian Gonzalez who lived opposite his house. This little story is 
illustrative of people's living conditions. Roberto: 
When the ejido ofAutldn was established Julidn had received land. He had a wife 
and six children. Then the plague of smallpox (peste viruela) came and his family 
fell ill. He took them to Autldn to find a cure, but they died anyway. I will never 
forget the moment he came back from Autldn. He arrived with only his eldest 
daughter and one of his sons. His wife and four children had died. He continued 
here as an ejidatario. But shortly afterwards people were sent from Autldn. We 
do not know who sent them, but they came to kill people for the revolution. The 
people here did not suspect anything and thought they were friends. They started 
drinking with them. When several men who were on their hit list to be killed 
arrived, the men from Autldn started shooting. When my father heard what was 
going on, he wanted to go there; his brothers and nephews were involved. But my 
mother would not let him go. She clung onto him and prevented him from going. 
They killed Julidn Gonzalez, Carlos Costo and Pablo Sanchez. Then, Pablo's 
father Refugio shot the man who had killed his son and the others fled. 
There are many of these personal stories and they convey elements which are important for 
the people themselves. For many people the revolution and the years afterwards were not so 
much a period of political fight, but more of chaos, violence, and movement. This 
phenomenon of chaos is also shown in several recent works on the period of the revolution. 
Buve (1993) for example, argues that the period from 1910 to 1920 was a chaotic period of 
violence, war, and uprisings in which little coherence can be found. In some regions peasants 
rebelled against hacendados, in others not. Many people lost their lives in diverse struggles. 
History, story-telling, and the contraction of community 45 
Bandits, guérilleros and conventional armies were all operating and sometimes the distinction 
between political fighters and bandits was not clear. These were periods of political crisis but 
also of economic crisis, hunger, and movement. 
The Limited Success of the Master Narrative and the Reform of Article 27 
What is remarkable when we analyze local story-telling about this period is first of all that 
the local themes and stories do not directly relate to the master narrative of the Mexican 
revolution and agrarian reform. Secondly, villagers do not try to construct grand theories 
leading to closure and clear conclusions. There are many fragmented and seemingly isolated 
stories and themes. The categories of people involved in the struggles, such as Cristeros or 
landless peasants are locally defined and do not necessarily coincide with generally used 
classifications. One of the central figures of La Canoa in the fight against the hacendado was 
not a poor man but a wealthy man, while the hacendado was neither very rich, nor cruel. 
However, the ejidatarios are not bothered by these discrepancies between local stories and 
the master narrative. It is obvious that the so-called "hegemonic" state project has not been 
able to push aside localized story-telling. This would seem to imply that the national 
revolutionary discourse had a certain influence in some domains and not in others. Perhaps 
it is an important discourse towards outsiders and in negotiations with officials, but not in 
villagers' private lives or in the construction of their own identity. If that is the case then 
the success of the national cultural project should be seriously doubted. 
In my view, the revolutionary discourse has indeed often been used in an instrumental 
way. Let me explain this on the basis of the following material. I mentioned before that the 
revolutionary expression "land to the tiller" was frequently used and that I had interpreted 
this expression as proof of a continuing revolutionary spirit. However, at a later stage I 
became aware of a very practical implication of this statement for the people. The agrarian 
law stated that ejidatarios who did not cultivate their plot themselves for two or more 
consecutive years, would lose the right to the plot. This is a very threatening rule in a 
situation were many ejidatarios live and work outside the region and have other people 
looking after their land. It means that the person who rents the land (the tiller) acquires the 
rights to the land. Although rules concerning the use of ejido land were never directly 
followed and always "negotiated" at different levels, they still formed a threat (see chapter 
five). This rule in particular has always remained very important and has probably been the 
ejido rule that has most bothered ejidatarios. It was probably more the practical threat 
implied in the expression "land to the tiller" that made it so meaningful to the ejidatarios 
rather than its ideological content. I also noticed that reference to violent and heroic struggles 
for land in the past was especially important in the interaction and negotiations between 
officials and ejidatarios (chapters seven and eight) and in conflicts at the local level between 
ejidatarios and landless villagers (chapters three and six). 
This more practical or instrumental meaning of revolutionary expressions concerning the 
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ejido becomes very clear when we look at the reactions of the ejidatarios to the reform of 
article 27 of the Mexican Constitution and the new agrarian law of 1992. The new law 
abolishes many rales concerning the use and transfer of ejido plots. Ejido plots can be sold, 
rented out, and left unused. With this new agrarian law, the ejido form of land ownership 
comes very close to private landownership and the formal transformation of ejido land rights 
into private land ownership has become possible. When talking with the ejidatarios about this 
new law and the possible transition from the ejido into private land ownership at first they 
thought this implied that the land would be taken away from them. They fiercely expressed 
a revolutionary spirit and said that as their fathers themselves had fought for the land they 
would never let the land be taken away from them. When they realized that they would keep 
the land but that many rules concerning the use of the land were going to be abolished, they 
seemed indifferent. After some time, many said it was going to be better that way, as 
everybody could now do what he or she wanted with the land instead of having to get the 
permission of the other ejidatarios and having to bribe functionaries. Ideological 
revolutionary expressions were no longer raised once they knew they would be the owners 
of their land. 
As we see, the meaning of certain expressions has to be studied with care. The ejidatarios 
use revolutionary images and discourse in certain situations. However, the significance of 
this revolutionary discourse can only be discovered in the wider context of their lives and 
political struggles. 
Life and Community after the Establishment of the Ejido 
I turn now to the period of the establishment of the ejido in 1938 and the years afterwards. 
We saw that with the establishment of the ejido of Autlan (1924) villagers from La Canoa 
became members of that ejido and received a tract of land, but they were denied the 
possibility of establishing their own ejido. The two most important men of La Canoa in the 
continuing struggle to get their own ejido established were don Filomeno's son, Miguel, and 
Juan Garcia. Juan Garcia is said to have been the illegitimate child of the son of a hacienda 
owner in the nearby region of Ciudad Guzman. He was very poor like most people of La 
Canoa. The only wealthy person in the village was don Filomeno. 
In 1932, La Canoa again requested land to form their own ejido and the decision again 
went against them. Times changed with the presidency of Cardenas (1934-1940), when 
throughout Mexico an unprecedented number of haciendas were expropriated and ejidos 
established. In 1937, after 14 years of administrative struggle, the MAR finally recognized 
that the village of La Canoa was separate from the town of Autlan and that the inhabitants 
needed land to make a living. It was decided to award an endowment grant to La Canoa and 
expropriate land from the hacienda La Canoa and three other large landholdings in the 
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surroundings. Only certain parts of these properties were given to La Canoa, as other parts 
were used to establish neighboring ejidos or remained in the hands of the former owners. At 
last, the people of La Canoa could establish their own ejido. The small storage building for 
maize in the village, that had previously belonged to the hacienda, was turned into a Catholic 
chapel. Villagers of La Canoa who had been ejidatarios of the ejido Autlan left that ejido and 
now became ejidatarios of La Canoa. The ejido Autlan yielded the land held by these 
ejidatarios to the newly established ejido. 
As the land they received in the endowment grant was not nearly enough for all the 
people with recognized agrarian rights, the ejidatarios of La Canoa made a request for an 
expansion grant two weeks after the ejido was formally established in 1938. This request was 
acceded to and in 1942 the ejido received a small expansion grant. Most heads of family in 
La Canoa had received a plot of land by 1942 (see chapter five for more details). 
The creation of the ejido of La Canoa was full of irregularities. By presidential resolution 
La Canoa was granted 1843 hectares of which 20 per cent (396 hectares) was said to be 
suitable for agriculture. The remaining part was mountainous terrain. However, during the 
execution of this presidential resolution in 1938 when land was measured and formally 
handed over to the ejidatarios, the engineer only came up with 1770 hectares. This might 
seem strange, but this was a common phenomenon during the execution of resolutions as the 
provisional projects for the establishment of ejidos often did not have very detailed maps or 
information. For this reason, during the execution, some land "appeared" that was not on 
the maps, or vice versa there was less land than officially registered. In the case of La Canoa 
the executing engineer, decided to take 230 hectares from other landholdings that were not 
officially affected in the presidential resolution. Afterwards, the MAR decided that the ejido 
could keep these 230 hectares and that the MAR would indemnize the owners of this land. 
Nevertheless, according to the ejidatarios they never received this amount of land. First 
of all they did not receive all the 20 per cent of 1843 hectares that was suitable for agricul-
tural use. A large part of this land was sold or given away at the very start. Secondly, they 
only received 90 of the 230 hectares that were additionally given to them. Chapters seven 
and eight deal in detail with this land conflict and with the struggle of the ejidatarios of La 
Canoa to get the land they are officially entitled to. Throughout the book I will use the term 
the "lost land" when I refer to this land conflict. 
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Autlan 
Figure 2.1 Land Situation of the Ejido La Canoa 
A = Lands the ejido of Autlan received in their endowment grant of 1924 and which they ceded to people 
from La Canoa. 
B = Lands the ejido of La Canoa received in their endowment grant of 1938. 
C = Lands that were erroneously given to the ejido La Canoa by the engineer of the MAR during the execu-
tion of the endowment grant in 1938. 
D = Lands that the ejido La Canoa received in the extension grant of 1942. 
Local Bosses 
Although people received their own plot of land, life after the establishment of the ejido 
remained onerous. As a result of the difficult situation caused by the scarcity of land and the 
insecurity of the harvest (dependent on the rains between May and November), many people 
migrated to other regions in Mexico or to the United States. Some ejidatarios left the village 
and were never heard of again, in particular after three consecutive dry years from 1938 till 
1941. Yet, the majority of men who had received land in the ejido, left the village to work 
in other regions only in the dry period. In the rainy season they returned to the village to 
work their own ejido plot. Whole families went to the coast of Jalisco in the dry season to 
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work in agriculture, leaving the village deserted. Only the richest families of cattle owners 
stayed in the village. 
The richer men, who had initiated the establishment of the ejido, began to control several 
village and ejido matters. Their dominant position was first of all based on control of the 
maize market. They provided expensive credits for the sowing of the ejido plots and after 
the harvest bought the maize at a low price. Cattle was another important factor in socio-
economic differentiation. Only the richer families could afford cattle and let the cattle graze 
on the abundant commons and on the plots after the maize harvest. Furthermore, drinking 
water was also a problem in the village and distinguished the rich families from the poor. 
Many women remember the times when they had to go and get water from the river or ask 
permission to get water from the private wells in the houses of the wealthier families. Some 
of these wealthier men in La Canoa became moneylenders who confiscated houses and plots 
when people could not repay their loans. Don Miguel (the son of Filomeno) and some others 
had built up relations with the state bureaucracy through their efforts to found the ejido. They 
also maintained relations with influential strong men in Autlán. 
So, after the establishment of the ejido, a process of socio-economic differentiation that 
had already existed before land reform continued. This socio-economic differentiation was 
not based on the possession of land but on the possession of cattle, capital, and access to the 
bureaucracy and important political networks. Cochet (1992) argues that the caciques who 
were the result of the agrarian reform were not so much political intermediaries or PRI 
people, but, for example, people with a high number of heads of cattle which they let graze 
on the common ejido lands. He argues that on the basis of this differential access to natural 
resources the rural caciques often developed their position as political intermediaries. Others 
criticize this position by arguing that economic accumulation did not always lead to political 
power (Boehm 1992) or that the process could also be the other way round: economic 
accumulation on the basis of political control (Zepeda 1992). Particular situations obviously 
varied greatly, but the phenomenon of the local bosses who arose after land reform and 
combined political and economic control is very common in rural Mexico. However, the 
question is whether we should really talk in terms of caciques. Although in La Canoa, these 
men had a certain degree of control, no large-scale accumulation of plots, houses, or capital 
has occurred in the village. Furthermore, there were a number of families involved in the 
maize market or PRI politics, for example Miguel Romero, Ramón Alcázar, Fausto Alcázar, 
Julián Ramos and Epitacio Ramírez. So, control was fragmented. At the same time Juan 
Garcia was principally involved in economic accumulation and was not particularly interested 
in ejido politics. Yet, he and his most successful son Ricardo are the men who are most 
criticized in the village for their haughty cacique attitude and the denigrating way in which 
they treat their laborers. 
Miguel Romero and Juan Garcia, as well as local bosses in other ejidos, maintained 
relations with General García Barragán. It is important to stress that the General was an 
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inaccessible person for most people in La Canoa. General García Barragán was a neighbor 
of the ejido La Canoa as some of his properties adjoined the lands of the ejido. Many men 
from the village worked for the General and people maintained different kinds of 
relationships with him. Although opinions about the General differ, the common image that 
is conveyed is that of an impressive man who was more held in awe than loved. Although 
he helped his followers and did all kind of favors in return for their loyalty, many people did 
not feel sure about some of the actions of the General. There were always rumors going 
around about the General and his people. The lack of transparency about what was going on 
only strengthened feelings of caution. There are several stories in the village that stress the 
less pleasant side of the General. The property of the general was protected by armed men 
and dogs and several people told me about the way in which they had been threatened or ill 
treated when they approached too close to the property. It was said that the people defending 
the General's property were criminals whose release from prison the General had secured. 
In this way the General was sure of their loyalty to him. As a neighbor of La Canoa, the 
General also annexed a public path that was used by the ejidatarios. He took away the wire 
fence that separated his land from the path and prohibited people from using use the path any 
longer. It was a wide path and he took a long stretch of it, but who could object about the 
General? 
Although many people talk in negative ways about the General and his politics, some also 
glorify him as a symbol of Mexican revolutionary machismo. For example, Ricardo García, 
son of Juan Garcia, talked in the most glorious way about the General. I had the following 
discussion with Ricardo about García Barragán. 
M: What do you know about General García Barragán? 
R: General Barragán was "lo máximo" that someone could bel 
M: How do you mean? 
R: He was a poor boy who managed to become colonel, then he became general, then he 
became the Governor of the state of Jalisco. Then they managed to remove him from the 
post because he supported another faction within the party. They won the elections but 
nevertheless he was removed from his post. I thought that general Barragán was finished. 
But then, amazingly, he was able to rise again and he became the national Minister of 
Defence. Incredible.... 
M: What has been his influence here in La Canoa? 
R: Very very good. When he was Governor, he gave us the school. He also made sure that 
the road to the village was constructed at that time. 
M: There are also people who talk ill about the General. 
R: But if he gave us roads. How could he have been bad.. ? There are people who say that 
he should have given paved roads. But you can't ask too much. 
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As will become clear in the next chapter contacts with the General were important for the 
organization of several village projects. The General and his men also interfered when ejido 
commissioners, ejidatarios, or others were harming his interests or those of his companions. 
He had allies in the ejidos and villages whom he supported in different ways. However, as 
long as village or ejido matters they did not personally affect him or his friends he was not 
interested. Furthermore, the General tried to establish individual relationships with people 
and was not interested in collective projects. Torres' comments are interesting in this 
respect: "They [the agraristas in the clique of the General] wasted time lobbying and 
complained that the General was more willing to support them personally than to comply 
with the collective demands of their agrarian communities. For example, when someone 
approached him with an ejido problem, he would inquire instead about their personal needs" 
(Torres 1994a: 117). Although nobody will deny the General's influence in the region, views 
and opinions about his operations and specific interventions differ. In chapter seven I will 
discuss speculations about the role of the General in the conflict over the "lost land" of La 
Canoa. 
Story-Telling about Local Heroes and the Discourse of Cacicazgo 
Whereas people have great difficulty in remembering the names of los ricos of the hacienda 
period, they are very explicit about the names of the local leaders who struggled to get the 
ejido La Canoa established. Filomeno Romero, his son Miguel Romero and Juan Garcia are 
always mentioned as the men who fought for the establishment of the ejido. However, the 
contribution of these agrarian fighters to the struggle and the degree to which they are 
worshipped differs according to the people who tell the story. 
Local Leaders Remembered by their Children 
There exists a tendency for the Romeros to give most credit to Filomeno and Miguel 
Romero. In contrast, the Garcías tend to give most credit to Juan García. Ricardo García, 
the youngest son of Juan Garcia, for example, said: My father was one of the founders of this 
ejido. Actually he was the main founder. He went on many missions to Guadalajara and 
Mexico City to get the ejido established. The great grandfather of the Romeros supported my 
father. So, according to Ricardo his father was the central figure in the struggle and he was 
helped by Miguel. According to the Romeros, however, Filomeno and Miguel Romero were 
the central figures. However, apart from these differences in attributing central roles, they 
agree about the participation of the three men. 
Many of their children feel frustrated that their fathers never received the respect and 
recognition that, according to them, they deserved. Rosa Romero, an ejidataria of La Canoa 
and daughter of Miguel, for example, says that the crucial people in the ejido in the period 
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after its establishment were her father don Miguel and her grandfather don Filomeno. She 
remembers that her father was commissioner of the ejido and went on a lot of missions for 
the ejido. But, said Rosa, people don't really appreciate these things, they gossip a lot in 
the ejido and there is a lot of jealousy. 
These men are presented by their children as resolute men who cannot easily be equaled. 
José Romero said of his father don Miguel that he was very serious and honest. He did not 
play cards, did not drink and came directly home after work. None of his sons is like he was, 
he commented. Ricardo García gave almost exactly the same description of his father, Juan, 
and went on to comment that he had never managed to become as good as his father. 
However, despite the pride they feel for their fathers and the fact that they like to refer to 
their braveness and the danger they ran, more detailed stories about them are hard to find. 
Their children remember especially the fear they and their mother felt when their fathers 
went on missions for the establishment of the ejido. They were aware of the risks their 
fathers were running and that the ricos wanted to kill them. But there are few stories about 
more specific actions of these men. 
However, there was also another side to these "heroic" fathers. They are portrayed as 
responsible but incommunicative. They were brave and just but were also sometimes cruel 
to their own children. This is a more generally expressed aspect of the men of this period, 
and the stories people tell show a strong resemblance to the atmosphere Juan Rulfo describes 
for the neighboring region of El Llano in his books El Llano en Llamas (1953) and Pedro 
Páramo (1955). Roberto Sánchez, for example, said that his father was always very nervous 
because he had a lot of problems on his mind. They were very poor and Roberto's father 
despaired when his children asked for things that he could not give them. Then he would beat 
them. However, despite the fact that he was treated very badly, Roberto admired his father. 
Another example is that of Ramón Romero. Ramón is one of the numerous grandchildren of 
don Filomeno. His father was one of don Miguel's brothers. Ramón told me on several 
occasions that his father was very despotic: Once we all were on my father's land; we were 
10 sons and 1 daughter. My father sent me away to get water for us all. But I was still very 
little. I tried to carry the water but fell... My father hit me terribly. But I could not do it, 
I was too little. Men do not like to talk in negative terms about their own fathers and tend 
to excuse the fact that they hit them so much or treated them so brutally by adding that they 
had experienced very dangerous and violent situations themselves. Alternatively, they 
excused both father and mother (who did not dare to interfere) by saying that they lived in 
harsh times and often did not have enough food to feed their children. 
These feelings towards their fathers may be very contradictory. Although they may resent 
the way their father treated them, at the same time they are very proud of the things they 
achieved and their courage. The heroic image of these men as fighters who did everything 
possible to establish the ejido is stressed, especially in public. In private or when people are 
drinking, the other side of these fathers may be commented upon. Lorenzo is a good example 
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of this contradictory relationship of ejidatarios with their deceased "heroic" fathers. Lorenzo 
is in his sixties and one of the 11 sons of don Miguel's first marriage. Lorenzo is clearly 
not a talker and especially disliked talking about his father don Miguel. Yet, when he was 
drunk, he would sometimes start to talk about him. Then, he would explain that his father 
had always been very severe with his children. Lorenzo remembered that on one occasion 
his father beat him severely: My father came home late and heard me respond in a 
disrespectful way to my mother. My father told me to apologize to my mother, but I refused 
to do so. Then my father got so angry that he beat me until I fell unconscious. My mother 
cried a lot and looked after me. I told her that I would leave home now, but in the end I 
stayed. Lorenzo also had conflicts with his father over a plot of land. Although everybody 
knows that Lorenzo received a plot of land from his father, Lorenzo himself denies this and 
claims that he received the land when the ejido was established. 
Although Lorenzo clearly had a difficult relation with his father, in public he stresses the 
efforts his father made to establish the ejido. Lorenzo and his brothers also like to comment 
that their father had twenty children in La Canoa (eleven by his first marriage, eight by his 
second marriage and one "illegally" but recognized by him). This fact emphasizes his 
manhood and his impact in the village through his many offspring. Lorenzo will never allow 
people to talk badly about don Miguel. People still remember that on one occasion, at an 
ejido meeting, Salvador Lagos complained about the corruption of don Miguel and the 
problems he caused the ejido. Lorenzo became very angry by this defamation of his father 
and drew his gun which he pointed at Salvador. The people present tried to calm him down 
and finally Lorenzo lowered the gun. However, the event was a humiliating one for Lorenzo. 
In "public opinion" a "real man" only draws his gun when he intends to use it. A "real 
man" would therefore have shot Salvador. So this event was very detrimental to Lorenzo's 
self image. There were other occasions when Lorenzo pulled his gun after somebody had 
talked ill of his father, but he never fired a shot. Although the ejidatarios suffered brutality 
from their courageous fathers and may feel great resentment towards them, at the same time 
they honor them in public. 
Agrarian Fighters Considered to be Caciques 
Besides the difficult relationship with their own sons, there are many things the men who 
helped establish the ejido are criticized for in the village. Several villagers do not worship 
these men but loath them. There are several men in the village who use a discourse of 
cacicazgo and exploitation when they discuss the practices of these men. They express 
themselves in extremely negative terms about these local bosses of former times and often 
become emotional while telling these stories. Although it would be too strong to talk about 
factions in the village, I broadly distinguish two groups: the "establishment" and the 
"opposition". The "opposition" are the men who express very negative views about the old 
bosses and who have been very active over the years to recover the "lost land". They have 
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been members of different political opposition parties and have tried to get the land back in 
many different ways. They are extremely critical of the role of the government. Although 
they recognized that the government helped them by founding the ejido, they criticized the 
government and the PRI for the many bad things they did afterwards. Others in the ejido call 
them the "opposers", "troublemakers", or "leftists", the "establishment" is a broad group 
of people who feel close to the old bosses and who maintain relations with PRI circles in 
Autlán. 
I will present parts of interviews I had with Salvador Lagos and Ramón Romero, in 
which they clearly express these feelings. Salvador Lagos related the following about former 
times: 
There were four, five rich men in the village. They monopolized the maize of the 
poor people buying it at a very low price. Later in the year they sold the maize 
back to the same farmers for a high price. They gave us the maize in May (the 
start of the rainy season) and we had to pay them back in November (harvest 
time). They lent at a rate of one for two, or one for three. If the maize was worth 
ten per hectoliter, they paid five. El gobierno (the government) did not exist for 
us in those days and if they knew about this, they just let the rich people do as 
they pleased. My father had to sell his maize at a very low price, almost for free, 
in order to have money to feed us. In every poblado (village) there were some 
people with money, who bought the maize harvests very cheaply. They also 
borrowed money for the sowing. Some eight to ten families in the village had 
enough to eat. We were starving to death and nobody gave us anything. That was 
in the 1930s [when a number of villagers of La Canoa were ejidatarios in Autlán]. 
In the 1940s trucks came to the village which paid a little bit more. These trucks 
belonged to the ricos in Autlán, the coyotes from Autlán. 
Ramón Romero relates how the older generation of his father and uncles (all sons of don 
Filomeno) managed to get several plots of ejido land and often the best land: 
An uncle of mine, Elias Romero, monopolized land. He bought plots but he also 
lent money to poor people to cultivate their plot. If people could not pay him 
back, he took the land. As the rains were very bad and there was no irrigation, 
people often could not pay him and had to give him the land. 
Ramón also remembers how his father took land at the time of the extension, even though 
this land was meant for the people who had not received land when the ejido was established. 
Ramón claimed that: 
This extension was a terrible mess. Many of these old men who already had land, 
took land in the extension. Some kept several plots. Others left their first plot to 
other people. They preferred to have a plot in the extension as it was land of 
much better quality. My father took land in the extension and abandoned the plot 
he had before. The extension was a mess. It was meant for the sons of ejidatarios, 
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but no, they gave it to those who were already ejidatarios. They just left the bad 
plots to others. 
I asked Ramón who was the ejido commissioner at that time, and he replied: 
It was almost always Miguel Romero. Miguel Romero, Ramón and Fausto Alcázar, 
Julián Ramos and Epitacio Ramirez formed a small group, but Miguel was the 
head of the group. He always fiddled. He gave a large tract of our ejido land to 
one of his brothers. There were four, five men who managed the ejido, they put 
the people in, or removed them. I never agreed with these practices, these Mafias, 
not in the ejido, nor in the parties. Epitacio was the ejido commissioner some 
eight, ten times. Miguel Romero some ten times as well, Ramón Alcázar as well; 
only they were ever commissioner; when one left the post the other one took it up. 
These men were superior. They knew more, had more knowledge. We did not 
know anything, we did not even know how the ejidos worked, nor how the 
Reforma Agraria worked, we knew nothing. Therefore we had to put people in 
office who did know. But in any case they put themselves in. They were 
courageous in the face of people who worked against them. In that time people 
used guns and pistols. Things were carambas in those days. People who had no 
problems tried not to get involved. 
Salvador Lagos commented about the men keeping control over the ejido: 
Some 40, 50 years ago there were dictatorial authorities (autoridades de 
dictadura) in La Canoa. Some three, four men decided everything in the ejido. 
These men also took land away from several ejidatarios and gave it to their 
relatives. For that reason, all the sons of former ejido commissioners possess ejido 
plots! Some 15 years ago, these useless people (inútiles) lost influence. 
As will become clear in the next chapters, the hatred felt for these local bosses meant that 
the stories about them are exaggerated. They did not monopolize ejido plots, nor were they 
ejido commissioner ten times, nor did the children of ejido commissioners all acquire ejido 
plots. Yet, these stories have to be analyzed in relation to the hatred these men caused in 
cases in which they did indeed dispossess someone of his plot (see chapter five). 
Story-Telling and Tensions Within and Between Families 
Returning to the question of local story-telling and local heroes, an interesting picture 
emerges. The sons and daughters of the founders of the ejido will stress the efforts of their 
fathers in developing the ejido and the fact that the other villagers have never appreciated 
their efforts. At the same time, the sons of these men had difficult relations with their 
incommunicative and hard fathers and developed feelings of resentment towards these 
"heroic" men. However, the founders are not the subject of hero worship principally because 
they developed into authoritarian local bosses. A lot of hard feelings exist in the ejido about 
these men and hard feelings do not seem to produce heroic tales. In conclusion, story-telling 
56 Chapter 2 
about the history of the ejido is rich, but also fragmented and emotional. This is related to 
the enormous number of conflicts that emerged after the creation of the ejido between but 
also within families. 
Factions, the Kinship Idiom and the Construction of Community 
Having discussed the history of the village and ejido La Canoa, I will now turn to present-
day divisions and social life. Although it is common in studies on rural Mexico to read about 
village factions, and the importance of kinship and compradazgo relations in local politics, 
I found that reality is more complex than these views would have us believe. Although the 
villagers themselves also like to talk in terms of clear-cut divisions in the village and the 
central role of kinship relations, we have to be very careful in our analysis of the meaning 
of these statements. 
On the Absence of Factions and the Kinship Idiom 
Factionalism and powerful political families form a rich tradition in the anthropology of rural 
Mexico (Bartra and Calvo 1975, Friedrich 1986, Schryer 1980, Zarate 1993), and as much 
this was an important theme during my research. The division between the "PRI-
establishment" and the "opposition", which I mentioned above, was the clearest form of 
division in the ejido during the research. However, the dividing lines were not clear-cut and 
most ejidatarios did not belong to either of these two "camps". The "establishment" which 
was a network formed around the Romeros, had most characteristics of a "political family" 
in the sense of persons who share the same name and which develop into a group with 
political purposes (Friedrich 1986: 106-107). However, although they had some 
characteristics of a "political family" this group had nothing like the power of the mighty 
political rural families described by other authors. 
Since the end of the 1970s, this "political family" around the Romeros was reduced to 
a few men who did not aspire to strong political control but instead tried to prevent others 
from causing "trouble". This was not a "political family" who had monopolized land or 
other resources, nor had they tried to make political careers through the ejido and PRI 
networks. The "opposition group" was less based on kinship ties and more on political 
sympathies. Their main political project was to counter the influence of the "establishment" 
and at times it seemed that they were principally fighting the influence which this "political 
family" had had in the past. Memories of past injustices played an important role in the 
motivations of this group. In reality, the "opposition group" was more a loose network of 
allies in which different people participated over the years. Their activities were focused in 
particular on the struggle for the "lost land". 
As the idea of differing interests and the organization that takes place around these was 
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a central component of my research project I also looked for other ways to define divisions 
in the village. Another common way to look for divisions is to try to distinguish factions 
consisting of people who follow the same leader in a political competition and who fight at 
one another's sides through a series of engagements but without sharing a common ideology 
(Bailey 1969: 52). However, it also proved impossible to define interest groups according 
to central problems and conflicts in the ejido and the mobilization around certain leaders. 
Interest groups could be distinguished around problems during specific periods but next time 
different interests were at stake. There were enduring problems in the ejido, as we shall see, 
but it was impossible to distinguish more or less stable interest groups of ejidatarios or 
villagers on the basis of these problems. One reason for the lack of stable groups around 
certain conflicts was that these were complex matters in which it was not a question of being 
for or against certain positions. Ejidatarios could take different positions in conflicts 
according to changing situations, perspectives and people involved. Positions were never 
fixed, and nor were the groups around certain problems. As Tapia points out "in the social 
web of power, political relations do not develop in a single direction nor are they produced 
within socially homogeneous groups. They generate alliances and oppositions; they become 
more diverse or homogenous, and are repeatedly reorganized according to strategies 
dependent on interests at stake, the actors present, the resources available and the social 
forces that as a whole determine the local political context" (Tapia 1992: 385 own 
translation). 
Furthermore, all divisions in the village and ejido are cross cut by other quarrels and 
relationships. This is very well expressed by Barth in his study of an Indonesian village: 
"Certain factional cores of persons can be identified who, for the moment, share positions 
and interests; but most persons have their particular networks of friendship, kinship, 
sympathies, conflicts and enmities, which for each one of them covers less than the village 
as a whole. Therefore, linkages do not add up to larger factional groups, and few longer 
sequences of events can be identified as resulting from the systematic strategies of such 
groups" (Barth 1993: 119). Hence, several times when I thought that I had more or less 
captured the central divisions in the ejido, new problems came up and new configurations of 
people became visible which did not fit into my model. Ejidatarios could work together for 
some time and then split up and continue the work with others. Alternatively, they could start 
working with someone with whom they had been in a conflicts shortly before. 
I often felt disturbed by these changing coalitions and networks. However, the people in 
the village always found logical explanation for these shifts in loyalty. Without exception 
these explanations took the form of kinship relations. They could say, for example: It is 
logical that he has changed his position as he is a nephew of the ejido commissioner and 
therefore wants to support him. or they could say: His loyalty to Pedro can be explained by 
the fact that his wife is a sister of Pedro. Villagers also liked to explain divisions in terms 
of family lines. For example, Ruben Romero told me that the main division in the ejido was 
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between the Romero and Garcia families and that each family had always had their own 
candidates for the ejido elections. On the other hand, according to Iginio Nunez this supposed 
division between the Romero and the Garcia families only concerned minor quarrels. Igninio: 
They are both cacique families! There are both of the same. They may have small quarrels 
but in the end they meet again and organize themselves together. It has always been like that. 
Furthermore, the Romeros and Garcías have intermarried a lot and are all part of the same 
now. Iginio's idea that the Romeros and Garcías were close allies was an exaggeration as 
the Garcías and Romeros did not get along very well. On the other hand, the fact that Rubén 
and other Romeros stressed so strongly their opposition to the Garcia families seemed more 
related to the conflict about Jose's daughter Miriam who was made pregnant by a son of 
Ricardo García than to a long-lasting division in the ejido (see the next section). After some 
time I also realized that when villagers talked about the Romeros or the Garcías they only 
referred to one or two of these men and not to entire families with this surname. For 
example, when villagers talked in a disapproving way about the Garcías, they always referred 
to Ricardo García and not to his brothers Tomás and Juan, who never played a prominent 
role in local affairs. 
The fact that villagers in La Canoa tend to use kinship relations to explain divisions in 
the ejido is similar to what Bailey experienced in the Indian village Bishara. He noticed that 
there were two factions in the village and when he first inquired about this, it seemed as if 
the two groups were recruited through kinship. "The two leaders represented different lines 
of descent and were each, so it seemed, supported by close kinsmen and opposed to more 
distant kinsmen. Closer investigation showed that this was not quite the case, and there were 
several examples of people changing sides and of close kin (an uncle and his nephews) being 
in opposed factions" (Bailey 1969: 47). Friedrich describes the same experience in the village 
Naranja, in Michoacán, where people tend to speak of village factions in terms of political 
families. However, he found out that in reality factions were not so strictly based on family 
lines as "each faction included at least one person from every political family" (Friedrich 
1986: 107). 
In conclusion, while there was always considerable activity in the village and ejido it was 
difficult to talk about long-lasting coalitions, factions, or family networks based on political 
projects, common interests, or shared histories. In the next section I discuss the role of the 
kinship idiom in social life. 
On Socializing Circles and Visible and Invisible Relatives and Compadres 
As has been stated, kinship relations are often mentioned as explanations for the political 
actions of other people. As will be shown in the subsequent chapters, kinship relations and 
"the family" are indeed highly valued in the village and many support networks exist among 
relatives, compadres (ritual co-parents), padrinos (godfathers) and ahijados (godchildren). 
However, as Sabean points out, "in a certain sense, where everyone is kin, no one is kin; 
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that is to say, all the connections between kin could hardly carry the same meaning, moral 
exigency, or attitude" (Sabean 1998: 3). This also became clear after having lived with the 
people for an extended period. Although it is clear that kinship relations are very close after 
some time one realizes that not all kinship ties are valued. In Barth's words "becoming more 
familiar with the community, the anthropologist discovers that there are also close kin who 
do not visit each other, and that people are aware of strands in the relations of close kin that 
are not so positively valued" (Barth 1993: 127). For example, after some time I noticed that 
in some families that I regularly visited they maintained close relationships with several 
brothers, sisters, uncles and other relatives but there were also relatives who never visited 
the house and who were never commented upon. The elaboration of a genealogy and 
discussions about it, also drew the attention to these "invisible" kinsmen. 
In this context it is important to pay some attention to a central institution for the creation 
of social ties, compadrazgo (ritual coparenthood). During the rituals of the Catholic church 
a man and a woman may be invited to become padrino and madrina of a child and 
accompany the child in the church ceremony. In the life of every person there are many 
occasions when these relations are established. Baptism, when a child receives Holy 
Communion for the first time, confirmation and marriage are all well-known occasions, but 
people may also be invited to become godparents when children finish primary school or 
secondary school, when girls celebrate their fifteenth birthday, and on several other 
occasions. The godparents of baptism and matrimony are considered to be the most important 
ones. 
Children address their godparents with much respect. The godparents not only assume 
certain responsibilities towards their godchild, but also establish a special relationship with 
the parents of the godchild. "The importance of compadrazgo stems from the fact that 
godparents share the parent's divine mission" (de la Peña 1984: 210). The godfather (or 
godmother) of a child, becomes compadre (or comadre) of the parents of this child. Literally 
this means co-parent. Comadres and compadres have a special bond and help and support 
each other whenever necessary. They always address each other as compadre or comadre 
which stresses the special bond. Compadrazgo relations are highly valued in Mexico. It will 
be clear that many elements play a role in the choice of padrinos for children. As the idea 
of care is central, many compadrazgo relations are established among close relatives. Another 
common option is the formation of compadrazgo relations with wealthy and influential 
bosses, in the hope that they will take care of the child and help the family when necessary. 
On the other hand, it is clear that not everyone can be asked to become a godfather or 
godmother. Normally, certain relations already exist between people which one tries to 
emphasize and strengthen through relations of compadrazgo. 
Parents with many children have established many relations of compadrazgo in their life. 
Although relations of compadrazgo are highly valued, in the same way as kinship relations 
are, one discovers after some time that bonds with some compadres are stressed and 
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developed but others are not. Some compadres or comadres are not addressed in this way 
anymore. In some ways for the analyst those relatives and compadres with whom people do 
not have a relationship anymore are more interesting than the ones with whom they hold 
close relationships. Close relationships with these people are considered to be the normal 
state of affairs, whereas strained relations between relatives and compadres do not correspond 
with the ideology. These ruptures are often related to severe family conflicts and are not 
easily talked about. The "banned" relatives and compadres tend to become "invisible" and 
"inaudible". They do not visit the family anymore, do not attend birthday parties, and are 
not talked about. There is not even much gossiping about these people, they are ignored. 
I will now present the case of the spoilt relationship of compadrazgo between two sons 
of the agrarian fighters in the village, namely, between Ricardo, son of Juan Garcia, and 
Lorenzo, son of Miguel Romero. Today, it is hard to believe that the men are compadres as 
they completely ignore each other and there is no relation whatsoever between the two 
families. I spent much time at Lorenzo's house (see chapter four) and Ricardo Garcia and 
his family were hardly ever mentioned there. When mention was made of them, it always 
was in very negative terms, but Lorenzo himself never talked about Ricardo. In earlier times 
relations between Lorenzo and Ricardo had been very close indeed. In those days Lorenzo 
asked Ricardo to be the godfather at the baptism of his son Carlos. Several small conflicts 
later occurred between the two men but what caused the final rupture was the scandal with 
the construction of the local school which will be described in chapter six. Ricardo was ejido 
commissioner at that time and responsible for the embezzlement of a considerable amount 
of ejido money. Tensions in the village ran high and people were afraid that somebody might 
be killed. In this period Lorenzo went so far as to ask Ricardo how much his being padrino 
was worth, so that he could buy it off; he did not want him to be padrino of his son 
anymore. Ricardo responded that he was padrino of Carlos and that Lorenzo and he would 
remain compadres for the rest of their lives. However, the consequences of this conflict went 
further than the relation between the two men. Aurora Garcia, Ricardo's sister, was madrina 
of Lorenzo's oldest child Dolores. The relation between Lorenzo and Aurora as compadres 
also came under pressure because of this conflict. Aurora supported her brother in this 
conflict and blamed Lorenzo for criticizing Ricardo. It is iUuminating to hear Aurora talk 
about the separation which was caused by these problems: 
Lorenzo's attitude towards Ricardo hurt me very much. Despite the fact that 
Dolores is my goddaughter and Lorenzo is my compadre, Lorenzo has been very 
rude to us. Before these problems, Lorenzo often passed this way. He is very bold 
and always looked to see what I was preparing. Then he used to take a tacofrom 
the pan. In the time that this conflict was going on he once arrived and asked me: 
what tacos do you have Aurora? I said: there are no tacos. Lorenzo: but I see a 
pan full. Then I responded: but for you there are no tacos here. I said this 
impertinence because of all the tensions and problems going on. Lorenzo never 
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came to the house again to have a taco. Now, a long time after the conflict, he 
sometimes comes to the house to borrow something but he never comes for a taco 
anymore. 
This example shows well how past experiences to a large degree determine present relations 
and forms of socializing between families and how relations between relatives and compadres 
may also change. This example also illustrates the role of pride and honor. It was more than 
twenty years ago that Aurora insulted Lorenzo but he never again visited her to have food. 
All these intrigues also explain the highly exclusive "visiting" and "socializing" circles 
in the village. For all families in the village visiting other houses is restricted to a small 
circle of very close relatives and friends. Only within these circles do we find the ideology 
of the "hospitable open house" where everybody can enter and will be well received. Most 
villagers will never enter a house if they do not have close relations with those living there. 
This means that "the house" as a locus of socializing is not only a form of inclusion but also 
of exclusion. Within these visiting circles people are very hospitable, eat together, and help 
each other in many different ways. Contacts with people who do not form part of this small 
intimate circle may take place in the street, in the church group, or in the bars. These 
contacts may concern exchange of information, working arrangements, the latest gossips, 
themselves etc. Here also circles can be distinguished of people who often talk to each other 
and people who will never exchange a word. 
Although these tensions between relatives and compadres may only seem natural, it 
means that we have to be careful with the idiom of family and compadrazgo, especially in 
situations in which the "imagery and idiom of family ties"(Rouse 1989: 3) is central to the 
reflections on relations between people. Several people have studied how selection within the 
kingroup occurs. It has been argued that because bilateral kinship systems are less bounded 
than other kinship systems, it forces people to choose a limited number of kin for meaningful 
social relations (Lomnitz and Perez 1987: 393). Long has argued that because in the Peruvian 
highlands "the kinship is open-ended ... people face the necessity of introducing into an 
existing kin relationship certain non-kinship criteria in order that the relationship may be 
more precisely specified in terms of the types of benefits, obligations and patterns of 
exchange that can be expected" (Long 1977: 158). Yet, the "selection" of only a small 
number of kinspeople for close relations and the fact that different types of benefits and 
obligations may be implied in kinship relations, means that there is no such thing as an 
exclusive "kinship domain", and that it is necessary instead to examine the uses of kinship 
within the varied contexts of people's practical concerns (cf. Geertz and Geertz 1975: 169 
in de la Pena 1984: 206). We should be sensitive to the "political" use of the kinship idiom 
(see also Bailey 1969, Bloch 1971, and Barth 1993). The idiom of kinship and compadrazgo 
can bring people together but also separate them; it shows the importance of the family as 
an ideological construction (Rapp 1982). 
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Mestizo Ejidos and (a Lack of) Community? 
There have been a large number of serious conflicts within and between families in the 
village. For example, there were several murders which influenced relations in the village 
for decades. Many resentments exist about inheritance problems and there have been several 
conflicts over land. Some of these conflicts are old. Others are very recent. Many of these 
conflicts are painful for the people involved and not always easily talked about. As kinship 
and ritual kinship are so highly valued people try to avoid commenting upon conflicts with 
their next of kin or compadres. In general people also try to avoid speaking ill of the 
deceased. Although some do not mind talking about the dead caciques, others prefer to say 
as few bad things as possible. At public meetings in the ejido people were also reprimanded 
when they started talking about the problems some of the deceased had caused the ejido in 
the past. Hence, the majority of people in the village are connected to each other by long-
standing relations of real and fictive kinship, they share histories of violent conflicts, and in 
their daily life they have to get on with each other. 
Much has been written about the internal division, distrust, and conflictive nature of 
Mexican villages (see the debate between Redfield 1930 and Lewis 1951). It has often been 
argued that mestizo ejidos in particular are ridden by internal conflicts, gossiping, and 
distrust. This is in contrast to Indian communities which are said to be much more egalitarian 
and cohesive. The explanation for this difference is often sought in the fact that ejidos are 
"not only of more recent formation but also tend to group together people from a large 
number of ranchos, such that internal ties of kinship tend to be thinner than in the Indian 
communities and ejidos" (Lomnitz 1992: 178). These theories about the lack of cohesion in 
mestizo villages in comparison to the Indian communities may be criticized for several 
reasons. First of all, as Ouweneel (1990) points out, the romantic image of the egalitarian 
Indian community is losing its footing and is being challenged by several authors who show 
the internal differentiation and unequal distribution of resources in Indian villages. Secondly, 
a mythical and romanticized view of community underlies these theories. Namely, the view 
that communities with a long and stable existence are not characterized by division, conflicts, 
and gossiping. However, there is no practical evidence to support this position. Furthermore, 
the idea that kinship relations diminish conflicts is arbitrary. Barth shows well in his study 
of a Balinese village that "closeness and loyalty also entail control, interference, and 
disapproval" and are accompanied by gossiping and slander (Barth 1993: 127). So, it seems 
doubtful to assume that kinship is a factor which prevents conflicts and divisions. La Canoa 
is a good example of the contrary. 
Yet, I would argue that conflicts and tensions do not mean that there is a lack of 
"community". All feelings which refer to belonging to certain networks or groups of friends 
and enemies are part of the construction of situated communities (Appadurai 1997). In my 
view, the construction of situated communities also implies the marking of distinctions 
between different social categories and processes of "exclusion and constructions of 
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otherness" (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 13). Furthermore, the construction of community is 
always related to forms of dominance (see Sabean 1984). In the same way as the history of 
numerous conflicts, the many village festivities strengthen "feelings of belonging". All the 
pleasure but also the complaints, gossiping, and quarrels contribute to the production of 
community. At these festivities social political divisions are strongly expressed, as well as 
the dominance of certain groups in the village. For example, the richest men are expected 
to make an important contribution to the fireworks for the annual feast and there is always 
competition between different sections of the village about who collects the most money for 
the festivities. Naturally "numerous anthropological studies have also paid careful attention 
to the ways in which Mexican local celebrations traditionally served simultaneously to 
reaffirm rights in communal lands and neighborhood structures, reinforce community 
solidarity, and redistribute wealth by requiring sponsors to underwrite their cost" (Beezley 
et al. 1994: xx). Hence, in La Canoa, the community as an imagined and lived entity to 
which a large part of the feelings and the intimate social worlds are related plays a very 
important role. I will now pay some attention to the festivities and scandals in the village 
which contribute to this construction of a situated community. 
The Village: its Festivities, Gossiping, and Scandals 
Village life is very rich in all kinds of social gatherings. Religion plays an important role in 
the life of the people and almost everybody belongs to the Catholic Church. The many 
Catholic celebrations during which relations of compadrazgo are established form the motive 
for big parties. However, any event may be the motive for a big party if the family has 
money to spend. According to the importance of the event and the wealth of the family, 
chicken, goat or pork may be served. Other festive meals are pozole and tamales. Sometimes 
a pig is especially slaughtered and the whole day long the participants in the party are eating 
the different parts of the animal. During these festivities a lot of alcohol is consumed. The 
favorite drinks are beer and tequila or brandy mixed with soft drinks. Women and men 
usually separate during these events and have their own tables or places. Women may also 
drink a lot during these festivities although women should not get drunk. On the other hand, 
men may get drank during these festivities. Children play around during this partying and 
have a good time on their own. 
The birthday parties are very important for women. Unlike men who spend most of their 
time out of the house, women are expected to remain in the house and are not allowed to 
"walk around". So birthday parties are excellent occasions for women to socialize and have 
some fun. Favorite topics among women during these meetings and birthday parties are their 
husbands and how they are treated by them. Besides these private parties at which only 
people from a close circle of friends and relatives are invited, there are also many other 
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festivities in the village and region. For example, in August they celebrate the fiesta of the 
piñatas in La Canoa. Young unmarried men and women throw a piñata towards each other. 
The person who does not catch the piñata and lets it fall, has to bring a bottle of home-made 
punch next time. The unmarried young women have to organize these gatherings. However, 
the most important festivities are those of each village's saint's day. Around this day, a 
whole week of festivities is organized which is intended to attract people from the 
neighboring villages and the hijos ausentes (the absent children) from the United States. 
In the beginning of November, La Canoa celebrates its saint, the Virgin of Guadalupe. 
Although the official date of the Virgin of Guadalupe is the 12th of December, according to 
the villagers they have always celebrated this day in November as otherwise their festivities 
would coincide with the national celebration of the Virgin and then nobody would visit their 
village. During the twelve days of festivities in honor of the Virgin they have many 
activities. A fair is brought to the village, dances are organized for the evenings, and bull 
riding takes place during the day. The last and the most important day of the 12 days 
celebration is the 12th of November. Then several priests come to the village, the mariachi 
from Autlán plays during the mass and the first communion of several children is celebrated. 
The festivities end with a display of fireworks on the 12th of November. The villagers 
together collect the money for the fireworks, but the wealthy families pay most of it. Gustavo 
Romero, a rich farmer, for example, always makes an important contribution to the cost of 
the fireworks. For the organization of the many activities a special group is formed which 
also takes care of collecting money from the villagers. Normally, this group is composed of 
young people of the village. 
Amusingly, during the time of my research, the villagers had numerous problems with 
the new parish priest about the village festivities. The parish priest had only recently arrived 
in the village after many years during which the villagers had requested their own priest. 
Until then, a priest from Autlán had come to La Canoa to say mass but they wanted their 
own priest. The villagers themselves had cooperated in building the priest's house and finally 
a priest was assigned to the village. However, from the very start difficulties emerged 
between the villagers and the new priest. The women in the village, who are most active in 
the church, were annoyed by a number of innovations the priest introduced. First of all, he 
intended to change the date of the village festivities. These had to be changed to December 
as that was the real date of the Virgin of Guadalupe. However, the villagers strongly opposed 
his interference and had their village feasts on the same date as always. The priest also 
wanted to have more control over the money of the feasts. This caused great indignation 
from the women who had been most active in the organization of the feasts all these years. 
So, a subtle struggle started between the priest and the villagers. For example, on the days 
of the feasts the priest took so much time for the mass that the dance could not start in time. 
Another important event takes place at the end of each year. The last days of the year 
and the first days of the new year bull riding and rodeos take place in the village. This is a 
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common form of diversion in rural villages in which young men try to stay as long as 
possible on the back of a bull. Besides the achievements of the men on the bull, the men on 
horse-back can show off their ability to lasso the legs or the head of the bull when the bull 
needs to be caught and sent away. This spectacle takes place in the bull ring in the village 
and is very popular among the villagers. The villagers cooperate in the costs of organizing 
these festivities. The organizers of the bull riding sell tickets to people who want to watch 
the spectacle and sell beer and food. The idea is that if money remains after the payment of 
all costs, it is used for village projects. For that reason the organizing committee is called 
the Junta de mejoras (committee of improvements), but as one woman remarked: The only 
point is that they do not do the mejoras anymore. The money stays with the organizers. 
There is always a lot of gossiping and talking going on in the village around these events. 
It is often said that the organizers keep the profits in their own pockets, or that they drink 
all the beer that is left over. So every year it is said that this time there will be no bull riding 
as the people refuse to cooperate any longer. But in the end, it is always organized. Many 
people say that the bull ring is a shame and the worst to be found in the surroundings. It is 
true that it is in a terrible state and many women do not go to the bull riding in La Canoa 
because one has to make an awkward climb to get onto the boards that serve as seats 
surrounding the bull ring. In 1992 one of the boards broke and a group of people fell down. 
One person Alfonso Romero was injured. He had to have an operation on his foot and will 
be crippled for the rest of his life. 
The most important of these village feasts are naturally those of the towns of el Grullo 
and Autlan. The carnival of Autlan is especially well known and many people come over 
from the United States to be part of these festivities. Besides the bull riding real corridas are 
then organized with famous Mexican toreros. During the days of the carnival in Autlan, all 
offices in the town are closed. These festivities have an important function in the 
consolidation of friendship bonds, compadrazgo relations, and also in the striking of business 
deals. 
A Village Scandal: the Dishonoring of a Romero Girl by a Garcia Man 
One of the big events in La Canoa during my research was that a "son of the village" had 
been ordained a priest by the pope in Rome and that he would give his first mass as a priest 
in his natal village La Canoa. Naturally, this was a very special occasion for everybody in 
the village. His godmother Aurora Garcia and one of his godfathers both gave a calf for the 
meal at the festivities. Another one gave a pig. Money was collected among all the villagers 
for the mariachi at the mass and for the banda at the feast after the mass. The meal and the 
party took place in the central plaza of the village. It was a big and very pleasant event in 
which people from far away participated. Even relatives from the United States came over 
to be present at this celebration. During the meal many comments were made about the good 
looks of the new priest but there was another thing that seemed to receive far more attention 
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that day than the priest: the presence at the meal of Miriam Romero and her baby. 
Miriam was José Romero's youngest daughter who was made pregnant by Juan Garcia 
(son of Ricardo García). This had been the latest scandal in La Canoa. Juan Garcia and 
Miriam had been novios (boyfriend and girlfriend) in the village for quite some time and 
when Miriam got pregnant, the boy abandoned her. This caused much indignation among the 
Romeros but also among other families in the village. The fact that the girl got pregnant was 
a shame, but much worse was the fact that the boy abandoned the girl. It was said that Juan 
wanted to marry Miriam but that his father Ricardo was opposed to the marriage. This 
attitude of Ricardo was seen as another indication of the fact that he felt his children were 
too good for anyone in the village, even for the Romeros who were one of the more 
influential families. The same had happened with Ricardo's oldest son who had made two 
girls in the village pregnant. He finally married the second one, but only after serious threats 
made to Ricardo by the father's girl. Rumors said that Ricardo had offered José money to 
help Miriam, but this had only made José angrier and he had furiously replied: tell me how 
much your daughters are worth, then I will buy one of yours! José had sent Miriam to her 
brother and sister who lived in Los Angeles, where she gave birth to a daughter. 
For the Romeros this was not a problem between the two adolescents Miriam and Juan 
but a conflict between the Romeros and the Garcías. It was speculated that matters could get 
out of hand and that somebody might be killed. Although it was presented as a conflict 
between the two families, I often found José drinking at the corner of the street with 
Ricardo's brother Tomás García and with Ricardo's nephew Vicente Garcia. This was 
always in a friendly atmosphere. After the talks about the conflict between the two families 
and the possible dramatic and bloody consequences, I was amazed to see these men drinking 
together. When I expressed my confusion with some of the Romero men, they acknowledged 
that the fight was only with Ricardo and not with the other Garcías. 
After spending a year in Los Angeles and having given birth to her baby, Miriam 
apparently thought it was time to present her daughter to the village and she arrived at the 
meal for the priest. This was the first time, that she openly and in public showed her 
daughter to the village. Miriam ostensibly walked around at the feast with her daughter on 
her arm. Logically, this was the cause of much gossiping and speculation. Many people did 
not even know that she had arrived in the village and her appearance with the baby caused 
much surprise. What were her intentions at being present in such a conspicuous way during 
an event in which the Garcia family played an important role? Not only Ricardo García was 
walking around, but also Juan, the father of the baby. Although many people were surprised 
by Miriam's nerves, most agreed about her intentions: she had returned to the village to 
marry Juan. Many bets were made about whether she would succeed or fail in her plans. 
However, the common opinion was that she came to fight a lost battle and that she only 
made herself ridiculous. 
A month later, Miriam was still in La Canoa and nothing spectacular had occurred. 
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However, there were signals that something was in the making. For example, on one 
occasion Ricardo García's daughters were at the house of one of Miriam's sisters playing 
with her children. This was a clear sign that something was about to happen for Ricardo's 
daughters never left the house and never socialized with other people in the village. So, the 
families were approaching each other and had probably already reached an agreement. Some 
days later, Miriam's sister said that Miriam and Juan would get married in a week. She said 
that Juan had told his father that he would follow Miriam to the United States if he did not 
let him marry her. Ricardo finally gave in and officially asked for Miriam at José's house. 
Miriam's plan had worked out fine. 
Still within the Romero family opinions differed. Several people said that Miriam would 
do better not to marry Juan as this whole affair had only proved again the real nature of the 
Garcías. Lorenzo, José's older brother, and his wife and children in particular were very 
contemptuous about this wedding and made nasty jokes about it. They did not want to have 
anything to do with it. Miriam and Juan finally had a simple wedding. They got married in 
a civil ceremony and not in church. Because of the whole history they did not have a party 
either but only a meal for the brothers, sisters, and parents. This was organized at Ricardo's 
house. 
This example shows the richness and density of social relations in La Canoa and how 
existing lines of division through the village can manifest themselves in the light of new 
events. 
Conclusion: Local Histories and the Construction of Community 
We saw that the establishment of the ejido La Canoa cannot be analyzed in terms of the 
struggle of a corporate community which successfully fought against the hacendados and 
afterwards developed collective localized histories and heroic tales. Smith rightly argues that 
"when peasants ... rebel, we are often tempted to slip back into stereotypical and 
decontextualized notions of the peasant community as one of tradition and homogenous 
solidarity" (Smith 1991: 182). Smith shows how a relatively successful rebellion by a peasant 
community in Peru gave rise to heightened political struggle and debate within the 
community and how "in the push and pull of debate, history itself is reconstituted" (ibid.: 
182). This is precisely what happened in La Canoa. There we see how discursive struggles 
and different reconstructions of history are related to new forms of dominance which 
developed after the founding of the ejido. This is not to say that there are no themes of 
collective importance in the ejido. But the interests and stories around it may divide people 
more than they unite them. For that reason I talk about a situated community (Appadurai 
1997) in which people are connected to each other by different types of experiences and in 
which one always finds forms of dominance and various mechanisms of inclusion and 
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exclusion. 
In this chapter the stories that villagers in La Canoa tell about the past were analyzed and 
confronted with the master narrative of the Mexican revolution and agrarian reform. The 
recent emphasis on regional histories (Benjamin and Wasserman 1990, Mallon 1995) as well 
as the stress on "history from below", from the subaltern or the oppressed, have led to 
important changes in the socio-historical analysis of the Mexican revolution. Joseph and 
Nugent, following the work of James Scott, see traditions of historical memory as part of 
popular subcultures of resistance (Joseph and Nugent 1994: 11). They try to develop "an 
analytical framework for simultaneously integrating views of the Mexican revolution 'from 
below' with a more compelling and nuanced 'view from above'" (ibid.: 12). Although these 
are very promising new perspectives, in my view, there are several elements which we 
should take into account when we analyze local culture and story-telling. 
First of all, we should be careful not to reify the oppressed or the subaltern and in this 
way present an undifferentiated view of rural people. For example, who are the subaltern in 
La Canoa: all villagers, all ejidatarios, the poorer ejidatarios, the landless families, or other 
groups? In addition, we should not try to "read" coherence in local stories or "popular 
culture" when they are perhaps more characterized by fragmentation and diversity. Finally, 
as Rowe and Schelling put it "the assumption that the culture of subaltern groups is 
necessarily the expression of resistance to state authority creates problems of its own. To 
place the relationship between dominant power and the popular inside a vocabulary of 
conformity versus resistance entails simplification and distortion of the issues" (Rowe and 
Schelling 1991: 10-11). A similar point is made by Sayer who argues against reifying the 
state and the project of the state, but adds that it is equally dangerous and misleading to reify 
and to attribute undue coherence to resistance and popular culture. He makes the point that 
unarticulated revolutionary sentiments and subversive subscripts frequently are not projects. 
To treat them as projects of resistance would be a misconstruction with totalizing tendencies. 
In this way we would fabricate a popular culture of resistance from the diversities we are 
trying to make sense of. This would very much resemble the way in which "the state" is 
itself ideologically constituted (Sayer 1994: 372). 
We observed that in La Canoa people refer frequently to the national history of the 
revolution and agrarian reform while they present a very unclear picture of the local agrarian 
history. The agrarian struggle is presented as a fight of los pobres against los ricos. 
However, the ricos are nameless: hardly anybody knew the name of the last owner of the 
hacienda La Canoa. On the other hand, there is a great deal of story-telling on other themes. 
In these stories no attempt is made to relate them to the broader national narrative of agrarian 
reform. Furthermore, these stories are fragmented and do not arrive at conclusions. 
Recurring stories are about the hidden treasures of the revolution, the occasion that the 
village was set on fire by the Cristeros, and the inexplicable wealth of don Filomeno, the 
great-grandfather of most ejidatarios. Other important elements in the stories of the people 
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about the past are the continuous movement of people from one place to another, the 
suffering, and chaotic violence. Yet, it would be erroneous to represent this rich story-telling 
as a form of resistance to the state's hegemonic project. Although certain elements may 
challenge the master narrative, we do not find a consistent "alternative" to this narrative. 
However, on the basis of this material the success of the so-called hegemonic cultural project 
can certainly be doubted. No connection is made between local and personal stories and the 
master narrative. 
Contradictions, gaps, and fragmentation in stories about the period after the establishment 
of the ejido, are related to local level politics, family feuds and the difficult relation between 
fathers and sons. In the story-telling about this period, the image is sometimes conveyed that 
the agrarian reform in fact replaced the hacendado with cruel fathers and despotic bosses. 
Here some people hold the PRI, or the government, responsible as they did not protect the 
peasants against these new powerholders. Although ejidatarios are grateful to the PRI for the 
land they received and the support against the hacendados, some ejidatarios are very critical 
about other political practices. 
However, there are more reasons to doubt the success of the national cultural project of 
influencing the peasants' consciousness. Besides the national history, certain expressions 
related to the agrarian reform and the ejido ideology can be heard at the local level. The 
most important ones are "our fathers themselves fought for the land" and "land to the tiller". 
However, these expressions are primarily used in negotiations with the agrarian bureaucracy 
and in the defense of their own plot of land. The point is that the expression "land to the 
tiller" refers to a set of rules which have been legally endorsed after the revolution, and 
which remained central in negotiations over land rights. This became especially clear in the 
reaction of the ejidatarios to the reform of article 27 of the Constitution in 1992. Whereas 
politicians and academics were angry and emotionally claimed that this meant the end of the 
ejido and the betrayal of the Mexican revolution, the ejidatarios in La Canoa reacted very 
calmly. When they realized that they would become the "real owner" of their ejido plot, they 
were happy and the image of the revolution and its famous expressions were not used. The 
fact that the master narrative is used especially as a discourse in relations with the state 
bureaucracy, puts into serious doubt the success of the much commented hegemonic project 
of the Mexican state after the revolution. It seems that ejidatarios have developed an identity 
which is much more independent of the Mexican state than is generally assumed. I would not 
go so far as Bantjes who argues that "the attempted cultural revolution was actually, to a 
large extent, a failure" (Bantjes 1997: 132). Rather, I think that the material presented in this 
chapter confirms Knight's position who says that "the ideology of the revolution offered a 
set of ideas and symbols that many - not all - social actors could appropriate, espouse, and 
utilize in their dealings - and struggles - with one another" (1994a: 64). 
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Notes 
1. Although I use some notions introduced by Appadurai (1997), I do not adopt his highly innovative but also 
controversial theoretical framework. 
2. In 1856 the Law of Alienation of Properties in Dead Hands (Ley de Desamortización de Bienes de Manos 
Muertas) was issued which declared that all land belonging to civil or ecclesiastic corporations would be 
expropriated and become the property of the people renting such land. One of the main objectives of the 
law was to confiscate the enormous amount of properties concentrated in the hands of the Catholic Church. 
However, the commonly owned land of Indian communities also fell into the category of corporately held 
land. Although the law offered the possibility for the Indian communities to ask for the protection of their 
rights within three months of the issuing of the law, most communities never made this formal request 
because of ignorance of the new law or lack of economic resources. Many Mexicans, but also some 
foreigners, took advantage of this situation and appropriated most of the land of the Indian communities 
(see Reyes et at. 1974: 536-537, Mendieta and Nunez 1966: 109-114). 
3. An idea of land distribution at the beginning of the 20th century can be gained from the following: in 1910 
there were about 830 hacendados in Mexico who owned 97 per cent of the land, 410,300 farmers owned 
the rernaining 3 per cent of the land, while 96,9 per cent of the heads of rural families owned no land 
(Zaragoza and Macias 1980: 2). The hacendados often owned several haciendas and the largest among 
them owned millions of hectares. 
4. According to Esteva the word ejido comes from exitus, exit. In 15th century Spain, it designated the 
common land located at the exit of rural towns. The Spaniards used the word to refer later to the Indian 
communities they found in America. Struggling against the colonizers for the recovery of their spaces, the 
Indians got used to the word, which they firmly incorporated in their vernacular speech during the 19th 
century. The revolutionary claim in 1910 took the form of a recovery of the ejidos (Esteva 1980). 
5. INEGI, 1990, Encuesta Nacional Agropecuaria Ejidal, 1988. Volume I: Resumen General. 
6. INEGI, 1991, XI Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 1990. Jalisco. 
7. Until 1935 the region of Autlán could best be depicted as an isolated hinterland as there were no roads that 
connected the valley to other regions. The road to Guadalajara was inaugurated in 1935. 
8. Data from: El programa de desarrollo rural integral de la región Costa del Estado de Jalisco, 1985. 
9. According to the Censo General de Habitantes, 1921 Departamento de la Estadística Nacional. 
10. Initially Autlán asked for a restitution of land that had been taken away from Indian communities in the 
preceding centuries. As on most occasions in the Mexican land reform, the claim for restitution of Indian 
properties was not acknowledged and in 1921 the request for restitution was automatically changed by the 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform into a request for endowment of lands. This request was conceded and the 
ejido of Autlán was established in 1924. For the creation of the ejido of Autlán, part of the hacienda of 
La Canoa was expropriated. Autlán was a big ejido and started with more than 400 members. A large 
number of the members were landless people from La Canoa and Vista Hermosa. 
11. Interview with Ernesto Medina Lima, regional historian, July 1995. 
12. These lands belonged to very good friends of the General and although according to the resolution of the 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform these lands had to be given to the ejido Autlán, this never happened. At a 
later stage the ejido Autlán received a second extension of the ejido, but the first extension was never 
executed. The ejidatarios of Autlán are still trying to resolve this situation today. After the death of the 
General in 1979, they put considerable energy into the case again but so far without any success. 
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13. This expression was used during the years of the revolution and agrarian struggles to state that land should 
be taken from large landholders who did not work the land themselves but had their laborers till the land. 
The people who had rights to the land were therefore those who actually tilled it. 

CHAPTER 3 
THE EJIDO AND VILLAGE LA CANOA 
Introduction: the Ejido and a Transnational Village 
In the foregoing chapter we saw how dense sets of socio-political relations developed between 
villagers of La Canoa after the founding of the ejido. This chapter focuses in particular on 
the relation between ejidatarios and the growing group of landless families in the village. 
This relation is analyzed in the context of the increasingly transnationalized lives of the 
villagers. As we will see, the ejido is an important element in forging relations between 
people but not in the most obvious ways. Much of the literature on the ejido has too easily 
taken for granted the importance of ejido land as an economic means of production and has 
focused on the productive aspect of ejido land. However, as F. and K. von Benda Beckmann 
(1998) point out, property has functions other than the merely economic. Property may have 
functions for "social security, for the continuing of social groups, for cultural-religious and 
political positions, such as providing a basis for power and prestige, or for a socially 
acceptable fair or equitable distribution of wealth" (F. and K. von Benda Beckmann 1998: 
2). This chapter demonstrates that owning an ejido plot is not always important in economic 
terms but can, instead, be very important in determining socio-political relations. This 
becomes clear when we study the role the ejido played in village politics. Hence, in this 
chapter we look at the force field in which village politics have developed and study the role 
of regional political networks and the ejido for the organization of local projects. 
In this context, it is important to make the distinction between the village La Canoa and 
the ejido La Canoa more explicit. In administrative terms a separation exists between village 
and ejido. The ejido is an agrarian institution which falls under the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform, while the village is an administrative unit, falling under the 
municipality of Autlan. While in the beginning there was no real difference between ejido 
and village as almost all households received land, this situation changed over time. The 
number of landless families in the village grew and today the majority of households are 
landless. This means that the relation between ejido and village has changed drastically. As 
will become clear, village dynamics and ejido affairs are intricately related but sometimes 
in tense ways. Different categories of villagers (ejidatarios, non-ejidatarios, sons of 
ejidatarios and outsiders) are defined who claim differing rights, especially around conflicts. 
A phenomenon which has to be taken into account in any analysis of the ejido and the 
village today is migration to the United States. As Kearney points out, "today an adequate 
ethnography of seemingly rural Mexican communities must situate them within transnational 
and global contexts" (Kearney 1996: 3). Most villagers of La Canoa are embedded in 
transnational networks, and important support networks exist between people in La Canoa 
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and the United States. As Rouse argues, many migrants "during the last two decades have 
managed to maintain active involvements with the people and places they have left behind 
and, in so doing, have often helped create new kinds of communities that span the 
international border" (Rouse 1992: 27). This chapter discusses how migration influences life 
in the village and how it affects the relation between ejidatarios and landless villagers. 
The chapter is divided into several parts. First, an analysis is presented of the regional 
economy and the importance of ejido land for village households is examined. This is 
followed by a discussion of the role of migration in the local economy and how this combines 
with the "peasant way of life" in the village. Finally, the central role of the ejido in village 
politics is analyzed and the influence this has had on relations between landless villagers and 
ejidatarios is shown. 
The Village and the Regional Setting 
Infrastructure of the Village 
Nine kilometers along the paved road from Autlán to El Grullo, one finds the exit to La 
Canoa. A further six kilometers along a dirt road takes one to the village. In the rainy season 
this road can be in a terrible state. On the way to the village one goes along the irrigation 
canals that irrigate part of the ejido lands of La Canoa. The dominant crop in this irrigated 
zone is sugarcane. At a certain point along the road one crosses the main canal and leaves 
the irrigated zone behind to enter the dry area. Here the predominant crop is maize which 
is cultivated in the rainy season from May to November. The rest of the year one only finds 
here leftovers of the maize and cattle grazing. Some fifteen minutes after turning off the main 
road, one enters the village through the broad main street. At this entrance one finds a small 
chapel, a shop where men can be found drinking and talking, and a wooden bull ring. The 
broad entrance road leads to a small central plaza (el jardín), where the ejido house is 
situated and a little park with benches. This area where one enters the village is called el 
pueblo abajo (the village below) and is considered to be the rich part of the village because 
most of the bigger ejidatarios and landowners live here and one can find the wealthiest 
houses here. The most politically influential families also can be found here. There are 
certain parts in the pueblo abajo where several houses together belong to certain families, 
such as the Romeros, the Garcías, the Cosíos, the Fábregas and the Lagos. This is the oldest 
part of the village. From the plaza two sandy roads continue to the part of the village that 
is called el pueblo arriba. The pueblo arriba used to be the poorer part of the village. One 
of the sandy roads leads to the neighboring villages Vista Hermosa, el Castillo, and La 
Piedra. On this road one finds a big Catholic church; a new building that has never been 
completely finished. Today the difference between the pueblo abajo and the pueblo arriba 
is less pronounced than in former days. According to villagers, the reason is that many 
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families in el pueblo arriba have migrated to the USA and so they are no longer poorer than 
the families in el pueblo abajo. 
According to the government census of 1990, La Canoa has 837 inhabitants.1 My own 
research suggests that this is an overestimate. This means that many sons and daughters who 
live in the United States or elsewhere in Mexico were still counted in the census. In 1993 my 
figures were as follows. When I only counted the people present in the village at that time 
there were 690 inhabitants. When I included the unmarried migrant children I arrived at 
approximately 803 inhabitants. 
La Canoa is very much a rural village. From any house, one can walk directly to the 
fields, the cerro, and the river. There are a large number of cattle and in the street one often 
comes across herds of cows, which are on their way to the field or on their way back to the 
stable. Many men ride horses but this is considered to be more a sign of wealth and leisure 
than of work. Today, most ploughing on the arable land is done by machines. The houses 
used to have large corrales. In these corrales people have their fruit trees, plants, chickens, 
goats, a pig, and so on. People do not grow their own vegetables, but buy vegetables in the 
shops in the village. Some fruits and vegetables are freely collected in the commons of the 
ejido. 
There are several small shops and one telephone in the village, a public telephone in the 
shop of Lupe Medina. At certain hours of the day people are queuing to make their calls. 
There is little privacy when speaking on the telephone and it is a very good place to get into 
the details of the latest village dramas. As communication through the telephone is often bad, 
people tend to shout and everybody in the shop can follow the conversation and become 
acquainted with the latest news. This one telephone in the village is very important for the 
relations of migrants in the United States. Around the many small shops in the village, men 
may gather, buy their licor, and talk about the latest developments. There are also several 
bars in the village; rooms with some tables and chairs. From time to time someone tries to 
start a brothel with girls from outside the village. They always do this in great secrecy for 
as soon as the women in the village get notice of this, strong opposition starts. Until now all 
attempts to establish a brothel have been defeated by opposition from the women in La 
Canoa. The village has a large school complex for kindergarten, primary school, and 
secondary school (by television), a small clinic and a football field. 
When we look at the perceptions of the people of their own village, we find that the 
villagers never talk with pride about the state of their village. On the contrary, they talk in 
negative terms about the condition of the roads, the plaza, and the general filthy state of the 
village. The villagers always compare La Canoa with other villages which are much better 
organized, where they do have a nice plaza with flowers and trees, and where they have 
paved roads instead of earth roads. However, what people do greatly appreciate about life 
in La Canoa is the freedom, quietness, and healthy way of life. This is especially valued in 
comparison with unhealthy and speedy life in Autlan, the big Mexican cities (Guadalajara and 
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Mexico City) and especially the United States. They also appreciate the "natural richness" 
of the village in terms of fruit and vegetables that are out there just waiting to be collected 
by the people in the commons. 
The Regional Setting 
The Autlán - El Grullo valley is a predominantly agrarian region. There is little industry and 
what industry there is, is related to the agrarian sector: vegetable and fruit packing, the 
animal fodder industry, and maize sheller machines {desgranadoras). A great change was 
brought to the region in the 1950s when the Mexican government constructed an irrigation 
system which came into operation in the beginning of the 1960s. Since then almost half of 
the arable land in the valley has been irrigated and production and economic activities have 
greatly increased. In La Canoa half of the arable ejido land falls within the irrigated zone. 
Since irrigation was introduced, agriculture in the region has taken on a boom - bust 
character (see van der Zaag 1992). The area experienced a boom in the production of melon 
and watermelon in the beginning of the 1960s on lands irrigated by wells. Then soils were 
exhausted and production dropped. Under the influence of General García Barragán a 
sugarcane refinery was brought to the region in the 1960s. To begin with the mill operated 
very badly and few people planted sugarcane. Under the presidency of Echeverría the CNC 
cañera was introduced and Zuñiga became head of the organization for the region of Autlán. 
It was under Zuñiga that the CNC took over several tasks in the production of sugarcane 
such as the planting, harvesting, and transport of the sugarcane and that a number of services 
were introduced for the ejidatarios (see Guzman 1995). The working of the mill improved 
considerably. Although Zuñiga has become a controversial figure, who is especially hated 
by the urban elite of Autlán and El Grullo, most ejidatarios speak well of him. They 
recognize that he has greatly enriched himself and that he is involved in dubious affairs, but 
they appreciate what he did for them in their problems with the sugar mill: he achieved 
higher prices, better organization, more services, and more economic security. He is also 
greatly admired for the fact that he is so accessible and many ejidatarios, men as well as 
women, approach him when they have questions or problems concerning the sugarcane. 
Sugarcane is now the dominant crop on the irrigated lands. 
However, other crops have been important and have had their own histories. For 
example, towards the end of the 1960s a tomato boom started when the foreign company 
Griffin and Brand started renting land from private farmers in Autlán. Later other companies 
followed and five important tomato companies were working in the region (See González 
1994 and Torres 1994a). Many people either rented their land to the tomato companies or 
worked under contract for them. A serious problem with the tomato production was that after 
some three consecutive years of production, viruses and pests augmented and yields would 
decline. The companies then looked for other lands to rent. The depleted plots that were 
returned to the owner were no longer suitable for tomato production and the diseases were 
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difficult to eliminate (González 1994: 124). By the beginning of the 1990s the tomato 
companies had left the region and the packing plants in the region had closed. The larger 
ejidatarios and private landowners ran up enormous bank debts during the years when tomato 
production generated major losses and were facing bankruptcy (see Torres 1994b for a 
discussion about the Barzón movement which came up as a consequence of this crisis). 
The crisis in tomato production affected the whole region and not only the landowners. 
The tomato industry had offered a lot of employment during the harvesting and in the 
packing plants. That was all over now. Furthermore, the tomato boom had brought the region 
to life. New restaurants had been opened, bars did good business, as well as the many music 
groups, mariachis and bandas. There was a lot of money in circulation and everybody in the 
region, including the people without land profited from the boom. With the tomato crisis 
unemployment became a serious problem in the region. There was still considerable 
sugarcane production in the region but this is much less labor intensive than the tomatoes. 
As the regional economy depends so much on agriculture, changes in agriculture are directly 
felt in household economies. When agriculture is in crisis, the whole region is in crisis and 
when agriculture is booming, the regional economy is booming. During periods of crises 
there is a tendency for people to leave the region and during periods of booming, people 
from other regions come to look for work. 
Another phenomenon which brought prosperity to the region in the 1980s needs to be 
mentioned: namely the production and trafficking of marihuana. It is said that part of the 
tomato boom of the 1980s was caused by the marihuana which was hidden in the tomato 
boxes. Although the role of marihuana production is difficult to estimate, some of the agro-
exporters have indeed been caught trafficking in marihuana. A manager of a major bank in 
Autlán also estimated that a substantial part of incomes in the region could not be explained 
and were thus, according to him, probably from drug trafficking. 
One well-known drug producer and trafficker in the region was Amador Garcia, from 
La Canoa (grandson of Juan Garcia, one of the founders of the ejido). He was called el 
Chino (the Chinese) and was caught by the police at the end of the 1980s. Most people in 
La Canoa regret the fact that he was caught. They say that the police itself is involved in 
drug trafficking and that at least el Chino brought work, money, and parties to the village, 
while the police only bring trouble. People in the village recall the good times when el Chino 
was around, especially in times of crises. In 1993 there was a serious crisis in the region. 
There was a lack of money and work in the valley and people were having a hard time. 
Benita Romero, sadly recalled the good times with el Chino. Benita: 
In the time of el Chino everything was much better. He always had fields full of 
tomatoes, melons, and so on. He rented a lot of land besides his own land and he 
gave a lot of work to the people in the village. He was a sinvergüenza (shameless 
devil) in the sense that he had many women besides his family, but he was great 
with the people. He organized marvelous parties with music. Every year he paid 
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for the twelve o 'clock Mass of the feasts of La Canoa with mariachi. Nobody 
knew that he was in the drugs business. We heard that later after he was caught 
by the police. But the police itself is involved in the drug business. He was at least 
a good man who provided work and treated everybody in a decent way. I am very 
sad that he is no longer around. 
El Chino was well known in the valley. Once when we were at the funeral of somebody from 
La Canoa in the cemetery of Autlan, somebody came to me and asked worriedly if we were 
burying el Chino Garcia. El Chino, however, was only put in jail for a short time and then 
left for the United States leaving large debts in the village. However, every year he still pays 
for the Mass of the village feast and the priest publicly thanks him during the ceremony. 
Household Economies and the Distribution of Ejido Land 
Households and Support Relations 
The custom in the village is that a child who marries leaves the parental house to establish 
his or her own household. It is not common for a married couple to stay in the parental 
house. It is not difficult for the newly weds to find a house to rent or borrow, as many 
houses in the village are empty. Many marriages in La Canoa take place within the village 
itself. Even with the migration to the United States, many men return to the village to marry 
their girlfriend and take her back to the USA. It is widely said that love is the most important 
reason for a couple to marry. Naturally, there is always much gossiping and politicking 
around marriages. The most important themes of gossip are the economic position and 
responsibility of the man and the reputation and domestic qualities of the woman, but there 
is a great deal of freedom in the choice of marriage partners. Children who do not get then-
parents' consent elope and in this way force their parents to accept their choice. If possible, 
the family of the man helps the young couple to get started and provides a house. 
Traditionally, the economic support follows the paternal line and parents will especially 
support the households of their sons. So, when a boy and a girl come from different villages, 
they tend to go and live in the boy's village. Property is mostly inherited by one of the sons. 
However, there are no fixed inheritance rules and the child who looks after the aged parents 
until their death develops certain rights to the property, even if it is a woman (see chapter 
five). People who possess several plots of land, often divide their property between several 
sons by passing plots over to them during their life. 
Parents and children support each other considerably, although no fixed rules can be 
given and much depends on the position of the specific families and children. Unmarried 
children contribute to the household economy of their parents. They work in the house (girls) 
and on the land (boys) and if they have jobs the earnings goes to their parents. 2 However, 
this general rule is applied with great flexibility. Although many people said that the custom 
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was that the children gave all their earnings to their parents as long as they lived in the 
parental house, upon closer study it appeared that in many households these rules were not 
so strictly followed. Many children were allowed to use a large part of the money for 
themselves or to save money for their future households. Boys often started building a house 
for their future family. Girls could spend the money on dresses, presents, make-up, or had 
their own savings accounts. Even when they move away from the parental house unmarried 
children use to support their parents and regularly send them money. Naturally, one finds 
cases of "good and responsible" children who regularly send money to their parents and 
opposite cases of "irresponsible selfish children" (especially boys) who spend all their money 
on enjoying themselves and forget their family at home. When the children get married, the 
obligation to contribute to the parents' household diminishes. From this point on, the 
contribution is more voluntary and is normally more irregular. However, although these 
mutual support arrangements diminish, if necessary parents and children continue helping 
each other in different kind of ways. 
When the parents grow old, the care relation is reversed and the children become 
responsible for their parents. They may provide the necessary money, but will also look after 
them if they cannot live on their own anymore. Many old people prefer to stay on their own 
and are visited and looked after by their children and grandchildren in the village. When the 
parent cannot live on his or her own anymore, he or she chooses to live with one of the 
children. The child who remains in the parental house longest, usually looks after their 
parents. So, "whether single or married, young or old, offspring are entitled to affection and 
help from their parents and are obliged to reciprocate, especially in their parents' old age" 
(de la Pena 1984: 211). As many children live in the United States today, they often try to 
convince their parents to come and live with them in the USA. 
Households and Access to Ejido Plots 
If we define the household as the co-residential domestic unit, we find that many households 
in the village do not only include the nuclear family. Different combinations of relatives may 
be found in households. Often grandparents live in with one of their children, or 
grandparents raise the children of their unmarried daughter, divorced son, or migrant 
children. Bachelors and widows or widowers may live together. There are several women-
headed households, and households of women and men who live on their own. In order to 
show the distribution of land between households with different care tasks I distinguished 
four types of households in La Canoa. 3 
80 Chapter 3 
Table 3.1 Distribution of ejido plots between different types of households in La Canoa 
with ejido plot without ejido plot total 
household type 1 8(13) 52 (87) 60 
household type 2 8(16) 40 (83) 48 
household type 3 22 (50) 22 (50) 44 
household type 4 20 (45) 24 (55) 44 
total 58 (30) 138 (70) 196 
Note: row percentages between brackets 
1 = young households with young children 
2 = household with young children and older children who have started working 
3 = household without smaller children, only older children of whom some have left the house 
4 = old couples without children to take care of and old bachelors 
From table 3.1 it becomes clear that today 138 of the 196 households in the village do not 
have access to an ejido plot. 4 Furthermore, only 15 per cent of households with young 
children (type 1 and 2) possess an ejido plot as against 48 per cent of older households 
without young children (type 3 and 4). So, younger households in particular do not possess 
land. Many landless people are sons of ejidatarios for whom there was no land available 
anymore. That ejido land remains in the hands of the older generation is also illustrated by 
the age composition of the ejidatarios (see figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1 Age composition of the ejidatarios of La Canoa in 1993 
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The fact that land remains in the hands of the older people not only means that the young 
families are in a much more difficult economic position, but also that the older generation 
maintains a significant control over the distribution of resources. Parents normally help their 
children when they need economic support, but this also means that they keep a certain 
amount of control over their children. As we will see in the next chapter, economic support 
by ejidatario fathers may go along with considerable interference in the life of the children. 
Another important and delicate issue which plays a significant role in the relation between 
parents and children is the inheritance of the ejido land (see chapters four and five). In this 
way ejido land ownership "marks periods of transition between generations, demarcates areas 
of competence, and creates bonds of dependence" (Sabean 1990: 33). 
Households and Access to the Commons 
The commons have been an important resource for the growing group of landless families 
in the village. Most of the lands that the ejido La Canoa received were common lands, 
namely approximately 1800 hectares, as against only 400 hectares of arable lands. Unlike the 
arable lands, the agrarian law did not allow the division of the commons into individual 
plots. All members of the ejido had the right to an individual plot of arable land and to the 
use of the commons. Although officially the commons belonged to the ejidatarios, nobody 
complained if other families collected fruits and vegetables or hunted on these extensive 
terrains. Many landless families were even allowed by the ejidatarios to take a part of the 
commons for a coamil: an extensive form of maize cultivation. For the landless families the 
coamil can make a difference to the household economy. It makes it possible for them to 
produce their own maize and have some animals which they feed with the waste of the crop. 
Many of the landless families cherish their coamil. This also has to be seen in the light of 
the fact that many landless men are sons of ejidatarios, who did not inherit the plot of their 
father. Hence, the coamil is their only remaining link with the land. It remains a poor 
substitute, for they possess the land only as a loan from the ejido and are excluded from the 
ejido community. In this way they are second-rate peasants. Still it makes it possible for 
them to continue a "peasant way of life", which is very important for most villagers. 
Although the commons the ejido La Canoa received in 1938 were abundant, over the years 
almost all the common lands have been brought into use. (In chapter six the management of 
the commons is discussed in more detail). 
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of ejido arable plots and common lands between households in the village of La Canoa 
A = households with an ejido plot and a coamil 
B = households with only an ejido plot 
C = households with only a coamil 
D = households without any land 
From figure 3.2 it is clear mat even if we include the coamiles as a form of land possession, 
most households in the village are landless today. Many of these landless households get 
there income by working as day laborers on the fields of the landowners. Others manage to 
get jobs in the sugarcane refinery or in the service sector in Autlan. Women also work in 
many different activities. Many women, for example, prepare meals for sale on Sundays, 
wash for other people, sew or embroider. Only the women of the poorest families work on 
the land, for example, in the tomato harvest. Women working in agriculture is seen as a sign 
of poverty. Migration, especially to the United States, is another important source of income. 
On the basis of a similar situation in an ejido in Michoacan, Gledhill arrived at the 
conclusion that "the problem of the countryside' is not the problem of the ejidatarios, who 
constitute a relatively privileged minority, but the problems of the landless who remain in 
the countryside, or move between countryside, city and the United States. These include, of 
course, a high proportion of the ejidatarios' own children" (Gledhill, 1991: 9). What 
complicates life for younger couples is the fact that apart from the arable land, there is no 
coamil available anymore in the commons. This makes life for young households very hard. 
Some live a poor existence as day laborers, some depend on their parents and many try to 
find a living elsewhere. Many young couples decide to join their relatives in the United 
States and try their luck there: they have little to lose. 
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Differentiation among Ejidatarios 
At a first glimpse we could say that in La Canoa the poor landless households provide the 
labor for the wealthy landowners. Although many people in the village would agree with this 
conclusion, the situation is more complex. Among the ejidatarios, we find some big 
entrepreneurs but also many small holders who cannot possible live off the land. 
Figure 3.3 Number of hectares ejidatarios of La Canoa possess in 1993 
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In La Canoa ejido land tenure is the most common form of land tenure. Only a few families 
bought private property land, but they are all ejidatarios. Hence, there is not a group of 
pequeños propietarios in the village which is separate from the ejido. 5 In figure 3.3 we 
notice strong differences in the number of hectares ejidatarios possess. However, since the 
1960s irrigation is a more differentiating factor than the number of hectares a household 
possesses. Ejidatarios with irrigated land find themselves in a much better position than 
ejidatarios with only rainfed land. 
Table 3.2 Area of rainfed and irrigated land in the ejido La Canoa in 1993 
rainfed land irrigated land all land together 
hectares 206 232 438 
number of plots 66 70 136 
number of owners 55 57 94 
Note: The reason that the number of owners of all the land together is less than the sum of owners of the 
irrigated land and owners of rainfed land is that some ejidatarios posses rainfed as well as irrigated land. Three 
of the 97 ejidatarios do not possess an ejido plot (only a coamil). For this reason the total is only 94 ejidatarios. 
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Without entering into a complicated economic discussion on how much land a family would 
need to be able to live off the land, a rough indication can be gained from the figures the 
villagers themselves gave me. Many people told me that in order to maintain a family, one 
needed at least four hectares of irrigated land or eight hectares of rainfed land. Based on 
these figures I made a calculation in which one hectare of irrigated land is counted as the 
equivalent of two hectares of rainfed land. 
Figure 3.4 Number of hectares ejidatarios possess when 1 hectare of irrigated land is counted as 2 hectares of 
rainfed land 
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In figure 3.4 we see that on the basis of this calculation, the majority of ejidatarios in La 
Canoa do not possess this minimum area of land. This explains that land is not the only or 
most important source of income for the ejidatario households. 
To show that a pronounced differentiation exists in the distribution of land in the ejido, 
I present a list of the ejidatarios who are best off in the sense that they have the largest 
irrigated plots in the ejido. Then I present the ejidatarios who are worse off and have only 
a small plot of rainfed land. Chapter five explains how these differences in plot size and 
possession of land came into being. 
Table 3.3 Distribution of irrigated land and rainfed land between ejidatarios in 1993 
ejidatarios with only rainfed land 37 
ejidatarios with only irrigated land 39 
ejidatarios with both rainfed and irrigated land 18 
total 94 
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Table 3.4 The seven ejidatarios who possess the largest area of irrigated land in the ejido La Canoa in 1993 
hectares irrigated land hectares rainfed land 
Pedro Romero 8.0 0 
Ricardo García 7.2 0 
Ignacio Romero 7.0 0 
Cristina Obregón 7.0 0 
Esteban Romero 7.0 0 
Claudio Núflez 6.8 4 
Marcos Vargas 6.8 0 
Table 3.5 The seven ejidatarios who po ssess the smallest area of rainfed land in La Canoa and who do not 
possess irrigated land 
hectares irrigated land hectares rainfed land 
Faustino Romero 0 1 
Clemente Aviles 0 1 
Amador García 0 1 
Mauro Bautista 0 1 
Mario Romero 0 2 
Francisco Ramírez 0 2 
David Obregón 0 2 
The figures in tables 3.4 and 3.5 show that there is a pronounced differentiation among 
ejidatarios.6 Irrigated land has been the central component in the differentiation process and 
nobody in the ejido has become rich on the basis of rainfed land. Although it is generally 
said that one needs at least eight hectares of rainfed land to maintain a family, this is of 
course an arbitrary figure as production on rainfed land depends on the rainfall. With bad 
rains there is no harvest at all and this happens quite frequently. With irrigated land the 
problem is a different one. Producers on irrigated land can make high profits from the 
production of vegetables. However, a central problem for them are fluctuating market prices. 
Unlike maize, there was no government price control for vegetables. This means that 
sometimes prices are very high and one can make a large profit (much more than with 
maize). But when prices drop one can loose the harvest and end up with large debts. 
During the time of my research Gustavo Romero, one of the biggest agricultural 
entrepreneurs in the village, did not harvest his crops on several occasions as prices had 
suddenly dropped and would not cover the costs of harvesting. On these occasions Gustavo 
gave villagers the opportunity to harvest vegetables for themselves for free on his land. 
People who do not want to take these kinds of risks grow sugarcane on their irrigated fields. 
Besides a secure price, sugarcane has many other advantages such as health insurance, credit 
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facilities, and harvesting organized through the sugarcane growers organization, the CNC 
cañera. For that reason sugarcane growers are often depicted as "lazy people". As the 
sugarcane refinery has reached its maximum production capacity there is now a waiting list 
for new sugarcane growers. 
With the exception of some of the bigger entrepreneurs with irrigated land, most 
households with an ejido plot have several sources of income besides the land. Several 
ejidatarios work as day laborers on the land of others or combine their small plot with other 
activities such as a shop or private business. Many ejidatarios also receive money from 
migration. As Gledhill points out, "the possibility of sustaining a rural household by means 
of seasonal migration, often supplemented by income remittances by children working 
elsewhere, was what permitted the eventual resurrection of ejidal fanning ... Migration is 
therefore a facet of a dialectical process of decomposition and recomposition which has 
marked the history of the peasantry as a social category" (Gledhill 1991: 154). 
The Importance of Migration 
In chapter two we saw that the village La Canoa has always been characterized by a 
considerable mobility of people. This started before the establishment of the ejido and 
continued afterwards. Furthermore, migration to the United States is no new phenomenon. 
The state of Jalisco is characterized by a long-standing and extensive migration to the USA. 
Many men from La Canoa went to work in agriculture in the USA in the 1940s and 1950s. 
This augmented with the bracero program (1940-1963) introduced by the United States in 
order to get Mexican laborers for the harvest in American agriculture. In this way peasant 
farming in Mexico was combined with wage labor in the USA. However, since the 1970s 
a new form of migration has developed in which not only the men go to the USA but 
complete families leave the village. This change in the form of migration in western Mexico 
has been documented by other researchers as well (see Massey et al. 1987). 
There is no single pattern of migration and people often do not know beforehand if they 
will ever come back to stay in the village. Migration often starts when one or two sons of 
the family join relatives in the USA. When work is going well, other children may follow 
and in the end the parents as well. Alternatively, the man of the family may decide to go to 
the USA and leave his wife and children in the village. Sons may later follow him and even 
the whole family. Migration naturally can have many reasons apart from simple economic 
ones. Migration also is an escape possibility for people with different types of problems in 
the village. Drugs dealers, people with high debts, and people who murdered someone in La 
Canoa, for example, have also left for the USA. 
An indication of the extent of the migration to the USA is the fact that of all people born 
and registered in La Canoa between 1946 and 1986 and who were still alive in 1993, 23 per 
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cent lived in the village and 31 per cent in the United States. 7 Many ejidatarios have also 
left the village. Today many ejidatarios even have their permanent residence outside the 
village. Of the 97 officially recognized ejidatarios of La Canoa, in 1993, 37 lived outside the 
village. 8 
Table 3.6 Residence of ejidatarios of La Canoa in 1993 
place of residence number 
La Canoa 60 
Autlan 15 
Elsewhere in Mexico 9 
United States 13 
Total 97 
Ejidatarios with small plots of rainfed land, as well as ejidatarios with large irrigated plots 
have left the village. The ejidatarios who have moved to Autlan, remain actively involved 
in the ejido and work the land themselves. Ejidatarios who have moved farther away, are less 
actively involved in local ejido matters. Some regularly return to till the land, others rent the 
land out or leave it to a son or other relatives. Most of the ejidatarios who live outside the 
village, still show great interest in their land and would not think of selling it. 
Another indication of the extent of migration is the fact that today 66 of the 262 houses 
in the village are empty. 
Table 3.7 Occupancy of houses in the village La Canoa in 1993 
Empty 66 
Inhabited by people "from the village" 171 
Inhabited by people "from outside" 25 
Total 262 
From table 3.7 it follows that there is not only emigration from the village but also a 
movement in the other direction. 25 of the 196 inhabited houses are occupied by "people 
from outside". The category "people from outside" is arbitrary and difficult to manage, but 
villagers use it for people who arrived at the village long after the establishment of the ejido 
and who cannot claim descent from the original ejidatarios. Most arrived recently. They 
come from states such as Michoacan and Guerrero where the economic situation is worse 
than in the valley of Autlan where at least one can try to find work as a day laborer on the 
irrigated land. These people borrow empty houses in the village and work as day laborers 
on the lands of people from La Canoa and other villages. However, they stay very separate 
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from the other villagers. Some are ethnically different from the villagers and they are often 
called Indios and sometimes condescendingly marihuaneros (suggesting that they cultivate 
marihuana in the commons). The attitude of the villagers to these "foreign" day laborers is 
contradictory. On the one hand, some villagers lend their houses to these people for free and 
there is a strong sense in the village that everybody has to be well received. On the other 
hand, most feel very different from them and treat them as outsiders. When there is little 
work in agriculture, they may leave again. On the whole, the village has grown significantly 
since the beginning of this century. 
Table 3.8 Number of inhabitants of the village La Canoa in this century 
Year Number of inhabitants 
1921 258 
1950 493 
1990 837 
Source: National Statistics9 
Although the migration to el Norte has a large impact on the local economy it is difficult to 
be precise about the resources coming from the United States. The main reason is that 
remittances fluctuate greatly. Some men are retired in the United States and receive a 
monthly pension, but such a regular income from the USA is rare. Most households have 
children in the USA. However, some children send money and others do not. Furthermore, 
migrant husbands may regularly send money and then suddenly stop sending. There may be 
many reasons for this fluctuation in the flow of money from el Norte. Naturally, one obvious 
reason is the work the migrants can find in the United States. 
Money from the United States can be used for many different purposes. Apart from 
supporting daily subsistence, money from the United States is often used for special projects, 
such as the cultivation of a crop, the painting of a house, the paying of the medical bills, the 
buying of a tractor, or the establishment of a shop. Again many different types of 
arrangements may be found. For example, a son in the USA may send his parents money to 
sow the maize or prepare the land without asking anything in return. However, they may also 
arrive at an agreement that half of the harvest will be his. 
To give an idea of the number of households that receive money from the United States on 
a more or less regular basis, 1 made an estimate. 1 0 For this estimate I excluded the "people 
from outside" as they form a group of people that move around and are very separate from 
the village. Furthermore, there is considerable "local knowledge" about the families of the 
village and the remittances every household receives from the USA, whereas there is no 
"localized" information about the "outsiders". 
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Migration and the Peasant Way of Life 
Despite the money coming in from the USA in the village the "peasant" or "ejidatario way 
of life" remains important for a large part of the population. As Kearney writes about the 
town where he did research: "an ethnographer from the sky would have no trouble filling 
notebooks documenting expressions of a corresponding 'peasant culture and mentality"' 
(Kearney 1996: 16). However, after some of research it would become clear that the town 
"was maintained as a seemingly 'traditional' community precisely because of the high degree 
to which migrants from the town penetrated into distant and diverse socioeconomic niches 
elsewhere in Mexico and California. Transnational patterns of production and consumption 
were supporting a seemingly traditional society that in fact was in many ways fairly modern" 
(ibid.: 17). One of my experiences with one of the oldest ejidatarios of La Canoa, Pedro 
Bautista, fits in well with Kearney's analysis. Pedro Bautista belonged to the small group 
of the first ejidatarios who were still alive. I knew that he was a migrant who traveled 
between Chicago and La Canoa, but in the village he fitted the image of a real "Mexican 
Table 3.9 Households "from the village", possession of ejido plots and remittances from the United States in 
1993 
with income from without income from total 
the USA the USA 
household with ejido plot 38 (66) 20 (34) 58 
household without ejido plot 39 (35) 74 (65) 113 
total 77 (45) 94 (55) 171 
Note: row percentages between brackets 
From the figures in table 3.9 it becomes clear that a strong relation exists between migration 
and land. 66 per cent of the households with an ejido plot receive remittances from the 
United States, whereas only 35 per cent of the landless households from the village receive 
remittances from el Norte. So, these figures support the view that the families who are better 
off (ejidatarios) are also those who have most links with the United States. It has often been 
suggested that one needs money and social networks to migrate and that for this reason the 
poorest people do not migrate so easily. However, we must be careful with drawing this type 
of conclusion on the basis of this data. We must realize that most ejidatarios are older people 
who have adult children in the States, while many landless households are young couples 
without adult children in the USA. So the relation between land and income from the USA 
which is found in these figures is also influenced by the age factor. 
Although land remains a highly desired asset and an important source of income for some 
families, migration to el Norte has reduced the interest of many young people in the land. 
Many sons in the USA have told their parents that they have no intention whatsoever of 
coming back and say that they do not have any interest in land anymore (see chapter four). 
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campesino". He took great interest in ejido affairs and liked to talk about the history of the 
ejido and the difficult times in the past. One day, after we had had a typical "peasant" 
conversation, he said that he had to return to Chicago as there were problems with his 
apartments. At first I thought that he must mean apartments he was looking after as a cleaner 
or a concierge. But then it became clear that he was the owner of an apartment complex in 
Chicago. This typical campesino who took so much interest in tilling his ejido plot and living 
in the village, appeared to be an entrepreneur in Chicago. 
This only makes clear the importance of studying migration and the many aspects of its 
relation to the ejido and village. As Kearney argues "Anthropological studies of migration 
have been ovemhelrningly framed within issues of development and underdevelopment of 
rural communities" (Kearney 1996: 121) but we should pay attention to the more social, 
political, and cultural aspects of migration as well. We have already seen that ejido land or 
a even a coamil in the commons may be very important in maintaining a peasant identity. 
Land may also fulfill this role for migrants who earn the largest part of their income in the 
United States. Rouse (1989) discusses in detail the differences in life styles between the rural 
Mexican village and the USA. In the rural village work can be hard, but it does not follow 
the strict labor discipline of the United States. There is no sharp distinction between work 
hours and leisure time, nor between the work place and one's private home. Notions such 
as hard work, and honor are central in the village, as well as socializing activities that might 
seem like aspects of leisure in the United States, such as hosting and attending parties, and 
partying with friends (Rouse 1989: 133). The next chapter shows that this difference in life 
style is problematic for sons who have to be prepared to become future ejidatarios. 
On the Ideology of Land 
What struck me from the beginning in La Canoa was that in the reflections of the local 
people (ejidatarios as well as landless people), land was considered to be a central asset in 
life. In these local theories land was the only source of wealth and the lack of land was used 
to explain the poverty of those without land. Estela Lagos, for example, who comes from 
a landless family, but is now married to one of the few young ejidatarios, said to me: My 
mother always says: the people with land are millionaires. However, Estela and her husband 
had difficult times and were certainly not living as millionaires. In contrast, Estela*s mother 
was doing quite well without land. Cristina, the woman of a poor landless family in the 
village said to me: There is a lot of difference between ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios. 
Ejidatarios have land, they have more money than we have. Cristina still speaks with great 
indignation about her parents in law who had ejido land but sold it in the beginning of the 
1960s and left for Guadalajara. Cristina (angrily): And they left their two sons in the village 
without any land! Other authors have also described this strong value attached to the 
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possession of land in rural Mexico. Luis Gonzalez, a well known Mexican historian, writes 
that "many consider the rancheros' obsession with possessing land that produces very little 
and is the source of thousand quarrels and pains a foolishness. However, in the rural 
environment almost the only way to stand out, to be taken seriously, to become a respectable 
and respected person is to be the owner of arable and pastoral lands" (Gonzalez 1988: 56 
own translation). Although Gonzalez description refers to rancheros who are private land 
owners and are not organized in ejidos, his characterization of the value attached to (poor) 
land, also applies to La Canoa. 
At first, this glorification of land seemed understandable in a region that is characterized 
by agriculture and animal husbandry. However, as was discussed above, among the 
ejidatarios there are also many people who possess only a very small plot of rainfed land and 
who cannot possibly live off the land. While it is true that the richest families in the village 
are ejidatarios, it is also true that many landless families these days are richer than their 
ejidatario neighbors. This can primarily be explained by migration to the United States, 
which has reduced the importance of the land as the main factor in socio-economic 
differentiation. In order to understand the value attached to the land, we have to look at the 
many different meanings which are attached to the possession of an ejido plot. 
Obviously, land is not only valued as a source of income. When I talked to Aurora 
Garcia, an ejidataria in La Canoa, about the many conflicts over land in the village she 
commented: All this fighting over land, while it does not produce very much. But for the 
people it is important to have land even it does not produce very much. It is the idea of 
having something; the security that the land provides. Besides security, the land is also 
important for the production of maize for home consumption. The production of one's own 
maize has a strong cultural significance and is also important for people who have enough 
income to buy the maize. Maize and beans are the central ingredients of meals in the village. 
Today beans are mostly bought in the shops but people try to be at least partly self-
supporting in their annual maize consumption. Maize is used to make tortillas and for 
festivities the maize is used to prepare tamales.11 Households that do not possess land often 
cultivate some maize in their corral. Hence, land also has a more symbolic value as the 
provider of the main ingredient of the rural diet. 
The possession of an ejido plot also provides a certain status. A clear social distinction 
exists between ejidatarios and landless families in the village. Although in middle class 
circles of private landowners or in the cities people tend to talk in a denigrating way about 
these smallholder ejidatarios, in the village their image is quite different. In the village the 
ejidatarios are the independent and proud people. The richer ejidatarios are very aware of 
their position and feel superior to landless laborers. For example, Lorenzo Romero explained 
that the sons of ejidatarios do not work in the fields. Lorenzo: They pay very little for the 
work on the land and the laborers on the land are generally poor people from other regions. 
They are paid 15 thousand ($5), whether it is man, woman, or a child. In contrast, the 
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ejidatarios receive 25 thousand ($8) a day and they only work when they want to. However, 
this quote is more an illustration of Lorenzo's feelings of superiority than a practical rule 
concerning day laborers. During economic crises, sons of ejidatarios, including Lorenzo's, 
also have to work as day laborers and for the same salary as others (see the next chapter). 
Another topic around which the distinction between ejidatarios and landless villagers is 
strongly felt these days, is the commons. The commons have become scarce and have started 
to become a source of serious tension in the village. Many ejidatarios have started asking 
questions about non-ejidatarios possessing coamiles. The landless people in their turn, 
recognize that the ejido only lent them the land, and that the ejido remains the real owner 
but at the same time they are very angry with, what they call, the selfish and egoistic attitude 
of the ejidatarios, who are better-off and yet are claiming lands that landless families have 
been working peacefully for many years. Among the landless families themselves divisions 
are also created: landless sons of ejidatarios claim that they have more rights to the commons 
than landless people in the village who are not even related to the ejidatarios (see chapter 
six). 
Besides the elements mentioned above which give the possession of an ejido plot all kinds 
of values besides economic ones, being an ejidatarios also means that one can participate in 
government programs for the ejido sector, such as credit programs, subsidy programs, and 
so on. Landless families are excluded from most of these programs. So, the membership of 
the ejido gives access to many different resources. Some ejidatarios are also capable of 
appropriating resources which are meant for the whole village, including the landless 
families. As a woman of a landless family said after expressing herself very negatively about 
ejidatarios: The government only helps the people who already have things; government 
support is directly taken by other people, the poor do not get anything. The government only 
helps the farmers. This comment illustrates the view of landless people that the ejidatarios 
are not only better off, but also monopolize other resources and support that may come from 
outside. As we will see in the next section, several ejidatarios did indeed control projects 
which were meant for the entire village. 
So, after some time of research in this complex "transnationalized" village I arrived at 
the conclusion that the "ideology" around ejido land in the village can best be analyzed in 
relation to the development of a force field in which the ejido dominates landless villagers. 
This also explains the bitterness and frustration in the way landless people talk about their 
poverty and explain this in terms of a lack of land. Landless people often reacted with 
amazement or irritation when I asked if there were any differences between ejidatarios and 
other villagers. It was as if I was asking something very obvious and was blind to what was 
going on. The landless families not only feel frustrated about their not having land, but also 
because of their second-rate position in the village. The ejido not only means access to land, 
but also control of political projects. The landless families not only have to work as laborers 
on the land of the ejidatarios, but are also politically dependent on the most powerful of 
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them. It is in this way that the significance of ejido land came to be power and wealth. Not 
because all the ejidatarios are powerful and wealthy, but because some of them are wealthy 
and also manage to control village politics. 
However, we must be careful not to give the impression that ejido land is a highly 
idealized good among all villagers. There are many people, especially among the younger 
migrants, who do not show much interest in ejido land. Yet, this makes it all the more 
important to recognize that the ejido signifies different things to different people and signifies 
much more than an economic means of production. I will now analyze how the ejido has 
been able to keep control of village politics and in this way frustrated many landless 
villagers. 
The Role of the Ejido in the Organization of Local Projects 
Ejidatarios Appointing Delegados and Controlling Local Projects 
As was explained above, an administrative separation exists between village and ejido. The 
ejido falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, while the village falls 
under the municipality of Autlán. The official administrative term for the village La Canoa 
is delegación. The administrative head of the delegación is the delegado. He is responsible 
for village affairs and has two local assistants, who operate as armed police officers at public 
events and other occasions that require their intervention. However, the villagers use a 
different terminology. They talk in terms of the pueblo and the comunidad. The delegado 
belongs to the pueblo (village) and the comisariado (ejido commissioner) to the comunidad 
(ejido). Unlike the ejido commissioner who does not receive a salary, the delegado receives 
a small compensation for this work. 
The most important activities of the delegado are the organization of local projects and 
the co-ordination of government programs for the village. Another important responsibility 
according to the villagers, (although not an official one), is the organization of the village 
parties in November and December. The position of delegado is not seen by the villagers as 
one of much influence but more one that gives opportunities to line one's own pocket 
through the administration of government projects. The management of resources and 
organization of these projects always gives room for negotiation and some enrichment. 
The delegado in La Canoa has always been appointed by the municipality of Autlán. 
Only on one occasion did the municipality let the delegado be elected by the villagers (the 
delegado of 1986-1988). These appointments are made through the PRI party networks. The 
most influential ejidatarios in La Canoa have always had political connections in Autlán and 
they decided who would be appointed delegado of the village. During the time of the 
research, several of the Romero men (Lorenzo, José, Gustavo) were among those who 
decided on the choice of delegado in the village. On one occasion, after José Romero had 
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explained to me how the delegados were appointed and what his role had been, I suggested 
that he had to be an important man if he could go to Autlán and tell them who had to be the 
next delegado in La Canoa. He then laughed and said: It is not a question of being important, 
but more that I have many friends in Autlán. A nephew of mine is the Police Inspector in 
Autlán, Héctor Romero. He is head of Seguridad Pública. If you go and talk to such a person 
about a possible candidate for delegado, they make sure that it will happen. Actually, there 
was never much secrecy about the way in which the delegado was designated and on several 
occasions I was present when the Romeros were discussing possible candidates. When I 
asked Lorenzo if the candidate had to be a member of the PRI, he said that it was not 
necessary for the delegado to be a member of the PRI but that he should not be known as 
being of the opposition either. 
The interesting thing here is that ejidatarios have been appointing delegados, although 
the delegados represent the whole village and not only the ejido. Hence, not only was the 
practice of appointing the delegado the privilege of a small group, it also was a form of 
control of the village by the ejido. This becomes especially clear when we look at the people 
who have been delegados in the village. In the village archive all the delegados since 1946 
are listed and from 1946 to 1983 all sixteen delegados have been ejidatarios (several 
delegados stayed on for less than three years)! Only since 1983 have non-ejidatarios also 
been appointed. After four non-ejidatarios (one of them only stayed one year in his post), in 
1992 an ejidatario was again appointed. This clearly shows the dominance of the ejido in 
political matters at the local level. The two important public functions at the local level, ejido 
commissioner and delegado, were filled by ejidatarios even when the majority of the villagers 
were landless. 
However, it was not only by appointing delegados that these dominant ejidatarios 
influenced village affairs. Their political networks in Autlán also made it possible for them 
to influence village projects. The point is that government projects for the villages are 
administered by the offices of the municipality in Autlán. For that reason, the contacts 
villagers have with the PRI networks in the municipality are crucial to get access to 
municipal resources and different kinds of projects (see chapter nine for an explanation of 
the relation between politics and the bureaucracy in Mexico). In La Canoa, some influential 
ejidatarios have always maintained these contacts. 
In this way, these ejidatarios brought many government projects to the village. For 
example, Ricardo García explained how he managed to get electricity in the village through 
his contacts with General García Barragán when Ricardo was ejido commissioner ( 1970-
1973). 
R: The General was a good friend of my father. When my father died the 
friendship continued with me. I know that there are people who talk ill about 
him. But in my opinion he was a very good person. I myself worked very hard 
to get water and electricity for the village. I talked to the General and told 
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him that I wanted to organize water for the village. He told me: I expect you 
on that day at that time in my office in Mexico City. I went there at that day 
and time together with Francisco Pradera. But the General only wanted to 
receive me. He gave me a visiting-card and told me that I had to go to a 
certain office. We went there and it was the most luxurious office I had ever 
seen. We were treated very very well. 15 days later the machines came to do 
the work. The only problem was that a geologist had told us where we should 
dig the well but the engineer didn't want to do it there. He wanted to do it 
nearby the village. So, they dug it there but it never gave water. [—] 
I also brought electricity to the village. [—J Because of the coming change of 
president they did the work very quickly to be sure to have finished it in time. 
M: And did General Barragán also help you with the electricity? 
R: General Barragán didn't help us with money but he helped us to get access 
to the different offices. In that way he also helped us with the electricity. I 
went to offices in Guadalajara and Mexico City. 
This interview illustrates that contacts with the General were important for arranging village 
projects. The next ejido commissioner Rubén García (1973-1976) also had important political 
allies in Autlán and arranged for houses to be built in the village as part of a special 
government program for poor families. In addition, he got a piped water system built with 
a subsidy from the government. Lorenzo Romero, in his turn, also maintained good relations 
with several influential figures in Autlán. In 1980 the mayor of Autlán asked Lorenzo to 
become delegado of La Canoa (1980 - 1983) and through his good contacts with the mayor 
Lorenzo managed to get a nursery and a small clinic built in the village and he arranged for 
an extra water well to be dug. 
Although one might say that the villagers should be pleased to have these well-connected 
ejidatarios, all these projects are surrounded by gossiping, scandals, and criticism. The 
people who organized these projects are criticized for giving houses to friends instead of poor 
families, for not listening to the needs and wishes of the villagers but deciding on their own 
what the village needs, and keeping part of the money to line their own pockets. A well-
known characteristic of Mexican government projects in the rural areas is that participation 
by the village itself is demanded in the form of labor or money. This only gives rise to more 
negotiations between officials and local organizers. This leads to the situation that in La 
Canoa many villagers stress that these local leaders always enriched themselves from these 
projects, while these men and their children feel frustrated that the villagers have never 
appreciated their efforts for the development of the village. 
However, the ejido was also important for village projects for other reasons: the ejido 
provided the necessary land and money. Many of these projects needed a plot of land for the 
construction of buildings and asked for the financial participation of the village. As the ejido 
owned all the land, it was the ejido who had to decide on the gift of a plot of land. By 
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renting out the pasture of the commons, the ejido also had the possibility of generating 
money for some of the projects. The ejidatarios are very conscious of the fact that the ejido 
provides many services to the landless families. Even the football field and the bull ring are 
situated on ejido land! Whenever problems arise in the village, the ejidatarios are eager to 
stress that landless families only have access to school (built with ejido money and on ejido 
land) and to many other privileges because of the benevolence of the ejidatarios. 
In this context one could even argue that the ejido meetings have a strong symbolic 
function. Although no important decisions are taken during these meetings (see chapter six), 
they make painfully clear who are the "insiders" and who are the "outsiders". The ejido 
meetings are held in the ejido house in the center of the village and only members of the 
ejido are allowed to attend. These meetings are held with doors and windows open and can 
easily be followed by people outside the building. However, although other villagers 
sometimes hang around the building they never enter when an ejido meeting is going on. On 
the other hand, the meetings for the village, which are organized by the delegado can be held 
at different places. Sometimes they are held in the open air in the center of the village or in 
the school. On other occasions they are held in the ejido house but then it is made explicit 
to the people that the meeting is meant for the entire village. So, the meetings function 
symbolically to discriminate between the ejidatarios and the landless. 
Changing Constellations 
Yet situations are changing and perhaps the privileged situation of ejidatarios as well. An 
important factor in this changing situation is that the economic differences between ejidatarios 
and landless people are dimmshing and that landless people are less dependent on the 
ejidatarios. In general, the link with the USA makes people much less dependent on income 
from the land and government resources. Although ejidatarios are still appointing the 
delegado of La Canoa, we saw that since 1983 they have also appointed landless villagers. 
Furthermore, the influential ejidatarios of former times are loosing influence in power games 
in the regional arena. For example, in the beginning of the 1990s the water which La Canoa 
received from the Manantlan area since the 1970s was taken away from the village and given 
to other villages in the region. Although La Canoa has a waterwell, the costs of pumping the 
water up from the well are very high and according to the villagers the water from 
Manantlan is of much better quality. What made this removal of the water supply from 
Manantlan especially hard on the villagers was that in the 1970s when this piped water 
system was constructed every household contributed with several weeks of labor. That this 
water was taken away is a clear indication that they are losing influence in the regional arena 
and they themselves are very conscious of this. An important ally of theirs in Autlan, Hector 
Romero, recently retired as head of the security police and is quickly losing influence in the 
regional power game. In this way the ejidatarios in La Canoa have lost access to an 
influential person in municipal politics. During the period of the research, the PRI group in 
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the village was very annoyed with the present mayor and his group in Autlân. In contrast to 
other periods, the Romero men could not get things arranged under the current 
administration. Little support was given for village projects in La Canoa and promises were 
not kept. 
This changing situation was also reflected in party politics. Ejidatarios realize that 
through PRI politics certain things may be arranged and that for practical reasons it may be 
important to remain within the PRI networks. However, most ejidatarios and landless people 
prefer to stay as far as possible from party politics. Even the PRI men in the village could 
be critical of the party and explained (he usefulness of the PRI mostly in instrumental terms 
of having influence on decisions, getting projects to the village, and so on. Now that they 
were no longer successful in obtaining projects, they became very critical of the political 
system. Hence, there was a general dissatisfaction in the village with the working of the 
Mexican government and the related PRI apparatus. Everybody expressed themselves in 
increasingly negative ways about the working of the government bureaucracies, the wide-
spread corruption, and the shameless abuses of the police. 
What seemed to be an indication of changing attitudes of PRI members towards the party 
was the fact that many PRI members who were asked to organize the polling-station for the 
mid-term elections of August 1991, refused to do so. Lorenzo Romero who had done this 
in other years, said that he did not want to do it any longer. Then they asked his wife Maria 
to do so, but Lorenzo prohibited her participation. José Romero and Alfonso Romero also 
refused, whereas in previous years they had always participated. Gustavo Romero, another 
PRI member, was less critical about the party and when in March 1993 the village received 
money from the SOLID ARID AD program which was used to build a fence around the trees 
at the entrance of the village, Gustavo painted the fence in the colors of the PRI: red, green 
and white. Many negative comments were made about this tribute to the party and not only 
by the "opposition" villagers. Even for the other PRI members like Lorenzo Romero and 
José Romero this was too much honor for the party. But they left it the way Gustavo had 
painted it. 
In 1994 with the national elections in La Canoa the PAN won for the first time with an 
overwhelming majority of 243 votes against 140 for the PRI in La Canoa (the PRD got very 
few votes). This victory of the opposition in the village was striking as at the national level 
the PRI won in relatively fair elections. However, in the region of Autlân and the state of 
Jalisco, the PAN did very well in these elections. More than a deliberate choice for a right 
wing party, this victory of the PAN in La Canoa must be seen as a vote against the 
maladministration of the PRI and local frustration with the municipality of Autlân. When I 
visited the village after these elections, I noticed that the fences had been painted again, the 
PRI colors had been changed to white. 1 2 
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Conclusion: Land, Politics, and Organizing Practices 
In this chapter we found that the possession of ejido land has many different meanings 
besides that of an economic means of production. It would be silly "to deny that the 
production aspect of property in many historic and contemporary situations plays a 
considerable role in social and economic life" but we have to recognize the many other roles 
of property as well (F. and K. von Benda Beckmann 1998: 15). We noted many other 
elements that constitute the value of ejido land: the fact that the land is related to the agrarian 
struggle and establishment of the comunidad; that it gives one the identity of being an 
independent peasant; that it is the provider of maize, the central ingredient of the rural diet, 
and that the ejido has been central for local politics. Even migrants who have done well in 
el Norte may still cherish their plot and peasant identity. Hence, when we talk about ejido 
land, we do not refer to one type of resource but to many different resources according to 
the situation and people involved. 
Although the number of landless families grew over the years, ejidatarios still dominate 
local village politics today. This is in part because of the fact that the ejido provides most 
resources for the village projects (land to build upon and money). However, the importance 
of the ejido as an organizer of local projects derived above all from the fact that some 
ejidatarios had the necessary political contacts to get things arranged. The whole ejido was 
not involved in such politicking, but certain ejidatarios with good contacts outside the ejido 
were. In the beginning these contacts were based on their experiences with agrarian reform 
and over time they developed on the basis of personal political networks with influential 
people in Autlan. The ejidatarios also appointed the delegado of the village and until 1983 
they always appointed an ejidatario, although the majority of families in the village were 
landless. 
The landless villagers naturally benefited from projects for the village, but at the same 
time these projects stressed their dependence on the ejido and some of its influential 
members. Furthermore, these projects always gave opportunities to the organizers to gain 
something extra or to do favors to some people to the detriment of others. In this way, these 
influential ejidatarios and their projects caused many hard feelings. Besides these village 
projects, the landless families also depended on the ejido for their coamiles in the commons. 
For many landless families the coamiles are their only remaining link with the land, but here 
again they depend on the ejido which is the formal owner of the commons. All these 
processes explain the frustration of the landless families and the ideology which surrounds 
ejido land in a time when land is not the most important means of production for most 
households anymore. 
Other authors have also written about the phenomenon of the ejido dominating the village 
in local government. Jones points out that although not legally recognized as such, in many 
municipalities it is the ejido which has traditionally functioned as the local government. This 
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means that non-ejidatarios depend on ejidatarios for access to services which have often been 
acquired through direct negotiation between the comisariado and the appropriate federal 
agency. Furthermore, the management of these services is often conducted by the ejido. This 
autonomy of the ejido often means that both the municipality and the non-ejidatarios are 
excluded from the decision-making process even when the latter are in the majority (Jones 
1996: 195). 
Zendejas and Mummert (1993), describe a different case of a village in Michoacan in 
which non-ejidatarios participate in the ejido structure and in this way constitute broader 
arenas of local organization in which landless villagers and ejidatarios together participate 
and struggle to press for roads, piped water, and so on. This situation is different from La 
Canoa as some landless villagers improved their position by "using" the ejido structure, 
while in La Canoa landless villagers were kept at a distance by some dominant ejidatarios. 
However, these different cases have in common that the ejido structure was central for 
obtaining village projects through political networks. 
In this way the ejido has been a central element in the construction of a situated 
community. I argued before that situated community refers to feelings of belonging to certain 
groups or networks, but always is related to processes of domination (Sabean 1984) which 
imply that distinctions are made between different social categories, and between insiders and 
outsiders. Gupta and Ferguson also argue that community "is premised on various forms of 
exclusion and constructions of otherness" and that "it is precisely through processes of 
exclusion and othering that both collective and individual subjects are formed" (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997: 13). The ejido, which determined processes of dominance in the village has 
been central to the construction of a specific type of situated community and in the distinction 
between different categories of people. It was shown that the ejido was important for defining 
"insiders" and "outsiders", ejidatarios, non-ejidatarios, and sons of ejidatarios, especially in 
relation to conflicts over resources. 
Much has been written on the distribution of government resources and "the selective 
distribution of material benefits (agrarian reform, agricultural credit, titles for squatter 
settlements, low-cost medical care) which have been delivered as particular favors through 
clientelistic channels" (Foweraker 1994: 3). It has been argued, especially in relation to the 
peasantry, that political leaders capture and control the resources the state makes available 
to peasant society. Carlos points out that peasant hierarchies "are the principal conduit 
through which the Mexican state transfers economic and political goods to the peasantry" 
(Carlos 1992: 93). However, these personal channels through which resources are distributed 
do not necessarily lead to strong forms of top-down control. I would rather say that 
according to the specific context it may well lead to the fragmentation of local and regional 
power as the resources are distributed through different institutions and persons and nobody 
controls more than a fraction of the resources (de la Pena 1986). Furthermore, the influence 
of state institutions on local practices has been very limited. As was discussed in chapter one, 
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it has often been suggested that the Mexican state kept control over the villages through the 
PRI apparatus with ramifications in the village, but on the basis of my research material I 
would not agree with this conclusion. The PRI networks certainly played a role in local level 
affairs, but not in the form of control from above. It was much more an instrumental network 
to get access to government resources. This also explains the instrumental outlook ejidatarios 
tend to have on party politics. 
However, what is interesting and deserves more attention is the relation between these 
political practices and organizing practices. First of all, it explains why the most effective 
organizing strategy is often the use of personal political networks and not necessarily forms 
of collective action (Cornelius and Craig 1991). Many authors try to explain the difficulty 
of collective organizing among Mexican peasants (Foley 1990) and talk about "the apparently 
contradictory quality of peasant politics wherein the major political manifestations are 
individual 'apathy' and collective revolt" (Lomnitz 1992: 125). However, in chapter two we 
saw that this idea of "collective" struggle against the hacendados was more an image of the 
master narrative than a reality in the villages. Furthermore, what is called apathy is generally 
a form of "taking a safe distance from the bureaucratic machine". Organizing through 
informal personal networks is often the most "rational" way to operate. A second effect of 
this situation on the organizing process is that it has a dividing influence on groups who do 
try to organize collective projects. The leader of a group is never only approached as the 
representative of a group, but also as a person with individual interests and "political 
capital". Thirdly, the bureaucracy is overly dynamic and its composition is always changing. 
This offers many possibilities and openings as with changing people in power, other networks 
become effective. This is one of the central characteristics of the Mexican bureaucratic hope-
generating machine; that openings can always be found. Finally, this situation strongly 
contributes to the culture of the state; the situation of never knowing exactly what is going 
on, accompanied by the continuous gossiping, quarreling, rumors, and distrust around local 
projects. 
Notes 
1. INEGI, 1991, XI Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 1990. Jalisco. Resultados definitivos. Datos por 
Localidad (Integración Territorial). 
2. When sons work on the land of their fathers, different arrangements may be used. When it concerns a poor 
family, or when there is a general crisis in the village, the boys are not paid for their labor. However, 
when the family is doing well, the boy may be paid the same amount of money as the other day laborers 
on the field. 
3. Obviously, the division in household types is always arbitrary. The most important element in this 
categorization of households is the presence of young children. For example, a family with young children 
and a grandmother living with them, falls under category 1. The old bachelors are especially mentioned 
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in type 4 as there is quite a large group of male bachelors in the village. 
4. Households with access to an ejido plot are those with (at least) one ejidatario or heir of a deceased 
ejidatario. Ejidatarios who live outside the village and who do not have (part of a) household in the village 
anymore are not counted among the 196 households. For that reason only 58 households with access to an 
ejido plot are included, although there are 94 ejidatarios with land. 
5. Five Garcia men bought private property land in Autlán in the past, and Ignacio Romero also recently 
bought private property land. Most of the Garcia men have moved to Autlán. 
6. However, this differentiation is even more pronounced than these figures suggest. Several ejidatarios with 
the largest plots of irrigated land have also bought private property land, for example, Ignacio Romero and 
Ricardo García. 
7. Before 1946 births in La Canoa were registered in Autlán. Since the end of the 1980s, a growing number 
of women from La Canoa go to the clinic in Autlán to give birth and registration again takes place in 
Autlán. Therefore I take the period between 1946 and 1986 when births were registered in La Canoa. 
8. In the case of ejidatarios who passed away or who sold their plots, the residence of the new owner of the 
land is used. 
9. Sources: 
a) Departamento de Estadística Nacional. Censo General de Habitantes. 30 de noviembre de 1921. Estado 
de Jalisco. Talleres Gráficos de la Nación "Diario Oficial", México D.F. 1926. 
b) Séptimo Censo General de Población, 6 de junio de 1950. Secretaría de Economía. Dirección General 
de Estadística. Estado de Jalisco. México D.F. 1952. 
c) XI Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 1990. Jalisco Resultados Definitivos. Datos por localidad 
(Integración Territorial), INEGI. 
10. To establish the number of households who receive money from the USA I counted those households who 
are known to receive cheques or to have a pension from the United States, the households who have several 
children working in the United States and families with members traveling between the village and the 
United States and working in both places. 
11. Formerly, the women spent much of their time every day preparing tortillas by hand. Today, many families 
buy their tortillas in the tortilleria in the village and twice a day one can see people queuing up at the 
tortilleria, especially young children. Even so, home-made tortillas are specially valued and in some houses 
only tortillas prepared by the women of the house are consumed. 
12. Although it is probable that situations change and that in the future the role of non-ejidatarios in village 
politics will be more prominent, as well as the presence of other political parties apart from the PRI, this 
does not necessarily change the organizing principles in the political games (see Aitken 1997, Pansters 
1997). 

CHAPTER 4 
LAND, GENERATION, AND GENDER IN A 
TRANSNATIONAL EJIDO FAMILY 
Introduction: Households and the Ideology of the Family 
In this chapter the interrelation between households on different sides of the USA - Mexican 
border is discussed. In the foregoing chapter we saw that remittances from the United States 
may help to maintain peasant enterprises in the village. Yet, in this chapter it is shown that 
the relation between USA households and village households can also be reversed. The 
revenues from ejido land can become crucial for sustaining migrants of the family who are 
not successful in el Norte. The phenomenon of the "unsuccessful" migrants who return to 
the village has been a neglected theme in the literature so far. However, many villagers do 
not "make" it in the United States and return to La Canoa to see if they can make a living 
there. In these cases they come to depend on the parental home again. Yet, after a long stay 
abroad, these men and women have great difficulty in adapting to the village style of living. 
As Kearney points out, migrants who are denied naturalization in the United States, but 
cannot make a living in their homeland either "construct a new identity out of a bricolage 
of their transnational existence" (Kearneyl998: 129). These transnational identities can also 
take forms which do not easily fit into rural Mexican village life. A central problem for the 
men is that they have not been successful in transforming themselves into wage-laborers in 
the United States but are not peasants either. As we will see, this notion of a "real peasant" 
also influences ejidatarios in their choice of an heir for their ejido plot from among their sons 
in the village and the United States. 
This chapter focuses on one family. More specifically, I present the interrelation between 
the household of a middle-aged couple in the village and the households of their adult 
children. I study the livelihood of different family members, by looking at the way in which 
they try to make a living, attempt to meet their different needs, cope with uncertainties, and 
respond to new opportunities and situations (Long 1997: 11). In looking at two generations 
I partially follow de Berteaux (1995) who proposes the study of social mobility processes by 
developing a different type of genealogies. In this method the unit of observation is not an 
individual (Ego in the old genealogies), but a set of life trajectories of individuals (and 
nuclear families) connected by kinship relations (de Berteaux 1995: 75). I think this use of 
genealogies is not only interesting for the study of social mobility but also for studying the 
interrelationships between households of one family (see den Ouden 1995). 1 By the in-depth 
study of the lives and events in one family different themes can be discussed in all their 
complexity. 
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In this chapter, I draw greatly upon Rouse's thesis Mexican migration to the United States: 
family relations in the development of a transnational migrant circuit (1989). His critical and 
sensitive views on family life and family ideology in the case of a transnational family in 
Michoacan, proved to be very useful for my study. Rouse points out that the household and 
the family are analytically important as "both a form of social organization and a nodal point 
of ideological constructs" (Rouse 1989: 3). However, the fact that households and the family 
are considered to be central in social organization, does not mean that the household is 
treated as a unit of strategic economic action in which the members share a collective project 
and common interest. Rouse, for example, clearly shows the different personal projects of 
several family members and how they may come into conflict. Feminist studies have also 
convincingly "cut through romantic assumptions about family and household unity, arguing 
that there exist instead multiple voices, gendered interests and an unequal distribution of 
resources within families and households" (D. Wolf 1997: 118, see also Thorne and Yalom 
1982, Folbre 1986). 
Eric Wolf stresses the importance of paying more attention to the organizing processes 
within the family. He argues that otherwise organization around gender and generation is 
treated as "an outcome, a finished product responding to a cultural script, and not visualized 
in the active voice, as process, frequently a difficult and conflict-ridden process at that" (E. 
Wolf 1990: 591). In the work of many authors on family and migration "their evidence still 
comes largely from what people tell them" (Rouse 1989: 37). However, when we look at 
active organizing within the family in combination with reflective talk by different family 
members, we arrive at a more complete view of relations between the sexes and between 
generations. In this way one also finds areas of contestation and breaks away from the 
romanticized view that "assumes that cohesion and coherence rather than conflict are at the 
basis of intra-household relationships" (D. Wolf 1997: 128). "The problem with these 
comforting, consensual images is that they miss entirely intra-household relations of power, 
subordination and perhaps conflict and dissent" {ibid.: 129). We will see, for example, that 
the changing conceptions of gender in this transnational setting are accompanied by 
considerable discussion of the roles of men and women. 
Another important point is that we should not treat the "discourse of family obligations" 
as a set of generally accepted norms, but as an ideological construct. As Collier, Rosaldo and 
Yanagisako argue, "the Family is not a concrete 'thing' that fulfills concrete 'needs' but an 
ideological construct with moral implications ... Only when we view The Family as an 
ideological unit and as a moral statement, we can begin to unravel the more complex, 
dialectical processes through which family relationships are constructed" (Collier, Rosaldo 
and Yanagisako 1982: 37). Hence, instead of searching for "cultural norms" governing 
relations between the sexes and generations, I focused on organizing processes in the family 
and tried to distinguish established practices together with areas of contestation and conflict. 
Only in this way, can we discover the politics of family life and the role that land plays 
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in this. Much of the analysis in this chapter is based on reflective talk by different family 
members, especially women. Many women were struggling with tensions and changes in the 
family and although they were not necessarily more concerned than the men about these, they 
certainly talked more easily about them. 
My Relation with the Romero Family 
My relationship with the Romero family started in 1987, when I lived in La Canoa to 
undertake fieldwork for my Masters degree. At that time I lived with dona Dolores and don 
Luis. Dolores and Luis have eight children of whom three lived in Los Angeles at that time. 
Dolores and Luis "adopted" me as one of their daughters and introduced me to the many 
peculiarities of Mexican country life. Ema, the oldest daughter at home took me to all the 
village parties where we were well protected and watched by the men of the family. In this 
way I was introduced to the world of the young and unmarried woman. In 1991 I returned 
to La Canoa, but now as a married woman and the mother of two daughters. 
When I returned to the village in 1991,1 soon learned that Dolores and Luis had left for 
Los Angeles with all their children. As Dolores was no longer in the village, we were now 
automatically "adopted" by her parents, dona Maria and don Lorenzo. They made it clear 
to us that from now on their house was our house in the village, or in their words: "in 
Mexico they were our family". The first thing that had to be arranged was a house for us 
to live in. After having had a look at the great number of empty houses in the village, we 
asked permission to live in a house that belonged to a compadre of Lorenzo who had moved 
to Autlan. As it concerned a compadre of Lorenzo, the permission was easily obtained and 
Lorenzo helped us with everything we needed to make the house inhabitable. However, 
although we had our own house we spent much of our time at Lorenzo and Maria's house 
and our daughters spent most of their time together with their grandchildren. I established 
close relationships with their daughters-in-law in the village who enjoyed talking to a 
"woman from outside" about the many things that occurred in their lives. We also had very 
pleasant gatherings with their migrant children who used to come over from the USA for 
special events, such as Christmas, Easter, mother's day, and the Carnival in Autlan. While 
enjoying many cuba libres we had lively discussions comparing life in the village with life 
in Los Angeles and discussing future family projects. We also visited their children in Los 
Angeles. 
It is worth mentioning that my relationship with Lorenzo was not the usual kind of 
relationship anthropologists establish with their "informant-family". Lorenzo was a warm but 
also very authoritarian man, who liked to present the image of himself as the strong, 
independent farmer who knows how to control his life and especially his wife. According to 
these Mexican village standards we were a strange family that violated gender specific roles. 
While my husband Pieter stayed at home most of the time (struggling to finish his Ph.D. 
thesis on Costa Rica), I left the house to talk to the men of La Canoa. Many women 
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expressed their amazement and asked me whether my husband wasn't jealous then. Jealousy 
was an important theme in the village and many men, especially men like Lorenzo, did not 
give their wives permission to leave the house. Although I did not mind my role as an 
independent woman and was treated with great respect by the men, Pieter was in the more 
unpleasant position of a man who obviously did not know how to exercise control over his 
wife. Yet, he counterbalanced this image by going out drinking with the men and by 
traveling a lot on his own. 
Although I was careful not to interfere in family affairs, I often challenged don Lorenzo 
on his strong machista attitudes. He, on the other hand, liked to tell me that Pieter was 
fooling around with other women. Especially when Pieter was away and I was on my own 
in the village, this was his favorite joke. On hindsight, I realize that these continuing jokes 
and discussions between us were a verbal struggle on gender images. For me, as well as for 
Lorenzo, it concerned the construction of the notion of self and the other through discourses 
of gender (see Pigg 1996). Furthermore, Lorenzo is the only person in the village who made 
clear to me that he did not want to be asked questions related to my research. This became 
a recurring topic in our relationship and we started making jokes about it. I told him that he 
was "afraid" of the questions, while he started asking me whether I was interviewing him 
whenever I asked him a common question. On the other hand, his honor was threatened 
when I asked his sons questions about the ejido or the village. Then he interfered by saying 
that they did not know anything about it and corrected them wherever possible. Still he felt 
uncomfortable about the fact that he did not cooperate more with my research. On several 
occasions he explained to me that he knew "too much" about the ejido and wanted to avoid 
speaking ill about other people. Towards the end of my field research he gave me his "word 
of a man" that he would give me a real interview, but he wanted to have a good drink 
before. We never had the interview, though. 
The History of a Household 
Maria and Lorenzo live in a house at the entrance to the village. They have twelve children: 
three in La Canoa, two in Tijuana, and seven in the United States. In 1991 the household 
consisted of four people: Maria, Lorenzo, Maria's father Cayetano, and their youngest 
daughter Yolanda. All their children are married, except Yolanda. In comparison with other 
families in the village, Maria and Lorenzo are well off. They possess Lorenzo's irrigated 
ejido plot of four hectares and they take care of Cayetano's irrigated plot of four hectares. 
Both plots are planted with sugarcane. As explained in chapter three, the main factor in 
socio-economic differentiation in the village today is the possession of irrigated land. A 
household with access to eight hectares of sugarcane clearly belongs to the higher strata of 
the village. Besides the land, they have a couple of cows, some pigs, chickens and a goat 
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especially for Cayetano who prefers goat's milk to cow's milk. Their children in the United 
States also send them money now and then. 
Although Lorenzo likes to show off and to distinguish himself from the poor families in 
the village, their "wealth" is recent and they had a very hard time when they were young. 
Lorenzo was nineteen when he married and Maria fifteen. Maria said to me that today she 
would never marry so young but that in those days there was nothing else to do. The 
wedding took place in 1946 and the couple went to live in a small house that Lorenzo had 
built before their marriage. The house consisted of one room and a kitchen. Like most other 
people in the village Lorenzo and Maria were poor. The difference was that Lorenzo's father 
don Miguel was an influential man in the village. Yet, that fact did not change the difficult 
economic circumstances in the village. Miguel gave them a large sum of money to celebrate 
their wedding at the yearly festivities in Autlán, but they decided to use the money to buy 
some appliances for the kitchen. 
Lorenzo did not possess land and worked as a day laborer on the land of other people. 
In the dry season he went to the coast for work. When they were recently married Maria 
accompanied him to the coast. Later when they had children she stayed in the village, where 
her parents looked after her in Lorenzo's absence. After some years Lorenzo's father 
Miguel gave Lorenzo a cow and some years later he gave him one of his plots. However, 
even with this rainfed plot of land, Lorenzo had to find an income elsewhere. 
When Maria had given birth to their first two children, Lorenzo went to the United States 
for the first time. Lorenzo went many times through the bracero program in which men were 
recruited in Mexico to work as day laborers in agriculture in the United States. 2 The 
advantage of this program was that he was assured of work and could legally enter the 
United States. Lorenzo went many times for short periods. He never spent a whole year in 
el Norte, but only periods of eight months. His experiences as a migrant were not always 
very pleasant. In the fifties he was caught by the United States border police when he tried 
to pass the border illegally and was treated very badly. He did not try to go to California 
again. The next time he went to Texas, where he has some relatives. 
Still it was hard to maintain a family wi t i so many young children. Between 1947 and 
1971, twelve children were born. Fortunately, all their children were healthy and survived. 
The girls and boys started to participate in the household economy when they were old 
enough. However, all of them also went to school and several of the daughters followed 
more specialized courses to become a nurse and school teacher. Although Maria herself 
worked on the land as a child, her daughters never worked on the land. They worked in 
houses in the village and in Autlán. María remembers those years as very hard times. Apart 
from looking after the children, Maria had to prepare tortillas by hand twice a day, do the 
washing by hand, wash all the nappies (terrible in the rainy season when they would not 
dry), do the cooking, cleaning, fetch the water, etc. There was no running water at that time, 
nor electricity. As Maria says: When 1 was lying in bed, exhausted, and a baby was crying, 
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Lorenzo used to send me out of the room because he had to rest. As if I didn't work! Lorenzo 
never helped me with the children. But the men also worked very long days. 
Maria tried to earn something extra by preparing and selling meals in the house. The 
older girls helped her. She also learned how to inject people as her mother was very ill and 
frequently needed injections. She also became a midwife to raise more income. At the 
beginning of the sixties Lorenzo's land received irrigation. This increased the production on 
his land significantly but he continued traveling to the United States. By the time his second 
son Javier was 17 he joined his father in Texas. Javier was the first of t i e sons to work 
abroad. The oldest son Rub6n had to stay home to look after the family and the land. Later 
on Lorenzo did not return to work in the United States but his sons continued to go on their 
own. In the seventies the demand for Mexican workers in the United States continued to 
grow and migrant networks of people from La Canoa in Los Angeles became firmly 
established. Several of their daughters went to stay with relatives in the United States and 
married with Mexicans there. Other daughters married men from the village and later 
accompanied their husbands to the United States. While they planned only to stay abroad 
temporarily, the daughters did reasonably well in the USA and do not plan to return to the 
village anymore. Many grandchildren of Maria and Lorenzo were born in the USA and only 
know the village from their visits. 
Cayetano, Maria's father had become a widower and lived with his only son in the 
village. When this son died, Cayetano moved to Maria and Lorenzo's house. Now that then-
children became independent and that they received income from two plots of irrigated land 
(Lorenzo's and Cayetano's), life became much easier for Maria and Lorenzo. Lorenzo was 
in his fifties and became more involved in local politics. He became active in the PRI 
networks and became a police officer in Autlan. Later, he became treasurer of the executive 
committee of the ejido (1979-1982) and delegado in La Canoa (1980-1983). Today he likes 
to play with the image of the proud, politically active landowner. Yet, it was the recent 
introduction of the irrigation system and the sugarcane which made it possible for him to 
develop into this figure. 
For Maria and Lorenzo their relation with the USA has changed drastically. Instead of 
going to the USA for work, they now visit the USA for "pleasure". Being an ejidatario it 
was easy for Lorenzo to get a USA visa for Maria and him to visit their children in Los 
Angeles. So, instead of the hardship of illegally crossing the border, they now travel 
comfortably by airplane with official documents. 
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Organization of a Household and the Patriarchal Ideology 
The Patriarchal Ideology and the Public - Private Distinction 
Much has been written about the centrality of the patriarchal ideology and the gendered 
division between private and public spheres in Latin America (see Gledhill 1994: 198-206). 
According to Rouse this distinction between private and public is related to the fact that men 
are thought to be oriented primarily to honor and women to unity. Honor concerns the 
relationship of the family to the wider world and is thus linked to the "public domain of 
bargaining and negotiation identified with men while unity concerned the relationship among 
family members and was therefore linked symbolically to the domestic realm of emotion and 
nurturance associated with women" (Rouse 1989: 77). This ability to move freely between 
the domestic and the public gives men a much greatef range of experience and contacts than 
women (Rouse 1989: 113). As a general image these views apply well to La Canoa. In 
general, the women are oriented towards nurturing the family and the house is their place. 
The kitchen is particularly a women's domain. In the kitchen women tend to gather, talk 
about what is happening and gossip while they are preparing the food. A common topic 
among women is criticizing the behavior of their husbands. Men can enter the kitchen but 
will never stay there for a long time and often do not feel at ease in this women's place. 
This may be a "Ihreatening" atmosphere, especially when there are several women present. 
While the house in general is very much a woman's place, the street is a man's place. 
When women go out, it is only to do the shopping and then they have to be back. On the 
other hand, men often stay the whole day outside the house. They work, come home to eat, 
and then leave again to talk or drink with other men. "Respectable" women do not enter bars 
and billiard halls. 
Although the terms machismo and machista are widely used in academia, the villagers 
of La Canoa did not often use these terms in their discussions on gender relations (see also 
Rouse 1989 and Gutmann 1997). Yet, under the influence of migration and the media, the 
term has started to be used more frequently. A concept which was often used in the village 
to refer to the phenomenon that men wanted to control their wives and did not want them 
outside the house, was the term jealousy (celos). Rouse points out that in the village he 
studied, a set of values were mentioned which emphasize "qualities such as independence, 
hard work, unity, honor, respect and shame. These qualities have often been described by 
anthropologist under the general title of 'the honor/ shame complex'" (Rouse 1989: 111). 
In La Canoa these notions can also be distinguished but not strongly. In many aspects the 
villagers were rather flexible and tolerant in relation to issues of "honor and shame". This 
was especially clear with respect to the control over girls. Although the reputation of girls 
is still important and young girls are closely controlled by their parents, the virginity of girls 
when they marry is not so strongly valued anymore. Many young couples have sexual 
relations before getting married. 
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Rouse argues that in the model of the patriarchal family authority is distributed hierarchically 
along lines of gender, generation, and age in a manner that is meant to leave jurisdictions 
unambiguous. This arrangement places the father at the apex or the center, the children at 
the base or on the margins, and the mother in a mediating position between them. Among 
the children, males take precedence over females, and older siblings over younger ones 
(Rouse 1989: 113). Although in reality, of course, few families manage to be quite as unified 
as this model suggests and although boundaries were always transgressed and statuses 
challenged, Rouse argues that the images of the family as a bounded entity and as a 
hierarchical system of care and commitment were undoubtedly crucial to the way that people 
defined their goals, construed their world, and reinforced their circumstantial claims (ibid.: 
113-114). Although in La Canoa the definitions of authority, rights, and obligations between 
parents and children were contested and sometimes subject to negotiation, the above 
mentioned ideological images of the patriarchal family were very influential. Let me illustrate 
this by describing the lives of the four members of Maria and Lorenzo's household in 1991. 
Lorenzo 
Today life is very relaxed for Lorenzo. Sugarcane does not require a lot of work and a great 
part of it is organized by the sugarcane refinery. Lorenzo takes care of the irrigation of the 
sugarcane and hires people from time to time to do the cleaning of the crop, or the 
fumigation. In this way he is always "busy" with the land although he is not doing hard 
work. In former times he had a lot of cattle, but today he only has two pigs, two cows, and 
a goat left. He does not want to have more animals to look after anymore. Lorenzo is a 
controversial figure in the village for things he did when he was a police officer in Autlán 
and later delegado in the village. He used to threaten people with his gun when things did 
not work out the way he wanted and several people told me that they disliked his high and 
mighty (altanero) way of addressing people. His nickname is el viudo (the widower) as he 
is famous for running after other women. On the other hand, to friends and relatives Lorenzo 
is known as a very hospitable man who enjoys receiving people in his house. 
Like many other men, Lorenzo spends most of his time in the streets and does not render 
accounts of his activities. Often Maria did not know what he was doing. He used to leave 
the house saying laughingly that he was going to pick up a young girl in Autlán. He 
frequently arrived drunk but he never drank in the house. He often visited one of his 
compadres who lives in a ranch outside the village. This compadre, who was in his eighties, 
was an interesting and much commented case as he had a second wife who was more than 
forty years younger than he was. The couple had two beautiful teenage daughters, but most 
gossip concerned their little boy of two years old. People asked themselves if the man, at his 
age, would have been able to produce this child. So, rumors said that the boy was 
Lorenzo's. Logically, Maria hated everything that concerned the compadre and his family. 
Furthermore, the compadre and his family were considered to be very dirty and without 
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manners. On some occasions the compadre and his family arrived at Lorenzo's house and 
Lorenzo instructed Maria and Yolanda to treat them well. The women had little choice than 
to obey Lorenzo, but this compadre and his family were the object of much quarreling in the 
family. 
Lorenzo was a man who enjoyed the aesthetics of "el macho Jalisciense" as depicted in 
the Mexican movies and stories about the Revolution: the image of the man always being free 
and in control. Lorenzo was quite a machista type: a proud man and a womanizer. On the 
other hand, Lorenzo was also a very sensitive and warm man, who had difficulty showing 
his feelings of affection to his wife and children. Lorenzo was very fond of his grandchildren 
and frequently said that he would like to have some more children of his own. Lorenzo 
struggled with many contradictions in himself. The clearest example was the relation he had 
had with his father don Miguel which was discussed in chapter two. He adored and hated his 
despotic father at the same time. Lorenzo had treated his own children in a much gentler 
way. However, although he was not physically abusive, Lorenzo was very authoritarian and 
has never been very communicative with his sons or daughters. He could insult his married 
sons severely when he was drunk. He never treated them as equals. On the other hand, he 
provided them with everything they and their families needed and he always got them out of 
trouble. 
While his children were careful not to get him angry, in private they often talked in 
negative terms about him. The daughters, in particular, condemned his drinking, the way he 
treated their mother, and the fact that he spent much of the money from the sugarcane on 
himself. Maria was not happy with many of Lorenzo's actions and decisions either, but she 
was very careful not to comment on them. 
Maria 
Maria and Yolanda do all the work in the house. The work is to a great extent organized 
around the availability of water. Only every other day is there running water in the house. 
Yolanda does most cleaning work and the washing in the house, while Maria does the 
cooking. In contrast to Lorenzo, Maria spends her days in the house and she is not allowed 
to leave the house without his permission. This is quite common in the village, but in the 
case of Maria the situation is worse, for there are two men she obeys, her husband and her 
father. She hardly leaves the house but is visited by her sisters, sons, daughters-in-law and 
grandchildren. 
Although most men in the village did not like their wives spending much time in the 
streets or in other houses, Lorenzo carried this to an extreme. For example, he did not even 
allow Maria to go to the birthday party of her only sister in the village. Most women had 
more room for themselves than Maria. Other married women were out in the streets more 
and could at least pay visits to relatives. Maria often complained to other women that she 
never got out of the house. As she put it: I do not even know the ranchos (hamlets) here in 
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the surroundings. She could go to the shop at the comer when she needed something, but she 
preferred to send Yolanda or one of the granddaughters when they were around. She had to 
make sure that she was in the house when Lorenzo arrived, because he would be angry if she 
was not at home to serve him. The only acceptable reason for Maria to leave the house was 
to go to church. 
On the other hand, Maria's daughters criticized their mother for obeying her father 
Cayetano. If Cayetano did not give Maria permission to go to Autlán, she would not go. 
However, her sisters and daughters thought this was ridiculous on her part. So, this was a 
rather extreme case of an authoritarian husband, a capricious old father, and a wife/daughter 
who was very religious and dutiful and preferred not to fight for more room for herself. 
However, as we will see later on, she actively supported her daughters and daughters-in-law 
in creating more room for themselves in relation to their husbands. 
Like most other parents, Maria suffered from her separation from her children and 
grandchildren of whom most lived in the United States. She would very much have liked to 
have them back, but she realized that this would never happen. She understood very well that 
her daughters liked the material conveniences and freedom to move around which they had 
in the USA and which they would never have in the village. Maria was most of all worried 
about her sons in the USA. While her daughters were all responsible women some of whom 
were doing very well, her sons in the USA were much less responsible and some were 
involved in drugs, fencing stolen goods, and robberies. Maria was a very religious woman 
and prayed a lot for her sons. 
Maria had a close relation with her children, especially her daughters. The women 
consulted each other often and although there were differences in authority, I never saw 
Maria behave in an authoritarian way. She also had close relationships with her daughters-in-
law although there always was some jealousy and competition with respect to their acceptance 
by Maria. Yet, Maria tried to support all her daughters-in-law and always tried to settle 
conflicts between them. Maria very much corresponded to the image of the Mexican woman 
who tries to establish and maintain unity in the family. She was also very careful not to 
engage in gossiping and speaking ill of others. She very much lived through the ideology of 
Marianismo: the association with the figure of the Virgin which gives women the role of 
carrying the burden of pain and sacrificing themselves for the well-being of their husband 
and children. At the same time this role gave her a dominant influence in the domestic sphere 
and in her relation with her children. 
Yolanda 
Yolanda was twenty years old years in 1991. She is the youngest child and the only one who 
is not married. She is a nurse and previously worked at the clinic in the village. She still 
gives injections when people ask her to do so but does not work as a nurse anymore. 
Yolanda is much freer to move around in the village than her mother. Naturally, she must 
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report where she is going and she has to be home in the evening, but in contrast to her 
mother she spends much of her time outside the house. She visits relatives or friends in the 
village, participates in the church group or goes shopping in Autlán. Yolanda's married 
sisters envy her for having a liberty they never had. Although formally Yolanda needs to ask 
permission from her parents when she wants to go to Autlán or to a village festivity in the 
evening, this often seems more like a formality than a real request. Her parents never told 
her not to go. Yolanda had not only considerable freedom of movement but also with respect 
to her income. She had her own bank account with savings from jobs she had had in the 
USA. The relationship of Yolanda with her two brothers and two sisters-in-law in the village 
was not without frictions. Yolanda, as the youngest child, was very direct in her way of 
addressing and criticizing people and this was not appreciated. Furthermore, she was 
considered to be lazy and spoilt. For example, her oldest brother Rubén felt considerable 
resentment towards her. He was often angry when she got up late in the morning. Rubén: 
and look at Yolanda, she is the youngest and doesn't have to do anything! She gets up 
whenever she wants. It was different for us. 
Yolanda had lived for some time in Los Angeles with her married sisters, but had 
returned to the village because her grandfather Cayetano missed her so much. Cayetano 
called her regularly by telephone and once when he could not hear her well he fell ill. He 
told Maria to tell Yolanda to come back home because otherwise he would die. So, Yolanda 
returned to her parental home. However, she did not intend to stay very long and wanted to 
go back to the USA soon. However, Yolanda was under great pressure from her brothers and 
sisters to stay in the village and look after their parents. She was criticized for only wanting 
to have some fun in the United States, while her obligation, as the only unmarried child, was 
to look after her parents. 
This tension became very clear one Christmas when Yolanda was making plans to 
accompany her sisters who were about to return to the United States. While Yolanda was 
arranging everything for her departure, her brothers and sisters made clear to her that it was 
her duty to stay with her parents. Maria did not want Yolanda to leave because of her father 
Cayetano. She was afraid that Cayetano might fall ill again if Yolanda left. However, Maria 
wanted Yolanda to decide for herself and she did not order the girl. When I asked Maria if 
she could not order Yolanda to stay home, Maria responded: No, from the age of eighteen, 
the children decide a lot for themselves. I cannot keep her here if she does not want to stay. 
On the other hand, the last time that Yolanda went to the United States, my father asked all 
the time if she was alright there. If she was not he would send her the money to come back. 
I would like her to stay for him. Yolanda was under great pressure and did not make up her 
mind. For several days she was in a bad temper. Maria was preoccupied and tried to 
convince Yolanda not to go. In the end she stayed. 
Hence, Yolanda was confronted with the moral obligation to look after her parents and 
grandfather. She herself was very aware of this but these moral obligations clashed with her 
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personal interests of having a better time in the United States and perhaps finding a husband 
which she could not in the village. She was in the luxurious position that her mother and 
father gave her considerable liberty and did not try to impose a decision on her. Most 
pressure came from her brothers and sisters. 
Cayetano 
Maria's father don Cayetano, was a special case. He was over 100 years old although 
opinions differed about his exact age (some said he was 101, others 104). He spent a large 
part of the day in bed and was very well taken care of. Often he shouted for Maria or 
Yolanda when he wanted some attention. If he had to wait too long or felt that he was 
neglected, he wet the bed. Maria sometimes complained that Cayetano did not let her do 
anything. He wanted her to sit next to him the whole day and when she walked to the door 
he told her to come back. He had the same attitude towards Yolanda. Cayetano often 
embarrassed Maria with the romances he still tried to start with every young woman around. 
He used to make "indecent proposals" to them and offer to marry them. Although this 
romantic behavior of Cayetano was the source of much fun in the family, it also was a 
source of some concern. What if a girl accepted and in this way became the heir to 
Cayetano's land? However, so far, no woman had accepted the hundred year old man's 
proposals. Cayetano often complained that Maria and Lorenzo did not give him any money. 
He liked to go out of the house and walk around. He also wanted money to go to Autlan and 
look for a girlfriend. On one occasion, one of Maria sons proposed to give him some 
monopoly money from a children's game to make him feel happy. Maria was annoyed by 
this remark and told him that he should show more respect to his grandfather. On some days 
Cayetano was allowed to have a mezcal and after happily drinking the liquor, he spent the 
rest of the day in bed. Later on, Cayetano's condition deteriorated and he could not walk 
alone anymore. Then, they put him outside in a chair to take some sun or took him out for 
a walk. 
Cayetano had six daughters and one son, who had died many years ago. Of his six 
daughters Maria and a sister lived in the village, two others lived in Autlan and two on the 
coast of Jalisco. They regularly visited their father. From time to time Cayetano fell ill and 
his daughters and grandchildren prepared themselves for his death but he always recovered 
remarkably well. For example, in January 1992, Cayetano fell ill again and threw up. The 
doctor said that at his age he could easily pass away and everybody was very worried. 
Immediately all his daughters came to the village and also a grandson came over from the 
USA. This was an interesting case, for this grandson was the illegitimate son of one of 
Cayetano's daughters. Since this daughter was not married when she had the boy, the boy 
was raised by Cayetano and considered him to be his father. The daughters spent all their 
time praying at Cayetano's bed. Again Cayetano recovered. In a couple of days he was 
better again and everybody was very relieved. The daughters returned home and the grandson 
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returned to the USA. 
The fact that Lorenzo managed Cayetano's irrigated sugarcane plot was not without 
tension in the family. Although the care for a parent gives certain rights to the land, it not 
necessarily means that all the proceeds of this plot are for the household where the parent 
lives. In this case it caused tension with Maria's sisters in particular as Lorenzo seemed to 
use most of the money for himself. Not even Maria knew what Lorenzo did with the money. 
On one occasion Lorenzo told me: I can use Cayetano 's land because Cayetano lives with 
us. Cayetano himself chose to live with Maria, so the right to the land automatically 
corresponds to us. However, not everybody agreed with his view of the situation. 
In addition to the present use of the plot, the future inheritance of Cayetano's land also 
led to speculation and gossiping. As Cayetano did not have a son anymore, it was probable 
that his land would be inherited by his daughter Maria. On the other hand, many people 
thought that Yolanda would be the heir of her grandfather's land because she was his favorite 
grandchild. The fact that Maria or Yolanda was going to inherit the land also caused frictions 
among the daughters of Cayetano. They all admitted that Maria took good care of their father 
and in this way had developed certain rights to the land, but this was valuable land and 
Maria's sisters could use some extra income. Several people in the village told me that in 
earlier times when Cayetano fell ill, his daughters would come over to the village to try and 
make him change his inheritance papers. Other rumors in the village stated that Lorenzo had 
forced Cayetano to make Maria the heir to his land. 
Other people claimed that Yolanda would inherit the land. Jokes went round that the man 
who would marry Yolanda, would get a large plot of land. At Yolanda's 21st birthday we 
were teasing her about the fact that one day she would become an ejidataria. She denied it 
and added that she did not know anything about agriculture and that it did not interest her 
in the least. However, later that same evening, she told a friend of ours (whom she liked 
very much) that she would be the heir to Cayetano's land and she asked him if he did not 
know a good potential husband as she did not know anything about agriculture. 
Lorenzo used Cayetano's presence in the house as a pretext for not letting Maria leave 
the house. He used to say to Maria that she could not leave the house as she had to look after 
her father. This had little to do with a sincere concern for Cayetano as Yolanda or other 
people were quite willing to take over this task from Maria. However, using Cayetano as a 
pretext for keeping her in the house, was a smart strategy. Maria and other people could 
blame Lorenzo for being jealous and restricting his wife too much. Yet, it was much more 
difficult to oppose to the highly socially valued principle of looking after one's parent and 
showing him due respect. Cayetano was only too happy to demand that Maria stayed with 
him. 
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Households Within Transnational Networks 
María and Lorenzo's house is the focal point of a set of social relations. In 1991 many 
people used to gather in their house. The two married sons in the village and their families 
always spent a lot of time with them. Their oldest son Rubén had visited the USA but never 
really worked there for a long time. He is married to Rosa who comes from a neighboring 
village and they have four children and were expecting the fifth. Rubén works as a school 
teacher in a village on the coast where he stays with an aunt. He only comes home for the 
weekends. The other son in La Canoa was Javier. He lived for many years in Los Angeles 
and had only recently returned from the USA with his wife and little son. 
Maria and Lorenzo's house was always full of people, especially in the weekends and 
during school holidays. The children and grandchildren used to spend their afternoons in this 
house and have their meals there. The adults generally watched television or played cards 
while the children were playing. Other people who frequently visited the house were 
Lorenzo's brothers José, Miguel, and Estanislao. In the afternoon, the four brothers used 
to play cards and domino. Other relatives, compadres, and friends also frequently joined the 
group. A friend Jaime always passed by and acted as if he was a close relative of the family. 
He always called Maria aunt, but according to Maria they were only distant relatives. 
Sometimes relatives from Guadalajara arrived or one of Maria's sisters from the coast came 
over and stayed for several days. Another couple mat frequently entered the house were a 
couple of deaf-mutes with their three children. The man was a distant relative of Lorenzo and 
it was interesting to see how well Lorenzo and he communicated with their hands. On 
summer days when many relatives were around it was common for one person or some 
people together to buy chicken or meat and organize a barbecue. Alternatively, the women 
might decide to prepare tamales. Coca cola and mezcal were bought and another pleasant 
event was organized. 
Hence, social life at the Romero's was warm and hospitable. They were good at 
organizing spontaneous gatherings and parties, there was abundant food and this contributed 
to Lorenzo's pride. In the village "men were esteemed not only for their more menacing 
qualities but also for their ability to build close and harmonious social ties, both with 
outsiders and among members of their own group, for their capacity to earn and offer trust 
and for their willingness to use economic capital for social purposes such as parties" (Rouse 
1989: 132). On many occasions Lorenzo himself left the house to attend to his own private 
affairs, but he wanted the others to stay in the house and enjoy themselves. 
Although Maria and Lorenzo and their children are divided between different households 
on both sides of the border, they continue supporting each other in diverse ways. The most 
obvious elements of continuing relations between households are the consumer goods which 
are bought with "migration money" such as the television, the satellite disk, the video 
recorder, furniture, and so on. Summer months are normally very good for Maria and 
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Lorenzo. First, the sugarcane profits of the whole year are paid in summer. Second, the 
children in the United States often send extra money to their parents in this period. The 
married daughters in particular help their parents a lot. Most married daughters have a job 
in the United States and this gives them the opportunity to continue supporting their parents. 
This summer inflow of money can be very visible. For example, one summer, one of their 
daughters sent them money for a new lounge suite. As the other daughters also sent them 
money Lorenzo and Maria decided to refurbish the house. The living room was painted and 
the walls were decorated with new ornaments. A big fan was installed on the ceiling. The 
old cement floor in the living room was replaced with flagstones. Rubén, who was free in 
summer because of the school holidays, did most of the work. This included tapping the 
walls, painting, renewing the electricity installation, putting the flagstones, etc. His uncle 
José, who had worked in construction before, gave him instructions. In terms of the money 
and labor invested this was a real family project. 
Two of the daughters who had sent the money for the 'redecoration', were going to 
come over for Christmas and everybody looked forward to seeing the surprise on their faces 
when they saw the "new house". When Adriana and Mariana came over at Christmas they 
showed a strong bond with the house and the village. During their stay Adriana and Mariana 
deliberated about the next improvements for the house. They concluded that they should 
collect more money among their brothers and sisters in the United States to change the whole 
floor and put down flagstones throughout the whole house. They also wanted to buñd a wall 
to separate the house from the plants in the corral. It was interesting to see the two migrated 
sisters talking to each other about the improvements that were needed in their parental house. 
They were the ones who were going to pay anyway. However, there were also other ways 
in which the children helped their parents. For example, by lending Lorenzo money for the 
work in the sugarcane. A couple of months later when Lorenzo received the proceeds of the 
sugarcane he would pay the loan back. 
Their trips to the USA were also interesting because of what they demonstrated of the 
relations between households. The children in the USA often asked their parents to come 
over and offered to pay for the plane tickets. On several occasions Maria and Lorenzo went 
to visit their children in Los Angeles. One day when they were going to return to the village 
the house was cleaned and decorated with garlands and their sons with their families were 
waiting for them in the house. Javier had left to pick them up at the airport. José, Lorenzo's 
brother and his wife were also there as well as Maria's sister from the coast. Maria and 
Lorenzo arrived with five suitcases and one box. Immediately the suitcases were unpacked 
and everything divided among the children and grandchildren. The daughters in the USA had 
sent a lot of clothing for their relatives. Maria had brought watches for her daughters-in-law. 
This unpacking of the suit-cases with the clothes for their nieces and nephews is a standard 
ritual in the village. This also happens when the brothers or sisters pay a visit to the village. 
Javier and Rubén and the other families in the village cannot keep up with their migrant 
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brothers and sisters playing "Santa Claus". Everybody was very happy with the presents. 
However, the support arrangements did not only go from children in the USA to parents 
in La Canoa. In their turn, Maria and Lorenzo helped those of their children's households 
that were not so prosperous or did not make it in the USA. They supported or even 
maintained them by providing them with food, houses, jobs, and loans whenever necessary. 
Lorenzo had always helped his sons. For example, he had bought Rubén - who not followed 
the necessary training - his position as a schoolteacher. Another way in which Maria and 
Lorenzo helped both sons and their families in the village was by providing them with milk 
for all the grandchildren. On some occasions Lorenzo gave his sons in the village money 
from the proceeds of the sugarcane. 
Compton, Los Angeles 
Although much of the support networks and experiences in Los Angeles become clear in La 
Canoa itself, my visit to the villagers in the USA made certain phenomena more visible. 
When I paid a visit to Dolores and Luis in Compton, Los Angeles, I met many people from 
La Canoa whom I did not even know had left the village. In the social gatherings it felt like 
being in the village: the same people, the same food, and the same hospitality. The networks 
of relatives and villagers are very strong in the USA. For example, La Canoa has its own 
football team in Los Angeles and on Sundays the villagers meet at the church where a 
Mexican mariachi plays. Afterwards they go to a farmer to have fresh cow's milk with 
liquor, an old custom from the village. The villagers also cooperate when somebody from 
the village dies in the United States and the body has to be sent back to the village. Often 
this concerns young people who were murdered or lost their lives in traffic accidents. These 
are sad events which always cause a great emotional reaction in Los Angeles, as well as in 
the home village. 
On the other hand, living in Compton obviously is not the same as living in a Mexican 
village. One of the things that was obvious in Compton were the ethnic tensions and violence 
the villagers experience in the United States. For example, Luis had been attacked twice and 
the second time he was shot in his legs. As a consequence of this assault he could not work 
for a long time. A son of Luis had also been shot in the leg. In the evening people did not 
leave the house anymore. Not even to go to the shop at the corner. Luis' adult sons often 
wanted to go out and enjoy themselves but Luis tried to do everything to keep them from 
going. He was very afraid that something might happen to them. Luis would prefer to go 
back to the "safe and healthy" life of La Canoa, but Dolores made it clear that she would 
not go with him as she did not want to leave her children and grandchildren in the USA. 
An important difference from the village is the role of the women. Many women have 
their own jobs and income in the United States. Much of the time this was out of economic 
necessity, to pay the rents and higher costs of living. However, several women were more 
successful in their jobs than their husbands. For example, Mariana one of Maria and 
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Lorenzo's daughters, started to sell tupperware at the houses of Mexican women. She sold 
very well and obtained many bonuses for being such a good saleswoman. She made a career 
in the business and earned a lot of money. This was not without problems in her marriage 
and she had many fights with her husband. However, she did not want to give up her income 
and in the end her husband accepted the situation. Her husband also had a good job in an 
airplane factory and they managed to buy a house with a swimming pool. 
It is obvious that these changing roles of women, also meant a change in gender 
relations. The village women in Los Angeles are clearly different from the women in the 
village who stay home all day. They drive around in their own cars, something which is 
unthinkable in the village. Many women told me about the problems they had had with their 
husbands about their working outside the house and having a much more public social life 
than in the village. On the other hand, many young Mexican husbands also started to help 
in the household and some said they enjoyed the different type of relation with their wives. 
Many parents were also very proud of their daughters for having a career and driving around 
in cars. For example, Luis proudly told me that Ema always drives her husband home when 
they go out and he has been drinking. This is in great contrast to village standards where a 
man would never let his wife drive, even if he had been drinking the whole night. 
Social networks are central to the migration process. These include, for example, 
information networks about the best ways to cross the border, or about where to find jobs, 
but also information about how relatives are doing and where they can be found. People often 
arrive at the homes of relatives or friends who help them find a place to live and a job. For 
example, when I visited Compton, Yolanda was living with her sister Dolores. Later she 
moved in with another sister in another neighborhood because she had changed job. Yolanda 
had many different jobs and moved in with the sister that lived nearest to the job. Not all of 
the brothers and sisters did well in the United States. Some of the sisters did very well, 
together with their husbands they earned a lot, bought houses and were doing fine. However, 
others were in a much more critical situation. 
Although most families had a better living standard (in terms of material well being) than 
they would have in the village, they also complained a lot about the "lack of freedom" in the 
United States and the high incidence of violence. A common topic of worry and discussion 
among migrants is the freedom of children and women in the USA and the dirninishing 
authority of parents and husbands. Most parents do not like the prospect of their children 
growing up in the "violent" and "immoral" society of the USA and hope to come back to 
the village for their children. In this way, "'Homeland' remains one of the most powerful 
unifying symbols for mobile and displaced peoples, though the relation to homeland may be 
very differently constructed in different settings" (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 39). However, 
many migrants themselves know that it is highly unlikely that they will ever return to the 
village. So far no family has returned to the village with older children. Many children were 
born in the United States and have never been to the village. 
120 Chapter 4 
The tension between life in the United States and life in the village becomes clear when the 
children of Maria and Lorenzo visit the village during summer holidays or at Christmas. The 
children from el Norte are easily recognized by their hair cut, the way they dress, and their 
language; Spanish mixed up with English. For these children the village is an interesting 
distraction for a few days but the visit should not last too long. The differences in life style 
and this alienation from their "root village" can sometimes give rise to painful situations. For 
example, many of these American kids do not like the "real" Mexican food their 
grandmother prepares. They sometimes even fall ill after eating food they are not used to. 
When relatives are over from the USA, tortillas are changed for Corn Flakes and the sale 
of instant meals in the village shops rises dramatically. 
Migrants also complain about the strong regulation and discipline in the USA and the 
absence of "relajo" (relaxing). Working hours are considered to be very strict and there is 
too much supervision. Many people say that in the USA one is a slave of one's work. They 
use to compare this to the "freedom" of the village where one can walk into the fields and 
where people at least know how to enjoy life. Rouse talks in this context about two languages 
migrants employ even after becoming long-term settlers in the United States. The first 
language is the one in which they have seemingly internalized the values and beliefs of the 
United States working class (talking about their success as wage-earners, the pride they take 
in the houses, and the prestigious consumer items they have been able to buy; being proud 
of being well-liked by the boss for turning up on time, being a hard worker, and providing 
labor in a steady manner) and the second in which they seemed to have retained their old 
ways of evaluating and interpreting the world (Rouse 1992: 40). According to Rouse these 
two languages, which in many ways are contradictory, reflect basic tensions which are 
always present and are always capable of manifesting themselves in confusion and conflict 
{ibid.: 41). Although I agree with his analysis of the existence of two contradictory 
languages, in my view, contradictory languages should not only be analyzed in terms of an 
indication of social tensions. In my view, the handling of contradictory discourses through 
reflective talk is a central characteristic of all social life and is not necessarily the result of 
the dealing with dramatic changes in living conditions. For example, in chapters six to nine, 
contradictory discourses will be analyzed in the daily setting of the ejido and the Mexican 
bureaucracy. 
Searching for a Solution for a Son who Failed in the United States 
With the economic crisis in the United States many migrants found themselves in increasingly 
difficult situations and returned to their villages in Mexico. Javier was one of Maria and 
Lorenzo's children who had not succeeded in the USA and came back to the village. Javier 
was expelled from the USA for possessing false papers (he used the identity papers of 
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somebody who had died) and fencing stolen goods. So, Javier, Elena, and their little son 
returned to La Canoa. Javier's oldest sister Dolores who lived in Los Angeles lent them her 
empty house in La Canoa. Javier had a hard time. Elena gave birth to their second child, a 
daughter but Javier did not even have money to buy food for his family. Javier and Elena 
lived very poorly and needed the support from Maria and Lorenzo. 
From the moment they returned to La Canoa, there were clashes between the village 
standards and the style of life Javier and Elena had developed in the USA. First of all, they 
had a child but were not married. Maria decided that they ought to marry immediately. Yet, 
it had to be a very quiet and simple wedding for it was shameful that they had lived together 
and had a child without being married. So, they soon had their quiet wedding. For Elena, 
life in la Canoa was hard. She grew up in the town Autlán and had lived a long time in Los 
Angeles. She had a liberal attitude towards life and found it difficult to adapt to the strict 
codes imposed by her family-in-law, especially dona Maria. Although Maria was very gentle 
with her, she nevertheless made it clear that Elena should change her style of dress, could 
not ride a bicycle anymore and should behave like a married woman now. According to 
Elena, Javier also changed in the village. He started to behave like the other macho men in 
the village, which he had never been in Los Angeles. Tensions between Elena and Javier 
grew. According to Elena Javier had been much more affectionate to her in the United 
States. There he hugged her when he came home and then they would talk for hours. That 
was all over now. In the USA he also used to help her in the house, but in the village he 
refused to do domestic work. However, according to Javier he was not the one who had 
changed but Elena. She had become much more aggressive towards him. Elena wanted to 
do other things besides the domestic work and she was dunking of selling pottery with her 
niece or start working as a teacher again. However, Javier did not let her to look for jobs 
and said that she did not even manage to do the housework well. 
Another problem was Elena's reputation as a free woman. Elena had had boy friends and 
several relations before she met Javier and Javier knew about that. However, some relatives 
of his kept speaking ill of her and told Javier that she was cheating on him. Elena was also 
hurt by remarks concerning her style of dress and make-up. When they lived in the USA 
Javier always liked to see her with make-up, but in the village Yolanda made jokes about it 
and Maria made remarks about the clothes she was wore. Maria said to her that wearing 
shorts was no way for a married woman to dress. So, Elena started dressing more and more 
like a traditional married woman in the village. As she said: I think that in the end the only 
way to stand life here is to become the same as all the other people. 
However, there were also other tensions between the different brothers, sisters and in-
laws. Rubén and Javier did not get along very well. Javier was irritated by Ruben's good 
schoolteacher behavior, while Rubén considered Javier a lazy, useless person. Although these 
tensions were always present, they were not openly expressed. Rosa and Elena, the sisters-in-
law, got along well, although Elena felt that Rosa was the favorite daughter-in-law. Rosa 
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corresponded most to the image of the traditional respectable married woman: she dressed 
the part, behaved in a subservient way to her husband and parents in law, and procreated 
many children. Elena in her turn, did not behave according to the village norms. Instead of 
a having a subservient, respectful attitude, she was a provoking, impulsive presence. She 
joked with don Lorenzo and tried to challenge him when the atmosphere was good. She tried 
hard to be respectful and helped Maria wherever she could, but she was much more effusive 
than traditional daughters-in-law. Although Maria tried to correct her on certain points, 
Maria and Lorenzo appreciated her cheerfulness. 
Frictions also arose between Javier and his sister Dolores who had lent them her house. 
The lending of houses is a common source of conflict in the village. When Dolores* husband 
Luis came over from Los Angeles to pay a visit to his relatives in the village, he accused 
Javier and Elena of not looking after his house well and of using things that belonged to Luis 
without having asked permission. Luis was very displeased. In her turn, Elena felt very much 
offended as Luis had accused them in front of Elena's family from Autlan who happened 
to be paying them a visit. In the end Luis did not talk about it anymore, but the next time 
he visited the village, the same problems were raised. 
Javier and Elena's position became increasingly difficult. Lorenzo and Maria maintained 
them, but a more permanent solution had to be found. As Javier was already in his forties 
with little experience in agriculture he could not work on the land with his father. For quite 
some time, Javier said that he intended to return to the United States. Yet returning to the 
States did not seem a real option for him. Lorenzo looked for other possibilities for his son. 
As a new delegado for the village had to be appointed, Lorenzo and his brother Jose talked 
about the possibility of having Javier appointed as delegado. Although the salary of a 
delegado is very low, it is at least a start. However, Lorenzo and Jos6 themselves rejected 
this idea as they realized that Javier did not have many friends in the village. Moreover, 
Javier himself said that he wanted to leave the village again. 
Finally, one summer when Lorenzo had received the money from the sugarcane, a 
solution to Javier's problematic situation offered itself. Lorenzo had decided to build a 
billiard hall for Javier, so that he could stay in the village. The billiard hall was going to be 
built in the large corral, next to Lorenzo's house. They started the project by putting in a 
drain and building a wall to separate the billiard hall from Lorenzo's house. It was clearly 
a family project and Rub6n, Javier, some of Lorenzo's brothers, and a nephew all worked 
on the project. They all expressed their opinions about the best way to run the billiard hall, 
about the number of tables they should put there, where everything should be bought, if he 
should sell food besides liquor, and so on. Javier's mood improved every day. They hoped 
to finish the project before the 16th of September, when Mexico's independence is 
celebrated, but that proved to be impossible. 
The opening of the billiard hall was celebrated towards the end of September. Although 
I was already used to the strong separation between men's domains and women's domains, 
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I was surprised to notice that all the men were at the celebration in the billiard hall and all 
the women were in Lorenzo's house preparing the tacos. In the following days it became 
clear that the billiard hall was a Romero's place and that besides a couple of alcoholics and 
an occasional outsider only friends of the family used to go there. It was never really busy 
and I wondered how Javier could ever earn a living from this business. However, Javier had 
to do more than just earn a living. Lorenzo had paid for the equipment for the billiard hall, 
but Javier had to pay him back. As not much money was earned in the billiard hall, the 
situation looked gloomy for Javier. He started allowing people to play cards for money. In 
this way he could earn more. He also started borrowing money from money lenders in the 
village and in Autlan. This was a risky affair as money lenders charged approximately 10 
percent a month in interest. 
Forms of Dependence and Interference 
Receiving financial support from their father sometimes created undesirable situations in 
which the sons had little control over their own lives. When he had been drinking Lorenzo 
liked to stress that all his children in the village depended on him. Quarrels between Javier 
and Lorenzo began to occur more frequently. Javier had to repay the investment his father 
had made in the billiard hall, but he hardly earned enough money to feed his family. During 
these quarrels Javier said that he was working very hard to try to earn money for his father 
who did not have to do anything for it. Lorenzo in his turn threatened to close the billiard 
hall as he had paid for everything and in this way remained the owner. Lorenzo also made 
comments about the ill use of the billiard hall tables and the bad management of the billiard 
hall. 
Besides the problems of paying back his father's investments and paying back the 
moneylenders, Javier also had trouble with the police. Lorenzo had paid for the license for 
the billiard hall but the police kept bothering Javier. One day the police from El Grullo 
arrived in the village to check the billiard hall's license. This checking of the license was 
only a pretext for getting money for not making problems about the illegal playing of cards 
(for money) in the billiard hall. Lorenzo was the one who dealt with the police officers and 
explained them that he had already arranged it with (and paid) another police officer and that 
he was not going to pay twice. Although this was true, Lorenzo did not feel quite sure about 
it. Dealing with the police is always tricky and it is not clear how things work between the 
different groups in the police apparatus. Every time that a car arrived at the village that 
evening, Lorenzo immediately went outside to see whether it was the police. Although 
Lorenzo himself had worked as a police officer in Autlan many years ago and still had 
several contacts within influential circles in Autlan and El Grullo, one was never quite sure. 
Anyhow, Lorenzo was the one who always dealt with these contacts and never his sons. On 
another occasion, when Lorenzo was not at home, police officers came to the billiard hall 
and took Javier with them to Autlan. Everybody of the family was worried and upset. 
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However, they remained quiet and decided to wait for Lorenzo to resolve this problem. Elena 
and Maria were very tense as it was getting dark and the prospect of Javier spending the 
night in jail was not a pleasant one. The police are known for beating people up. Fortunately, 
Lorenzo came home and immediately went to Autlan. Later that evening he returned with 
Javier. Lorenzo said that he knew the head of the traffic police in Autlan and had the 
problem resolved through him. 
A couple of months later, the billiard hall seemed to be going well at the weekends but 
it all depended on the economy in the region. When there was a crisis in the region, nobody 
spent money in the billiard hall. On the other hand, during Christmas holidays when people 
from the United States came over, Javier was earning well. However, Javier kept having 
trouble with the police. In March 1993, for example, he and three other men who were 
playing cards for money in the billiard hall were taken away by the judiciaies (a police force 
that is greatly feared in Mexico). When they passed through a village Javier got out of the 
car to borrow money from someone he knew there. He paid the police 600,000 pesos ($ 200) 
and they were released. Lorenzo criticized Javier for having the gambling in the billiard hall. 
However, this was the only way for Javier to earn something as in 1993 the region was 
passing through a severe crisis again. Lorenzo heavily criticized both Javier and Elena and 
as a result of this quarrel the billiard hall was closed for two days. Javier again started 
borrowing from other people in order to pay his father's investments back. Elena did not 
visit the house anymore as she was afraid that Lorenzo would start to criticize her again 
when he was drunk. After some time everyone calmed down again, but Javier was seriously 
thinking of selling the billiard hall and using the money to buy a little house in Autlan and 
establishing himself as a money-lender. However, for the moment he did not dare to talk 
about this plan with his father. 
Hence, Javier found himself in the extremely unpleasant situation of having failed in the 
USA and becoming dependent again on his father. In the village he could not continue the 
type of relation he had had with his wife in Los Angeles and the couple had serious 
problems. Even with the support of his father, he was not able to make much progress in 
getting a steady income. 
Another Son Returning from el Norte 
In January 1992 I left the village for ten months. When I came back to the village in 
October, the family situation had changed drastically. Don Cayetano had passed away in 
March. Yolanda had stayed until his death but had then left for the United States. However, 
another son, Carlos, had come back from the United States with his wife Magdalena with the 
intention of staying in the village. The arrival of this son had had great consequences for the 
relations within the family. Carlos is one of the youngest and most "irresponsible" sons of 
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Lorenzo and Maria. He had recently married Magdalena, whom he had met in Los Angeles 
(Magdalena's brother is married to a niece of Carlos's). Magdalena comes from a small 
rural village in Nayarit where they got married before arriving in La Canoa. Lorenzo gave 
them his house next to the billiard hall to live in. Carlos had had many jobs in the USA but 
had not managed to get fixed employment. Together with his brothers he had worked in jobs 
like construction, mowing lawns, restaurants etc. Several times he got into trouble because 
of fights he was involved in. The economic crisis in the USA made it increasingly difficult 
for him to find work. When he had lost his last job again, he decided to leave the USA and 
establish himself with his wife in La Canoa. 
Although Carlos and Magdalena lived in the house next to Lorenzo's, they spent most 
of the day with Lorenzo and María. Magdalena did the washing there, they ate and watched 
television there. Carlos tried to look for work and started working as a waiter in a restaurant 
in El Grullo. Soon I became aware that family relations had changed. Rosa and her children, 
who used to spend a lot of time at Lorenzo's house, hardly came anymore. Rubén and Rosa 
criticized Maria for only paying attention to Magdalena and her new baby. Elena did not visit 
the house very much either. So, most of the time when I visited the house only Maria, 
Magdalena and the new granddaughter were in the house. Although Magdalena was young 
and had only recently entered the family, her presence and interference was strongly felt. The 
two other daughters-in-law felt that Magdalena had "taken over" the house of their parents-
in-law. As a result, the house was much less lively than it used to be in 1991. Maria 
regretted this change very much but she could not do anything about it. She missed her 
daughter Yolanda and her grandchildren who used to come around. Although Maria tried 
hard, she could not anymore successfully fulfill her role of the matriarch who brought unity 
in the family. Her husband, her sons, and daughters-in-law in the village had difficult 
relationships with each other. This was especially hard on Maria who always tried to be 
supportive towards her daughters-in-law and always tried to mediate between them and 
refrain from gossiping and destructive politicking within the family. 
Relations between the three brothers that now lived in the village were also strained. 
Carlos was a cheerful, extrovert man and unlike his two brothers in the village he chased 
after women and liked to drink and smoke marihuana. With respect to the women and the 
drinking he resembled his father much more than his two brothers. Carlos used to engage 
me into the same kind of gender discussions and (indirect) gender struggles as his father. 
Although Carlos was a cheerful element in the house, he also caused his father a lot of 
trouble. Lorenzo said that Carlos was the most difficult of his children. He was not a hard 
worker, often had fights with people when he had been drinking and tended to lose every job 
Lorenzo managed to arrange for him. Yet, Carlos was the only one of the three sons who 
accompanied his father to the fields. Lorenzo paid him for the days he worked with him. 
Lorenzo and Maria practically maintained Carlos and his wife anyway as they spent the days 
in their house. 
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When he had been drinking Carlos could become aggressive. He had a trained body and his 
relatives were afraid that one day something serious might happen. On one occasion Carlos 
severely beat a man at a family party. The man started to speak ill of Lorenzo and 
commented upon the bad things he had done in the past. Carlos did not wait long and it soon 
came to blows. The man who had been beaten left the party calling out serious threats to 
Lorenzo and his family. The next day Lorenzo visited the parents of the boy in Autlan to 
offer his apologies. Offering apologies was very unusual for Lorenzo but he was afraid for 
possible repercussions for Carlos in the future. Here we see that Lorenzo's sons are 
confronted with the same kind of stories about their father as Lorenzo was with stories about 
his father don Miguel. In the same way as Lorenzo, Carlos does not accept people speaking 
ill of his father. 
Lorenzo and Maria tried to convince Carlos that he had to be more responsible now that 
he was married. His wife was pregnant and soon he would also have a family to take care 
of. Carlos seemed to become aware of his responsibilities and took up the idea of selling 
balls of popcorn with honey in the village whenever there was a football match or during the 
days. It was funny to see him riding around on his bicycle selling the popcorn. However, he 
soon got tired of if and after some time he did not go out again. He often stayed in his bed 
"resting". All these things irritated his brothers Javier and Ruben and his parents. However, 
this staying in bed also illustrated that Carlos did not fit into the village style of living. 
Although life in the village could be very relaxed, it was unusual for men to lie in. A man 
could have a nap after a day's work or after a meal in the afternoon, but he could not stay 
in bed the whole morning. 
In the winter of 1992 and during the whole of 1993 the region went through a severe 
economic crisis again. Many crops on the irrigated land were not harvested because of the 
low prices, there was no work, no money, and everybody was complaining about the difficult 
times. Even borrowing money from money lenders became impossible. Meals were reduced 
to tortillas and beans. Now that the situation had become so critical Lorenzo went to see 
Zuniga, head of the CNC of the sugarcane producers in the region, to ask for a job for 
Carlos. He said that it did not matter what kind of a job, but that the boy urgently needed 
something. Zuniga gave Carlos a job at the office. This was a golden opportunity for Carlos 
in a time of economic crisis and was an indication of the good relations Lorenzo still 
maintained with influential people in the region. Although Lorenzo and his brothers had 
difficulties with the municipality in Autlan about the organization of village projects (chapter 
three), they still had very good individual relations with powerful men in the region. Yet, 
the job only lasted a week. Carlos was fired for fighting with other employees. 
Carlos now tried to work as a day laborer on the land when some crops were harvested. 
The economic crisis in the region became worse and in March 1993 Carlos even started 
working in the harvest of the sugarcane, as did other boys from the village. This was an 
indication that things really were very bad as the cutting of the cane is very heavy, dirty 
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work which is usually done by cuadrillas of poor landless people from other regions. 
Although Lorenzo used to boast that the sons of ejidatarios did not have to work on the land, 
the work his son was doing now (cutting the cane) was considered to be much worse and 
more disgusting than normal work on the land. However, for Carlos there was no other 
option as he did not want to go to the USA now that his wife was expecting their baby soon. 
In March Magdalena gave birth to a daughter. After his daughter was born, Carlos began 
to plan to leave for the USA. He started to drink again and Maria tried to change his 
behavior. Magdalena did not dare to say or do anything against the behavior of her husband, 
but Maria as his mother commented upon it. His youngest brother Vicente who lived in Los 
Angeles had told Carlos that there was a lot of work in the USA and that he could arrange 
a job for him. So, Carlos left for Los Angeles, leaving Magdalena and the baby with his 
parents. After a couple of months Carlos sent money from the USA. He even sent money 
to repair the roof of their house and for an electricity meter for the house. In May Carlos 
wanted to come back, but now Maria and Magdalena told him to stay longer as there still 
was no work in the region. They told him that his daughter was eating one tin of milk 
powder a week costing 17,000 pesos per tin. They would not have the money to pay for that 
if he returned to the village. So, Carlos had to continue his stay in el Norte. 
When Carlos finally returned to the village, things soon were as before. He became 
involved in several fights and did not work. Magdalena was very worried about the whole 
situation but hardly dared to talk to him about it. On one occasion when she had criticized 
him Carlos hit her. Here Carlos had gone too far and when Maria learnt about it she warned 
Carlos that he should never do that again. Although men in La Canoa liked to express 
themselves in "violent" terms and it was common to hear that "a real man hits his wife", 
the beating of wives was not a common practice and was condemned when it occurred. As 
Rouse points out, "local ideas about proper manliness differed from the conventional portrait 
in important ways. In the first place, the use of violence was not esteemed. The skill that 
people really respected was the ability to strike a pose so convincing in its intimations of 
aggression that actual violence would rarely, if ever, be necessary" (Rouse 1989: 131-132). 
On later visits to the village I heard that in 1995 Lorenzo arranged a job for Carlos in 
the police force in Autlán. Lorenzo again had used his connections to arrange a job for his 
son. I now met Carlos walking around in his police uniform in Autlán when I went to the 
region. But shortly after he entered the police force he was fired there as well. This 
happened the day before Lorenzo and Maria were going on another trip to Los Angeles. 
They had to postpone the trip for a day. Carlos had had a fight with his superior about a 
loan. He was fired and put in jail. Lorenzo went to Autlán to get him out of jail and even 
managed to get him appointed again. Carlos continued in the police force but Lorenzo was 
losing the esteem of influential people because of his son's behavior and he was very 
displeased with Carlos. In fact, what was happening here is that sons returning from the 
United States had to learn the discipline and rules of rural Mexico again. They had to learn 
128 Chapter 4 
the skills of dealing with honor and duty. 
Changing Gender Relations 
Although the control over women by men in the village cannot be denied, gender relations 
are a complex field of contestation. Practices of domination are continuously challenged. We 
should also be aware of the fact that men and women sometimes "play" with the images of 
the patriarchal ideology, but that this does not necessarily mean that the practices of control 
are really organized according to these principles. 
A common strategy used by men in the village to make it clear who is in charge is to 
deny women important information or leave them uncertain for a long time about what is 
going to happen. I noticed this phenomenon in many families in the village, even when it 
concerned important decisions such as migration to the United States. Leaving Maria unsure 
about what was going to happen, was one of Lorenzo's favorite strategies in establishing his 
control over his wife. In the summer of 1991, for example, their children had invited them 
to come over to the USA by plane. Their children would pay for the tickets. Maria did not 
know if Lorenzo wanted to go and if he would take her with him. In the end, he decided that 
they would not go. Once during a conversation I had with Maria, she said: Lorenzo does not 
tell me anything about anything. Not even about the debts he has or the money that he 
possesses. Sometimes I think that he does not even know me. That is not right, is it? 
There were also indirect ways in which Lorenzo stressed who was in control and 
threatened with what he could do. For example, one day when we had one of these nice 
gatherings at his house, Lorenzo said that it seemed him a good idea to kill and eat the goat. 
He immediately fixed the date for the feast. This decision caused much commotion in the 
family. The goat milk was one of the very few things that don Cayetano still wanted to eat. 
So, killing the goat would almost certainly also mean the end of don Cayetano. Lorenzo was 
well aware of this but still wanted to have the party with goat meat. Maria strongly opposed 
to the idea and criticized Lorenzo. This quarreling about the goat continued for several weeks 
and finally it was not talked about anymore. The goat stayed alive as did Cayetano. Yet, by 
these threats Lorenzo strengthened his authority in the family. However, this conflict also 
made clear that the relation between Lorenzo and his father-in-law was not without tensions. 
These actions were perhaps not without consequences for Lorenzo's conscience either. When 
Cayetano died some years later, it was commented in the family that Lorenzo feared the 
ghost of don Cayetano. As Cayetano had spent his last years together with Maria and 
Lorenzo in the bedroom, Lorenzo did not dare to sleep in the room when Maria was not at 
home. On one occasion, when nobody was at home, Lorenzo even slept in his truck. This 
weak spot of their authoritarian father was the cause of much amusement and irony among 
his daughters. 
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On the other hand, Lorenzo could suddenly surprise Maria by giving her permission to do 
things that were normally not allowed. Occasionally, Lorenzo let Maria go to village feasts 
in the region or the carnival in Autlan. On one occasion we all had dinner in a well-known 
popular restaurant in Autlan and had a very pleasant afternoon. On that occasion Maria drank 
a lot and to my amazement Lorenzo allowed Maria to drink and behave in a way that he 
normally would not allow. At a certain moment Lorenzo started to sing with the banda and 
Maria was visibly pleased. As I felt in a joyful mood I said to Lorenzo: One day in the year 
the women give the orders in Mexico! However, Lorenzo answered: In Mexico the men give 
the orders every single day of the year! 
Lorenzo's authority was not unchallenged, however. According to the situation and 
Lorenzo's mood, his wife and children tried to give him their opinions on his actions, 
influence him in his decisions, or criticize him. What most annoyed Lorenzo's wife and 
children was his spending money on liquor and his insulting mood when he was drunk. The 
one who was allowed to say most was Yolanda. She could say things to her father that 
nobody else was allowed to say. There were many of these occasions. On one occasion, for 
example, when Lorenzo had heavily criticized Javier, and I was sitting with him and Yolanda 
in the room, he said that he had the right to treat his son in this way because this was his 
house. I often felt that these explanations where directed towards me, who still had to learn 
a lot about gender and authority relations within the household. Yolanda reacted by saying 
that the house was not his but Maria's. Contrary to my expectation, Lorenzo did not grow 
angry but turned towards me and asked my opinion about it. Trying to give a "neutral" 
answer I said that I had no opinion about it but that in Holland the house belongs to the one 
who buys it. This answer pleased Lorenzo as he had bought the house and in this way I had 
put him in the right. Yet, Yolanda explained to me that in Mexico the house belongs to the 
woman even if the man buys it. This type of discussion and debating can be seen as a 
challenge to gender relations which is "tied to the pursuit of particular goals with arenas of 
conflict and so must also be understood politically" (Rouse 1989: 311). That these were 
"serious matters" for Yolanda is illustrated by the fact that she was never in a joyful mood 
during these conversations. She was irritated, angry, and was fighting a struggle on gender 
and authority. 
However, although Lorenzo is an authoritarian husband and father who dominates a great 
part of his wife's life, upon closer inspection it becomes clear that his authority also involves 
a "playing" with images, or as Rouse calls it "an orchestration of appearances" (ibid.: 306). 
It was obvious that now that he was growing older, Lorenzo was becoming more generous. 
On many occasions critical things were said to him by his children and he was treated in a 
way that was not in accordance with the role of the authoritarian boss. In reality, Lorenzo 
has hardly any authority over his children anymore. He leaves his only daughter in the house 
very free in her actions and has no control over his sons in the village either. Only when they 
become economically dependent on him, can he exercise some influence over them. 
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However, when they have their own income, they are outside his control. Lorenzo withholds 
information from his wife and children and threatens a lot about things he is going to do or 
things he is going to prohibit but most of the time he does not carry his threats out. Lorenzo 
plays with the image of the patriarch more than he really is one. 
I was also often struck by the machista attitude of Lorenzo's sons who, in my opinion, 
often without any reason treated their wives in a very authoritarian and denigrating way in 
public. However, I also realized that this was part of a ritual, of showing in public who was 
the boss. Interestingly, on several occasions Maria stopped her sons behaving in a denigrating 
way towards their wives. On these occasions, the sons always obeyed their mother. I 
sometimes even had the impression that they were "happy" that Maria interfered as they had 
publicly shown their manliness and could now turn towards other things. This feeling was 
especially strong with Javier, who used to insult and criticize Elena at his parents' home. 
This seemed more a desire to demonstrate that his experience in the United States had not 
turned him into a "soft" man than a felt need to correct his wife. When, for example, when 
Javier criticized Elena in front of all of us because the house was a mess, Maria often 
interfered and said that he should leave Elena alone and let her have her meal. This was a 
form of female solidarity. Lorenzo in his turn, never interfered when Maria corrected her 
sons. Maria also supported her daughter-in-law Magdalena in her relation with her son 
Carlos. On one occasion when we were all together having drinks, Carlos started drinking 
liquor after he had been drinking beer. Maria who saw that Carlos was drinking a lot told 
Rosa to take Carlos's glass away. Carlos noticed what his mother was doing and made a 
remark but he stopped drinking. For a man to be treated in this way in front of his relatives 
and friends was a humiliating experience. This again showed the powerful position Maria 
held in relation to her sons and that she used this position to support her daughters-in-law. 
Gender relations were a topic of debate and tension in a much wider sphere. Many times 
we had discussions in the family about men's and women's roles and obligations. This was 
especially a favorite topic among the migrant children who were struggling with this theme 
in their own relations. For example, with several sons and daughters we once had a lively 
discussion about whether it was different for men or women to have sexual affairs outside 
their marriage. The immediate cause of this discussion was that Elena had found a condom 
in Javier's pocket after she had been to visit her mother in Autlán for a week. When Elena 
had asked about the reason for the condom, Javier had laughed. When Elena had reacted that 
next time she would go to Autlán, she would also carry a condom, Javier had become 
furious. Elena had talked with Maria about this experience and Maria agreed with her that 
there should be no differences in sexual norms for men and women. She said to Elena that 
she also had had to accept many similar painful experiences in her relation with Lorenzo. 
This reaction from Maria is interesting. On the one hand Maria put pressure on her 
liberal daughter-in-law Elena to adapt to village norms and behave like a respectable married 
woman. On the other hand, Maria had a strong gender conscience and supported her 
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daughters-in-law who were fighting for more freedom and equal rights in their relations with 
Maria's sons. Her sons owed her respect and obedience and she used that authority. 
Although it was difficult for Maria to object to her father and husband, she was in a right 
position to criticize her sons. Maria knew that her sons would accept things from her which 
they would never accept from anybody else and certainly not from their own wives. This 
again shows the importance of the "orchestration of appearances". While Maria seemed to 
be the clear example of the Mexican matriarch who tries to maintain unity in the family by 
living according to the principles of marianismo and the patriarchal ideology, in her case 
there was also a certain degree of "playing with the ideology". If Maria really followed the 
patriarchal ideology, she would have demanded obedience from her daughters-in-law and 
supported her sons' domination of their wives. 
Gender relations were also dealt with in the church. Once during a mass in La Canoa, 
the priest gave a sermon in which he supported a better position for the women in the 
village. He was rather strong in his expressions and said that women should not be treated 
as slaves, but as companions of their husbands. However, he warned that the situation should 
not become like in the USA either where women are the boss in house. Although in his 
sermon he tried to support the women of the village, by depicting the United States as the 
threatening example of "a society where women are in control" he only strengthened the 
village men's feeling that they were right. Yet, this example again shows that there was 
considerable reflection and debate about gender relations in this transnational village. 
Changing Gender Roles and Important Female Networks in a Transnational Family 
When Maria fell seriously ill the changing role of women in the family was clearly shown. 
Maria fell ill, was in great pain and had to have an operation on the gall-bladder. However, 
the hospital had a waiting list for the operation and she had to wait two weeks. Yet, the 
surgeon also had a private practice at which Maria could be operated on right away. 
However, in that case the costs of the operation would not be paid by their health 
insurance and had to be paid by the family. Interestingly, the central roles in what followed 
were played by the women. Several daughters came over by plane from Los Angeles. This 
was not an easy endeavor as some had to borrow the money for the tickets, take days off 
from their work and make arrangements at home for their husbands and children. As Maria 
was in great pain, the women decided that she should be operated in the private clinic. Maria 
was happy with this development, but the question of the money bothered her. She did not 
want her children to pay but she knew that Lorenzo would not have the money at his 
disposal. It was never clear what Lorenzo did with his money but they thought that he had 
lent it out in loans. Still it was decided that the operation would go ahead and that the 
daughters would take care of the bill. Although the surgeon said that it was not a dangerous 
operation, other children also came over and ten of the twelve children were present on the 
day of the operation. 
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The day of the operation itself their youngest son Vicente and Yolanda directly arrived at the 
clinic from Los Angeles. They had taken a cab at the airport in Guadalajara to the hospital 
in Autlán. As usual Vicente was drunk by the time he arrived. Fortunately, the operation was 
successful. In the end, Josefina paid for the operation. She had to borrow the money but she 
and Vicente are the family members considered to be best off. The problem with Vicente is 
that he squanders all his money. As his sisters were irritated by the fact that Vicente spends 
so much money, drinks a lot, and is so irresponsible, they took a small revenge. They went 
out with him to an expensive restaurant in the region where they had an exuberant meal. 
When they left, they let Vicente pay the whole bill. According to the sisters, this was the 
only way in which they could make him cooperate. Still, Maria felt bad about her daughter 
paying the operation and the daughters agreed that Lorenzo should have paid for it. He 
received good money for the sugarcane. So, why couldn't he pay? Tensions continued but 
at least Maria had her operation and the children returned to the United States, with the 
exception of Yolanda, who stayed to look after her mother. 
This example shows the marginal status of sons in this transnational family and the 
growing strength of female networks within the family. Although it has often been said that 
in rural Mexico parents lose the support of their daughters once they get married, here we 
see that the daughters have very strong bonds with their paternal home. This is related to the 
fact that the daughters have jobs in the USA and have their own income independent of their 
husband's. This makes it easier for them to keep supporting their parents in financial ways. 
However, this is also an example of the "responsible women" against the "irresponsible" 
men. At least, this is the way in which the women themselves see this situation. The example 
also illustrates the "burden" of close kin. As Josefina earns well, she is automatically obliged 
to pay her parent's bill. On the other hand, economic support also means greater influence. 
For example, in the discussions about what to do about the operation, the men did not play 
an important role. They could not, or did not want to, contribute in the costs, so they did not 
have a voice in the matter. This was a matter between a mother and "responsible" and 
"prosperous" daughters. 
Maria Becoming an Ejidataria and the Struggle around Family Resources 
When Cayetano died in March 1992, Maria inherited his land and she became an ejidataria. 
Maria's sisters were talking very negatively about the fact that Maria had inherited all the 
land. However, although Maria was the formal owner, it was Lorenzo who took the honors 
and went to the ejido meetings in Autlán (Cayetano had been ejidatario in the ejido of 
Autlán). 3 Lorenzo had already done this when Cayetano was still alive and for him nothing 
substantial had changed with the passing away of Cayetano. Although Maria several times 
said to Lorenzo that she would like to go to the meetings, he never allowed her to go. Maria 
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was very interested in land questions and always wanted to know from me what was 
happening in the ejido and what I thought about the latest developments in agriculture. 
However, she made sure not to ask these questions when Lorenzo was around. 
Then speculations started about whom Maria would register as the heir to her land. 
Lorenzo apparently left this decision to Maria and asked her on several occasions if she had 
already decided. It was difficult for Maria and once she said to me that she had no idea to 
whom she should leave the land. The matter was not discussed with the children. Finally, 
Maria decided to put her favorite and youngest ("irresponsible'') son Vicente as first heir and 
Carlos as second heir (actually, the second heir has no significance as he would only inherit 
the land if the first heir died before having inherited the land). When Lorenzo and Maria 
went to the United States in August that year Maria informed her children about her decision. 
This caused a huge uproar in the family. None of the daughters agreed with Maria's 
decision. Vicente had already lived in the United States for a long time and had no intention 
of ever coming back to La Canoa. Vicente himself told his father Lorenzo that he had not 
asked for this inheritance and that if he inherited the land, he would sell it if he needed 
money. The sale of a plot is not what ejidatarios have in mind when they decide on the 
inheritance of their land. The land is considered to be family patrimony and has to support 
the family. Hence, it was obvious that Vicente should be canceled as the heir. Maria asked 
her daughters for advice but they were divided on who should be designated in place of 
Vicente. Mariana said that the land should be left to the child who took care of their parents 
until death, even if this happened to be a woman. In Mariana's opinion Yolanda should 
inherit the land if she was the one who took care of their parents. However, Maria preferred 
a son to inherit the land. It was obvious that the three other sons, Javier, Rubén and Carlos 
were all interested in the land as they lived in the village and the possession of a plot with 
sugarcane means a substantial extra income. 
Interestingly, the sons in the village were left out of the discussion about the heir to 
Maria's land and again we see the central role of the women in the family. After their visit 
to Los Angeles, Lorenzo said that Maria was going to change the heir because everybody had 
been against it. These discussions about the possible heir of Maria's land were interesting 
since normally inheritance questions are not openly discussed (see chapter 5). For example, 
the inheritance of Lorenzo's land had never been discussed within the family and the sons 
in the village had never spoken about it with their father. Lorenzo probably wanted to make 
this his own private decision. 
Maria told me in private that she had changed the sequence of her heirs. This meant that 
Carlos would now be the heir of her land. Maria was still struggling with her decision and 
said that she would prefer to divide the land among the four sons or to make an arrangement 
in which the proceeds of the land every year were divided among the four brothers. These 
were common considerations among ejidatarios, who were struggling with the inheritance 
question, but in practice this never worked out (see chapter 5). Maria said that Lorenzo had 
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told her that he had not yet registered the heir of his land but that he would put the other two 
sons as the first and the second heir. This meant that Javier or Rubén would inherit their 
father's plot. However, it was clear that the inheritance of these two plots could give rise 
to quarrels and conflicts in the future. The name of the heir can easily be changed and this 
frequently happens according to changing relations between parents and children. 
The Frustration of the Oldest and Only "Responsible" Son 
The return of two sons who did not make it in the United States also had consequences for 
Lorenzo and Maria's other children. In the village, this was most obvious for Rubén. Rubén 
saw his chances of inheriting one of his parents' plots radically diminish by the return of his 
brothers. His brothers who had caused his parents so many problems and who had been 
involved in drugs and robbery, would probably inherit the land instead of Rubén. This 
frustration was only strengthened by the fact that Rubén, as the oldest and only "responsible" 
son in the family felt he did not get enough recognition from his parents. 
Rubén is the only child who did not try to make it in the USA. He is the son with the 
most traditional lifestyle and spent a lot of time at his parents* house. During school 
holidays, when he was free from work, he did all kinds of repair jobs in their house. Rubén 
liked to recall that twenty years ago the family went through a serious crisis when Maria was 
expecting Yolanda and Lorenzo went the USA to look for work. Rubén as the oldest son had 
to carry the burden of the family and left school to tul the land. However, despite the fact 
that he was the one who never caused his parents any trouble and that he often helped them 
with all kinds of odd jobs, he never felt appreciated. Rubén felt that his parents favored his 
brothers above him. 
When Carlos returned from the USA and received so much support from his parents, 
Rubén grew more frustrated. Rubén and Rosa were both irritated by the fact that Carlos was 
paid for his work while Rubén never got paid for the many things he did for his father. 
Tensions were growing and on one occasion Rubén and Rosa directly asked Maria why they 
had given Carlos and Magdalena a house and a huge corral. Rosa said that she also would 
like to have such a corral to keep some pigs and chickens. This was an open critique on his 
parents' actions, which was highly uncommon for Rubén. That even Rosa was participating 
meant that they had to be very annoyed, for Rosa was always very respectful. Rubén and 
Rosa would never have dared to say such a thing to Lorenzo, but they tried with Maria. 
Maria was bothered by the accusation that one son was favored above the others. 
Although Rubén had never spoken about the inheritance question with his parents he 
silently hoped to inherit his father's land. Rosa had told him that he was only dreaming as, 
according to her, Lorenzo would probably leave the land to one of the sons who had no 
regular job. Although Rubén did not earn much, at least he had a fixed income as a teacher. 
On the other hand, Rosa did not expect Javier to inherit the land either as he did not "love 
the land" and never worked on the land. So, this still left an opening for Rubén. Although 
Land, generation, and gender in a transnational ejido family 135 
these were Rosa's personal reflections, it is probable that these elements all influence 
Lorenzo's choice of the heir to his ejido plot. In other words, Ruben's chances of inheriting 
the land depended greatly on the future projects of his migrant brothers. 
Conclusion: Transnationalism and the Peasant Life Style 
This chapter showed how transnationalism works out in the daily lives of several members 
of one extended family. We discussed the strong support networks which exist between the 
household of a middle-aged couple in La Canoa and the households of their children, seven 
of whom lived in the United States in 1994, two in Tijuana and three in the village. As Long 
points out, "in many situations confederations of households and wide-ranging interpersonal 
networks embracing a wide variety of activities and cross-cutting so-called 'rural' and 
'urban' contexts, as well as national frontiers, constitute the social fabric upon which 
livelihoods and commodity flows are woven" (Long 1997: 11). Rouse talks about a 
transnational migrant circuit to refer to the circulation of people, money and services 
involved in migration. However, in my view, Rouse stresses too much the formation of a 
"single community spanning a variety of sites on both sides of the border" (Rouse 1989: 3). 
In my view, we can better talk about a variety of migrant circuits and transnational settings 
instead of talking in terms of a single community. As we saw in the case of this family, 
while some children may continue their links with the village, others do not cherish these 
connections and are more involved in the formations of new communities which have little 
relation to their "home village". 
The fact that children and parents feel responsible for the well-being of each other and 
frequently discuss their responsibilities, rights, and obligations is a continuing investment in 
the "idea of the family" as an ideological construct (Collier, Rosaldo and Yanagisako 1982). 
Yet, this study makes clear that there are different expectations and projects within the family 
and that we cannot treat the family or the household as a collective actor. There are strong 
generational and gendered divisions within the family (D. Wolf 1997). Lorenzo, for example, 
expected his daughters in the USA to pay for Maria's operation. These daughters, in their 
turn, criticized the irresponsible behavior of their father who had no money available for the 
operation. It is obvious that gender relations are changing under the influence of 
transnationalized experiences and gender roles are a topic of heated debate in the village as 
well as among villagers in Los Angeles. The most remarkable development in the Romero 
family is that female networks between the mother and her prosperous migrated daughters 
have become central in the organization of family matters. 
An important phenomenon which I found in La Canoa and which is less developed in the 
literature is the return of migrants to the village. We can say that the men who return to their 
village "had bad luck" in the United States but following Rouse's argument, it could be 
136 Chapter 4 
argued that they are the ones who have had most difficulty accepting the disciplinary regime 
in the United States. Rouse argues that Mexicans in the USA undergo a process of 
"proletarianization" in which they learn to turn up at the workplace regularly and punctually, 
be sober and rested and use the time for which they are paid exclusively for work (Rouse 
1992: 29-31). Javier and Carlos, the two sons of Maria and Lorenzo who returned from the 
USA, both did not make it in the regular disciplinary system. One was active in illegal 
activities and the other was not able to keep a job and obtain a stable employment. The cases 
of these two men also show that although for migrants who "failed" in the USA, their "home 
village" may be their "last resort" it is often not the place they would prefer to be. 
The return of migrant children means that during certain periods, adult children come to 
depend again on their parents' income and set of socio-political relations. Maria and Lorenzo 
supported their children in many different ways: they arranged jobs for them, provided them 
with food, and money, and with loans for new enterprises. Lorenzo can "organize" these 
jobs for his sons, through his political networks and relations with influential men in the 
region. This also helped him several times to get his sons out of trouble when they had 
problems with the police (Javier with the billiard hall and Carlos with his fighting). In this 
way ejido land as a source of income and the ejido as the provider of important political 
networks remains a central factor in the lives of Maria and Lorenzo and their children. 
Yet, accepting support by the family also means that the sons have to comply with 
patriarchal authority. As Barth remarks, the profound interdependence within the family and 
the strong ideological emphasis on respect and authority in the relationship between seniors 
and juniors in the family, and particularly between parents and children, can easily lead to 
pressures and forms of control which are experienced as stifling (Barth 1993: 130, see also 
den Ouden 1995). In addition to the difficulty of accepting parental authority again, for some 
migrants it is also difficult to adapt to the village life style. Although the "peasant style of 
life" is much more relaxed than that of a laborer in the United States a specific discipline 
also reigns in the village. A peasant family in La Canoa defines "fulfillment primarily in 
terms of the capacity to create and maintain independent, family-run operations, ideally based 
in land" (Rouse 1992: 34). In the peasant life style, a man does not stay in bed the whole 
day relaxing, drinking and smoking marihuana. Furthermore, as Rouse points out, while 
socializing in the USA is normally identified as an aspect of leisure, in the village socializing 
activities are important for building networks and forging reputations and in fact are vital to 
the local economy (Rouse 1989: 133). In rural areas establishing socio-political relations and 
notions of honor are very important. 
In the case of Javier, we saw that his dependence on his father was accompanied by 
interference in his personal life which caused enormous tensions in his marriage. Yet, in the 
case of Carlos his non-adaptation to village norms was much worse. While Carlos was used 
to being fired and having different jobs in the USA, in the region his father Lorenzo was 
using his "social capital" to get Carlos jobs and get him out of trouble. Carlos damaged his 
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father's reputation by not complying with the people who did Lorenzo special favors by 
giving Carlos a job. By quarreling with superiors, easily starting a fight with everybody 
around him, not doing his work, and beating his wife, Carlos exposed a form of machismo 
that was not common in the village, this was "machismo without honor". This behavior was 
not appreciated and certainly did not help a man to build up the socio-political networks 
which are indispensable in a rural Mexican setting. 
As we saw in this chapter, and will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, 
inheritance of ejido land is a sensitive subject which normally is not openly discussed 
between parents and children. Many elements influence the choice of an heir and an 
important factor is the notion that land is family patrimony and should be used for the 
continuation of the family. This makes the choice of an heir in a transnational family 
extremely difficult and also means that the "migrating behavior" of one brother can influence 
the others' chances of inheriting. The inheritance of an ejido plot can be used to stimulate 
children to return to the village. However, when Maria designated her favorite son in the 
United States as the heir to her land and he made clear that he would not return to the village 
and would sell the land if necessary, a new heir had to be chosen. Maria then registered 
Carlos as the heir of her ejido plot. However, this was not without problems either. Carlos 
was prepared to work on the land, but he had still a long way to go before being the worthy 
heir of an ejido plot. Fortunately, the registration of an heir can be easily changed and this 
is what often happens: the heir changes according to new developments within the family. 
In addition, Lorenzo also possesses an ejido plot which will be left to one of the children. 
However, for the time being Lorenzo's choice was not open to discussion. In the next 
chapter the organizing practices around inheritance decisions will be further discussed. 
Post script 
In the summer of 1998 I returned to La Canoa for a short visit. I learned that Carlos had 
returned to the USA together with his wife and daughter. The billiard hall was closed and 
the tables had been sold. Javier also had returned to the USA and had left his wife and 
children in the care of his parents in La Canoa. He wanted them to come to the USA once 
he had saved enough money. With his brothers in el Norte again, for the moment Ruben's 
chances of inheriting the land seemed to have increased. 
Notes 
1. Den Ouden (1995) makes an interesting use of genealogies in his study of the management of labor and 
family relations in enterprises in Bénin. 
2. The bracero program, which was operated between 1940 and 1964 made it possible for Mexicans to obtain 
contracts to work brief periods in the United States, principally in agriculture. 
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. Cayetano was the only ejidatario of La Canoa who remained ejidatario in Autlán when the ejido of La 
Canoa became independent and separate from the ejido of Autlán (see chapter two). 
CHAPTER 5 
ORGANIZING PRACTICES AROUND INDIVIDUAL EJIDO PLOTS 
Introduction: the History of Land Transfers and Land Transactions 
This chapter has two principal aims. First of all it presents an overview of what happened 
with the land of the ejido since its establishment in 1938. It shows how the arable land was 
distributed between families in the village and what happened to these plots over the years. 
Secondly, specific organizing practices around the use and transfer of ejido plots are 
discussed. I decided to focus on three types of practices, namely the sale of ejido plots, the 
renting out of ejido plots by migrants and the inheritance of ejido plots. In my view, these 
practices are the most interesting ones as they determine the future distribution of the land 
and because they have most problems with the law (sale and renting by migrants) or are the 
cause of great social tension (inheritance). As was explained in the first chapter, the aim of 
the study was to find out how a certain patterning had developed in these organizing practices 
in relation to the intimate social worlds of the ejidatarios and in relation to the rules and 
procedures of the MAR. 
In much of the literature the selling and renting out of ejido plots has been attributed to 
the influence of local powerful bosses (caciques) and the high degree of corruption at the 
MAR. Gordillo (1988), for example, argues that the cacique ejidal controlled access to ejido 
land and that through the renting out of ejido land and monopolization of plots an illegal land 
market developed which formed the basis of accumulation for the cacique (1988: 231). 
Although this phenomenon indeed has been documented in certain ejidos and in determinate 
periods, we should not assume that this was the central principle underlying land transactions 
in Mexican ejidos. Furthermore, land was not always and everywhere an important element 
in political control. For example, in La Canoa, which only received rainfed land, control 
over the maize market was the most important element of political control and not access to 
arable land (see chapter two). Yet, despite the low importance of land for political control, 
a dynamic land market developed in the ejido La Canoa. 1 
The image of the "cacique in control" has prevented people from studying how the 
manifold "petty" transactions of ejido plots were organized in relation to procedures and laws 
which prohibited these deals. 2 Ibarra, who discusses the ejido from a juridical perspective, 
shows very well how control by the state over internal ejido organization and ejido land use, 
and interference by the MAR in dispute settlement, culminated in a widespread set of 
relations and spheres of influence encompassing the local ejido level and different institutions 
belonging to the state bureaucracy (Ibarra 1989: 21). Consequently, he argues that studies 
from "below" of the way in which ejidos and ejidatarios become involved in the juridical 
structure and the state apparatus are necessary to arrive at a full understanding of these 
140 Chapter 5 
processes (ibid.: 23). This is precisely what has been lacking in studies of the ejido. In 
addition, the inheritance of ejido plots has been a largely neglected theme in the literature. 
Only an in-depth study of transactions and transfers of property rights can show how 
practices developed in force fields in which several elements played a role: the different 
values attributed to ejido land, the ideology of the family, local politics, wider social 
networks, and bureaucratic rules and processes in government agencies. This chapter 
analyzes how the agrarian law and the MAR played an important but not decisive role in 
these transactions. It is also argued that the development of local practices around ejido plots 
has to be analyzed in relation to the strong moral value placed on reciprocal care relations 
between parents and children and the fact that land is considered to be individual property 
and family patrimony at the same time. Notions of individual responsibility and honor in the 
striking of deals all play important roles in the practices which developed through time. 
This chapter discusses the development of land transfers in the period between the 
establishment of the ejido in 1938 and 1992, the year that the agrarian law was changed. The 
most fundamental change introduced with the new agrarian law - with respect to land 
transactions - is that ejidatarios are now allowed to sell, buy, rent, or lease their land, 
activities that were all forbidden under the old agrarian reform law. Yet, discussion of the 
practices which developed before 1992 will give an idea of the consequences the new 
agrarian law may (or may not) have. It certainly shows the limited effect the agrarian law 
has always had on land transactions at the local level. 
Combining Genealogies of Families and Genealogies of Ejido Plots 
In the study of the individual ejido plots I wanted to combine a general overview of 
transactions with detailed studies of specific cases. Yet, I encountered serious problems in 
distinguishing "general trends" from "specific cases", or "exceptions to the rules". There 
were many stories and commentaries about land transfers. But how representative were the 
stories people told me? For example, some people said that many plots had been sold through 
the years and others said only a few. This obviously did not help me in finding out how 
important land sales had been in relation to the total number of land transfers. The ejidatarios 
also tended to express themselves in terms of established rules or customs. For example, they 
could say: It is the custom here in the village that the youngest son inherits the land. 
Although at first I tended to accept this statement, which was frequently uttered, doubts grew 
when many exceptions to mis rule became apparent. In the many cases when the youngest 
son had not inherited the land, the ejidatarios always came up with logical explanations for 
this "exception". So, the logic of these practices seem to lie partly in general principles and 
partly in the emergent properties of the situation. So, what then were the principles which 
informed the designation of the heir and was it possible to speak of inheritance customs in 
the ejido? How did the many conflict stories I was collecting relate to the non-conflictive 
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patterning of land transactions? 
With respect to the political side of land transactions and the monopolization of land in 
the hands of certain families, I had the same doubts as I had about the agrarian history of the 
ejido. On the basis of what people told me I was convinced that Miguel Romero had been 
a despotic local leader who had abused of his relations with the bureaucracy to get more land 
for himself and his sons. But to what degree? How does one compare the amount of land a 
man with eleven sons at the time of the land distribution received (Miguel Romero) with the 
situation of a man with only one son (Claudio Nunez)? In sum, I felt that I needed a detailed 
picture of the wider framework. For that reason I elaborated "maps of kinship" (genealogies 
of people) and "maps of land transfers" (genealogies of land). The combination of these 
genealogies of land and people provided me with a general overview of land transactions in 
the ejido. Furthermore, it gave a good picture of the distribution of plots between different 
families in the village and how this changed over the years. 
A Basic Contradiction in the Agrarian Law 
The Mexican agrarian law has been the object of much criticism and debate. It is well-known 
that "post-revolutionary states are especially prone to enacting laws of high ideals which 
come up against an intractable reality" (Harris 1996: 9) and the Mexican agrarian law case 
is no exception. Here I will discuss one fundamental contradiction that worked through all 
the procedures. The reason to discuss this point in detail it that it greatly influenced the 
practices around land transactions which developed over time. This central contradiction 
consisted in the fact that on the one hand the agrarian law allowed the "individual" 
possession of ejido plots, while on the other hand the use of the ejido plot was restricted by 
many "social" rules. The agrarian law not only provided procedures for the division of the 
arable land into individual plots but also allowed the ejidatarios to choose their own heir. 
This individual possession and inheritance of plots made ejido land tenure very similar to 
private landownership. However, the agrarian law also expressed a more "revolutionary" aim 
of the land reform by presenting the ejido as an agrarian community with important social 
duties. This was apparent, for example, in the official terminology which said that the 
ejidatarios only received "use rights" to the land and not property rights. An important 
general principle derived from the Mexican Revolution was: land to the tiller. This principle 
underlied many of the rales in the agrarian law. For example, the rale that the ejidatario had 
to work the land himself and could not leave it unused or rent it out. Ejido land was meant 
to provide a subsistence basis for peasant families and should not become an economic 
commodity. Furthermore, the rule that ejidatarios were not allowed to possess more than one 
plot was an indication of the social character of ejido land tenure. As they only possessed use 
rights to the land the ejidatarios could obviously not sell the land either. The use rights to 
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the land could be taken away from the ejidatarios if they infringed the agrarian law and the 
ejido assembly could then "transfer the use right" to somebody else. 
This tension between the "individual" and "social" character of ejido land tenure became 
especially clear in the registration of ejido land. Although almost all ejidos made use of the 
opportunity to divide the land into individual plots, the law never provided the procedures 
for the registration of ejidatarios in relation to a specific plot of land. Hence, maps of the 
individual ejido plots were seldom made. In this way, the agrarian law never carried through 
the individualization of land tenure which it itself had set in motion. At the MAR ejidos were 
registered with their name, a map of the total ejido (if the ejido was lucky) and a list of 
ejidatarios (members of the ejido). On the basis of this list, certificates of agrarian rights 
were issued with a number. These numbered certificates accredited ejidatarios as members 
of the ejido and provided them with certain rights. The first and most important right was 
the usufructuary right to an ejido plot and the right to designate the heir of the land. 
However, it also gave them rights to use the common lands and the right to receive a free 
lote within the urbanized zone of the ejido (see chapter six). 
In terms of the law, the numbered ejido certificates referred to a specific plot of land 
(unidad de dotación) and protected the ejidatario in his or her agrarian rights. However, as 
individual plots were never measured, the link between a plot and the number of the 
certificate was never formally established. Nevertheless, for the ejidatarios these certificates 
acquired a very important, even symbolic value. It was their proof of land rights. The 
certificates were issued after a long delay (some ejidatarios had to wait for more than thirty 
years) and were cherished and well guarded by most ejidatarios. Some even refused to show 
them to others out of fear that something might happen to the certificate. Although ejidatarios 
acknowledged that the basis of their security of land tenure was not so much official registra-
tion at the MAR, but recognition by the other ejidatarios, the ejido certificates had an 
important legal-symbolic value. This arrangement of individualized land use without any 
formal registration of land plots would have been logical if the management of the land 
would have remained within the ejido community. In that case the MAR would not have 
needed exact information about land use within the ejido by the different members. Then it 
would have been a question of internal arrangements by the ejidatarios. However, enormous 
formal complications and bureaucratic discrepancies were raised by the fact that the 
government wanted to keep control over ejido land use and in this way tried to guarantee the 
"social use" of the land. The MAR was the institution that was going to check on the right 
use of individual ejido plots. Furthermore, in the case of problems over ejido plots this 
ministry was also the place the ejidatarios had to recur to to settle disputes. But how was the 
MAR to keep control over ejido land use and resolve internal ejido land conflicts if they had 
never made a register of individual use of plots in the first place? As we will see, this 
peculiar registration of ejido land in Mexico has had a great influence on the organizing 
practices which developed around the use and transfer of ejido plots. 
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The IUP (Investigación de Usufructo Parcelario) 
In order to keep control over the "social use" of the lands, the Investigation of Use of Plots 
(Investigación de Usufructo Parcelario) (IUP) was introduced. The aim of the IUP was to 
check if ejidatarios used their land in a legal way. In cases where they did not, the land could 
be taken away from them and the ejido assembly had to decide to whom the land should be 
given. There were several steps involved in this IUP. The first step was for an official of the 
MAR to visit the ejido with the official list of ejidatarios and their certificate numbers. An 
ejido meeting was convened in which the official named one ejidatario after the other. The 
assembly had to say whether the ejidatario concerned was still working the land himself, or 
whether somebody else was tilling his plot. 
The procedure of the IUP only recognized three categories of ejidatarios. First, those 
who were in the official list and had been working their plot without problems. These were 
the ones who simply stayed on the list as official ejidatarios. The second category were 
ejidatarios who had ceased to till the land themselves for two or more years. They would lose 
their agrarian rights and the ejido assembly had to say who had been working these plots 
during this time. These persons would then officially be proposed as the new ejidatarios with 
the agrarian use rights to the plots. The third category were ejidatarios who had been 
improperly issued with certificates as they had never received a plot in the ejido. 3 These 
certificates would have to be canceled. The dispossession of an ejidatario from his or her 
agrarian right was seen as a serious issue and after this meeting of the official with the 
general ejido assembly, several other steps followed. For example, the ejidatarios who were 
to be dispossessed of their rights were given the opportunity to defend their position at the 
office of the MAR. After the final decision was taken by the MAR, the dispossessions were 
published in the Gazette of the State. 
In practice, the IUP functioned in a way that had very little to do with control over land 
use. Instead it became a way to disguise legally permitted transactions that had not followed 
the formal procedures, as well as many illegal manoeuvres. This was encouraged by the fact 
that the IUP only distinguished three categories of ejidatarios and that the ejido assembly had 
the decisive vote at the meeting of the IUP. As an ejidatario in La Canoa told me: If we 
ejidatarios did not want to let the functionaries interfere, they had no way to know what was 
going on here. The point is that the assembly could "hide" every type of land transfer under 
the second category - ejidatarios who had abandoned their plot which was being tilled by 
someone else. Anyhow, as no register of the plots belonging to specific ejidatarios existed, 
the IUP soon presented totally distorted views of land transactions and new land 
possessions.4 
Inheritance of plots provides an example of disguising legally accepted practices that did 
not follow the formal procedures. Many sons inherited land from their fathers without these 
changes ever being registered. For example, in the case of La Canoa, an IUP was held in 
1974 on the basis of the ejido census of 1942. At the IUP meeting in June 1974 in the ejido, 
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the assembly agreed that 45 of the 109 registered names, no longer tilled their land 
themselves and the agrarian rights of these people were transferred to the people who had 
been working these plots. So, these cases were recorded in the IUP under the second 
category of people who had ceased to work their own plot and were dispossessed of their 
land rights. In reality the great majority of these 45 cases were simple and lawful inheritance 
cases. As the IUP used the ejido census of 1942, these inheritances had not yet been 
registered. Moreover, the registering of the transfer of ejido rights to an heir after the death 
of an ejidatario, was a very slow procedure. The officials often asked money for the new 
registration and for these reasons many ejidatarios did not bother about the registration of the 
heir. So, in 1974 all the inheritances of ejido plots in La Canoa were registered as people 
who had been dispossessed of their plot which had consequently been given to someone else. 
It will be obvious that this led to a situation in which official statistics and registers give few 
insights into land use and transactions in the ejido. 
Another part of practices "covered" by the IUP were illegal land sales. The official who 
visited the ejido for the IUP was often uncertain whether the changes in ejido members 
concerned inheritances, sales, dispossession of plots or what, nor was he particularly 
interested. Officials had to cope with procedures that did not offer them any instruments of 
control and which did not bear any relation to what was going on "on the ground". Officials 
themselves often played an active role in the legalization of illegal transfers through the IUP. 
Ejidatarios often tried to strike a deal with the official before or after the meeting of the IUP. 
As the MAR official who regularly attended La Canoa, explained to me: We often became 
aware of the illegal sale of ejido plots at the meeting of the IUP. Or people themselves came 
to talk to us before the meeting took place. We helped them by making the transfer of the 
agrarian right to the new name easy, by not asking questions. In return we received money 
from them. In this way, these sales could also provide some room for negotiation and an 
extra source of income for the officials of the MAR. 
However, it was not only a question of money. Both officials and ejidatarios knew that 
they were dealing with procedures that did not bear any relation to reality. At one of the IUP 
meetings in La Canoa at which I happened to be present, the official himself suggested an 
ejidatario put one of his plots in the name of his son as he was not allowed to possess more 
than one plot. On several occasions during this meeting the official deliberated with the 
ejidatarios about the best way to formalize the many illegal situations. Although afterwards 
the official received some financial compensation from a few ejidatarios, many more illegal 
situations had been legalized by him during the meeting. Here we see how in quite an open 
atmosphere during a public meeting, an official and ejidatarios together tried to squeeze 
"illegal" practices into "official rules and categories". 
This awkward registration of ejido plots also led to an interesting dynamic in the case of 
land conflicts. In the official documentation around land conflicts reference is always made 
to the number of the ejido certificate and the related plot (unidad de dotación). Yet, because 
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of the active land market the numbers often did not bear any relation anymore to the original 
plots that were handed over at the first land distribution. However, the ejidatarios had clear 
maps of ejido land distribution and trajectories of plots in their head. (Most ejidatarios only 
have this knowledge of the parts of the ejido they are involved in, not of the whole ejido.) 
So, for the people involved in the conflict it always was very clear which plot they were 
fighting over. When they were fighting over a plot that was referred to with a certain number 
in the MAR documents, they knew exactly which of the (for example) five plots of the 
ejidatario was in dispute. 
From the above it will not be surprising that the official settlement of land conflicts says 
little about what really happened to the land. Still, the official administration remains very 
important as it provides the legal language and categories according to which deals have to 
be formalized. Many people prefer to "play the official game" as far as possible. As we will 
see, the fact that most of the time the rules were not followed, did not mean that the rules 
did not have influence. 
Land Distribution at the Start of the Ejido 
La Canoa received arable land on three occasions: in 1924 together with Autlân, in 1938 at 
the establishment of the independent ejido La Canoa and in 1942 with the extension of the 
ejido. In total the ejido received approximately 450 hectares arable land and 1800 hectares 
common lands in the mountains. The arable land they received was immediately divided into 
individual plots, while the common lands remained in collective use (see the next chapter). 
The age and gender structure of the family at the time of the land distribution was very 
important for the number of plots a family received. Only married men, widows, and boys 
over 16 could receive a plot of land. This meant that young boys who were married were 
"lucky" as they were given preference over unmarried boys. It also meant that families with 
many boys in the "right age" acquired many more plots than families with younger children. 
Naturally, people augmented the age of their sons by one or two years, but in general 
families with older boys acquired more land. 
I decided to elaborate the genealogy of land plots from 1942 onwards. At that time the 
three stages in which the villagers received land had been finished and the ejido was 
"completed". Another reason for taking 1942 as a starting point for the genealogy of 
transactions of land plots is that I got hold of a very valuable document at a MAR office in 
Mexico city. This was a census by the RAN (Registro Agrario National) of the ejido La 
Canoa in 1942. In this document the 109 people were listed who were recognized as 
ejidatarios in La Canoa. The ages of all these 109 people are given, as well as the complete 
names of their wives (only men and widows were listed) and all children with their ages in 
1942. Furthermore, the census gives the number of years people had been living in La 
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Canoa. This RAN census has been very valuable for my research, since besides helping me 
with the genealogy of land, it also helped me with the genealogies of families. 
Ironically, although this was a very valuable document for my research, it said very little 
about its official topic: the people who received land in the ejido. Many people who were 
registered as ejidatarios in this list, never received land. Others only received land many 
years later. My data on who had received land by 1942 was drawn from the genealogies of 
ejido plots which I elaborated together with the ejidatarios. The total number of people 
appearing in this 1942 census of La Canoa is 379, including the children. These figures 
imply that there were 71 households (the sum of married men, older unmarried men and 
widowers and widows) in the village. All the 109 people listed were recognized as ejidatarios 
and received a certificate number referring to their agrarian right. However, of these 109, 
only 77 possessed a plot of land in 1942. 
Table 5.1 Land distribution in La Canoa in 1942 
with agrarian right with ejido plot without ejido plot 
married men 58 51 7 
old single men and widowers 5 5 0 
widows 7 5 2 
young unmarried men over 16 39 16 23 
total 109 77 32 
Several figures in the table are immediately brought to one's attention. Most remarkable is 
the fact that seven married men did not receive land, whereas 16 unmarried young boys did. 
Although it is tempting to attribute this to local power relations, situations were more 
complex and different factors appear to have influenced this process. First of all, it is true 
that several of these young boys were sons of the local agrarian leaders and received the land 
on account of the good contacts their fathers had with the officials. However, other young 
boys received land because their mother was a widow. Hence they received the land instead 
of their mother. In the case of the married men who did not receive land, different factors 
also played a role. Several of them were not born in the village and had only recently 
established themselves in the village. Others were sons of the local agrarian leaders. In these 
cases it could be said that the fathers, who acquired several plots, received the land instead 
of the sons. This shows again the role of patriarchal influences. Cayetano Lomeli also was 
one of the seven, but he did not receive land because he was an ejidatario of Autlan. 
We have to realize that in 1942 all land was rainfed and that land possession in the ejido 
did not offer a basis for subsistence. When we look at the possession of land in 1942 by the 
families of the two agrarian leaders and compare this with the families of two of the 
ejidatarios of the "opposition", Salvador Lagos and Iginio Nunez, we see the following. 
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Figure 5.1 Land possession in 1942 by the two agrarian leaders and by two families who today belong to the 
"opposition", and the ages of the different family members 
Agrarian leaders 
Miguel Romero x Engracia Jiménez 
(47; 2 plots) 
Rosa (26) 
Francisco (24; 1 plot) (married) 
Miguel (20; 1 plot) (married) 
Estanislao (19; 1 plot) 
Lorenzo (18) 
Soledad (18) 
Federica (16) 
José (12) 
Emilio (10) 
Ignacio (9) 
Filomeno (4) 
Juan García x Hermelinda Lomelí 
(63; 3 plots) 
José (37; 1 plot) (married) 
Rubén (35; 1 plot) (married) 
Elena 
Alicia (27) 
Juan (26; 1 plot) (married) 
Tomás (23; 1 plot) (married) 
Aurora (20) 
Esperanza (16) 
Ricardo (14) 
Margarita (8) 
Families of men who today belong to the "opposition" 
Cayetano Lagos x Epigmenia Romero Claudio Núflez x Clara Fábregas 
(widow 43; 1 plot) (46; 4 plots) 
Salvador (19) Iginio (16) 
Magdalena (16) Enedina (12) 
Soledad (14) Dolores (10) 
Alberto (12) Teresa (5) 
Gerardo (10) Maria (3) 
Miguel (6) 
bold = received land 
italics = female 
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We can see that Miguel Romero, who is most criticized for monopolizing ejido plots, did 
indeed possess several plots in 1942. Juan Garcia possessed even more plots as did his sons. 
This can be explained by the fact that his sons were older. In contrast, Epigmenia Romero, 
Salvador Lagos's mother, only possessed one plot of land in 1942. Epigmenia was a widow 
at that time and she had inherited the land from her late husband. Salvador did not receive 
land at the establishment of the ejido although he was the eldest son and 19 years old in 
1942, but only received land years later. So, comparing these three families, Salvador's 
family had a much worse start and there was clear inequality in land distribution between 
these three families. However, when we look at the situation of Claudio Nunez, Iginio's 
father we see that he was also able to monopolize land. While Iginio is one of the men of 
the "opposition" who uses a language of cacicazgo and who talks a great deal about the 
shameless Romero bosses who monopolized land in the ejido, his own father Claudio also 
possessed four plots in 1942, although his oldest child and only son Iginio was only 16 years 
old at that time. 
Hence, while there obviously has been an unequal distribution of plots among families 
in the village, no strong deductions can be made about the monopolization of ejido plots from 
the start in the hands by certain cacique families. It remains difficult to compare the number 
of plots different families received because of differences in family structure and especially 
the age of boys at the time of the distribution. Families with older sons also received land 
in the name of these boys and the father tilled the land of the unmarried sons. Although local 
politics played a role in land distribution, and above all in the number of plots households 
received, almost all households in the village possessed at least one plot of land in 1942. Real 
competition for land only started afterwards when the population grew and there was no land 
available anymore. There was no land available for the sons of ejidatarios and they could 
only hope to be the heir of their father's land. In this way a category of landless households 
was created that would grow steadily with the years. Land became a scarce resource in a 
region with hardly any other sources of income and ejido land gradually turned into a 
valuable commodity. 
As the ejido had received land from four different haciendas, the land was rather 
dispersed. Some plots were up to an hour and a half s walk. In the beginning, everybody 
preferred to have land near the village as it rained more in that zone and it was easier to get 
there. So, several people exchanged plots (permuta). Ironically, the land that was going to 
be part of the irrigation project in the 1960s, was the land that was farthest from the village. 
Hence, ejidatarios who exchanged several hectares of land far away for only one hectare 
nearby, eventually came out very badly. For example, Aurora Garcia's late husband, Daniel 
Fabregas, changed five hectares of land where it never rained for two and a half hectares of 
better land near the village. However, the five hectares became part of the irrigation system 
and today are sown with sugarcane, whereas the two and a half hectares remained rainfed. 
This had been a very unlucky exchange for Daniel. 
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In table 5.2 we see what happened to the 32 people who were recognized as members of the 
ejido in 1942 but who had not received land in the ejido by then. Although many of them 
never received land and saw their ejido certificate canceled at a later stage, most managed 
to get their own ejido plot in the end. Here again, the young unmarried men are the ones 
who did relatively well. 70 per cent (16 of 23) of the young men who had no land in 1942, 
managed to get a plot at a later stage. Although several of these landless ejidatarios got a plot 
through inheritance, most of them acquired land by other ways. This is shown in the 
following table. 
Table 5.3 Types of acquisition of land by landless ejidatarios since 1942 
inheritance clearing of abandoned di spossession total 
land land 
Married men 0 1 2 0 3 
Young unmarried men 7 2 6 1 16 
Total 7 3 8 1 19 
Hence most land is obtained by the abandonment of plots by other ejidatarios and by clearing 
new land. In total eight men received or took land that had been abandoned. However, this 
does not automatically mean that eight ejidatarios abandoned their plots. Abandoned plots 
were often divided into smaller plots and given to several people. Three men acquired land 
by clearing parts that had not been included in the arable land. This was land situated on the 
fringes of the ejido or concerned land under water that was drained. Dispossession means 
that land was taken away from a migrated ejidatario (without his consent) and given to 
somebody else in the village. 
The diverse events which occurred over the years make it artificial to analyze processes 
of land acquisition only in general terms. I will give two contrasting examples of stories 
about land. Ramón Romero is a good example of a young boy who was registered as 
ejidatario in 1942 but who did not receive land at the start. He managed to get ejido land 
later on. 
Table 5.2 Acquisition of land by people who were recognized as ejidatarios but who were landless in 1942 
without land in 1942 never land land at a later stage 
Married men 7 4 3 
Widows 2 2 0 
Young unmarried men 23 7 16 
Total 32 13 19 
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Ramón Romero: a plot through a box of beer 
Ramón was one of the young unmarried boys who were excluded from the land distribution of the 
endowment and extension. He was 16 years old in 1942 and one of the middle sons of Andrés 
Romero, who acquired several plots of land. Like several others who did not receive a plot of land 
at that time, Ramón was officially registered as an ejidatario of La Canoa and received the official 
ejido certificate which proved his membership of the ejido. For Ramón this official membership 
of the ejido was important as he hoped to get land at a later stage. Like many others, Ramón left 
the village. He went to Guadalajara and then to Mexico City where he entered the military school. 
He came back to the village when his father fell ill and died. Then he decided not to return to the 
military school. His father left his plots to Ramon's eldest brother and to one of his grandsons. 
So Ramón remained landless. However, he still was an official member of the ejido and hoped 
to acquire some land in the future. 
Ramon's chance to get some land came a couple of years later. One of the men who had 
received a plot of ejido land, had left for the coast of Jalisco and never returned. It was decided 
by the ejidatarios that the plot of 3 hectares that he had left behind, would be given to one of five 
men in the village at that time who were officially members of the ejido but who had never 
received a plot of land. Ramón was one of the five. Ramón made clear to his uncle Miguel 
Romero that he was interested in the plot, but his uncle did not want him to have the land and 
refused to help him. An official of the MAR was to come to La Canoa to conduct a lottery among 
the five men. Ramón said to me that this plot "cost him" a box of beers and twenty pesos. Ramón: 
/ went to see the official of Agrarian Reform in Avalan. He told me to bring him a box of beer. 
He said that he would do the lottery with numbers on balls. The left ball would be the "right one". 
At the ejido meeting at which the plot was raffled, one of the five participants managed to get there 
before me, but luckily he chose another ball. When it was my turn I said: let's see whether I am 
lucky and I took the right ball. Things always happened in these ways, bad habits in everything, 
everything... 
Ramón proved to be even more lucky as his land was in the part that received irrigation later 
on. Later on Ramón cleared a plot of three hectares of rainfed swampy land that was not used by 
anybody. So, Ramón now belongs to the privileged landowners in the village although he had to 
arrange it himself and without help from his influential and rich father and uncle. 
Let us now contrast this story with the story of one of these men who left their plot behind. 
In this case the man who left the plot returned to the ejido in his old age and I could 
therefore hear his side of the story. 
Juan Rivera: bad luck in leaving his plot 
Juan Rivera passed the years of the Revolution in Autlán and came to live in the village when two 
of his sisters married men from La Canoa. He is now an old man in his eighties who walks with 
great difficulty. He is a widower and never had children. He is taken care of by the family of one 
of his sister's sons. Juan was actively involved in the distribution of plots at the start of the ejido 
La Canoa. He remembers how they received wire netting to demarcate the different plots of the 
endowment grant. He himself was actively involved in this. In the lottery, Juan received one of 
the plots. As he was one of the few ejidatarios who knew how to read and write, he was several 
times ejido secretary. However, he was never much involved in ejido politics. Juan is one of the 
ejidatarios who left his ejido plot to try his luck elsewhere. Juan: 
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I have land here, but I worked the land and it did not produce anything. It did not rain in these 
years. I had a house here which I lost to Elias Romero as he lent me money for the cultivation and 
I could not pay him back. So, he kept the house. When the land did not produce and I lost my 
house, I paid my debts and left for Colima. Miguel Romero, who was ejido commissioner at that 
time, asked me what I wanted to do with my land. I told him: lend it out to someone who has to 
maintain a family and when I get back, we will see how we settle it... Juan worked on the 
construction of roads and as cattlebreeder in different states of Mexico. 
In the meantime the irrigation system started working in the valley and Juan's plot of three 
and a half hectares was one of the irrigated plots. Vicente Cosío, the man whom they had given 
Juan's land to, had passed away and the ejido had passed the right to use the land to his widow 
Elena Michel. Juan was officially canceled as member of the ejido. Juan returned to the ejido after 
many years when his wife fell ill. When he returned, he saw that his land was irrigated and that 
Elena was working it. 
Juan: I said to Elena: Elena, every year that they pay you the sugarcane, you should help me 
with something. She responded very irritatedly: I never asked you to give me the land. You did not 
give it to me. The ejido gave me the land. She has my land and does not help me with anything. 
The other cañeros (sugarcane growers) tell me that every year she receives 18 or 20 million pesos 
[six and a half thousand dollars] and she has never given me anything. I would like to go to a 
lawyer. Perhaps I could get the land back. Once a lawyer told me that it would be easy to get the 
land back. I would like to get the land back in order to sell it and get myself cured. I need an 
operation. For two years I have had severe pains. Other people sold their land, but I never did. 
I never rented it out either. I worked it year after year in the beginning but it did not produce. 
Year after year we lost on it. 
Why does this woman not want to help me with a little money. She can keep the land for her 
children. I cannot work anymore. The teachers of the secondary school also told me that it would 
be easy to recover the land as I never signed an agreement for the ejido to give my land to 
somebody else. 
Although Juan's frustration is logical, his claim to the land is very weak. He left his plot a 
long time ago and Elena has been the recognized ejidataria for a long time. Some people in 
the village state that Elena was indeed very ungrateful towards Juan and was not even 
prepared to give him a glass of water. Elena in her turn, had her own history. She became 
a widow seventeen years ago when the youngest of her twelve children was only three years 
old. She and her children always had to work hard to maintain the family. The boys worked 
as day laborers and the girls did domestic work in other houses. Elena herself always did 
extra washing and ironing work for people in the village and embroidery. Hence, in her case 
the land was a valuable and necessary support for the family economy. 
Migration and the Renting out of Ejido Land: a Risky Endeavor 
I decided to pay special attention to the renting out of ejido land by migrant ejidatarios and 
the organizing practices which developed around this. This is particularly interesting since 
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the agrarian law prohibited the abandoning or renting out of ejido plots for more than two 
consecutive years. Yet, migration became increasingly important in the lives of the ejidatarios 
and many rented out their land for many years in succession. I was interested to know how 
these arrangements were organized in the light of a law that did not allow this. I also wanted 
to find out what the influence of the law and the MAR finally had been on these practices. 
It was obvious that these practices took place within fields of tension as many ejidatarios 
mentioned that migrant ejidatarios risked their land being taken away from them. 
In the first years after the ejido was established several migrants were dispossessed of 
their agrarian rights. At that time the interest in the land was not so great and although the 
dispossessions certainly caused tensions the affected ejidatarios did not try to stop the 
dispossession by lodging a formal case at the MAR. The local powerholders, and especially 
Miguel Romero, had considerable influence in the taking away of plots from migrants and 
the redistribution of abandoned or confiscated plots. The following example illustrates this 
point. 
Iginio: a migrated ejidatario being dispossessed of his land rights 
Iginio was registered as an ejidatario in 1942 but had not received a plot of land. However, his 
father Claudio possessed four plots of land and later passed one to Iginio. After receiving the plot, 
Iginio went to work in grape cultivation in the United States. He stayed several years in the USA 
and his father Claudio took care of his plot during his absence. Then an IUP was held in the ejido. 
Miguel Romero was commissioner at that that time and he wanted to take the plot away from 
Iginio and another ejidatario who was in the United States. The MAR official told Claudio that 
for 100 pesos he would not make a problem about bis son living elsewhere and Iginio could keep 
the land. However, Claudio refused to pay the official. Iginio in his turn refused to come back to 
the village. Iginio said that in that period he was having a good time in the USA and was not very 
interested in the land. So, the agrarian rights of Iginio and the other man were withdrawn and the 
plots were given to José Romero, one of Miguel's son who had no land. When Iginio returned 
to the village years later he received another of Claudio's plots. However, Iginio never forgave 
don Miguel and still grows angry when he talks about the case. 
Don Miguel not only aimed to accumulate land for himself and his family but also helped 
many other people. We saw that in the case of Juan Rivera who left his plot to the ejido, he 
gave the land to Vicente Cosio, a landless villager. Pedro Bautista also remembered how don 
Miguel helped him with a plot of land. 
Pedro Bautista: receiving the plot of a migrated ejidatario 
Pedro's father Antonio had received land in the ejido at the start, but he sold his house in the 
village and left for Autlân with his family to start a little goat farm. From then onwards he did 
not use his ejido plot anymore. When Antonio died, the goats were divided among the four 
children and Pedro returned to La Canoa. He was 24 years old at that time. He tried to reclaim 
his father's land but that had already been given to somebody else. However, don Miguel, who 
had been a good friend of Antonio said that he would help Pedro. After some time Pedro was 
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given the land of an ejidatario who stayed most of the time in Mexico City. This man was angry 
as he wanted to keep his plot, but being most of the time in Mexico City his position was not a 
strong one and the land became Pedro's. 
However, as land became scarcer and more valuable over the years, and especially after the 
arrival of irrigation in the sixties, migrants did not take such a passive attitude anymore if 
the commissioner or somebody else threatened to take their land away. Most migrants had 
become wealthier and had more means to fight for the land. Real legal fights in which the 
MAR would become involved and which could take many years were something most people 
wanted to avoid. Several people who intended to dispossess migrants of their land, preferred 
to give up when they realized it would become a difficult case. So, the individual plots 
remained stable in the hands of their "transnational owners" and no land was taken away 
from migrants anymore. At this stage not even don Miguel succeeded in taking land away 
from migrants ejidatarios. However, as migration and renting out the ejido plot remained a 
risky situation migrants used to take several precautionary measures. 
One precautionary measure was the payment of the ejido land tax. This tax was collected 
by the ejido treasurer and written down in a book. The ejidatarios received a receipt of 
payment. Although the amount of money paid was negligible, this tax acquired a different 
and very important role. It became a "proof of land use". People who rented out their land, 
insisted on paying the tax themselves as this was considered to be an important proof of their 
being in the ejido and working the land themselves. If, instead, the leaseholder paid the tax 
and had the receipts in his name, he could try and claim rights to the land at the MAR. 
Furthermore, in the case of an official investigation (for example, during an IUP) the 
payment of the land tax by the leaseholder would weaken the position of the migrated 
ejidatario. In addition to paying this land tax every year, the migrant ejidatarios also tried 
to be present at the IUP meeting in the ejido. When an IUP meeting was announced by the 
MAR, migrant ejidatarios in the United States were immediately informed by their relatives 
in La Canoa and if possible they would return from the United States. The migrant 
ejidatarios also tried to remain good friends with the ejido commissioner and paid officials 
if necessary. In this way, they would not make problems about their case. 
For the official the migrant ejidatarios provided an interesting way to raise some extra 
money. They tried to strike deals with these ejidatarios in the sense of not making problems 
about the fact that they lived in the United States if they paid some money. However, the 
power of the official was limited. He depended on other ejidatarios and often on the ejido 
commissioner for information about ejidatarios who were living abroad. These situations 
could be interesting for the ejido commissioner and offer room for negotiation as he was in 
a position to inform the functionaries, or to ask money from the migrated ejidatario. The 
following example illustrates this dynamic well. 
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Pedro Bautista becomes a migrant himself 
We saw before how don Miguel helped Pedro Bautista to acquire a plot of land of an ejidatario 
who lived in Mexico City. However, Pedro himself also migrated and later entered into problems 
with don Miguel. The following part of an interview I had with Pedro, shows this very well. 
M: Did you never have problems with your land because of your residence in el Norte? 
P: / never rented my land to others and never had problems. Only on one occasion. Miguel 
Romero has always been very good to me, but later when he became commissioner again he 
changed and tried to make life difficult for me. But I always paid the land tax. They could not 
take the land away from me. When there was an TUP meeting the commissioner always 
warned me and I came over from the USA. On one occasion I was warned by Pedro Montano, 
who was commissioner in Vista Hermosa at that time. He said that this time things looked very 
bad for migrated ejidatarios with the IUP. He told me to be present at the IUP meeting in 
Vista Hermosa [a neighboring ejido] in order to be better prepared for the meeting in La 
Canoa. I went to the IUP meeting in Vista Hermosa and heard all the problems there. After 
the meeting we went to Pedro's house together with the MAR official. The official asked me: 
how long have you lived in the USA? I said: five years. He said: don't you know that that 
is prohibited? I said: yes, but I also know that we have the obligation to maintain our family. 
The official said that he could arrange the matter if I gave him ten thousand pesos. I told him 
that I did not have that amount of money. He said: how can I believe that after five years in 
the U.S, you do not have this money? I answered him that even if I did have the money I 
would not give it to him as there was no reason to do so. When I left to go home, the official 
followed me and told me where I could leave him the money. But I did not pay. 
M: And what happened finally when he arrived at the IUP meeting in La Canoa? 
P: Nothing, I thought that he would cause me trouble, but nothing happened. 
The same happened when David [an official of the assistance office of the MAR in Autldn] 
came to do the IUP. 
M: When was that? 
P: That was when Ignacio Romero was commissioner (1985-1988). At the meeting in which they 
checked the land titles David did not say anything about my case. But after the meeting David 
told Ignacio to tell me to come to Autldn on a certain day and time. Ignacio said that they 
were threatening to take the land away from me. I did not go to see David. Three days later 
Ignacio and David visited me at my house. I said that I did not want to talk to David as he 
only wanted money and I did not intend to pay any money. David said: You don't live here. 
I said: No, but that is something that cannot be avoided. I am still a Mexican and was never 
nationalized in the USA. We were quarreling like that for an hour. Then I said: Is it money 
that you want ? David said that he did not want money. I said: I have been ejidatario for more 
than 50 years. I always paid my tax. If you think you can take the land away from me, try it. 
But in that case I will lodge an official complaint about what you are doing here. I was 
already retired from my job in the USA then. I have never heard anything about it. I know 
they cannot do anything against me. I have my ejido certificate. 
Although Pedro likes to stress that he never paid anything to avoid trouble, other ejidatarios 
told me that Pedro always paid the ejido commissioners to keep him informed about what 
was going on and to support him at the IUP meetings. Pedro's situation was less risky than 
that of other migrated ejidatarios as most of the time he himself came over to till the land 
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in La Canoa or his sons managed the land. Also the fact that, unlike Iginio, he always came 
over to be present at the IUP meetings, made his position much stronger. 
The renting out of ejido plots by migrants was not only a risky endeavor because the 
migrant infringed the law, but also because the leaseholder was building personal rights to 
the plot. The person who rented and tilled the same ejido plot for several years, legally 
acquired rights to this plot (the land belonged to the person who tilled it). Hence, unlike 
many other illegal transaction where nobody had a personal interest in interfering, with these 
renting arrangements the leaseholder could turn into a personal enemy of the migrant 
ejidatario. This becomes clear in the following example. 
A leaseholder tries to acquire the rights to an ejido plot 
In the sixties Daniel FSbregas started renting two and a half hectares of rainfed land from Ignacia 
Hernandez, a widow who lived in the United States with all her children. When Daniel died, his 
sons continued renting Ignacia's land. Before dying Daniel had told his wife Aurora Garcia: That 
land is yours, don't let anybody take it away from you! Every year Ignacia came to the village 
to agree on the renting arrangement and pay the land tax. However, Aurora had twice paid the 
tax before Ignacia arrived in the village and Ignacia had been furious about it. 
When Ricardo Garcia, Aurora's brother became commissioner (1970-1973), Ricardo told 
Aurora that he could easily dispossess Ignacia of her land rights and pass these to Aurora or one 
of her sons. They decided to start a formal procedure at the MAR to start this process. Aurora 
found herself in a good position. She had worked the land for many years, she had paid the tax 
several times, and she had the support of the ejido commissioner. However, Ignacia was not 
prepared to lose the land and she fought back. Among other things, she claimed that she had been 
living in the village all these years. As tensions between the families in the village rose and things 
seemed to get out of hand, Aurora told her sons not to put any more efforts into the case. 
By not putting any more efforts into the conflict, and by stopping their dealings with the MAR 
bureaucracy, it was most probably that Aurora would lose the case. Especially as Ignacia actively 
negotiated with the MAR officials. In 1973 the MAR issued an official decision in which Ignacia 
was indeed recognized in her rights to the plot. So, Ignacia kept the land. 
After having won the case Ignacia and her sons worked the land themselves for three 
consecutive years. They obviously did not want to run any more risks with renting arrangements. 
Later Ignacia sold the land to another ejidatario. As will be discussed later on, sale of ejido land 
was a safer option than renting the land out. Aurora regretted the affair very much as she would 
have preferred to continue renting the land or, even better, buy the land. For several years the two 
families did not speak to each other. However, now relations have been normalized and they even 
visit each other again. 
The migrated ejidatarios were well aware that the danger came from the leaseholder and for 
that reason they were very careful to whom they rented their land. They often left a relative 
in charge of the land. The other ejidatarios followed the strategy of not causing problems. 
As long as they were not involved as a potential beneficiary and knew that it was very 
improbable that the land of the emigrated ejidatario would be allotted to them, they would 
not start any trouble. So, no objections were ever made in the majority of renting 
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arrangements by migrants. 
In conclusion, we can see a certain patterning of organizing practices around the renting 
out of land by migrated ejidatarios. These practices changed with the changing value of ejido 
land. When the value of the land was low, and people had less resources to fight a powerful 
ejido commissioner, several migrants were dispossessed without fights being made about it. 
In that period the law worked in the favor of the powerholders. With land becoming more 
valuable and ejidatarios acquiring more resources and experience, the practices changed. The 
resources at stake became more important, and people were prepared to fight for it if 
necessary. Local power relations had less influence, and the support of the ejido 
commissioner was not sufficient anymore to dispossess a migrant ejidatarios of his land. So, 
practices developed which strengthened the private property character of ejido land 
possession. The MAR officials were in a weak position. As we saw, they had no register of 
individual ejido plots and they certainly held no registration of the renting out of plots or 
residence of the ejidatarios. The MAR officials were totally dependent on information from 
ejidatarios and could only act in cases where someone wanted to start a conflict with a 
migrated ejidatario. The organizing practices which developed as precautionary measures 
(paying the ejido land tax, coming over from the USA for the IUP meetings, and paying 
officials and commissioners) meant that there was a lot of "legal game playing". I call this 
"game-playing" as these activities had no real effect on the practices about land, it happened 
in the margin. The only effect of the agrarian law was that it opened (a little) room for 
negotiations. Yet, the migrated ejidatarios had the most powerful position. In conclusion, we 
see organizing practices in which the individual ejidatarios had considerable autonomy and 
in which the agrarian law and the bureaucracy only stimulated some "legal game-playing" 
activities in which officials and commissioners had a limited "bargaining position" and could 
earn some extra money. 
It can be expected that the new agrarian law of 1992 will finish off with the "bargaining 
position" of officials and the official "game-playing" with respect to renting out by migrants 
as it permits the renting out of ejido land. 
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A Myriad of Transactions and the Fragmentation of the Land 
Table 5.4 Types of transactions with ejido plots between 1942 and 19933 
Inheritance 
Buying and selling 
Dispossession 
Exchange of plots 
Abandonment 
M 
29 
3 
8 
4 
Total 140 
Table 5.4 shows that the arable land has been a very dynamic field with respect to 
transactions.6 When we compare the situation of 1993 with that of 1942, we see that certain 
families have been able to acquire many plots in the years after the establishment of the 
ejido. For example, Miguel Romero and his sons started with five plots (approximately 20 
hectares altogether) while in 1993 the widow and children of Miguel Romero together 
possessed seven plots of ejido land (approximately 26 hectares together). Juan Garcia and his 
children possessed seven plots in 1942 (24 hectares) and 10 plots in 1993 (36 hectares). The 
most dramatic concentration of land is to be found in the case of a brother of don Miguel, 
Andres Romero. He and his sons possessed nine plots in 1942 (30 hectares) and 14 plots in 
1993 (46 hectares). 
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Figure 5.2 Possession of plots by three families in 1942 and 19937 
1942 1993 
Miguel Romero (2 plots) x Engracia Jiménez 
Rosa (26) 
Francisco (24; 1 plot) 
Miguel (20; 1 plot) 
Estanislao (19; lplot) 
Lorenzo (18) 
Soledad (18) 
Federica (16) 
José (12) 
Emilio (10) 
Ignacio (9) 
Filomeno (4) 
Juan García (3 plots) x Hermelinda Lomelí 
José (37; 1 plot) 
Rubén (35; 1 plot) 
Elena 
Alicia (27) 
Juan (26; 1 plot) 
Tomás (23; 1 plot) 
Aurora (20) 
Esperanza (16) 
Ricardo (14) 
Margarita (8) 
Miguel Romero x Engracia Jiménez 
Rosa (1 plot) 
Francisco 
Miguel (1 plot) 
Estanislao (2 plots) 
Lorenzo (1 plot) 
Soledad 
Federica 
José (1 plot) 
Emilio 
Ignacio 
Filomeno 
x Guadalupe Medina (1 plot) 
Teresa 
Ramón 
Juan 
Federico 
Lorena 
Victor 
José Luis 
Mario 
Juan García x Hermelinda Lomelí 
José (2 plots) 
Rubén (1 plot) 
Elena 
Alicia 
Juan (1 plot) 
Tomás (2 plots) 
Aurora (1 plot) 
Esperanza 
Ricardo (3 plots) 
Margarita 
Andrés Romero (5 plots) x María Moreno 
Esteban 
Mario (30; 1 plot) 
Tomás (27; 2 plots) 
Victor (25) 
Sergio (24; 1 plot) 
Faustino (22) 
Inocencio (19) 
Joaquín (17) 
Ramón (16) 
Diego (12) 
Rosaría (9) 
Francisco (7) 
Andres Romero x Maria Moreno 
Esteban 
Mario (1 plot) 
Tornas (2 plots) 
Victor (2 plots) 
Sergio (1 plot) 
Faustino (1 plot) 
Inocencio (2 plots) 
Joaquin 
Ramon (2 plots) 
Diego 
Rosaria 
Francisco (3 plots) 
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In the case of Andr6s Romero the situation is even more extreme as Andres left one of his 
plots to a grandson and two other plots have been taken away from him and given to others 
in the ejido. This means that a growth of eight plots in his family has to been explained! One 
may wonder how this expansion has been possible when we take into consideration that the 
ejido has not received more land since 1942 and no large scale dispossession has occurred. 
Let us see where they got their extra plots from. 
Table 5.5 Types of land acquisition by Miguel Romero, Andres Romero, Juan Garcia and their children 
between 1942 and 1993. 
inheritance dispossession buying clearing abandonment total 
Miguel R. and child. 1 1 2 
Andres R. and child. 1 4 2 1 8 
Juan G. and children 1 2 3 
Total 2 2 6 2 1 13 
From table 5.5 it becomes clear that the buying of land from other ejidatarios has been the 
most important mechanism through which these families acquired more land. The abandoning 
of ejido plots, fragmentation of ejido plots, and buying and selling of parts of it has been a 
wide-spread phenomenon in the ejido. 
Increasing Fragmentation of Ejido Plots and an Increasing Number of Ejidatarios 
On the basis of the genealogy of land I concluded that in 1942 the land was divided into 119 
different plots among 77 ejidatarios. As a result of fragmentation of plots and the clearing 
of new land, in 1993 there were 136 plots divided among 94 ejidatarios (three of the 97 
ejidatarios do not possess an ejido plot but only a coamil).* As the amount of land has only 
scarcely augmented (by clearing new lands) it is clear that the average size of plots has 
diminished, as has the average number of hectares each ejidatario possesses. This becomes 
clear in the following table. 
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Table 5.6 Distribution of land in the ejido La Canoa in 1942 and 1993 
T54T 
ejidatarios with land 
total number of hectares 
number of plots 
average number of plots per ejidatario 
average size of plot in ha. 
average number of ha. per ejidatario 
77 
422 
118 
1.5 
3.6 
5.5 
94 
438 
136 
1.4 
3.2 
4.7 
Although the figures are not dramatic, table 5.6 shows that succeeding generations work ever 
smaller plots of land. An important subdivision of plots has taken place since the establish-
ment of the ejido. A great number of plots nowadays measures less than two hectares. This 
serious fragmentation of the land is above all due to the transfer of plots to more than one 
child and to the sale of fractions of plots. However, this does not mean that the total amount 
of land ejidatarios possess is that small. Many ejidatarios have more than one plot of land. 
Some ejidatarios possess up to five different plots. 
The Many Elements Influencing the Inheritance of Ejido Land 
The inheritance of ejido plots also formed an interesting theme of study. Before the ejido was 
established, all ejidatarios had been poor landless laborers. So customs concerning the 
inheritance of land did not exist. The agrarian law left the ejidatarios relatively free in the 
choice of their heir and only made the restriction that the plot could not be divided and that 
the agrarian right had to be left to one heir. 9 So, it was interesting to study what kind of 
inheritance practices finally developed. 
What happened is that inheritance practices developed which are strongly embedded 
within the ideology of the family. Ejido land tenure is seen as a form of private property, 
but also as family patrimony within patriarchally organized families. There is a strong feeling 
that the "owner" of the land has certain moral obligations to take good care of the land and 
make sure that it will be there for his or her children. Land and the inheritance of land are 
used to keep continuity in the family. Mutual obligations of care between parents and 
children influence the choice of the heir and ensure that there is no fixed person in the family 
with a "natural right" to inherit the land. As we saw in chapter four, this makes the 
inheritance of land a long-lasting process in which any new development may lead to a 
change of the heir. It will be obvious that this gives rise to many tensions and conflicts. As 
Sabean points out, "property can focus attention and create expectations, provide 
opportunities to exhibit skill and character, and establish connections and cooperation or 
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points of resentment and disruption" (Sabean 1990: 33) . 1 0 As we saw in chapter four, the 
increasingly transnationalized lives of ejidatarios and their children only seems to make the 
inheritance question more complex. 
The notion that the land is family patrimony and that it should be used to maintain and 
support the different members of the family and not just one means that many ejidatarios 
want to leave their plot to more than one child. So, the official rule that only one person 
could inherit the agrarian right causes certain tensions. If the land is left to one son, he is 
often made to promise that he will look after the other brothers and sisters once the parents 
have passed away. For the same reason the land is also often passed from the husband to the 
wife, who can continue looking after the land for the benefit of the whole family. F. and K. 
von Benda Beckmann talk in this respect of "the social continuity function of inherited 
property" which "instills a sense of responsibility to guard and maintain the property" (F. 
and K. von Benda Beckmann 1998: 18). Inheritance by a wife may be seen as the 
postponement of the transfer to the next generation. Often it is not clear yet who will be the 
most appropriate heir to the land in the future and then the land can better remain with the 
longest living partner. At the transfer to the next generation, the land normally returns to a 
man as parents prefer a son to inherit the land over a daughter. I will give several examples 
of inheritance cases as this is the best way to show the complexity of the issue. 
The idea that all the children should profit equally from the land is well expressed by Elena 
Michel. She is the widow discussed above who received the land of Juan Rivera. 
Elena Michel 
Elena is a widow who owns three and a half hectares of irrigated land with sugarcane. She has 
12 children of whom four live in the United States. Only one son (the oldest) lives in the village 
with his family. Elena lived on her own but recently a daughter got pregnant and moved back in 
with her. Now she lives with her daughter and grandson. I asked her what the inheritance customs 
were in the village with respect to land. 
E: The custom is that the youngest boy inherits the land. 
M: W/ry is that? 
E: / do not know. Actually it seems better to me to leave the land to a daughter, who divides the 
product of the land every year among all brothers and sisters. Daughters-in- law are always 
very greedy. If you make such an arrangement with a son, you run the danger that the 
daughter-in-law wants to keep everything for herself. Daughters are better in that respect. 
M: But then you may have the same problem with the sons-in-law.... 
E: (laughing) Yes, that is true, sometimes I think that I would do better to sell the land and spend 
the money, in order to save them all this trouble. 
Several ejidatarios expressed the idea of selling the land and divide the money among the 
children. In particular, ejidatarios who have no children left in the village anymore talked 
about this possibility. With the change of article 27 of the Mexican Constitution and the 
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agrarian law in 1992 the sale of ejido land has become a legal and relatively easy transaction. 
On the other hand, the sale of land goes against the idea of land as family patrimony. So, 
people find it difficult to decide to do this. 
As was already mentioned an important element that influences inheritance decisions is 
the element of care and obligation. A son that has looked after his parents until death has 
created certain rights to the land of his parents. This may sometimes lead to awkward 
situations among brothers and sisters who do not want one of them to look after their parents 
too much and in this way create rights to the land. In their turn parents also consider another 
element of care in their decisions. They often prefer to leave the land to children who really 
need it and preferably to children who live in the village. For example, they may decide to 
leave the land to the only son who has no job. Alternatively, as we saw in chapter four, a 
son who migrated to the United States and declares that he does not intend to come back, 
may be replaced as heir by a son in the village. All these considerations taken into account, 
imply that the choice of heir is not an easy one. It also explains why officially registered 
heirs are often changed. For example, most of the people who were listed as the heirs of the 
ejidatarios in the register of the RAN in 1942 in the end did not inherit the land. 
The ejidatario can change the designated heir whenever he or she wants to. Before 1992 
the ejidatarios had to go to the offices of the MAR to register or change the designated heir. 
There they had to deliver a letter which had to be signed by the majority of ejidatarios and 
signed and stamped by the ejido commissioner. Although this was an easy procedure, many 
officials tried to make it more complicated and asked money from the ejidatarios. One of the 
officials of the promotoria in Autlán, David, was always prepared to help ejidatarios with 
their inheritance papers in exchange for large amounts of money. In the case of Maria's land 
(see chapter 4) he asked Lorenzo for 500,000 pesos ($170) to register the heir at the office 
in Guadalajara. When a couple of weeks later Maria decided to change the heir, he again 
asked for the same amount of money. From other ejidatarios I heard that he had asked for 
1,500,000 pesos ($500) or even 2,100,000 pesos ($700) to register an heir. This obstacle 
which David caused the ejidatarios in the registration of their heir could have important 
consequences. For example, on one occasion Juan Garcia told me that he wanted to change 
the heir of his ejido plot but that David had asked him 1,500,000 pesos. Juan had refused 
to pay and asked me what he had to do to change the heir in Guadalajara. A couple of weeks 
later Juan had died without having been able to change his inheritance papers. 
In the case of ejidatarios who possessed several plots, these were often transferred to 
different children and this transfer often started when the ejidatario was still alive. This 
happened when the ejidatario was warned that the agrarian law prohibited the possession of 
more than one plot and that plots might be taken away from him. Some plots were then put 
in names of one or more sons. In some cases this was only a formality and the father 
remained the "real owner" and continued to use the land as before. If the registered son did 
not show much interest in the land and left the village, the father could then put the land in 
Organizing practices around individual ejido plots 163 
the name of another son. However, in other cases a gradual transition of property rights took 
place as father and son worked together for many years and the father more and more handed 
the management of the land over to the son. However, normally the authority of the father 
in decisions over land remained very strong. 
Through these practices land could be divided among different sons from one generation 
to the next. This partly explains the growth in the number of ejidatarios in La Canoa from 
1942 to 1993 (see table 5.6). I will illustrate this with the example of an ejidatario who left 
part of his land to two of his sons during his life and left his remaining land to another son. 
This case also gives insights into the many elements which influence the choice of an heir 
and the problems the change of heir may cause within the family. 
Julio Pradera: building up inheritance rights by looking after the parents 
Julio Pradera received one hectare of land in the part that La Canoa received together with Autlan 
and three and a half hectares later in the extension grant. Julio had 7 sons and 2 daughters. His 
two oldest sons received land themselves at the founding of the ejido. However, the other five sons 
remained landless. From the beginning Julio had put his son Federico down as the heir to his land. 
Federico was the oldest son after the two who had received land themselves. At a certain moment 
Julio decided to give the one hectare in the Autlan part, to two of his other landless sons. Although 
it was not much land, they could at least produce some maize for home consumption. This still 
left three sons landless. Federico knew that he would inherit the remaining plot of three and a half 
hectares. All sons married and the youngest son Manuel stayed with his parents, working their 
land. After some years his father told Manuel that he wanted to arrive at an arrangement with him. 
He said that if Manuel would take care of him and his mother and would pay for them if they fell 
ill, he would leave the land to Manuel. Manuel said that it was not necessary for his father to 
leave him the land and that he would continue to till his land and look after them anyhow. 
Manuel's father was lucky as his land fell within the irrigation project and received irrigation in 
the sixties. Manuel married and his wife came to live in the parental house. (This is not very usual 
and according to Manuel's wife the young couple suffered greatly from the interference of the 
mother-in-law). When his father fell ill, he told Manuel that he wanted him to have the land and 
that he did not want Manuel to have problems with Federico. Julio realized that once he would 
pass away, Federico (the official heir) could immediately take the land away from Manuel. 
Another solution would have been to register Julio's wife as the heir but she did not want to be 
involved in ejido matters or go to the ejido meetings. So, Manuel went to the promotoria in Autlan 
and arranged the papers to change the heir from Federico to himself. The papers were signed by 
Manuel's father, a majority of ejidatarios and were to be signed and stamped by the executive 
committee of the ejido. The ejido commissioner at that time did not feel very happy with the affair 
and said to Manuel that he would have preferred Julio to come and sign these paper in his 
presence. However, he signed and stamped the papers anyhow. The commissioner's objection was 
logical as the sudden change of heir by old and dying ejidatarios can be the cause of tremendous 
conflicts. Then the papers were sent to Guadalajara. Federico, who heard that he had been 
removed as heir of Julio's land, was furious. All these years he had dreamt of becoming an 
ejidatario. He was very attached to the land and had always worked his coamil in the commons. 
When his father died Manuel continued working the land as he had been doing for many years 
already. However, the ejido treasurer at that time, continued using Julio's name for the ejido tax. 
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Registration in the ejido always is very behind on inheritances. However, Manuel was angry that 
they did not change the names and he refused to pay the ejido contribution for several years. This 
offered an opening to Federico. The ejido commissioner at that time, Ruben Garcfa, told Federico 
that he could easily take the land away from Manuel and pass it to Federico. He offered Federico 
his assistance in lodging a case at the MAR. He told Federico to pay the ejido contribution for his 
father's land. He suggested that this would help him in the struggle to get the land transferred to 
his name. Federico paid Ruben and an official who was helping him for their efforts and hoped 
to get the land. 
One of Manuel's compadres told him that Federico had been paying the contribution and had 
started procedures to get the land. Manuel told Federico that he should give up the struggle as 
there was no way in which he could ever recover the land. Not even our mother could take the 
land away from me, if she wanted to, he told him. However, Manuel still went to see the ejido 
treasurer. He managed to get the name on the tax payment changed from Julio to Manuel and from 
then on Manuel paid the tax himself. 
Manuel told his brother Federico that he had better leave the case, as people tried to raise his 
hopes only in order to get money from him. However, Federico was angry and stopped speaking 
to Manuel for a time. Manuel never heard anything about a formal case against him concerning 
the inheritance. Federico let the case resting. After a time, Federico started talking to him again 
and relations have been normalized. Manuel is not so much angry with Federico but more with 
Ruben Garcia and the MAR officials as, according to Manuel, they only tried to get money from 
Federico, while they knew that it was a lost case from the start. 
Manuel was well aware of the fact that when his father had passed away, he could have 
recovered the hectare that his father had given to two other brothers, as this formed part of the 
possession of his father. But Manuel said that he would not act against the will of his father. These 
two brothers in the end sold their land. Yet, the buyer of the land realized that Manuel was the 
legitimate owner of the land and could cause him problems in the future. So, he went to Manuel 
and asked him if he agreed to the sale. Manuel told him that he agreed to it because their father 
had given them this plot of land and it was their responsibility. Manuel did not sign any document 
concerning the land. The buyer was Samuel, a brother of Manuel's wife. He was already an 
ejidatario, so no extra paperwork had to be done in order to make him an ejidatario. Still it was 
very much a question of trust between Samuel and Manuel. If Manuel later claimed that the land 
had been his and that he had not agreed to the sale by his brothers, Samuel would have had a 
difficult time trying to keep the land. 
Manuel: ƒ did not sign any paper and told Samuel that I agreed to it. The only thing that can 
happen in the future is that they come from the MAR office in Guadalajara and that they call my 
name and ask me how many hectares of land I possess. I will tell them: four. And they could say: 
but here it says five hectares. I will then answer: but my father gave one hectare to my brothers. 
If the commissioner or somebody else then commented that my brothers had sold the land, the 
official might ask me if I had agreed to the sale. I will then answer: No, but I did not want to 
impede them because it was my father's will to leave this land to my brothers. As in the majority 
of land sales, no problem was ever made about it. 
In the case of Julio we notice several considerations that play a role in the choice of heirs 
and the transfer of land rights to the next generation. The fact that Manuel had looked after 
his parents for a long time upto their death, gave him certain rights to his father's land. 
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Although it is logical that his elder brother was very disappointed at being removed as the 
heir of the land after having been registered as the heir all those years, he did not have a 
strong case. When their father finally made the formal change of heir before his death, there 
was little that Federico could do to fight for it. Moral principles played a role in the decision 
of Manuel to respect his father's decision to give part of the land to two of his brothers. 
This division of lands had already taken place a long time before his father's death, so 
everybody had been used to this situation and accepted it. For the same reason, out of respect 
for his father, Manual accepted the fact that his two brothers decided to sell this land. 
Although he did not agree at all with their decision. The one who took most risks at this 
land sale, was the buyer. However, he accepted Manuel's word that he would not make 
problems about it. Manuel is a very respected man in the village and this oral agreement 
offered enough security to proceed with the purchase of the land. What we find here is a 
complex combination of moral rights and obligations, locally developed inheritance practices 
and the influence of formal rules and procedures. This complex combination of elements can 
be found in many inheritances and can lead to different outcomes. 
The following example also illustrates expectations and quarrels around an inheritance. 
Here the inheritance from grandfather to grandson is canceled by the interference of a father 
who wants to secure the future position of a disabled son. The aggrieved son decides to 
accept his father's decision even though he knows that his father is acting illegally and he 
could easily win a formal case against his father. In this example, elements of care among 
relatives also play a central role in inheritance decisions. 
Claudio Nunez: assuring the future of a disabled son 
After Claudio Nunez became a widower, he went to live with one of his four daughters in Autlan. 
Hence, this daughter expected to inherit Claudio's land. However, Iginio, Claudio's only son, 
insisted on his father coming to live with him in La Canoa. Finally, Iginio convinced his father 
and Claudio spent his last years with him in La Canoa. The last years of his life, Claudio was an 
invalid and needed a lot of care. He was caringly looked after by Iginio's wife. In 1992 Claudio 
died and a delicate situation arose about the inheritance of his land: almost seven hectares of 
irrigated land and four hectares of rainfed land. 
Years before his death Claudio Nunez had made his will, which had already caused a lot of 
problems. He had told his children that Joaqum, one of Iginio's sons, would be the heir to his 
land. One of his daughters was so angry about this that she said that she wasn't her father's 
daughter anymore. Over the years she had calmed down. However, another arrangement was 
made as well. An oral agreement was made between Claudio, Joaquin, a daughter of Claudio, and 
a nephew that, although Joaquin would officially inherit all the land, he would leave one hectare 
to this aunt and nephew. 
Joaquin who inherited his grandfather's land when his grandfather died in 1992, was 23 years 
old, single and preoccupied with the establishment of a workshop in the village. He had followed 
a technical career which he had not finished, but he felt he knew enough to start a locksmith's 
workshop. He had a girlfriend in the village whom he wanted to marry, but first he needed to 
establish himself professionally in order to maintain a family. Joaquin was very religious and 
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involved in church youth groups in the village for the improvement of the village. Although he 
put a lot of energy in it, his workshop developed very slowly as the crisis in the region was severe 
and people did not have much money to spend. The land his grandfather left him was very 
welcome to him. Joaquin started to develop a serious interest in ejido affairs and went to some 
ejido meetings. He also became actively involved in a group that had to establish new internal 
ejido rules (see chapter 9). 
However, it soon became clear that Iginio had other intentions for the land that Joaqufn had 
inherited. Iginio wanted this land for another of his five sons, Antonio. Antonio is ill and Iginio 
and his wife always worried a lot about him. Antonio has always helped his father in the field. 
Iginio and his wife know that Antonio will never be able to do anything other than work on the 
land and that he will probably never marry. Hence, they wanted Antonio to inherit the land as a 
form of insurance. In this way he would at least be able to maintain himself when his parents 
passed away. So, Iginio decided to change the papers and make Antonio the heir to Claudio's 
land instead of Joaquin. Joaquin's dreams of becoming an ejidatario vanished. Although Joaquin 
felt bad about his father changing the inheritance papers, he also understood his fathers concern 
for Antonio. Furthermore, he decided not to challenge his father's authority. However, he did 
not agree with the way his father was operating. Joaqufn: 
My grandfather left the land to me, but there was more. We had made a promise to leave one 
hectare or more of this land to my aunt and nephew. My father was against this, as my aunt 
always behaved very badly. But to be honest, my nephew never did anything bad, only my aunt. 
This agreement was made between my grandfather, my father, my aunt, and me. I loved my 
grandfather very much and always listened to him. He liked that very much; somebody who listened 
to him. Perhaps that was the reason that he left the land to me. If I was another type of person 
I could claim the land and my father could not do anything about it. But if this is the way my 
father wants it.... if my brother needs it.... 
Although Joaqufn accepted his father's decision, he felt extremely frustrated about the whole 
affair. A short time later, Joaquin suddenly left the village and found work in Las Vegas. 
The fact that so many factors influence inheritance decisions and that no fixed inheritance 
pattern exists, is reflected in the inheritances between 1942 and 1993. 
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Table 5.7 Types of inheritance of ejido plots from 1942 to 1993 
husband - wife 16" 
father - youngest son 18 
father - eldest son 9 
father - intermediate son 10 
passing over from father alive - son 14 
father - only son or only child 7 
brother - brother 5 
father - daughter 4 
mother - son 5 
mother - daughter 2 
grandfather - grandchild 3 
uncle - nephew 3 
total 96 
Although many people tend to give a common rule for inheritance, such as: the custom here 
is that the youngest son inherits the land, table 5.7 shows a great variety in types of 
inheritance. It is true that of all inheritances the transfer from father to youngest son is the 
most common one, but 81 per cent of all inheritances were not from father to youngest son! 
So taking this as a general rule would give a very distortioned view. As was mentioned 
before, preference is given to sons over daughters. Only when there are no sons left in the 
family or in special cases, is the land passed to a daughter or a granddaughter. There are, 
for example, several cases of ejidatarios who left the village with the whole family except 
a daughter. In these cases, the father passed the land to the daughter. 
Figure 5.3 Number of male and female ejidatarios in 1942 and 1993 
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It is interesting to note that the number of women ejidatarias has grown considerably between 
1942 and 1993. This is mainly caused by inheritance. Of the first group of 77 ejidatarios, 
5 (6 per cent) were women, whereas of the 97 ejidatarios today, 21 (22 per cent) are women. 
These first 5 women were all widows. Of the 21 women today, 14 are widows. This growing 
importance of women in the ejido is an interesting development. Even if the women transfer 
the land to one of their sons at their death, the fact that many ejidatarios leave the land to 
their wives and that women tend to live longer than men, means that an important part of the 
ejidatarios will always be women. Despite the fact that people always claim that the land and 
the ejido is a man's affair, being the legitimate owner of the land gives women more 
influence in what happens to the land and the spending of the proceedings from the land. 
Women also start playing a more active role in the ejido administration (see the following 
chapters). 
Table 5.8 The ways in which the ejidatarias in La Canoa today acquired land since 1942" 
from 1942 onwards 2~ 
inherited from husband 11 
inherited from father 4 
inherited from mother 1 
purchase 3 
total 21 
Although it is clear that most women have become an ejidataria by inheriting the land of then-
husband, we can also see that there are many other ways in which women have obtained 
land. Here the same holds as with the other figures. When we talk in general terms or 
trends, and say that the most common way for women to obtain land is by inheritance from 
her husband, we would not be lying. However, at the same time we would convey an idea 
of established customs and certain general rules that do no justice to the diversity of practices 
and the many "exceptions to the rule". 
The Difficult Choice of an Heir 
Inheritance is a sensitive subject, that is often not openly discussed within the family. 
Although there may be a lot of speculation and gossip, it is considered to be a decision of 
the ejidatario him or herself which is not open to discussion among siblings and their parents. 
Although we have already seen the tensions, expectations, frictions, disappointments, and 
joys, which inheritance decisions may cause among "would-be heirs", we may find the same 
feelings among testators. Many ejidatarios have great difficulties in deciding on the heir of 
their property and women ejidatarias in particular talked to me about their problem in 
choosing an heir. When I asked people about inheritance customs in La Canoa, many said 
that the custom was that the youngest son inherits the land except when he could be described 
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by the phrase "no sirve". Then another son inherits. This "no sirve" generally means that 
the man in question does not work and spends his money on women and alcohol. In other 
words, men who are considered to be irresponsible. People are afraid that they will sell the 
land and prefer another heir instead. This becomes clear in the case of Juana Sanchez. 
Juana Sanchez 
Juana is a woman of 73 years old. She inherited five hectares of rainfed land from her husband. 
She has six sons and three daughters. Four of her sons live in the village. The youngest son is still 
living with her in the house, the others are all married and have their own houses. The most 
obvious solution would be to leave the land to the (youngest) son Heriberto who lives with his 
mother. But Heriberto is a known drunkard and Juana is afraid that he might sell the land. She 
has three other sons in the village to whom she could leave the land instead. However, besides the 
fact that this will cause a conflict with Heriberto, this brings her to another difficult decision: 
which of the three brothers, Jaime, Angel, or José? All the three other brothers have an interest 
in the land. At the moment, the brothers in the village work their mother's land together with a 
brother in Autlân. They divide the produce and give a part of it to their mother. 
Angel is the son who has been most successful. He is a teacher and school inspector. His wife 
is a teacher as well and they are doing very well. However, Angel also uses his position to support 
his relatives. For example, he organized a job as a cleaner in a school nearby for Jaime, who has 
been unemployed for quite some time. He also tried to help Jaime's wife to get a job as a teacher 
in La Canoa. Angel is also the son who most supports their mother. So, besides being successful, 
Angel is considered to be the typical good, responsible son and brother. Therefore, Juana put 
Angel as the heir to her land. Her wish is that the land will be for Heriberto and that he will till 
the land, but that Angel will see to it that he does not sell the land. As the land will formally be 
Angel's property, Heriberto will not be able to sell it. However, not everybody is sure that Angel 
will keep the promises he has made to his mother that Heriberto has the right to till the land. Some 
of these doubts were expressed in the following conversation between Jaime (Juana's son) and 
Javier Romero. 
Jaime: My father always wanted Angel to inherit the land, although he is the one who needs 
it least. I would like to inherit the land myself as I need it more than Angel who is a school 
inspector and has a wife who is working as a teacher as well. We all agreed that Heriberto is the 
one who has most rights to the land, as he lived with my mother, works the land, and does not 
have another job. But he is an irresponsible drunkard and we agreed not to let him inherit the 
land. Angel is the heir and I am sure that he will help his brothers. 
Javier: That remains to be seen.... The one who has more, always wants more... 
Juana's case was often mentioned by the people in La Canoa as an example of the difficult 
situation an ejidatario can be in when he or she has to designate the heir to the land. 
Although most people understand Juana's decision to put Angel as the heir instead of 
Heriberto, they are not convinced that it will produce a good outcome. Although there is an 
informal agreement between Angel and his mother, legally the land will be Angel's when 
his mother passes away. These informal agreements do not have any legal value and in the 
past there have been many problems with this kind of agreements. Furthermore, it means that 
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in the next generation the land will stay with Angel's children. If Heriberto married and had 
children of his own, there is no way in which the land will ever go to his children. Most 
ejidatarios expect that serious problems will emerge in this family about the inheritance when 
Juana dies. 
The ejidataria Aurora Garcia has a different kind of problem in the choice of an heir. 
Aurora Garcia 
Aurora Garcia is another widow who inherited the land from her husband. She is 71 years old and 
owns two and a half hectares of rainfed land and one and a half hectare of irrigated land. She has 
ten children of whom three live in the United States. The scarcity of land that developed in the 
generation after the founding of the ejido is well illustrated by the position of her sons. Aurora 
has five sons in the village who do not own any land. Yet most of these sons earn their living 
from agriculture and animal husbandry. For that reason several sons and Aurora work together. 
The sons till their mother's land together, join their cattle, rent extra lands etc. This is one of the 
few cases of very close cooperation between different households of one family in the village. The 
sons give their mother part of the maize after the harvest of her plot and they give her anything 
else she needs. An unmarried daughter lives with Aurora and looks after her. This daughter has 
a job at the social security office in Autlán. In Aurora's case it is very difficult to decide to whom 
she will leave the land. She has five sons and one daughter in La Canoa and all are considered to 
be "good children" in the sense that they respect and support her. Although some do better than 
others, they can all maintain their families. When I asked Aurora about the possible heir of her 
land, she said: 
At the moment we use the land in good harmony. In my opinion it is going fine now. I never 
have to oversee what they are doing. I get everything I need from them. I have the impression that 
everything goes well, but who knows.... (laughing). For that reason I want to leave the land to my 
youngest son Mauricio in the United States. He does not need the land and is arranging papers 
to migrate permanently to the United States. As he does not need the land, the others can go on 
working the land together as they do now. 
On the other hand, she is afraid that land might be taken away from Mauricio for living outside 
the ejido. Aurora: 
I am only afraid that they may take the land away from Mauricio for living outside the ejido. 
That is forbidden. However, many ejidatarios live outside the ejido.... I could also leave the land 
to Gregorio [one of the sons in the village], but I am afraid that his sons will claim the land later 
on. Many people say that the problems are caused by the next generation. 
Interestingly, in order to avoid making a choice among the sons she is working with in the 
village, Aurora prefers to nominate another son who has no interest in the land. In this way 
she hopes things can go on the way they are today and she does not have to show a 
preference for one of the sons in the village. This is one of the difficult inheritance cases that 
may develop in different directions. For the brothers in the village, who are working with 
their mother, the situation could change drastically when their youngest brother inherits the 
land. On the other hand, they may decide to buy the land from their brother. Recently two 
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of the brothers already bought a plot of ejido land. 
We saw that property "marks periods of transition between generations, demarcates areas 
of competence, and creates bonds of dependence" within the family (Sabean 1990: 33). The 
different principles that guide inheritance practices offer flexibility but also cause difficulties 
and tensions for ejidatarios as well as their children. It is a dream of many ejidatarios that 
their children will work the land together or at least will all benefit from its produce once 
they pass away. However, they realize at the same time that this is not a realistic option. 
Although a son who inherits the land may promise that he will give part of the revenue of 
the land to his brothers and sisters, one never knows what will happen in the future. People 
are quick to provide examples in which this type of arrangements did not work out. 
In conclusion, in the inheritance practices ideas concerning the land as family patrimony 
and mutual care and obligation between parents and children are most important. These 
notions which guide the inheritance decision can lead to many different outcomes in the 
ultimate choice of an heir. Family relations are complex and can change over time. In an 
increasingly transnational context, sometimes contradictory considerations are taken into 
account in the choice of an heir (trying to get children back to the village through inheritance 
or, on the contrary, favoring children in the village). This explains that inheritance is a 
source of tremendous tension within families and can strongly influence the relation between 
different family members. 
The influence of the agrarian law on inheritance practices has been limited, as the rule 
that only a child or partner could inherit coincided with the intentions of the ejidatarios. On 
the other hand, the official rule that the property can not be divided and that only one child 
can inherit the land has influenced inheritance decisions of ejidatarios with one plot. Even 
if they preferred to divide the plot among several children, they registered only one as the 
official heir. In the end, this always meant that the official heir, backed by the law, took all 
the land. In the case of ejidatarios with several plots, this rule had no effect as they often 
passed plots over to different sons during their life. Relation with other ejidatarios played a 
minor role in inheritance practices. 
In the next section a famous local example is described of a case in which the wish of 
an ejidataria to divide the land among her four sons and the impossibility of legalizing this 
situation caused tremendous conflicts. In this case local relations between ejidatarios did play 
a role. 
A Serious Inheritance Conflict: the Lagos Brothers 
The case that was most mentioned during my stay in the village as the proof that leaving the 
land to more than one child, always ends in trouble, is the case of Epigmenia Romero. 
Epigmenia was the widow of Cayetano Lagos. She was one of the few widows with ejido 
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land in 1942. She had inherited the land from her husband, who received four hectares of 
land when the ejido Autlan was established. Epigmenia was Cayetano's second wife. 
Salvador was born in 1924 as the first son of this couple. Cayetano died in 1936, leaving 
Epigmenia to bring up six small children. Salvador, being the oldest son, felt responsible for 
the family although he was only twelve years old. He had a heavy responsibility, especially 
because he was followed by two sisters and his three younger brothers were still very small. 
His youngest brother was only a few months old when their father died. From the age of 
fourteen Salvador went to work in the coast of Jalisco in the dry seasons. Salvador also went 
several time to the United States. Salvador told me proudly that "he married all his brothers 
and sisters" and built a house for all of his brothers. Although he was the eldest son, he 
himself did not marry and waited for his brothers and sisters to marry. 
Salvador had been listed as an ejidatario in 1942 but, like many other young boys, he had 
not received land then and only received a plot of two hectares in 1950. This was land that 
had been abandoned and was given to two ejidatarios who had not received land before. One 
of them was Salvador. Salvador's brothers were not on the list and were not recognized as 
ejidatarios as they had been too young in 1942. All these years Salvador stayed with his 
mother and tilled her land as well as his own land. According to Salvador, his brothers and 
sisters respected him more than many children respect their father. Salvador finally married 
in 1960 at the age of 35. He and his wife Cecilia moved to their own house and had eight 
children. 
Salvador continued working Epigmenia's land and he maintained her. His brothers 
remained landless, but two did quite well. Miguel, the youngest produced ice-lollies and 
Alberto worked as a waiter in Autlan. His brother Gerardo was the poorest of the four 
brothers. Epigmenia first lived with her daughters and then moved with her daughter-in-law 
from her first marriage, Aurora Garcia, who had also been widowed. Towards the end of 
the 1970s Epigmenia decided to divide her four hectares of rainfed land among the four sons 
from her second marriage. The sons of her first marriage had received land themselves. So, 
Salvador and his three brothers all received one hectare. According to Salvador his mother 
had told him: Son, you are the owner of the land, as you did everything for your brothers, 
but I want the four of you to benefit from your father's land. She told her sons that she 
wanted to see them work together peacefully and see to it that nobody tried to take the land 
away from the others. She left a paper with the ejido commissioner that this was the way in 
which she wanted the land to be worked: divided among the four brothers. This paper was 
signed by the four brothers and the members of the executive committee of the ejido. So, 
from then on each brother worked a part of their mother's land. The land was divided into 
four different plots and the four worked the land separately. 
However, only one of the brothers could be the official heir. Epigmenia decided to make 
Alberto (the waiter) the heir of her land. She called her sons and explained to them why she 
wanted Alberto to inherit the land. She said it was because Salvador already owned land, is 
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an ejidatario and has a lot of cattle, Gerardo would receive one hectare of ejido land from 
an uncle and Miguel, the youngest one, was doing very well without land. For that reason, 
she had decided to leave the land to Alberto. However, the three other brothers took this 
decision very badly and it caused a lot of trouble in the family. The other brothers did not 
trust Alberto. Alberto was a waiter and spent little time on the land. While the three other 
brothers were close and lived together in the same street, Alberto had always been different. 
His wife had never been accepted by the wives of the other three brothers and Alberto and 
his wife had lived outside the village for a long time. Salvador told Alberto that he would 
see to it that he never inherited the land. Miguel threatened Alberto in the fields with a 
machete and Alberto's son was called names by Salvador during a football match. The 
women also became part of the fight and started offending each other. On one occasion, one 
of Alberto's daughters got drunk at Miguel's house and was made to look ridiculous. While 
the nieces had always visited each other, Alberto's daughters were not allowed to visit 
Miguel's house anymore. 
Although the three brothers hoped that Alberto would respect Epigmenia's wish that the 
land should remain divided among the four brothers after her death, they were well aware 
of the fact that their brother would be the legitimate owner of the land once their mother 
passed away. Salvador said to me in 1987 when Epigmenia was still alive: According to the 
certificate of agrarian rights, only Alberto will be the owner of the land. If mother dies 
tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, he can say to us: leave the land! For he is the 
legitimate owner. We agree that if Alberto wants all the land, we will leave him all the land. 
Legally we cannot do anything about it even though mama's wish was a different one. 
Salvador added that he did not understand why his mother had not put him as the first 
heir. Although I did not talk to Epigmenia at that time and later she had passed away, there 
were several elements that may have influenced her decision not to put Salvador as the heir. 
First of all, Salvador was the only son who already possessed an ejido plot, had a lot of 
cattle and who was doing fine. However, what was probably more important was the fact that 
Salvador had been an alcoholic for many years. During that period he had spent his money 
on alcohol. He had sold his cattle and neglected his children. As was discussed before, most 
parents did not want to leave their land to alcoholic sons for fear that they would use the 
money in the wrong way or perhaps sell the land. 
Whatever the reasons behind Epigmenia's decision to put Alberto down as the official 
heir, she wanted the four brothers to have equal parts of the land. For over ten years while 
Epigmenia was still alive, each son worked his part of the land, but relations between the 
three brothers and Alberto remained strained. When Epigmenia fell ill and was dying, 
Salvador made a final intent to change his mother's mind and change the inheritance papers. 
A couple of days before her death in 1988 Epigmenia signed a document, drew up by 
Salvador, that changed the heir from Alberto to Gerardo. The ejido commissioner, Ignacio 
Romero, helped with the document and signed it. Epigmenia died and now a fight started 
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among her sons about the inheritance of her land. 
Naturally, Alberto was hurt by what had happened all these years and he was very angry 
about Salvador's last manoeuvre. Salvador had received help from an official of the 
assistance office of the MAR in Autlan. For that reason, Alberto decided to go directly to 
Guadalajara and lodge a complaint at the MAR against his brother for letting their mother 
change inheritance papers a couple of days before she died, when she was not competent 
anymore. Alberto also had the support of several other ejidatarios in La Canoa. He is known 
as a nice quiet man, whereas Salvador has the reputation of being a trouble-maker. Gustavo 
Romero, the new ejido commissioner also supported Alberto against Salvador and his two 
brothers. Lorenzo Romero, who is a friend of Alberto's, accompanied him to the MAR 
office in Guadalajara. Lorenzo was eager to hurt Salvador as he had never forgiven him for 
insulting his father Miguel Romero during an ejido meeting (see chapters two and four). As 
Alberto had been registered at the MAR as the heir of his mother for all these years, and the 
papers from the Autlan office had not yet been processed, Alberto had few problems in 
Guadalajara and was registered as the new owner of the land. 
In 1989 Alberto asked his brothers for the hectare of land that they had been working for 
more than ten years and from then onwards he worked all the land himself. According to 
Alberto he would never have taken the land away from his brothers if they had not tried to 
remove him as the official heir of the land. During the ejido meetings it was obvious that 
Salvador had difficulty in accepting his brother Alberto as a new ejidatario. However, 
Salvador has gradually become less hostile towards his brother. In the beginning of 1993, 
Alberto arranged his own inheritance papers. His only son, who lived in the United States 
was registered as the heir of his land. This son, who is a known alcoholic claims that he will 
return to the village one day and stay there. 
In this case, several elements are interesting. First of all the choice of heir was a difficult 
one. No moral obligation towards a child that had taken care of his or her mother until death 
existed. Still, Salvador clearly felt that he had certain rights over the land as he had taken 
care of his brothers and sisters when his father had passed away. Although he did not want 
the land so much for himself, he felt that he had at least some rights to say what should 
happen to it. However, Epigmenia decided to put Alberto as the heir and hoped he would let 
the four brothers each have their one hectare of land. She made her four sons even sign an 
agreement in which they said every one of them would till one hectare of land. The 
arrangement between the four brothers worked well when Epgimenia was still alive but 
everybody in the ejido foresaw the problems that would emerge when she died. Then the 
official heir could do whatever he wanted with the land and this was exactly what happened 
in the end. 
As Epigmenia had removed Alberto as the heir to her land shortly before her death, 
Salvador and his brothers could still have tried to have Gerardo recognized as the official heir 
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but this would have been a long (and dirty) fight which they did not want to get involved in. 
Furthermore, Alberto had considerable support from many ejidatarios which would make his 
position very strong in an official conflict. With respect to the one hectare that their mother 
had lent to each of the sons, the brothers could not claim any right whatsoever. Everybody 
realized that the paper they had written years ago in which they declared their agreement 
with Epigmenia's decision that every son would have the right to work one hectare did not 
have any legal value. It only was a moral obligation to respect their mother's wish, but 
moral obligations did not play a role in relations that were spoilt by dirty conflicts. 
Organizing Practices Around the Sale of Ejido Plots in La Canoa 
In table 5.4 we saw that 29 plots have been sold in La Canoa between 1942 and 1993. Many 
of these sales concern only parts of ejido plots that were sold. Of the 29 ejido sales, 20 
concerned land in the rainfed area and 9 land in the area that has been irrigated since the 
sixties. As of yet, ejido plots have always been sold to people within the community, that is 
to say to sons, brothers, or sisters of ejidatarios. Hence, it was an internal landmarket. 
People "from outside" have never bought land in the ejido. 
There were several elements which influenced the development of organizing practices 
around the sale of ejido plots. According to the agrarian law, the ejidatario who sold his plot, 
as well as the person who bought the plot would lose the right to the land. Although this 
certainly was a threatening prospect, the sale of plots was less risky than the renting out of 
land. In a land sale, unlike a renting arrangement, both parties infringed the law and would 
lose their rights. This meant that both parties would be careful not to make problems about 
the issue. This in contrast to renting arrangements in which the leaseholder was building up 
rights to the land at the expense of the migrant ejidatario. 
Many ejidatarios had mixed feelings about the sale of ejido plots. The main reason 
against land sales was that land was considered to be family patrimony. The ejidatario as the 
official "owner" of his or her plots was not considered to be the only person with rights to 
the land. According to most ejidatarios, the other members of the ejidatario's household: his 
wife, his children and even grandchildren had certain rights to the land. For that reason, 
ejidatarios who sold their land without any urgent need for money were heavily condemned 
by the ejidatarios and other villagers. Especially when they left their partner or children 
without land. In the same way people often felt ashamed about the fact that they sold a piece 
of land in the past. 
However, despite this moral judgment on ejido land sales, ejidatarios did not interfere 
in the transactions of others. A strong sense of individual responsibility reigned and if 
somebody wanted to sell, the others would not make it impossible. They would gossip about 
it and criticize the ejidatario who had decided to sell his land, but they would not interfere. 
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This attitude of the other ejidatarios was very important for the people involved in the land 
sale for they needed the approval of the ejido assembly for the transfer of the ejido land right 
from one person to another. Notions of honor also played an important role with respect to 
land sales and the support of the other ejidatarios. The common view was that if people had 
agreed on a transaction they should not go back on it later. So, people who later on tried to 
recover land that they had sold in the past, could not count on the support of the other 
ejidatarios. As we will see, this support of the majority of the ejidatarios could be crucial in 
a land conflict. 
Nevertheless, because of this ever present "menace" of the agrarian law, which 
prohibited land sales, people tried to "formalize" their illegal arrangements in a way that 
made it look like a permitted transaction. In this way they hoped to be safe in the future if 
someone created problems. Land sales were formally presented as a "voluntary transfer of 
use rights" from one person (the seller) to the other (the buyer). The majority of ejido 
members had to agree to the "voluntary transfer" of the land and signed a document. (They 
always knew that it concerned a sale.) There were additional ways to protect the sale. One 
was to put the new owner down as the successor of the one who was going to sell. In this 
way, one avoided officially registered heirs claiming their rights at a later stage. 1 2 Likewise, 
it was important that the partner of the ejidatario who sold the land signed his or her 
agreement with the "transfer of rights", as well as their children. This was important since 
if an ejidatario "transferred his rights" without the permission of the rest of the family, the 
sons or wife could later on try to claim the land. The above mentioned elements were all 
very usual but there were no fixed common rules in this respect. There are for example, 
people who sold ejido land without informing and asking permission at the ejido assembly 
or without putting the buyer down as their successor. Others sold land without the permission 
of their wives. These arrangements were more risky and led in some cases to problems at 
a later stage. 
Apart from these formal precautions, it was helpful to assure the favorable attitude of 
officials of the MAR, so that they would not make problems about the sale. Therefore, they 
were often paid a certain amount of money "to keep quiet". These functionaries of the MAR 
often were actively involved in the sales as they knew better than anyone else the working 
of the bureaucracy and the best way to arrange and formalize these transactions. When we 
look at what eventually happened with land transfers in La Canoa, we see the following. The 
great majority of illegal transactions was silenced forever and never mentioned or reported 
in the formal arena. Ejido land sales in La Canoa were never canceled, although on several 
occasions people have tried to cancel them in a formal procedure. 
Hence, with respect to ejido land sales, a patterning of organizing practices developed 
which went very much against the "letter" and the "spirit" of the agrarian law. However, 
these organizing practices were less characterized by tensions than the organizing practices 
around the renting of land by migrants and around the inheritance of land. The reason for 
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these lesser tensions was the fact that in the organizing practices around land sales it was not 
so much a question of opposing interests (like siblings fighting for an inheritance within the 
family or a leaseholder building up rights on the plot against the migrant ejidatario) but of 
mutually agreed transactions in which both parties had something to win. Furthermore, in 
the sale of land the fact that the ejidatarios considered land to be private property and felt it 
was a question of individual responsibility if ejidatarios decided to sell it, made that the 
ejidatarios acquired a high degree of autonomy. Again the officials were not central to the 
development of these organizing practices as they had no means to check or influence the 
situation. They depended on the information provided by ejidatarios. In the land sales the 
agrarian law also worked above all as a "distant threat" and stimulated the development of 
"legal and official game-playing", activities on the margin which did not really influence 
what was going on but were carried out as form of precaution (legalizing the land sales as 
voluntary land transfers, obtaining the consent of the ejido assembly, paying ejido 
commissioners and officials, etc). 
I will now relate in detail the history of a sale of an ejido plot in the 1960s in La Canoa. 
The case illustrates how people bypassed the law, how ejidatarios and officials were all 
involved in these arrangements, and how disagreements were fought out. Although several 
ejido plots have been sold in La Canoa, this case is the most commented upon by the 
ejidatarios as it is one of the few cases in which the former owners tried to cancel the sale 
at a later stage. 
The Story of a Famous Illegal Sale of an Ejido Plot in La Canoa 
The sale of the ejido plot which will be discussed in detail took place in 1962. The buyer was 
Gustavo Romero, who had been an ejidatario since the establishment of the ejido. After he 
had worked a couple of years in the United States in the 1950s, he returned to the village and 
developed his farm with the money he had saved. In 1962 Gustavo himself was ejido 
commissioner in La Canoa. Obviously, this position helped him in the purchase of the ejido 
plot. However, what was more important than his being ejido commissioner was the help he 
received from his uncle Miguel Romero. Miguel knew how the MAR functioned and had 
several influential contacts. It was known that there were functionaries at the MAR who 
helped with the sale of ejido plots and the paperwork for the legalization of these illegal 
arrangements in exchange for payment. However, Gustavo felt he did not need these 
functionaries as he had the help of his uncle Miguel and a friend in Autlan. This friend in 
Autlan had been involved in the agrarian struggles and agrarian procedures for the 
establishment of the ejido of Autlan. Afterwards he developed into a famous broker between 
ejidatarios and the bureaucracy. He said to Gustavo: Why would you go to these idiots 
(pendejos) at the Agrarian Institute? So they did all the paperwork among the three of them 
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and Gustavo paid the friend a small amount of money for his work. 
The ejidatario who wanted to sell his plot was Mario Sanchez. There were serious 
problems in the village with the Sanchez family at the time of the land sale. A brother of 
Mario had killed a son of Juan Garcia in a conflict over cattle that had damaged crops on a 
field. People in La Canoa were disconcerted by the murder and a hostile attitude developed 
towards the Sanchez family. Speculations circulated about a possible revenge from the 
influential Garcia family against the Sanchez family. In this atmosphere of hostility Mario 
decided to sell his ejido land, leave the village with his wife and children, and establish 
himself in another region. 
As usual with the sale of ejido plots, the sale was formally presented as a transfer of 
agrarian right. Mario declared that he voluntarily transferred his agrarian right. As the law 
does not allow the possession of two agrarian rights by one person, Gustavo decided to 
register the plot he bought on the name of his son Raul. To "play safe" Gustavo furthermore 
asked Mario to put Raul formally down as the heir of his agrarian right. As Mario had no 
successor registered for his land, this was easy to arrange. 
At the ejido meeting where the transfer of the ejido right from Mario to Gustavo had to 
be approved, Miguel Romero was chairman. All the ejidatarios present at the meeting knew 
that the "transfer" concerned the sale of an ejido plot, but the case was presented in terms 
of a legally permitted transfer of ejido rights. A majority of ejidatarios were present at the 
meeting and signed the document. Although not all ejidatarios approved of the sale of ejido 
plots, in this case things were accepted more easily because of the problems in the ejido with 
the Sanchez family. Mario and his wife both signed their agreement to the transfer of 
Mario's agrarian right. After the meeting the papers were sent to the offices of the MAR 
in Guadalajara and Mexico city. Gustavo was the new "owner" of the land, which was 
registered in his son's name. Mario left with his family for the coast of Jalisco. 
Years later Mario and his wife separated and Mario's wife, Angela and their sons tried 
to recover the land. They came to Gustavo's house several times to talk about it, but 
Gustavo made it clear to them that nothing could be done about it anymore. Angela and her 
children then decided to go to the MAR in Mexico city. However, Gustavo had already gone 
there years before and talked to several people in order to check that all his papers were in 
order. Gustavo was informed about this visit of Angela to Mexico city, because a close 
relative of his, Sylvia, worked at that time as a secretary at the MAR. Sylvia told Gustavo 
that Angela accused Gustavo of invading their land and that she told the functionary that her 
husband had obliged her to sign the agreement of transfer and that he had threatened her. 
According to Sylvia, the functionary had not paid much attention to it and asked her why she 
only remembered this more than ten years after this had taken place. He said he would keep 
her informed about the case. When they had left, Sylvia explained the case of her relative 
Gustavo to the functionary. 
However, the efforts of Angela at the different offices of the MAR had had some results 
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as became clear at the IUP that was held in La Canoa in 1974. Mauro, the functionary of the 
MAR who came to La Canoa to do the IUP, had Gustavo listed as the invader of the land 
that he had bought. Mauro told the ejido commissioner Rub6n Garcia this, the day before he 
was to come and do the IUP. Rub6n immediately informed Gustavo about it and Ruben and 
Gustavo decided to go straight away to Autlan that evening to talk to the functionary. 
Rub6n and Gustavo arrived at the promotoria of the MAR in Autlan. They were told that 
Mauro had gone to the movies, and they were recommended not to bother him. However, 
Gustavo and Ruben went directly to the cinema and told the girl at the entrance to go and 
get the functionary. This act is significant as it shows a particular style of dealing with the 
bureaucracy and gives an indication of Gustavo's status. Gustavo is a self-confident 
entrepreneur, conscious of his position and prepared to strike a deal. His attitude contrasts 
with that of many ejidatarios who are characterized by a frightened, over-respectful attitude, 
who would not do anything that might disturb a functionary. By this act it also immediately 
becomes clear to Mauro that Gustavo had the support of local powerholders, such as the 
ejido commissioner, who accompanied him. According to Gustavo, Mauro came outside and 
Gustavo introduced himself and the commissioner. Ruben then explained to Mauro what had 
been going on with the land and the problem that Angela was causing Gustavo. They then 
took Mauro out for dinner. Some days later, when the meeting of the IUP was held in La 
Canoa, the sale of the land came up. Mauro told the ejidatarios that the transfer of land right 
was totally in order and he told Angela that she had better leave. 
It is important to pay attention here to the relation between Mauro and Gustavo and the 
way in which functionaries of the MAR get "compensation" for their services. It is very 
common for the engineers or lawyers of the MAR to receive payment for whatever task they 
do for ejidatarios. We saw that even simple administrative tasks such as the registration of 
inheritance papers often have to be paid for. Naturally, these compensations depend on the 
kind of work or "favor" done and the parties in the negotiation. Standard compensation for 
an engineer who visits an ejido is the payment of his gasoline, of his hotel bill and they are 
often taken out for dinner and to any place the official wants to go. Although these kinds of 
services or payments may be called "bribes" or "corruption", by the people involved these 
are considered to be logical forms of reciprocity and seen in terms of the development of 
certain types of relationships and even forms of friendship. 
According to Gustavo, for example, he and Mauro ended as good friends after he had 
taken Mauro out for dinner in Autlan. Gustavo is proud of the fact that Mauro did not ask 
him for any money for his services. Gustavo claims that he only took Mauro out for dinner 
in gratitude and definitely does not see this as a form of payment. Besides certain immediate 
benefits, the different parties also make an investment for possible arrangements in the 
future. Mauro, as an official of the MAR, is interested in establishing relationships with 
influential local people who will "treat him well" and may be of help in future arrangements. 
Gustavo has developed a way of dealing with officials in which, according to him, he "does 
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not pay" but "knows how to treat them" and in this way attains his ends. This creation of 
a "useful alliance" between Mauro and Gustavo is illustrated by two other incidents. Some 
time after this IUP meeting in La Canoa, Gustavo saw Mauro arriving at the village. Gustavo 
went towards him and Mauro told him that he was looking for the commissioner, Ruben 
Garcia, as he needed money for gasoline to get back to Guadalajara. As the ejido 
commissioner was not in the village Gustavo decided to give Mauro a certain amount of 
money himself. Mauro left pleased. On another occasion, Gustavo went to the MAR in 
Guadalajara. Mauro saw him, left his office, and came immediately towards Gustavo to 
embrace him cordially (un abrazo). He told Gustavo that he would help him with whatever 
problem he had in the future. But according to Gustavo he has had no further problems and 
one does not approach the MAR if one does not have problems. Although this alliance 
between Gustavo and Mauro does not seem to have developed any further since then, this 
is the type of relationship that is often established between influential ejidatarios and 
functionaries and can eventually develop in many different ways. 
Although his position was rather secure, some years later Gustavo changed the papers 
again and put the land he had bought in the name of his son Pedro instead of Raul. The 
reason being that his son Raul had remained in the United States and did not show any 
intention of returning to La Canoa. As there always exists a risk that land may be taken away 
from ejidatarios who have migrated to the United States, Gustavo preferred to put the land 
in the name of his son Pedro who lives in La Canoa. However, in the exploitation of the land 
nothing has changed. Gustavo has been the owner and tiller of this ejido plot since 1962. 
When asking in the ejido who is the owner of this plot, people always respond that it is 
Gustavo. Pedro Romero, his son, only appears as a name on the formal list of ejidatarios. 
The Official Settlement of the Conflict: Social Networks and the Law 
In the archives of the MAR, I found several documents referring to this land dispute. It is 
clear that Angela had reopened the case before the IUP meeting and that for that reason the 
case was registered on the IUP list as an illegal land invasion by Gustavo. After the IUP 
meeting, which clearly had an unfavorable outcome for Angela, she lodged a complaint at 
the MAR against Gustavo and Mauro together. She said that they had been conspiring 
together against her interests. She tried several ways to attain her ends. She used lawyers, 
went to different offices of the MAR and even wrote a letter to the Mexican President. These 
are common practices: to pursue the case through different "entrances" and via different 
channels and a letter to the Mexican President is always popular (the only thing that happens 
to these letters is that they are channeled to the offices of the MAR). 
What is interesting is that in the official documents Angela never referred to the sale of 
the land. This is logical as she had obviously known about it and had even signed her 
agreement to it. In this way she herself had infringed the law. Therefore, she tried to recover 
the land on the basis of other arguments. First, she blamed Gustavo (as he was the one who 
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tilled the land) for invading the land that belonged to her husband. At a later stage she 
accused Raul (the officially registered ejidatario) of not living in the ejido. She even asked 
two ejidatarios of La Canoa to make an official declaration at a notary's office that Raul 
Romero did not live in La Canoa but in the United States. These declarations were included 
in the letters sent to the MAR. 
Nevertheless, the resolving departments of the MAR decided in favor of Raul on the 
basis of two arguments. First, that according to the ejido assembly, he had been in peaceful 
possession of the land for more than 12 years. Second, that Raul had officially been 
registered as Mario's heir and not his wife. 
When we look at "the facts" of this land sale in terms of the law, the situation is rather 
clear. According to the law Gustavo would not only have lost the land he bought, but also 
the ejido land he already possessed. By entering into the illegal act of buying ejido land and 
another illegal act of monopolizing ejido plots, he would lose all his ejido rights to the land. 
The seller Mario would also forever lose his rights to ejido lands as well as his wife who had 
signed her agreement to the transfer. Mario and Gustavo's plots would return to the ejido 
community and the general assembly could grant the land to others. 
Yet, the "facts" were never revealed in the presentation of the conflict at the MAR. In 
the documents I found about this case no comment is ever made about the illegal character 
of the land transfer between Mario and Raul. So, the official presentation and resolution of 
land disputes give a very distorted view of what really happened. People with experience can 
to a certain degree "read through" the official language and documents and deduce the real 
version of the events. Every official of the MAR, for example, understands that a voluntary 
land transfer between non-relatives most probably signifies a sale of land. 
However, even if the sale had been denounced, Gustavo would not have had his rights 
to the land taken away easily. He had the support of the general assembly of the ejido at the 
local level. It is important to pay further attention here to the crucial role the ejido assembly 
played in agrarian procedures. There is a general tendency to argue that "money" and 
"relations" determine the outcome of conflicts at the MAR. In these views, the people who 
win a conflict are the people with the best relations both within and outside the MAR who 
can influence the agrarian procedures and rules in their favor. As an official with a great deal 
of experience in the MAR told me: The decisive elements in the resolution of conflict cases 
are "not rules" but "relations". However, this same official added that certain practices had 
also developed within the MAR that ejidatarios who had sold their land, should not go back 
on it. Furthermore, he explained to me that the MAR did not easily go against the will of 
the ejido assembly even though it had a right to do so. This means that certain organizing 
practices had also developed within the MAR which went against the agrarian law and which 
gave great power to the local ejido assemblies (even in covering illegal transactions). So, if 
the assembly said that a certain transaction concerned a voluntary transfer of ejido rights, this 
was accepted by the MAR. Normally, the MAR did not interfere with decisions taken about 
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individual ejido rights by the assembly, nor did it check information provided by the 
assembly. In this case, the assembly had declared (supporting Gustavo) that Raul had been 
in possession of this land since 1962. Whether this was true or not, was not investigated. The 
two official declarations of ejidatarios that Raul did not reside in La Canoa did not make any 
difference. It was the statement of three persons against that of the majority of ejidatarios 
who had said differently. This enormous influence of the local ejido assembly in land affairs 
implied that people with much support or control at the local ejido level could barely be 
"touched" by the agrarian bureaucracy. By way of conclusion, we can say that a combination 
of Gustavo's influence at the local level, his use of legal forms, and his clever dealings with 
the bureaucracy guaranteed his illegal transaction. 
Sales in the "New Way" 
The new agrarian law which was issued in 1992 allows the sale of ejido plots. Actually, this 
is an adaptation to reality as land had already become a commodity in most ejidos throughout 
Mexico. However, before the ejidatarios are allowed to sell the land, the individual plots of 
the ejido have to be officially measured and registered. Yet, the interesting thing is that the 
ejidatarios did not wait for the measuring of their plots but immediately reacted to this new 
law by organizing the land sales in a "new way". They no longer talked about a transfer of 
right, nor asked the consent of the ejido assembly, nor did they put the buyer as the heir of 
the seller. Ejidatarios who wanted to sell their plot directly went to a notary or a lawyer to 
draw the acts of a land sale. One of the first men who wanted to buy an ejido plot in La 
Canoa after the change of the agrarian law, was Ignacio Fabregas. Ignacio first went to the 
MAR office in Autlan to ask if they could help him. David said that he could help him with 
the land transfer but he asked him for a large amount of money for the transaction. Then 
Ignacio went to see a lawyer and asked him if it was already permitted to organize ejido land 
sales as real sales, in the "new way". The lawyer explained to him that is was not allowed 
yet, but that there was no problem in doing it in the new way as these sales would be 
respected anyhow. The lawyer charged a much smaller amount of money than David. So, 
Ignacio and the ejidatario who sold his plot decided to let the lawyer handle the sale which 
took place at the office of a notary. To be on the safe side, they invited the ejido 
commissioner to come as well and sign the document. So, this time neither the ejido 
assembly, nor the MAR were involved in the transaction. This quick adaptation to a new 
reality is interesting because according to the agrarian law these new transactions would only 
be allowed in the future when the plots had been measured. However, ejidatarios as well as 
officials, and lawyers realized that nobody would cancel this new type of sales. Most 
ejidatarios preferred these new rules as now they did not need the consent of the ejido 
assembly anymore, nor the assistance of MAR officials who always asked for money. Since 
the new law was issued several plots have been sold in La Canoa, but during the period of 
my research (until mid 1995) no important changes in the ejido land market had occurred. 
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Conclusion: Organizing Practices within Multiple Force Fields and the Role of the Law 
In this chapter we analyzed how in La Canoa different sets of organizing practices developed 
around the individual ejido plots. The study showed that the influence of "the state" and "the 
cacique" has been exaggerated in the literature. Although local bosses, or caciques, and the 
agrarian bureaucracy definitely have influenced land transactions, they have not been central 
in the distribution and transfer of plots in La Canoa. Only in the first years after the 
establishment of the ejido, was the official rule which prohibited the renting out or 
abandoning of ejido plots used to take land away from ejidatarios who left the ejido for a 
long time. These dispossessions and the re-distribution of these plots were influenced by local 
political relations. However, when land became scarcer and more valuable with the irrigation 
in the 1960s, ejido land possession became more and more a form of private property and 
land was never taken away from migrated ejidatarios anymore. The main reason for this 
development was that with land becoming more valuable and ejidatarios becoming wealthier, 
nobody let the land be taken away from them anymore without a fight. This meant that in 
order to dispossess an ejidatario of his or her land a long and dirty struggle had to be 
followed in which the MAR would become involved and the outcome was never clear. This 
was not a pleasant prospect even for local powerholders. We saw that many illegal transfers 
of ejido plots have taken place between the establishment of the ejido in 1938 and 1992. 
Many ejido plots have been sold and many others have been divided into several plots and 
were passed to several children. Yet the fate of the majority of these illegal arrangements in 
La Canoa was the same. While they sometimes were vehemently criticized at the local level, 
they were never brought up in the official arena. 
The Law as a Distant Threat and the Bureaucratic Machine 
Although the agrarian law was seldom applied it had considerable influence on the 
organization of illegal transactions. As far as possible, ejidatarios tried to organize their 
illegal transactions according to the accepted procedures and in this way hoped to avoid 
problems in the future. The fact that the official rules remained important was the reason that 
the ejidatarios often repeated the rules that were most threatening to them: the prohibition 
of the sale of land, the prohibition of land rental and the prohibition against leaving the land 
to more than one heir. These were also the rales they used to refer to when they tried to 
explain the ejido system. These were the rales which were seldom enforced but at the same 
time formed the biggest threat to their property. The fact that transactions were always 
carried out "in the shadow of the law" (F. von Benda Beckmann 1992) meant that the legal 
agrarian rales remained a powerful weapon in negotiations and bargaining even when affairs 
were settled according to other criteria. This can be called the "bargaining and regulatory 
endowment" which is constituted by state law even when the law is not applied Galanter 
(1981). 
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If an illegal transaction or a conflict case was formally denounced at the MAR and officials 
became involved it was not clear at all what was going to happen. The process of formal 
decision-making in the case of disputes could take a long time and could involve different 
departments in different cities. Official documents could easily get "lost" or procedures be 
delayed for years. In the resolution of conflicts money and relations played an important role. 
So, the official bureaucratic world was quite obscure. However, the formal settlement of land 
conflicts was hardly ever followed to its conclusion. People who felt that they would lose a 
case or who feared that it would end in a dirty fight with negative consequences for their 
personal life, often decided to withdraw from the case in the middle of the process and 
before a formal decision was taken. In this way they left "the victory" to the other party. 
Yet, this "non-resolution" and the fact that conflict settlement by the MAR took such a long 
time also meant that tensions could linger on for a long time. The possibility that somebody 
would take the case up and set the MAR bureaucracy in motion was always present. Cases 
were never closed and one could always try to reopen them. We saw that MAR officials have 
been very eager to stimulate ejidatarios to lodge formal complaints and start a formal case 
even if they had little chance of winning. 
As the MAR has many different offices and a complex organizational structure ejidatarios 
often went to many different offices to find officials who were willing to help them. If they 
were not heard or listened to at one office, they used to go to another to see if they had 
better luck there. The notion of "forum-shopping" for situations in which disputants shop for 
forums for their problems and forums compete for disputes is applicable to this situation (K. 
von Benda Beckmann 1981: 117). Even though it concerns only one institution, the 
bureaucratic labyrinth of the MAR offers countless entrances. One never knows what the best 
"forum" is and where it will finally lead to. 
Another phenomenon which we saw in Gustavo's case and which is common in land 
conflicts is "playing the game" at different levels. Local level relations in the ejido are 
crucial but we also noticed the necessity of arranging things in Guadalajara and the desire 
to settle problems at "the center" in Mexico City. Often it is not clear whether this is really 
necessary. For example, for the registration of inheritance papers and assignment of rights, 
it is sufficient to go to the state capital Guadalajara. From there information is sent to 
Mexico City. However, people think that the offices in Mexico City are the "higher" and 
therefore the more "powerful" ones. Officials themselves also urge ejidatarios to go to other 
offices, or to go to the "center". This leads to situations in which people and documents 
travel around from office to office and from city to city and keep the bureaucratic machine 
working. However, it also points to the spatial dimension of the relation between the 
ejidatarios and the bureaucratic machine. In chapter seven and eight I return to this theme 
and elaborate it further. 
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The Re-enchantment of Governmental Techniques 
An element which helped the ejidatarios "keep the law at a distance" was the fact that the 
MAR did not keep a register of individual ejido plots and had no means of controlling the 
use and distribution of plots. However, although the MAR had little influence on what 
happened in the ejidos, many procedures were followed to keep some form of control. In this 
context I talked about legal and official "game-playing" as this created some room for 
officials and others to earn some extra money, but without being of any real effect on what 
happened to the land. However, what is more interesting is that this led to a situation in 
which procedures and documents acquired meanings which had little relation to their official 
function. For example, the IUP, a procedure to check on ejido land use, turned into a 
procedure for the legalization of illegal transactions and the formalizations of legal actions 
which had not followed the official procedures. The numbered ejido certificate took on an 
important symbolic value for the ejidatarios, even though it did not bear a "real" relation to 
their plot and their security of land possession rested on the recognition of their fellow 
ejidatarios. The receipt of ejido tax payment became a "proof of residence" in the ejido (in 
the case of migrants), instead of a proof of payment. This phenomenon in which official 
documents and procedures get different meanings, is what I call the re-enchantment of 
governmental techniques (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1993). It also shows the limitation of 
perspectives focusing on governmentality. Certainly, we find a complex aggregate of 
institutions and procedures. We find a great deal of official paperwork, many complicated 
procedures, stamping, taxing, and so on. However, this does not lead to a "strong state" 
which exercises control over ejidatarios. On the contrary, we find ejidatarios with great 
autonomy and freedom in their land transactions and a state-bureaucracy with very little 
control over local land issues. 
Multiple Force Fields Instead of Different "Normative Orders" 
As I talked about the influence of ideological notions in the patterning of organizing practices 
and about the high degree of autonomy of the ejidatarios, it might seem that I come close to 
certain notions developed within legal anthropology. Legal anthropologists might talk in this 
situation about of the development of a semi-autonomous field (Moore 1973) or the co-
existence of a "variety of normative orders and suborders" (F. von Benda Beckmann 1992: 
1-2). Indeed, in La Canoa we found alternative forms of ordering and even resistance to state 
law. Yet, the central limitation of these approaches lies in the fact that they stress the 
normative side of organizing practices and pay too little attention to the fact that struggle and 
power relations are central components of the patterning process. With respect to the dealings 
with ejido plots, many practices were not based on normative standards, but on what - people 
thought - was practically and politically attainable and what was not. As Wiber shows in her 
work on property and the law in the Philippine Uplands "conflict over resources is often 
couched, not in terms of normative expectations, but in terms of what the market will bear" 
186 Chapter 5 
(Wiber 1993: 11). As Sierra points out, official laws are not separate from local normative 
notions, but "constitute a frame of reference that people incorporate or manipulate in their 
daily lives"(Sierra 1995: 241). So, instead of studying the discrepancy between the "local 
normative order" and the "official legal order" we should study the role the official laws 
play in the development of different organizing practices. 
We saw that several factors were crucial in the development of organizing practices 
around ejido plots in La Canoa. To begin with, ejidatarios thought of ejido land possession 
as a form of private property and considered it to be the responsibility of each family to do 
whatever they liked with the plot. Another important element is the strong feeling that it is 
better not to interfere in someone else's business unless you are personally involved. 
However, there were also more strategic and practical reasons not to meddle in the 
transactions of others. It could be in everyone's interest that such transactions were 
tolerated. If you accepted if from your neighbor now, he would not make problems if you 
did something similar in the future. Furthermore, even if an ejidatario did not agree with an 
ejido land sale and wanted to lodge a formal complaint about it, it was very improbable that 
in the case of a formal settlement he himself would receive the land. So, why bother and 
make trouble? In the existing force field, there was little to gain from denouncing illegal 
transactions. Hence, these practices were not only based on values concerning property 
relations but also on what was politically attainable. 
The force fields around the renting out of land by migrants, the selling of plots, and the 
inheritance of land were composed of many different elements: ideological notions in which 
land is considered to be family patrimony; (he formal legal setting (the agrarian law, formal 
procedures, and dealings with MAR officials); the complex relations between parents and 
children; the changing value of ejido plots (by the growing scarcity of the land, the arrival 
of the irrigation system, and the increasingly transnationalized nature of family economies); 
local power relations; different types of relationships between ejidatarios; ideological notions 
of individual responsibility and honor in the striking of deals. 
The organizing practices around inheritance showed a dynamic which was different from 
that around the renting out and selling of plots. While in the practices around inheritance, 
notions of care and obligations within the family were central, in the fields around renting 
out by migrants and land sales, notions of honor (in the striking of deals) and personal 
responsibility were more important. This can be explained by the fact that the organization 
of inheritance took place within circles of close relatives, while the renting out and selling 
of land took place in the wider circles of ejidatarios and villagers of La Canoa. Another 
important difference was that in the inheritance practices the question of illegality, 
circumventing the law, and dealing with officials played a much less important role. Finally, 
the inheritance practices are more characterized by tensions and conflicts than the practices 
around the renting out and the selling of ejido plots (see appendix six for an overview of the 
different organizing practices). 
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The organizing practices which developed around individual ejido plots (with regard to 
inheritance, land sales, and renting out of land) and which gave people considerable security 
in land possession, is ironic in the light of the new agrarian law which was introduced with 
the argument that the measuring and registration of individual ejido plots and the issuing of 
individual property titles would finally give the ejidatarios legal security. A strong form of 
legal security had already developed without land titles and without registration by the state. 
The strong forms of ordering which had developed over time also imply that a new 
legislation will never affect existing practices in a direct way, but will only mean a new 
element in historically developed force fields, made up of many different elements. As F. 
and K. von Benda Beckmann point out "new legislation ... interferes with existing property 
rules and property relationships. Whatever effects the introduction of new property forms 
may have, they will always be shaped by the historically grown property regimes" (F. and 
K. von Benda Beckmann 1998: 2). I fully agree with this view, only rather than talking of 
property rules I would talk of historically developed organizing practices concerning access 
to land. As Sabean points out "property is not a relationship between people and things but 
one between people about things" and "all social transactions take place within a field of 
rights, duties, claims, and obligations, which taken together comprise the system of property 
holding" (Sabean 1990: 17-18). 
Notes 
1. The widely held view that power relations determined the land market has prevented many academics from 
studying what actually happened with the land. Gledhill (1991) presented the first detailed historical study 
of the history and transfer of ejido plots in an ejido in Michoacán. He demonstrated the existence of a 
complex and active land market that was certainly not characterized by monopolization of land by cacique 
families and that showed different types of inheritance. 
2. Valuable exceptions are El desarrollo agrario de México y su marco jurídico by L. Zaragoza and R. Macías 
(1980) and Estructura agraria y desarrollo agrícola en méxico: Estudio sobre las relaciones entre la 
tenencia y el desarollo agrícola de México by S. Reyes, R. Stavenhagen, S. Eckstein and J. Ballesteros 
(1974). 
3. Villages often did not receive enough arable land for all the people who met the requirements for receiving 
land in the ejido. So, a significant number of people in the village (above all young men) were recognized 
in their agrarian right and were official ejidatarios but they never received land. 
4. Without information from the ejidatarios themselves, there was no way for the official to find out if people 
had sold part of the land, had bought other plots, had rented their land out, etc. Hence, the official 
registration of the ejidatarios could remain the same even though people had changed plots, had bought 
extra land or only possessed a fraction of their original plot. 
5. One must take into account that what is counted in this table are transactions and not necessarily plots. For 
example, if an ejidatario sold half of his plot and left the other half to his son as his heir, this is counted 
as one inheritance and one land sale. 
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6. As only the transactions from 1942 onwards are included many of the cases of dispossession of agrarian 
rights and abandonment of plots are not included. The abandoning of plots mostly happened before 1942. 
7. In the case of people who passed away the number of plots they left to their heirs are counted. 
8. As far as possible I have tried to organize the land under the 94 official ejidatarios. This means that I 
registered the land of people who have passed away but are still registered as the official ejidatario under 
the name of this ejidatario and not under the name of the heir and next owner. 
9. The agrarian law stated that the ejidatarios could designate the heir of the agrarian right from amongst their 
partner and children. If there was no partner nor children, the right could be designated to a person who 
was economically dependent on the ejidatario. Article 83 continues saying that if the ejidatario has never 
designated the heir of his/her agrarian right, the right will be given to one of the persons described in 
article 81. According to article 84 the agrarian right is considered to be vacant if inheritance in the 
foregoing way is impossible and in that case the ejido assembly (following certain guidelines) can assign 
the right to somebody else. 
10. See also den Ouden 1995 for a discussion of the role of inheritance in family enterprises among the Adja 
in Bénin, where there were no rules of succession and fathers had the difficult task of picking out the sons 
who were best able to take over from them. 
11. The reason that the figures in this table do not seem to coincide with the figures from the foregoing table 
is that in this table people are counted while in the foregoing table transaction with plots are counted. For 
example, if an ejidataria had five plots and left two plots to one daughter and the other three plots to three 
different sons, this appears in this table as one ejidataria who received land from her mother. In table 5.12 
this is counted as two cases of "mother - daughter" inheritance and three cases of "mother - son" 
inheritance. 
12. Obviously, this remained an awkward arrangement as the agrarian law stipulated that the heir had to be 
chosen from among the partner and children of an ejidatario. So, officially inheritance by someone else 
would be illegal. 
CHAPTER 6 
ORGANIZING PRACTICES AROUND THE 
EJIDO ADMINISTRATION 
Introduction: in Search of Leaders and the Flow of Action 
In this chapter the administration of the ejido is discussed. When we talk about the ejido 
administration we refer to a broad range of activities. In the foregoing chapter we already 
saw that the ejido has several official tasks in relation to the individual ejido plots, but the 
ejido also has to administer the commons and the urban zone. Besides the administration of 
different types of land, the ejido acquired additional adrninistrative tasks when government 
programs started to use the ejido as an intermediate organization to channel resources, such 
as agricultural inputs and credits. So, the administration of the ejido involves many different 
activities. 
In this chapter I set out to explain how organizing practices developed around the 
administration of the ejido and how this is related to control over resources. As has already 
been mentioned the agrarian law, which determines in great detail the local administration 
of the ejido, bears little relation to practices which developed "on the ground". In La Canoa 
one of the most remarkable developments is that the ejido commissioner has developed a high 
degree of autonomy in his decisions concerning the ejido, but at the same time has little 
power and authority. At first sight this may sound like a contradiction but it will be shown 
that the autonomy of a leader does not necessarily mean that he is "in control". This is 
caused by the fact that a certain patterning of organizing practices has taken place over the 
years which leaves little room for abrupt changes of established routines by individual 
ejidatarios or commissioners. 
It will also be shown that although the ejido commissioner or other ejidatarios may not 
be publicly asked to render accounts of their actions at ejido meeting, other effective forms 
of accountability exist outside the formal channels. There are several ways in which 
ejidatarios control their commissioner and events that take place in the ejido. This dynamic 
has led to a situation in which official procedures do not fulfill their official roles but have 
acquired different meanings. For example, ejido meetings play no role in the publicly 
rendering of accounts or arriving at collective decisions but rather have become arenas of 
quarreling and confrontation. On the other hand, the formal structure and official 
administrative rules can become important again in serious ejido conflicts. Then the "official 
game" is played in combination with informal ways of exercising pressure. 
Ejido Administration in Academic Debates 
Much has been written on different aspects of the ejido administration, but most works stress 
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the "cacique style" of ejido management. It has often been commented and shown in detailed 
studies that the position of commissioner as well as other positions in agrarian institutions 
were used to gain control over ejido resources (economic accumulation) and to develop a 
position of intermediation between ejidatarios and the state (political power) (Warman 1972, 
Bartra 1975, Par6 1975, Friedrich 1986). It has frequently been argued that Mexican peasants 
in leadership positions "aspire to positions in the hierarchy largely for the economic 
advantages these positions confer on themselves, their kin, and other members of their power 
blocs" (Carlos 1992: 93). Others have pointed out the ways in which local bosses used the 
executive committee of the ejido to dispossess people of their land, extort money from the 
ejidatarios, and make the ejidatarios sign documents to support their arbitrary transactions 
(Martinez 1980: 181). In their valuable work on agrarian issues in Mexico, Reyes et al. 
(1974) also point out that in reality it is often the executive committee that controls ejido af-
fairs. 
Although these studies are very valuable for the analysis of political process in certain 
areas and periods in Mexico, in my view, they do not necessarily present an adequate 
representation of the way in which ejido adrninistrations have developed and how this is 
related to control over resources. Furthermore, although these studies give important insights 
into the development of leadership, they are useless for the analysis of situations in which 
this type of leadership is not present. How should we analyze ejido organizing practices and 
politics in situations where there are no local bosses interested in developing a political career 
through the ejido? I would argue, that the dominance of such bosses is not an all-pervasive 
phenomenon. In any case we should not assume the existence of these mechanisms 
beforehand. As Law put it "if we want to understand the mechanics of power and 
organization it is important not to start out assuming whatever we wish to explain" (Law 
1992: 380). 
Searching for the Real Action and the Center of Control 
If we do not want to start from a one-sided focus on bossism and leadership for the study of 
organizing practices and power but on the other hand know that official organigrams give 
little insight into what is going on, we have to mink of alternative ways to approach the ejido 
administration. This dilemma was especially pressing during the first period of the research. 
Although from the start of the study I realized that much of the organizing occurred outside 
the formal and public setting, it was still frustrating to deal with this formal part of the ejido 
administration. Ejido meetings were seldom held, few ejidatarios attended the meetings and 
few matters were discussed on these occasions. In addition, the ejido archive provided very 
little information. There was no registration of land possession of the individualized land, the 
urbanized area, nor the commons. There was no information on the organization of ejido 
projects under the different ejido commissioners, nor minutes of ejido meetings. This was 
rather depressing at the start of the research. 
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On the other hand, although ejido meetings were seldom held and decisions were seldom 
taken on these occasions, things were always going on in the ejido and suddenly seemed to 
have been decided somewhere by some people. In a similar fashion, information concerning 
the ejido always seemed to circulate in small undefined circles. Thus, mere was a lot of 
organizing taking place in - what appeared to be - informal and changing settings. At first, 
I felt frustrated that meetings had been held in the ejido, and things had happened that I had 
not been aware of. This experience closely resembled John Law's experiences during his 
study of organizing practices in a nuclear laboratory in Great Britain. Law describes it in the 
following way: "I had a terrible anxiety about being in the right place at the right time. 
Wherever I happened to be, the action was not. Sometimes people would say: 'Did you hear 
what happened at such-and-such meeting?' ... 'Did you hear what happened to so-and-so?" 
Always it seemed to me, that the real action was going on somewhere else" (Law 1994a: 45-
46). 
I was slightly comforted when I realized that many ejidatarios found themselves in the 
same position. They had not heard anything about a meeting or about the visit of an official. 
They had not been aware of decisions that had been taken either. However, while most 
ejidatarios did not seem to be bothered by this phenomenon, it certainly did disturb me. The 
ejido was my research object and I felt it necessary to know what was going on and to 
"follow the flow of action". During the research I gradually found out to whom I had to go 
in order to find out what was about to happen. Towards the end of the research when I 
myself became actively involved in several ejido projects (see the following chapters), I felt 
that I had finally "gained control" over my research object. The odd thing was that, in the 
same way as Law describes for his study, "other people, those excluded from these meetings, 
sometimes assumed that where I was, there was the action, and they'd ask me questions -
questions that I 'd have to deflect - about what had happened at 'important* meetings" (Law 
1994a: 46). In La Canoa it was not so much a question of being present at "important" 
meetings but more of being part of a network in which ejido affairs were discussed and 
decided. 
However, even though being present at important meetings or having access to central 
networks gives interesting insights, it only explains part of the organizing process. As Law 
points out, "since there are discontinuities in place, and discontinuities in ordering, it follows 
that the largest part of the action is always generated elsewhere" (Law 1994a: 47). This is 
certainly true. In fact, a locus or center of control which directs the ejido does not exist. 
Actually, this belief in a center of control prevents us from seeing the complexity of the 
historical force field in which the organizing practices and forms of ordering have developed. 
Following Wolfs (1990) suggestion that we should follow the flow of action, I decided 
to approach the ejido administration by studying the organizing practices around concrete 
resources, projects, areas of contestation, and overt conflicts. In chapter five this approach 
was used in relation to the arable land. In this chapter it will be developed for those projects 
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which throw most light on the admimstrative aspects of the ejido. An advantage of this 
approach, which focuses on specific resources or projects, is that artificial boundaries 
between, for example, the ejido and the village are immediately dissolved. At the same time 
it shows how different social categories may be positioned around struggles over resources 
and how ideological notions may be used in an instrumental way. In relation to the flow of 
action considerable attention is paid to the "flow of ideas" that guide people's organizing 
behavior and to the way in which ejidatarios themselves reflect on organizing practices in the 
ejido. 
The Central Role of the Ejido Commissioner 
Formal Responsibilities of the Executive Committee 
Every three years the general assembly of the ejido, which includes all ejidatarios, elects the 
executive committee (president, secretary and treasurer). Besides the executive committee, 
a comité de vigilancia (vigilance committee) is also elected every three years which has to 
control the functioning of the executive committee. The executive committee of the ejido is 
called comisariado ejidal and the president of this committee is the comisario ejidal (ejido 
commissioner). However, the ejidatarios do not use the term comisariado ejidal for the whole 
executive committee but only for the comisario ejidál. This is amusing as it suggests that the 
comisario ejidal on his own represents the whole executive committee, which indeed is often 
the case. When the ejidatarios refer to the whole executive committee, they use the term 
mesa directiva or only mesa. The executive committee is responsible for the daily 
administration of ejido affairs and has to represent the ejido in relations with outside 
agencies. However, the highest authority at the local level is the general assembly of all 
ejidatarios (see appendix four for an overview of ejido commissioners in La Canoa). 
In his capacity as the formal representative of the ejido the commissioner has to sign and 
stamp every ejido document in order for it to be valid. For that reason he is in possession 
of the official ejido stamp, an important administrative instrument. Not only documents that 
concern the whole ejido have to be signed and stamped by him, but also documents 
concerning individual land transfers and inheritance papers. In La Canoa the ejido archive 
with the official documents stays in the house of the ejido commissioner. This means that it 
moves every three years, together with the ejido stamp to the house of the newly elected 
commissioner. The archives of the ejido are very incomplete. It is said that some 
commissioners deliberately took documents from the archive to hide their illegal transactions 
and their stealing from the ejido or to make it impossible to prove that certain agreements 
had been made between the ejido and certain ejidatarios. I indeed found a "private archive" 
in the house of Ramón Romero who had been ejido commissioner in the beginning of the 
eighties. According to him, he had appropriated these documents to save them from future 
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corrupt commissioners who might want to take these document away. As we will see in the 
next chapters, these were documents that were important in the struggle for the "lost land". 
The official functions of the executive committee imply a variety of activities: checking 
on land use, informing the assembly, mamtaining correspondence, following different steps 
in administrative and legal procedures, dealing with officials, etc. Land conflicts in the ejido 
also imply work for the executive committee as they have to sign and stamp papers and give 
their opinion about the conflict. To do a good job, the members of the executive committee 
sometimes have to spend a lot of time on it. For certain matters, the executive committee has 
to go on trips to Autlan, Guadalajara, or Mexico City. These matters might include, for 
example, lodging a complaint against officials working in the region, or border conflicts with 
neighbors or inheritance conflicts. They can also be called to present themselves in offices 
in relation to different government programs or land conflicts. The expenses of these trips 
are paid out of ejido funds, but the loss of work on their farm is not compensated. 
Another responsibility of the executive committee is to collect the land taxes of the 
individual ejidatarios and coarmleros and pay the tax to the government. This tax is a very 
small - almost symbolic - amount of money. However, as we saw in the foregoing chapters, 
the tax receipt can play a central role in ejido land conflicts which involve migrated 
ejidatarios. The executive committee also has to render accounts of the receipts and 
expenditure of the ejido to the general assembly. The income of the ejido consists above all 
of the money earned from the renting of pasture in the commons. The ejido expenses can be 
very diverse. They can include traveling costs of members of the executive committee to 
MAR offices in Guadalajara or Mexico City, telephone costs, maintenance of the ejido 
building, payment of meals and other expenses to officials, building of water reservoirs, and 
fencing of parts of the commons. 
Besides rendering accounts to the general assembly, the executive committee also has to 
inform the MAR extensively about the productivity of the ejido: how many hectares are 
cultivated, which crops are grown, how much credit is used, how many agricultural machines 
the ejido possesses, and how many head of cattle. However, the reports for the MAR tend 
to be very incomplete. The reports of La Canoa which I found at the MAR office in Mexico 
City did not correspond at all to the actual situations. The executive committee also has the 
responsibility of convening general ejido meetings every last Sunday of the month and other 
meetings when necessary. Hence, there are always things going on in the ejido that require 
action by the executive committee and general assembly. The members of the executive 
committee do not receive a salary or compensation for their work. 
The Autonomy of the Ejido Commissioner 
I will first discuss how the position of ejido commissioner has gained considerable autonomy 
in decision making and will then show how this is combined with an absence of centralized 
management in the ejido. In La Canoa, as in many other ejidos, the ejido commissioner is 
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the central figure in the ejido adrninistration and sometimes almost eliminates the role of the 
general assembly. Many decisions which should be taken by the general assembly are taken 
by the commissioner on his own. He often validates documents with his signature and the 
stamp without consulting the general assembly. He decides on his own to lend parts of the 
commons to ejidatarios or landless villagers. He decides to whom he sells the ejido pasture 
and how the ejido will spend the money. It is common that in the case of conflicts between 
ejidatarios, the commissioner reaches an agreement with one of the parties and interferes on 
behalf of this party. In conflicts between ejidatarios, the one with the support of the 
commissioner often has a better position. Hence, the ejido commissioner is a central figure 
in ejido matters and for all ejidatarios at a certain moment in time he may become a crucial 
person or in other words an "obligatory point of passage" (Callon and Law 1992: 46). 
Not only is the general assembly marginalized by the commissioner, but the vigilance 
committee also plays no significant role. This is understandable when we realize that in 
former times the vigilance committee was composed of the people who had lost the ejido 
elections for the executive committee. Although formally they have a controlling task, in 
practice the ejido commissioner and his assistants hold power. This development of an 
executive committee and especially ejido commissioner with a very large degree of autonomy 
is accompanied by the fact that a financial account of the revenue and expenditure of the 
ejido is seldom provided and is never very specified. During the time of the research when 
accounts were presented this always happened very quickly and without questions being asked 
about it. 
Explaining the Position of the Commissioner 
The fact that the role of the commissioner extended far beyond his formal competence seems 
to be a general phenomenon in Mexican ejidos. Explanations can be found in the agrarian 
history which led to the founding of ejidos and in the way in which politics and bureaucratic 
practices in Mexico are closely interrelated. In the previous chapters we saw that the men 
who made the most efforts to establish the ejido La Canoa had developed good political 
contacts in the bureaucracy, whereas the other ejidatarios lacked contacts, information, and 
resources. In the first decades of the ejido, these "founders" had great influence in the 
village and the ejido. The power of these men was first of all based on their role in the local 
history of the agrarian struggle and not so much on this newly created ejido structure. These 
local bosses controlled the maize market and provided expensive credits, they possessed a 
lot of cattle and were the ones who provided the poor families with work in the rainy season. 
In this context the position of ejido commissioner automatically seemed to correspond to 
these local bosses. 
Although the other ejidatarios might have wanted to oppose these men, this was a risky 
endeavor as they depended on them. Elections in the ejido at that time were a public event 
and people just had to queue up for the man they were voting for. Hence, voting for 
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somebody else was dangerous. Furthermore, the idea of demanding that these men render 
accounts of their actions was out of the question. So, the idea of the general assembly being 
the highest authority at the local level, was hollow from the very moment the ejido started 
to operate. The corrrmissioner, or the people who controlled the executive committee, took 
the decisions that formally corresponded to the general assembly. 
However, agrarian history and local power relations were not the only factors that made 
the commissioner develop into an "independent operator". The embodiment of the ejido in 
the figure of the commissioner has also been stimulated by another characteristic of the 
Mexican bureaucratic machine, namely the fact that officials always try to establish 
personalized relationships with formal representatives of organizations. It is a common 
phenomenon in Mexico that formal representatives of organizations or leaders of movements 
never act only in their capacity as official spokesman, but also in their capacity as a person 
who operates in different personal and political networks. Officials always try to establish 
personalized relations with "clients" of the institute. The person they deal with is not only 
interesting for the position he represents but also for the political relationships he may have 
and the information he may provide. Hence, for the officials of the agrarian bureaucracy 
ejido commissioners were not only important because they were formal representatives, but 
also because they were influential people at the local level, and through them they could get 
important information and open space for negotiation in conflicts. In my own experience with 
visits of ejidatarios to the MAR, officials always wanted to talk to the commissioner. If 
someone wanted to discuss matters that occurred in the ejido, the first question they asked 
him or her was if he or she was the ejido commissioner. If not, they were told that the 
commissioner should come and talk about the matter. Hence, a combination of local socio-
political differentiation and the importance of personal relations in the Mexican bureaucratic 
and political system led to the expansion of the autonomy of the commissioner at the expense 
of the general assembly. 
Limited Control by the Commissioner 
Even though some ejidatarios like to recall the terrible practices of the former caciques, the 
degree to which these powerful men used the executive committee of the ejido for enrichment 
and political control was limited. As we saw in chapter five, no concentration of land in the 
hands of local leaders has occurred. In reality, the management of the ejido does not bring 
great financial benefits. One may buy the pasture of the commons cheaply, try to keep some 
ejido money in one's pocket, try to get a better share of farming credits, or go on missions 
to Mexico City paid by the ejido, but most wealthier ejidatarios are not interested in these 
small benefits. We also saw that in internal ejido land conflicts, obtaining the support of the 
commissioner, though useful, is not necessarily decisive for the outcome. Although it is 
always argued that local leaders tend to monopolize relations with the bureaucracy, the 
bureaucracy offers many different entrances. In land conflicts, negotiations with officials of 
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the MAR play an important role and the commissioner is not necessarily the best negotiator. 
We could even argue that in the bureaucratic arena the local boss may sometimes lose his 
privileged position as other qualities are required than those useful in the local setting. In 
chapter five we noticed that in the different conflicts of Aurora Garcia, Salvador Lagos, and 
Federico Pradera the support they received from distinct ejido commissioners in the end was 
not decisive for the outcome. So, in the case of La Canoa the idea that from the position of 
ejido commissioner one can effectively control ejido matters seems an exaggeration. 
Since the 1970s forms of control became even weaker as the old bosses died off and none 
of their sons has been able to develop into the same kind of figures. A great deal of 
politicking is always going on and some people have more influence than others, but power 
structures have become much more fragmented. Because of the general improvement of the 
economy and migration to the United States ejidatarios have become less dependent on local 
bosses. They say themselves that they also have become more capable of dealing with the 
bureaucracy. I will now show a few other principles which underlie organizing practices in 
the administration of the ejido. 
Different Factors Influencing Ejido Management 
In this section, three examples are presented which make it clear that the influence of the 
commissioner is restricted and contested and that the force field in which the organizing 
practices around the ejido management have developed are composed of many different 
elements. 
Punishment of the abuse of power by an ejido commissioner 
When Ricardo Garcia (son of Pedro Garcia, one of the founders of the ejido) was 
commissioner of the ejido (from 1970 to 1973) a serious conflict arose the effects 
of which still can be felt today. The central actors in this conflict were Ricardo 
and the treasurer of the ejido, Inocencio Romero. Both were then among the 
biggest farmers in the ejido. 
At that time there was a government program for the construction of 
schoolbuildings, which asked for a financial contribution from the village. La 
Canoa already had a small school but needed a much larger building. The 
ejidatarios of La Canoa decided to sell the pasture from 600 hectares of common 
lands for five years in a row. This resulted in a large amount of money which 
could be invested in the school project. The executive committee of the ejido took 
responsibility for the school project. However, Ricardo convinced Inocencio 
Romero, who as treasurer of the ejido had received the money, to use this money 
for equipment Ricardo needed for his farm. At a later stage, he would return the 
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money. 
When meetings about the building of the school were organized, Ricardo did 
not turn up anymore. He withdrew from active involvement in the school project. 
The other ejidatarios started to get angry and suspicions mounted about the use 
of the ejido money. Not only was a lot of money involved but the building of the 
local school was also endangered. When they realized that the whole project could 
fail because of the possible sabotage of the commissioner and secretary of the 
ejido, several ejidatarios took measures. They looked for help from important PRI 
politicians in Autlan, among others, Hector Romero. Hector informed the mayor 
of Autlan, who summoned Ricardo to call a meeting in the ejido and return the 
money to the ejido. Ricardo held the meeting but he could not return the money 
as he did not have it anymore. The conflict continued and Ricardo and Inocencio 
were sent to jail for several days. In the end Inocencio managed to borrow enough 
money to pay back the ejido. Later on he settled the matter with Ricardo. The 
school was built in La Canoa. Ricardo Garcia declared that he would never send 
his children to this school. He kept his word and despite the practical troubles, 
all his eleven children went to school in Autlan. 
This incident, together with the way in which Ricardo, as a very rich farmer, 
exploited the laborers working for him, made him a man disliked by most people 
in the village. Today many villagers still do not talk to Ricardo or his wife and 
children. They remain very isolated from activities and festivities in the village. 
In his turn, Ricardo feels that the efforts he and his father made for the 
development of the village never were appreciated. He recalls the troubles he 
went through to have water and electricity installed in the village. 
This example is interesting as it shows how political networks with people in Autlan may be 
used to influence dynamics in the ejido La Canoa. Several ejidatarios contacted Hector 
Romero and the mayor of Autlan to stop Ricardo. However, the interesting point here is that 
Ricardo himself maintained good relations with this political group. The fact that he was 
punished despite his good political contacts, meant that he had gone too far in his 
manipulation of ejido funds. The opposition to him in the village had grown so strong that 
the people in Autlan had to interfere and stop him. This shows that even well-placed 
powerholders have to know how to "play the game" and should not enrich themselves too 
much. 
Ricardo's position was also weak as he had never created groups of loyal followers in 
the village. More than anyone else he is criticized for the unpleasant way in which he treats 
the villagers and ejidatarios who work for him and for not keeping his promises. This 
position clearly limited his room for operation. In the end, Ricardo came out as the most 
damaged person in terms of political networks and his status in the village. 
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Finally, this example makes clear that ejidatarios use different ways to get somebody to 
render accounts. When the normal methods through ejido meetings or directly addressing the 
person in question do not work, they look for other ways to put pressure on him or her. 
The next example shows another common aspect of organizing practices, namely the 
appropriation of resources through personal networks. 
The appropriation of resources through personal networks 
The BANRURAL credit program for maize was one of these government 
programs in which the ejido was used as an intermediary structure to channel 
resources. For several years the credit program of BANRURAL was 
automatically connected with a governmental crop insurance program through the 
insurance company AN AGS A. This implied that part of the credit for the 
ejidatario was immediately used by BANRURAL to pay the fee for the crop 
insurance. In the case of the loss of a crop, AN AGS A repaid the loan to 
BANRURAL and the ejidatarios were let off their debts. The ejidatarios could 
receive a new credit the next year. 
Although this system made the credit rather expensive (because of the high fee 
for the crop insurance) ejidatarios with rainfed land liked the remission of debts 
in the case of bad harvests. However, this remission of debts only took place if 
the loss of a crop was due to bad weather and not to the neglect of the crop by 
the ejidatario. So, inspectors of the ANAGSA and BANRURAL offices in Autlan 
would come and visit the ejido in order to see if the crop was well taken care of. 
At the last visit of the season, the ejidatario as well as the ejido commissioner had 
to be present as an assessment of the harvest was made by the inspector. The 
ejidatario had to sign that he or she agreed with this assessment. The assessment 
of the total harvest of a plot was important as it detennined the percentage of the 
loan the ejidatarios had to repay. With a high production they had to repay a 
higher percentage of the loan than with a low production. The ejido commissioner 
would mediate in case of problems between the ejidatario and the inspector. 
As will be clear these field inspections offered interesting possibilities for 
negotiations between field inspectors, commissioner, and ejidatarios. However, 
although some negotiations took place, at the beginning of the nineties all 
ejidatarios, except for some close relatives of one of the officials of the 
BANRURAL office in Autlan, had entered into serious problems with 
BANRURAL and ANAGSA. This official, Marcos Vargas, who was born in La 
Canoa, always made sure that his mother and brother, who are ejidatarios in La 
Canoa, were treated generously by BANRURAL and ANAGSA. His mother, 
always obtained the best arrangements. Her crops were always assessed to be a 
total loss due to bad weather even if the crops were not lost. She also received 
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credit and remission of debts for many more hectares than she possessed. 
However, Marcos did not help other ejidatarios in La Canoa. 
Ejidatarios complained that BANRURAL did not pay the fee for the crop 
insurance to ANAGSA and that for that reason they were not indemnified by 
ANAGSA when their crops were lost. Other problems were the late payment of 
the credit and the excessively high assessments of harvests by inspectors. In the 
beginning of the nineties most ejidatarios had stopped working with BANRURAL 
and complained bitterly about corruption at the institute. The problems with 
BANRURAL and ANAGSA were a problem at the national level and the 
government credit system for the ejido sector was changed. 
For a certain period BANRURAL also provided credit for tractors to groups 
of at least ten ejidatarios. As most ejidatarios in La Canoa prefer to work on their 
own and be the only owner of a tractor, they found an easy way to buy a tractor 
with credit from BANRURAL. They asked several good friends and relatives to 
sign the credit contract with BANRURAL and in this way, they bought the tractor 
officially as a group. In reality, only one ejidatario took the credit and owned the 
tractor. He was the one who was responsible for the repayment of the credit. As 
the whole group was officially responsible for the repayment, this was a relation 
of trust with the tractor owner. Several tractors were bought in this way by 
ejidatarios in La Canoa. Naturally, it was the richer ejidatarios with irrigated land 
who bought these tractors (Amador Garcia, Rub6n Garcia, Ignacio Romero, 
Inocencio Romero). Also for these arrangements the signature and stamp of the 
executive committee were needed. No problems occurred with these 
arrangements. 
In these examples of BANRURAL, we see the appropriation of resources through personal 
networks. In the credit program for maize close relations between an official and some 
ejidatarios in La Canoa proved to be more important than negotiations between the executive 
committee, ejidatarios, and officials. In this case, most appropriation of resources took place 
by the officials of BANRURAL and ANAGSA and their relatives in the ejido. However, in 
the case of the BANRURAL credit for tractors, the appropriation took place by a select 
group of richer ejidatarios. So, depending on the circumstances and the other actors that play 
a role, the appropriation of resources may take different forms. Yet, it is notable that in both 
cases the commissioner did not play a central role. 
In the next example again different aspects of ejido organizing practices are shown. This 
example illustrates how conflictual situations may linger on for many years without 
resolution. However, in the end a group of ejidatarios may join forces and tackle the 
question. The reason why so many conflictual situations linger on for a long time without 
anything being done about it is that the "resolution" or "ending" of conflictual situations is 
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accompanied by hard fights, family quarrels, and violence. The following conflict evolved 
around a part of the urban zone of La Canoa. 
The ejido retakes control 
A famous local conflict around the urban zone is the conflict of "las Malvinas". 
This concerned a tract of land within the urban zone of the ejido, near the 
commons. As in former times nobody used this land the ejido gave Elias Romero, 
one of the richest ejidatarios, permission to use it for the cultivation of maize. 
However, the land was lent to him on condition that it would be returned to the 
community when more land was needed for the construction of houses. According 
to the ejidatarios an agreement was drawn up which was guarded in the ejido 
archive. Elias used this land for many years. When he passed away, his wife 
Petra Sanchez and their sons continued to use this land. However, the pressure 
of the population on the urban zone was growing and in the seventies the ejido 
decided to ask for the land back from Petra. 
Petra said that the ejido had given this land to her husband and she refused to 
return the land. The conflict dragged on for many years and Petra and her sons 
tried to keep the land by all possible means. The agreement in which Elias 
declared that he would return the land when the ejido would ask him for it, had 
disappeared from the ejido archive. For many years Petra refused to give in and 
the ejido did not get the land back. Since at that time the war between England 
and Argentina about the Falkland Islands (las Malvinas in Spanish) was taking 
place, the ejidatarios started referring to this part of the village as las Malvinas, 
a name it retains today. 
Francisco Romero was the ejido commissioner (1982 - 1985) who decided to 
make a real effort to recover this land. Besides lodging an official complaint at 
the MAR, he hired a lawyer. Francisco was supported by the majority of 
ejidatarios. Francisco and several ejidatarios had to go on many trips to the MAR 
offices in Guadalajara and Mexico City. Petra and her sons also hired a lawyer 
and tried to get several ejidatarios on their side. However, apart from some close 
relatives of Petra, all the ejidatarios supported the commissioner in his efforts. 
Manuel Pradera remembers that one of Petra's sons visited him to make him sign 
a letter which said that he as ejidatario agreed to Petra possessing this land: But 
I did not sign. I told him: as far as I know the ejido only lent your father the land, 
they did not give it to him. I do not have a personal interest in this matter. You 
can try and see what you can get out of it, but it is your fight. Later on I had to 
sign the papers of the ejido that said that I agreed that the land should be taken 
away from her. 
During this period the ejido meetings were well attended. Although Francisco 
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was supported by the majority of ejidatarios, for him personally this fight was not 
a pleasant one. He was threatened by Petra's brother and one day he was even 
put in jail accused of illegally invading Petra's terrain. The ejidatarios 
immediately reacted and got him out of prison in one day. Rumors went around 
that one of Petra's sons intended to kill Francisco. Finally, after many incidents 
and much tension in the village, the MAR reached a decision which said that the 
land had to return to the ejido. The conflict was formally won by the ejido, and 
the ejidatarios took the land. The recovered land was immediately divided into 
lotes for the construction of houses. As the ejido had spent a lot of money on 
lawyers, trips to the cities and on officials, the people who received a lote had to 
pay an amount of money to cover these costs. The widow was offered two lotes 
for her sons, but she refused. Many villagers stopped talking to Petra and her 
sons for years. Shortly afterwards Francisco Romero left with his family for the 
United States. 
These three examples show very different aspects of organization and practices of control in 
the ejido. They make clear that a simple analysis in terms of bosses or cacique families who 
arrange everything in their own favor by monopolizing relations with the bureaucracy is 
highly inadequate as a general explanatory model for the management of the ejido. One of 
the aspects which in my view is much more central to the management of the ejido is the one 
that is illustrated in the last example. Namely, the fact that the costs that are involved in the 
resolution of conflicts and in "retaking control" over certain ejido matters may be extremely 
high in personal and social terms. Retaking control often means quarrels, tensions and fights. 
This is precisely the reason why there is no interference in many ejido matters and we can 
speak of a lack of centralized control. This becomes very clear in the practices which have 
developed around the common lands in the ejido and which are causing increasing tensions 
in the ejido and the village. I will now relate the practices around the commons in more 
detail. 
Who is Managing the Commons? 
When I asked ejidatarios during the research what they thought were problematic issues in 
the ejido, many came up with the cerro (mountainous terrain). As was discussed in chapter 
three, the ejido received large extensions of mountainous terrains which had to remain in 
common use. These mountainous commons of La Canoa have always been used for different 
activities and provide many resources. According to the season, the commons may be used 
for collecting fruits (pitayas, tunas) and vegetables (nopales, guamuchiles), for hunting, 
gathering firewood, agro-forestry, and for the herding of cattle. The herding of cattle is 
202 Chapter 6 
especially favorable in the humid parts of the commons, where people have built water 
reservoirs. Fields of the commons which are used for the herding of cattle, are called 
esquilmos. The esquilmo can be sown with pasture, but it can also be natural vegetation. A 
famous and widespread use of the commons is also the coamil: an intensive form of maize 
cultivation. Another well-known use of the commons, especially in more isolated regions, 
is for the cultivation of marihuana. 
Ejidatarios and other villagers never refer to these lands as the commons, but always talk 
about los esquilmos, los coamiles or el cerro (the general name for these mountainous 
terrains). Although the official legal name of this part of the ejido is tierra de uso común 
(land of communal use), some people had never heard of this term before I mentioned it to 
them. However, whatever its name, it is clear to everyone that this land belongs to the ejido 
and not to the village. 
According to the agrarian law the general ejido assembly had to develop regulations for 
the use of the commons. The executive committee had to supervise the exploitation of the 
commons and report irregularities like it did with the arable land. Although in La Canoa 
regulations for the use of the commons were never made, over the years a certain patterning 
of organizing practices developed. Today the commons are divided into several parts with 
their own use. A large part of the commons has been fenced for the ejido and the pasture 
from this part is sold every year. This forms the most important source of income for the 
ejido. Some parts of the commons are rented to a neighboring ejido that uses them for the 
cultivation of maize and in exchange leaves the waste after the harvest for La Canoa. 
Another part of the commons is fenced and used for the collective herding of the cattle of 
ejidatarios of La Canoa. In the rainy season, the cows are brought here to eat the fresh grass. 
Recently a water reservoir was built here for the animals. The remaining part of the 
commons have been divided into individual coamiles or esquilmos. 
These individual coamiles and esquilmos in the commons are not only important for the 
landless families but also for the ejidatarios. Ejidatarios often cultivate maize on the coamil 
as a form of minimizing risks. As the mountains have a different type of soil and 
precipitation pattern, the coamiles sometimes give better maize harvests than the rainfed 
arable land which is more prone to drought. Different maize seeds are also used. So, in years 
of drought the crops below (on the arable land) may be lost while the harvests of the 
coamiles may be saved. However, there are also ejidatarios who think the coamil is much 
too labor intensive and they show no interest in the cerro. On the other hand, for many 
landless families their plot in the commons is very important as it is the only way for them 
to continue the peasant way of life (see chapter 3). 
The way in which people have received their individual coamil or esquilmo differs. Some 
people just took a coamil without asking anyone's permission. Most people, especially the 
landless families, asked the ejido commissioner permission to take a coamil and this 
permission was always given. These arrangements were made with the commissioner and not 
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with the general assembly of the ejido who officially had to decide on this. Sometimes these 
agreements were written down but this was rare; most of the time these were oral 
agreements. When people had been given permission by the commissioner to take some 
hectares of the commons they often took more land. As these agreements were not written 
down, it was very confusing who had given permission for what. For example, sometimes 
an ejidatario or a landless man claimed that commissioner Romero gave him permission to 
take land in the commons, while commissioner Romero denied this and said that probably 
it had been commissioner Paz. In his turn, commissioner Paz denied everything. However, 
whoever gave permission, the coamiles were not taken away. 
No map or register of land in the commons exists either, mterestingly, there is much less 
common knowledge in the ejido on the use of the commons than on the use of the parceled 
lands. Whereas several men could give me rather exact information about the division on the 
arable land "below", nobody could do this for the commons "above". It was only through 
combining information from several people that I myself could draw maps of the division of 
the commons. The fact that much more knowledge exists about the division and use of the 
arable land may be explained by the fact that the division of the arable land was executed 
from the moment the ejido was established, whereas the division of the commons was a 
gradual process. Furthermore, the commons cover a much larger area than the arable land 
and are much less accessible. In addition, the possession of new plots in the commons was 
often only known by the ejido commissioner or not even by him. 
Over the years the pressure on the commons increased. Now that the cerro has become 
rather crowded, people have started fencing their plots in order to defend their coamil and 
avoid damage by cattle. Although the users of the commons - ejidatarios as well as landless 
families - realize that officially they cannot claim individual rights to specific plots, people 
who have been working the same coamil for many years feel that they have developed certain 
property rights. To such a degree, that the coamiles are even passed over to the next 
generation, rented out or sold! In the same way as with the ejido plots in the arable part, in 
the case of conflicts people claim to have certain rights to plots on the basis of the payment 
of their tax. Everybody using part of the commons, has to pay a certain amount of money 
per hectare. This amount of money is very little, but in the same way as with the arable 
plots, the tax receipt has become a form of acknowledgment of property rights to the land. 
Many ejidatarios are annoyed by the fact that the commons have become almost totally 
occupied as they realize that soon there will be no land available for themselves nor their 
children anymore. Another issue that is considered to be a serious problem by many 
ejidatarios is that some ejidatarios have taken and fenced enormous parts of the commons and 
sell the pasture for their own benefit. Some ejidatarios rent the pasture lands for 200,000 ($ 
67) per hectare to cattle owners, while the ejido only charges a symbolic tax of 1,000 pesos 
($ 0.33) per hectare to the local users of the land. Another problem concerning the commons 
that illustrates well the scarcity of all types of land in the ejido, is the fact that people have 
204 Chapter 6 
started building houses in the commons. Some fourteen houses have now been constructed 
there. In the same way as with the coamiles, people have often received individual 
permission from the ejido commissioner and again a lot of confusion exists about which 
commissioner gave permission to whom. Again these have been oral agreements and they 
have never been endorsed by the general assembly. The following example illustrates well 
that these organizing practices in the commons have developed outside the formal setting and 
that official procedures which one can follow do not exist. 
The awkward situation of a formal request 
Once during an ejido meeting the son of an ejidatario wanted to ask formal 
permission of the assembly to take a plot of coamil in the commons. The man, 
a lawyer who does not live in the village anymore, wanted to follow - what 
according to him were - the correct formal procedures. He had already come to 
several other ejido meetings but these had all been canceled because of the low 
attendance. This time the ejido meeting would take place and the man could 
finally present his formal request to the ejido assembly. However, this was a 
rather awkward situation. The ejidatarios are not used to formally being asked 
permission to use a part of the commons during ejido meetings. Now that the 
lawyer raised the subject, and formally asked permission to take a coamil, many 
ejidatarios used the opportunity to complain about the fact that everybody has 
taken land in the commons, that there is no land available anymore, and that it 
is a total mess which should be regulated. In the end no decision was taken during 
the meeting and the man did not get his formal permission to take a coamil. 
However, it was not prohibited either. The lawyer was annoyed by the whole 
affair and said that he could better just go and take a coamil without asking 
anybody any permission. 
That was indeed the best thing for him to do. This was acknowledged by the ejidatario 
Manuel Pradera with whom I had the following discussion. 
Mo: Do you have an esquilmo? 
Ma: No, but I am thinking of taking a piece of land near here which nobody has enclosed so 
far. I will first ask the ejido [meaning: the commissioner] if they lend me this piece of 
esquilmo. If they say no, I will just take it. Because if one just takes it, they don't do 
anything. But first I will ask them. If I don't take an esquilmo, soon everything will be 
occupied. And I have my sons to think of... Many ejidatarios just took esquilmo without 
asking permission and gave it to one of their sons later on. 
Although most of these practices were accepted and the ejido did not actively intervene 
in the practices in the commons, many ejidatarios were very worried about what was going 
on. In the most extreme cases of land appropriation several ejidatarios wanted to intervene. 
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However, as the conflict of "las Malvinas" showed, it would imply a long and dirty struggle 
to win parts of the commons back. This is illustrated by the following example. 
The ejido trying to take control again 
During the time of the research, the ejido started taking up one of the most 
serious problems caused by Refugio Sánchez, an ejidatario of La Canoa who lives 
in Autlán. Refugio possesses many hectares of commons and recently confiscated 
a public path and part of a coamil that is used by Macario Paz, another ejidatario 
of La Canoa. As Macario lives in the United States, his wife Teresa looks after 
the coamil together with their sons. The executive committee of the ejido 
supported Teresa's complaint and the general assembly also decided that Refugio 
had to give Teresa the land back. Most ejidatarios were extremely annoyed by the 
fact that Refugio had for many years fenced an enormous part of the commons, 
rented the land out to others, and kept the money for liimself. On one occasion 
during an ejido meeting Refugio was asked to pay the ejido a large amount of 
money for the renting out of "his" part of the commons. At this meeting a MAR 
official had been present and Refugio promised to pay this amount of money to 
the ejido. However, nobody knows if he ever did and everybody doubts it. 
This time Refugio refused to return the land and the public path and the 
members of the executive committee together with Teresa went to several offices 
in Autlán to lodge a formal complaint and to ask for official intervention. 
However, as usual, the case against Refugio developed extremely slowly and the 
lodging of official complaints at offices of the police, the MAR, and the 
Procuraduría Agraria (PA) in Autlán had had no effect. 
Refugio himself warned Teresa and the executive committee that he had many 
influential contacts in Autlán and that they would never get the land back from 
him. To prove his influence he sent the Autlán police to Teresa's house to accuse 
her son of trespassing and make him pay a fine. Refugio also claimed that the fact 
that the ejido treasurer made him pay the tax for all his land in the commons, was 
a recognition by the ejido that this land belonged to him. Despite these 
hindrances, the executive committee continued with the case. However, during 
the period of the research the situation did not change. 
Established Organizing Practices and the Language of Differing Rights 
When we look at the commons we can distinguish different processes. Although its 
management has never been formally regulated, certain patterns in organizing practices have 
developed. In the same way as with the parceled land, large part of the commons have 
become a form of private property. Alongside this process, the commoditization of the 
commons has begun. For some people a plot in the commons is interesting as a form of 
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speculation and business and not so much for own production. Even though everybody 
recognizes that the possession of a coamil is a loan, people feel that they have developed 
certain "customary possession rights" to "their" coamiles. So far, nobody has been removed 
from land they have taken into use. 
Now that land in the commons is becoming scarce, many ejidatarios have started to 
openly question the possession of coamiles by non-ejidatarios. The landless people in their 
turn, recognize that the ejido only lent them the land and that the ejido remains the "real 
owner", but at the same time they feel that they have developed certain possession rights to 
their coamil or esquilmo. They are very angry with, what they call, the selfish and egoistic 
attitude of the ejidatarios, who are better-off and yet are claiming lands that landless families 
have been working peacefully for many years. Take, for example, José Luis. He is a man 
in his sixties who arrived in La Canoa in 1954 to visit an uncle. At that time, there was a 
lot of work in cotton production and José Luis stayed to work in the cotton. He and his wife 
never left the village and the ejido lent them a coamil in the commons. Today José Luis sells 
sweets and raspados (ice) at a table in the center of the village. He is a nice quiet man, who 
is respected by everybody. However, when he talks about his coamil, a fighting spirit 
emerges. José Luis explained to me: 
The comunidad [ejido] wants to take away the coamiles from us. In the times that we received 
the land, there was a lot of land above which they did not use; they lent it to us; as long as 
we cultivated it, we could keep it. They lent me 1.5 hectare. Afterwards I took more. I 
possess two hectares now. I have been working this plot for 15 years now. Three years ago, 
the ejidatarios started talking about taking the coamiles back. The government does not allow 
them to take it away from us; it is not mine but... if they really want to take it away they 
can. But all the people with a coamil agreed that we won't let this happen. We will go to 
Guadalajara or to Mexico City. The ejidatarios have more than enough land and should not 
take the coamiles away from us. 
However, the non-ejidatarios are very careful about expressing these feelings in public 
as they realize that their position is one of dependence, and the ejidatarios have the legal 
right to decide. It is interesting to notice that among the landless families themselves 
divisions have also been created: sons of ejidatarios claim that they have more rights over 
the commons than landless people in the village who are not even related to the ejidatarios... ! 
Some sons of ejidatarios even feel that they have more rights than the ejidatarios, as they are 
the first generation of men who were excluded from the ejido. Hence, some landless sons 
of ejidatarios feel abandoned by the ejidatarios who only think of their own interests. For 
example, Gerardo Lagos, who liimself is a landless son of an ejidatario said the following 
when he was discussing the problem of the commons with several men: 
It's a scandal that everybody is taking land wherever he likes, without taking into account 
the people who really need it: the sons of the ejidatarios! I myself am the son of an ejidatario 
and it hurts me to see how people with a lot of cattle go to the cerro and fence in some land 
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without consulting anybody. I will go to the cerro and take some land myself as well. Let 
them accuse me in an ejido meeting. Then I will talk against the abusers. What we need is 
another revolution! I know of people who are not ejidatarios, nor sons of ejidatarios and they 
give them land in the cerro! 
Hence, as was already mentioned in chapter three, some groups claim to have more 
rights to the commons than others and in this way they use a language of differing rights. 
The ejidatarios use a language which is based on the agrarian law which states that the 
commons belong to the ejido and not to the village. The non-ejidatarios use a language of 
moral rights and of the revolution to claim rights to their coamil. Hence, around the 
problems with the commons different categories in the village are distinguished and different 
groups get organized. These social categories have different interests and sets of different 
rights are claimed. 
When we look at the agrarian law, we see that in contrast to the parceled land, the 
individual right to a coamil is not legally protected. According to the old agrarian law (before 
1992) the commons cannot be divided into individual plots and nobody can claim individual 
rights to parts of the commons. The right to the use of the commons is a collective right of 
all ejidatarios. Ejidatarios, as well as non-ejidatarios are very aware of this official rule. 
However, in the same way as with the parceled land, it is not clear what the role of these 
official rules in future conflicts will be. Although nobody has been removed from the 
commons so far, as with the arable land, these official rules may play a role in the future. 
We saw that in the case of the parceled land, the prohibition on selling or renting ejido land, 
influenced the way in which these transactions were organized but did not prevent large scale 
selling and renting of ejido plots. 
Developments to be Expected in the Future 
If the ejidatarios decide to fight as a group against the non-ejidatarios who possess coamiles 
they would be in a very strong position. However, although a lot of discussion is going on 
in the village, there are several reasons that prevent the ejido from taking the coamiles back 
from the landless families. In the first place, the ejidatarios are very divided on the issue and 
much more serious conflicts are going on among ejidatarios themselves. In the second place, 
although people like to have a coamil, the value of this land is low and not comparable to 
the value of the arable land. Finally, there are also other types of relations between 
ejidatarios and non-ejidatario coamil possessors. Many ejidatarios are close relatives of these 
landless coamileros. They may be their brothers or sons. So, although the ejidatarios may 
be annoyed about the over-exploitation of the commons, dispossessing their brothers and sons 
of these lands is another matter. 
In the future the issue will only become more complex. As well as the existing dynamic, 
more elements are starting to play a role, for example, the deforestation of the mountains. 
Much of the mountains have been burnt down to sow maize on the coamiles. This is seen by 
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some people as the cause of the serious erosion which is occurring. The forestry police 
controls these practices but this only seems to lead to negotiations about permits. 
Furthermore, control of the cultivation of marihuana in the commons is an element which 
plays a permanent role and leads to interference by the drug control police. Another problem 
is that neighboring ejidos are invading the commons of La Canoa and have started law suits 
to keep these lands. In this way the commons are changing from a relatively unproblematic 
area in which all actors had considerable autonomy into a highly contested area of socio-
political struggle in which many different interests and actors are involved and in which the 
role of the state bureaucracy will only become more pronounced. 
The new agrarian law which was issued in 1992 and the regulations which appeared 
afterwards opened the possibility of renting out the common lands even to commercial 
enterprises. Under certain conditions, the use of the commons as a collateral for loans is also 
allowed, as well as the division of the commons into plots for individual use. The sale of 
plots in the commons is still prohibited. Although the situation differs from that of the 
parceled land (different resources and social actors are involved, different official rules 
apply) it is to be expected that a process of privatization also occurs in the commons. In 
contrast to the parceled arable land, however, in the commons non-ejidatarios will also 
participate. 
Ejido Meetings 
Meetings as Arenas of Bickering and Indecisive Confrontation 
When I started the research, I thought that although official meetings may give very little 
insight into the central negotiations and decision-making processes concerning the ejido 
management, they would be illuminating in other respects. They would give important clues 
about what is happening "backstage". By listening to the ironic remarks, the conversations, 
and discussions in the back of the room I could get an idea of things that were going on. 
Furthermore, these meeting would show how informally arranged affairs are formally 
presented, challenged, and negotiated. The public debates at the meetings would give an 
indication of the most powerful political discourses. An important aim was to study the 
relation between these public official performances and negotiations in other settings. 
However, although I felt that I started with an "open" and "flexible" attitude it was difficult 
to deal with the meetings I found in the ejido. The point was that I still held to a modernist 
view of a meeting as: a public gathering of people in which information is given, arguments 
are presented, debates take place, voting occurs, and decisions are taken. Even if everything 
at the meeting had been prepared beforehand and if this was just the "playing out of the 
formal game", in my view, this was what a meeting should more or less look like. Yet, what 
I found in the ejido did not remotely correspond to this image. 
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The ejido meetings were characterized by many ejidatarios talking and quarreling at the same 
time. There was seldom a central discussion and when there was it soon dissolved into side-
discussions in which old fights were recalled and often the same people started criticizing 
each other again. None of the three commissioners I knew over the years, had any authority 
at these meetings. They were just one of those talking, giving an opinion, or quarreling. 
Only officials who sometimes attended the meetings had any form of authority and could 
decide on the direction of the discussion. However, ejidatarios used to give little support or 
cooperation to the official's theme. When an official attended the meeting for a special 
purpose, he drew up an act of the meeting which had to be signed by the ejidatarios. 
However, during the meetings which were held without an official, minutes were hardly ever 
kept or acts drawn up. Although the meetings were held to discuss important ejido matters, 
collective decisions were never taken and voting never took place. Different people expressed 
their opinion and that was it. When accounts of income and revenue were presented they 
were always quickly passed. Certainly, there were always people complaining about these 
accounts, but the commissioner was never obliged to give a public explanation. Many side 
remarks were made during the meetings in the style of: things should be different, more 
ejidatarios should attend the meetings, people should learn to listen to each other, the rules 
should be followed, and so on. During the meetings ejidatarios used to walk in and out of 
the building. Outside the building small groups discussed what was going on inside. When 
they thought they had heard enough, the ejidatarios left the meeting. 
It was obvious that I had to give up my plan to study political rhetoric and discourses in 
which decisions were formally presented, negotiated, and challenged. There was no public 
debate. Not even the commissioners spoke up and nobody had to defend decisions by making 
use of political discourses. The only thing that became very clear during these meeting were 
the areas of contestation in the ejido. The same conflicts about the "lost land" and the 
commons, for example, always came up and without exception ejidatarios accused each other 
of things that had gone wrong. However, these were loose accusations, in the sense that no 
central discussion would follow in which attempts were made to resolve these issues. 
Although Bailey (1969) describes a very different situation in the village of Bisipara, 
India, there are some similarities in the meetings he described. The difference with the 
situation in La Canoa is that in his study he distinguishes clear-cut village factions and 
presents an analysis in the form of the "playing of the public political game according to 
certain generally accepted rules". In La Canoa there were no clear-cut factions or established 
groups and although there is some patterning in the meetings I would not talk in terms of the 
"rules of the political game". Yet Bailey nicely describes how in the village council people 
publicly accused each other of failure to contribute to common tasks, of embezzling of 
village funds, and other matters and how this always led to heated debates. Yet, decisions 
were never reached on these affairs and after these open confrontations the affair would slip 
back to the more covert competition of gossip and backbiting. "Then sooner or later, there 
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would be another confrontation of just the same kind, followed by another period of gossip 
and slander" (Bailey 1969: 89). The interesting similarity is that in Bailey's study, as in La 
Canoa, public meetings have become an arena of "bickering and indecisive confrontation" 
and not of decision-making and resolution (ibid.: 90). Before elaborating further on the 
diverse roles of meetings in the ejido, I will present some more details. 
Organization of Meetings and their Symbolic Aspects 
During the time of the research meetings were convened whenever the executive committee 
felt there was a reason for it or when officials called a meeting. Meetings were normally held 
on Sunday afternoons. The meetings were announced by sticking posters on the walls of 
certain houses in the village and sometimes by a car driving around with a loudspeaker. Still, 
many ejidatarios were often not aware of meetings that were planned and only found out 
afterwards that they had taken place. The ejido meetings always took place in the ejido 
building (casa ejidal) in the center of the village. There is one room in the casa ejidal with 
a table and some chairs. The door of the casa ejidal remained open during the meetings and 
the windows were also open. This meant that the meeting could easily be followed by people 
gathering outside the building. 
The first time an ejido meeting is called, half the number of ejidatarios plus one need to 
be present for the voting. If less ejidatarios are present, no decisions can be taken and the 
meeting has to be called a second time. The second meeting decisions are valid irrespective 
of the number of ejidatarios. This official rule is well followed by the ejidatarios. This is also 
the reason why few ejidatarios attend a meeting the first time it is called as they know that 
a second meeting almost always has to be called. More people may attend at this second 
meeting, but during the time of my research, the attendance of the meetings was generally 
very low. 
Ejidatarios themselves often say that they feel that they should go to the meetings, but 
immediately give several reasons for not wanting to go. First of all, the real decisions are 
taken outside the meetings. If somebody has to arrange a matter, he or she directly goes to 
the ejido commissioner or to other people of importance. Secondly, ejido meetings can be 
unpleasant and sometimes result in an aggressive atmosphere in which problems and conflicts 
become worse instead of being resolved. Long-standing conflicts between ejidatarios or things 
that happened a long ago are often dug up. Finally, many affairs the meetings deal with, are 
of no interest to the ejidatarios. 
Naturally, the type of meeting determined the attendance of the ejidatarios. For the 
meeting in which MAR officials arrived to check on the use of the individual ejido plots (the 
IUP) even ejidatarios who lived in the United States came over. These IUP meetings, though 
chaotic, followed the agenda set by the official. On the other hand, on one occasion when 
officials of BANRURAL came to the ejido to talk about possible credits, only three 
ejidatarios arrived, not including the ejido commissioner. So, the meeting was canceled. Yet, 
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this lack of interest was a statement by the ejidatarios that they did not want to work with 
BANRURAL anymore. Other meetings which were convened by officials to inform 
ejidatarios about new government programs, for example about deforestation, also did not 
find much enthusiasm and often had to be canceled. Many ejidatarios had other channels 
which provided them with relevant information. However, other themes were of more 
interest to the ejidatarios. For example, the meetings at which officials came to talk about 
the change of article 27 of the Constitution and the new agrarian law and about the new 
subsidy program PROCAMPO were much better attended. 
As we saw in chapter five, 21 of the 97 ejidatarios are women. The ejidatarias always 
sat together and often brought some needlework with them. Women hardly ever spoke up at 
the meetings. Some women declared to me that they would prefer their husbands to go the 
meetings as they did not feel at ease in these male-dominated spheres. However, I never saw 
one of the women ejidatarias being represented at the meetings by their husbands. If the 
ejidatarias did not attend the meetings, their husbands sometimes stayed outside the ejido 
building to find out what was happening, but they never entered the building. This was 
understandable as these men found themselves in a rather unpleasant position. They managed 
the land of their wives but were not the formal owners of the land. They did not want to run 
the risk of being humiliated at an ejido meeting by being told that they should leave and 
bring their wives instead. On the other hand, there were also women ejidatarias who loved 
to go to the ejido meetings or to the meetings of other organizations, such as the CNC 
meetings for sugarcane growers. So, with respect to the position of women in the ejido no 
fixed pattern could be distinguished. In the following chapters it will become clear that the 
role of women in the ejido was much more important than was generally assumed. 
Officially, only ejidatarios can attend ejido meetings and vote. This rule could be 
problematic in the case of a deceased ejidatario whose land had not yet formally been 
transferred to the inheritor, in the case of migrated ejidatarios, or in the case of old and 
disabled ejidatarios. In the case of deceased ejidatarios, the inheritors were always accepted 
at the meetings as full ejidatarios. As we noticed in chapter five, the official MAR register 
of ejidatarios was a mess and the official transfer of an agrarian right to the inheritor could 
take many years. So, the ejidatarios worked with - what could be called - a "practical 
register" of ejidatarios. This means that they themselves knew very well who possessed 
certain ejido plots and who were the "real" ejidatarios. 
In the case of migrated or old ejidatarios, matters were more complicated. Migrated or 
old ejidatarios could be represented at the meeting by a son or a wife. However, to vote an 
official warrant could be required. Interestingly, these requisites depended to a large extent 
on the situation and the people involved. While the wife of a migrated ejidatario could attend 
ejido meetings and vote for her husband for a long time, suddenly somebody might object 
to her presence and ask for the warrant. In periods of conflicts and tension in the ejido, in 
particular, there was suddenly little flexibility with respect to the attendance of ejido 
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meetings. Although the periods that I stayed in the ejido were relatively quiet, and comments 
were never made about the presence of people who had no right to be at the meetings (myself 
included), I noticed that non-ejidatarios themselves avoided attending the meetings. The 
husbands of women ejidatarias or sons of old ejidatarios seldom showed up at the ejido 
meetings. In the rare occasion they did, they refrained from speaking up. So, we see that 
although certain rules may be applied with great flexibility, they may become instruments 
in periods of conflicts. Again we notice the sensitive distinction between being a "real 
ejidatario" or only a "stand in". 
However, ejido meetings could also play symbolic roles in other ways. This is well 
illustrated, for example, in the following case in which the conspicuous "non-meeting" by 
ejidatarios conveyed an important message to the commissioner. This happened in 1993 when 
an ejido commissioner (whose election will be discussed in the next section) wanted to resign 
because of personal problems and conflicts in the ejido. He convened several meetings to 
present his resignation. However, the ejidatarios knew that he wanted to present his 
resignation and nobody came to the meetings. This conspicuous non-presence of the 
ejidatarios was a message that they did not want him to resign and in this way they made it 
impossible for him to make his resignation official. Besides the fact that the other ejidatarios 
did not want him to leave, nobody wanted his deputy (suplente) to replace him. As the 
commissioner insisted on leaving his post he decided to invite a MAR official to put more 
pressure on the other ejidatarios. However, the official was informed by the ejidatarios about 
what was going on and he was asked not to present himself at the meeting. So, the official 
did not arrive and only the commissioner and his deputy arrived at the meeting. 
A strange situation developed in which for several months it was not clear who was the 
ejido commissioner. The official commissioner had given the ejido stamp to his deputy to 
show that his intention to resign was serious. Many ejidatarios were annoyed by this 
manoeuvre as the ejido stamp is considered to be an important official instrument. A weird 
situation evolved in which people who went to the commissioner's house to get their papers 
stamped, were accompanied by the commissioner to the house of his deputy who stamped 
the papers. The commissioner understood very well that people were annoyed about this and 
he recognized that the ejido stamp was an important official instrument which should be 
handled with caution, but if the ejidatarios did not come to the meeting to accept his formal 
resignation, these were the consequences. 
However, in private, pressure was put on the commissioner by different ejidatarios to 
stay on. Finally, the commissioner understood and accepted the messages of the empty 
meetings and the personal pressures and he stayed on. At the next meeting no comments 
were made about this affair. This example makes clear that meetings may fulfill several 
symbolic roles. It also illustrates that events at the meetings have to be analyzed in 
conjunction with modes of accountability that take place outside the public sphere. 
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Meetings and the Playing of the Official Game 
The ejido meetings and acts drawn up at these meeting become important as the "formal 
game" has to be played towards outside agencies. This happened, for example, in the case 
of "las Malvinas" which was discussed before and also in the conflict between the ejido and 
Refugio Sanchez (see the discussion on the commons). When Refugio appropriated a public 
path and invaded coamiles possessed by other ejidatarios, an ejido meeting was organized to 
tackle this question. Thirty ejidatarios arrived at the meeting and mis was the only meeting 
during my research where an official act was drawn up by the ejidatarios. The act was signed 
by all the ejidatarios present and stamped by the commissioner. The executive committee 
went to several offices in Autlan with that document. This shows that for the struggle in a 
different arena - in this case the arena of public offices in Autlan - the official ejido structure 
and official procedures can play an important role again. Although, at the same time, the 
playing of the formal game is only part of the struggle in these wider arenas and political 
influences and personal networks have also to be mobilized. 
This meeting pattern in the ejido is often labeled by academics, as well as officials, as 
disorganized and as a consequence, they argue, it is necessary for ejidatarios to learn "how 
to organize themselves". Yet, in my view, these meetings have to be analyzed in relation to 
historically developed organizing practices in the ejido and in relation to forms of 
accountability outside the formal setting. It is obvious that these meetings do not follow the 
official formula in which the executive committee presents the problems and issues in the 
ejido to the general assembly which then discusses the points and takes decisions by voting. 
There is no question of publicly accounting for one's actions either and the commissioner 
can take several decisions on his own. However, there is no concentration of power in the 
position of the commissioner either. The commissioner is bound by many restrictions and 
when he goes too far or damages the interests of certain people, they will let him know and 
he will be stopped. He is not stopped so much by people speaking up at a meeting, but by 
their talking to him in private, and their use of other political networks and gossip and 
rumors to stop him. 
In this context, meetings have acquired other meanings. In La Canoa the meetings give 
ejidatarios the possibility of expressing their opinions and feelings and stressing the 
differences and tensions in the ejido. The meetings are an arena of expression and 
contestation. In these meeting there is a strong sense of the value of the individual. The 
commissioners has no more authority than anybody else. The meetings also have more 
symbolic functions by showing who is an insider and outsider and who is a real ejidatario or 
only a stand in. The low or high attendance at meetings can send important messages to 
officials or commissioners. The meetings, as well as acts drawn up at the meetings, may 
become important again for the playing of the official game. However, in order to be really 
effective, this has to be combined with pressures and organizing through unofficial channels. 
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The Unpopular Position of the Ejido Commissioner 
We have already seen that all organization in the ejido or the village is mediated through 
personal or political networks. Many issues are negotiated informally and not through formal 
bureaucratic channels or public meetings. In addition, all ejidatarios are related to each other 
and this means that every project may soon become embedded in a dense web of socio-
political relations. These characteristics of ejido and village organizing practices, mean that 
many people choose not to take action. Even issues that in the opinion of most ejidatarios 
should be dealt with are not tackled. While many ejidatarios have clear opinions about what 
is going wrong in the ejido and what should be changed, at the same time they feel powerless 
or are afraid to do something about it. They know that they will get into problems with their 
neighbor, uncle, or compadre and that is something they want to avoid. In addition, most 
ejidatarios are old people who have already had many experiences with conflicts and murders 
in the village and they do not want to become involved in these problems anymore. So, 
several people told me that the best strategy is not to do anything. As somebody said, even 
the politically most innocent act will in the end annoy someone. Rub6n Romero, gave a nice 
explanation of this phenomenon of "not doing anything" being the best strategy, when I 
asked him how the delegado was doing: The one who doesn't do anything is good (es bueno 
el que no hace nada). The people don't talk about the delegado we have now. He doesn't 
annoy anybody. He is a bad worker (para trabajar es malo). But the point is that whatever 
you do, you will always have opponents. For example, if you want to make a street you will 
annoy the people who do not want a street near their house or through their land. If you want 
to prohibit the cows from walking in the street you will have problems with the cattle owners. 
If you want to let the people pay their water according to the quantity they use, you will also 
have problems with cattle owners, etc. Everything good he is doing, is bad for someone else. 
And then he has his friends, his compadres and his relatives whom he doesn't want to harm... 
As a consequence of this situation, most villagers do not want to take any formal 
responsibility and most ejidatarios do not want to stand for a post in the ejido. Some people 
are very explicit about their wish to stay away from an official position. For example, 
Manuel Pradera is a very capable and much respected ejidatario who never gets into trouble 
with anyone. On many occasions he has been asked to become ejido commissioner or 
delegado or to take a position in special committees. He is asked to fill formal positions 
especially when conflicts are going on as nobody will doubt his integrity. However, so far 
he has always refused because he does not want to get involved in all kinds of problems and, 
as he says, he does not want to be used in the political games of other people. 
Besides the fact that one can easily get into conflicts with other people, the leaders of 
organizations and projects are always criticized. There always is a lot of uncertainty about 
what is going on. So, there is always room for rumors, complaints, and gossiping. The 
executive committee of the ejido is always held responsible for everything that goes wrong. 
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If they do not go on trips for the ejido, they are blamed for not working on behalf of the 
ejido or it is said that they have been bought by the caciques. If, on the other hand, they go 
on many trips, they are blamed for spending ejido money on nice trips, hotels, restaurants, 
and other amusement. 
In addition to all this criticism, the commissioner may become involved in delicate 
matters which he would like to avoid. He can be asked to negotiate on behalf of the 
ejidatarios with inspectors of BANRURAL. In the case of serious problems in the ejido, the 
commissioner is often held responsible and on several occasions the commissioner of La 
Canoa was put in jail. The commissioner also has to deal and negotiate with a range of 
engineers. Engineers from the Ministry of Agriculture often come to explain new programs, 
inspectors from the forestry police can come by and fine people who burn the commons, the 
judicial police occasionally invades the ejido to check on marihuana production. In 1994, for 
example, the ejido commissioner was summoned to accompany the judicial police to a part 
in the commons of La Canoa where they had found marihuana. Although the commissioner 
was not personally held responsible, this was not a very pleasant experience for him as 
exchanges of fire often take place between the judicial police and marihuana producers. 
Finally, the position in a executive committee is not remunerated, but in order to do the 
job well, the members of the committee may have to neglect their crops or their animals on 
several occasions. For all these reasons the positions in the executive committee are not very 
popular among the ejidatarios. The position of commissioner is especially unpopular. Most 
ejidatarios have no interest in a position which implies little authority, possible involvement 
in a series of conflicts and continuous accusations by fellow ejidatarios. Ignacio Romero, 
who had been commissioner from 1985 to 1988 told me: I would not like to stand for the 
post of commissioner again. You do not gain anything from it and there are always a lot of 
problems in the ejido. During his own administration Ignacio was very active campaigning 
for the "lost land". However, it was said that he suddenly stopped working on the "lost 
land", when he was really making headway. It was rumored that he was given a plot of 
private land in exchange for abandoning the case. Ignacio himself said that he bought the 
land, but others assured me that he was bribed with this land. 
To a certain degree the executive committee and the commissioner can decide themselves 
how active they want to be in the ejido, how fairly they want to do the adnrinistration and 
how much they want to get involved in conflicts. There have been different executive 
committees with different agendas. The fact that every executive committee develops its own 
specific ways of dealing with their peculiar position is well illustrated by the executive 
committee of 1988 - 1991. 
The conspicuous non-management of an executive committee 
From 1988 to 1991 the executive committee consisted of Gustavo Romero 
(commissioner), Mauro Bautista (secretary) and José Romero (treasurer). The 
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three of them agreed to do as little as possible in the adrninistration of the ejido. 
This conspicuous non-management of the ejido implied that they only held three 
meetings in the three years they held power, that they did not interfere with the 
commons, the parceled land, or the urban zone, and that they only went on three 
missions to Guadalajara and Mexico City. They did not do anything about the 
many border problems La Canoa has with other ejidos and private landowners 
either. 
There was a lot of complaint in the ejido about the passivity of this committee 
and towards the end of their admimstration an official complaint was even lodged 
at the MAR. An official came to the ejido to investigate the case and the 
executive committee promised to organize more meetings. However, nothing 
changed. 
As ejidatarios always complain about ejido money that "gets lost" this 
executive committee decided to use the ejido money for the renewal of the roof 
of the ejido house and to build a big kiosk in the central plaza of the village. In 
this way it would be "visible" where the money had gone. Although most 
ejidatarios appreciated the decision to build the kiosk, there were also complaints 
that they should have used the ejido money to resolve conflicts in the ejido and 
to fight for the "lost land". Yet, most complaints concerned the fact that no 
meetings were held. 
José Romero the treasurer explained to me why they had not organized more 
meetings during their term: ƒ know that we have the obligation to organize a 
meeting every month, but these meetings do not make any sense. We have not 
been on missions. So, there was nothing to talk about. When we discussed the 
criticism that he should have organized more ejido meetings, Gustavo Romero, 
the ejido commissioner, told me the following: There was no reason to convene 
more meetings as the people are not interested in meetings and they never attend. 
Gustavo was tired of all the complaints. He had been ejido commissioner in 1962 
and according to him the people had been much more united then. Gustavo: But 
here in the ejido there are always a lot of problems and politics going on. Mauro 
Bautista, the secretary, told me laughingly that he only had written one act in his 
three years as ejido secretary. When we talked about the low attendance of ejido 
meetings he laughed and told me: Once there was a meeting and I thought that 
it would not go ahead. As I very much like bullfighting, I went to a bullfight and 
did not go to the meeting. When I came back I asked someone if there had been 
a meeting. He answered: no, not even the executive committee was present! 
What is interesting in the management of this executive committee is that they developed 
their own strategy to cope with the conflictual situations in the ejido. Namely, to do the least 
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possible and not to take any initiative to interfere in conflicts. Mauro had taken advantage 
of his position to buy the pasture from the commons at a low price but the members of this 
committee did not fill their pockets with ejido money. Instead, they built a kiosk as a visible 
remembrance of their administration. 
Reflective Talk and Two Contrasting Discourses of Organization 
The ejidatarios themselves often reflect on the organizational characteristics of the ejido and 
their role in this. In reality, this is a dialogue with the modernist discourses on organization 
as propagated by the government. Officials always say to the ejidatarios that they should 
accept their responsibilities, follow the formal rules, and organize themselves better (see 
chapter 9). This places the ejidatarios in a dialogue between their "practical knowledge" and 
a "modernist organization discourse". This becomes very clear in discussions with ejidatarios 
about the ejido. For example, many ejidatarios say that they know that it is their duty to 
attend the ejido meetings but at the same time they can explain to you why they often prefer 
not to go. They realize that they have the responsibility to fulfill official functions in the 
ejido, but then start explaining why they do not want to do this. They say that they should 
ask the commissioner to render accounts of his actions but then start explaining that this 
would be senseless. 
Ejidatarios know very well that organizing never occurs according to the formal model. 
Nor do they mind about the fact that in the view of outsiders their ejido is so "disorganized". 
They have a lot of freedom in their operations and nobody interferes with their land 
transactions. Furthermore, they have considerable security of land tenure. So, most of the 
time there is no reason for the ejidatarios to want the ejido adnrinistration to work differently 
and in a so-called modern, democratic way. On the contrary, they are happy that there is no 
centralized control. On the other hand, in infl ict ive situations central management and 
formal rules may become useful. In these situations we see that some ejidatarios start using 
an "accountability discourse" which stresses the necessity of following modern organizing 
principles. 
The "accountability discourse" of organization 
The accountability discourse presents a modern bureaucratic model of the ejido. 
According to this model, every ejidatario should assume a position in the 
executive committee and take responsibilities if he or she is asked to do so. The 
executive committee should organize meetings and the ejidatarios should all attend 
these meetings. At the meetings decisions should be taken about the important 
affairs in the ejido and the implementation of the decisions should be open to 
inspection. The executive committee should render accounts of their actions at the 
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ejido assembly. The executive committee should defend the interests of the whole 
ejido at the different institutions. Ejidatarios who do not follow the official rules 
should be punished, they should be fined, or even lose certain rights to the land. 
This accountability discourse is only used in situations in which certain ejidatarios want to 
retake control over issues in the ejido. Formal bureaucratic organizing gives power to the 
management (see Morgan 1986, Reed 1992). So, when somebody expropriates large parts 
of the urban zone or the commons, or when the ejido commissioner operates in a way that 
some ejidatarios do not like, then a (growing) number of ejidatarios may say that things 
should be done in the formal way, and that the official rules should be followed. The 
ejidatarios start stressing the importance of formal rules and using the accountability 
discourse of organization if they think that the rules are useful in winning a conflict or 
retaking control over areas where the ejido does not have much influence anymore. This 
became very clear when I worked with the ejido commissioner and some other ejidatarios 
on a set of internal regulations for the ejido (see chapter 9). While I did not see much use 
in formulating rules, some of them were extremely enthusiastic about the prospect of 
formulating more rules and in this way getting the commons under their control again. 
Another discourse which is very strong in the ejido, and everywhere else in Mexico, is what 
I call the "personal politics discourse" of organization. 
The "personal politics discourse" of organization 
In this discourse people in official functions will always use their position to favor 
themselves and friends. It is argued that there is always a lot of favoritismo 
(favoritism) and politics in organization and that in the end everything is 
determined by money and relations. The people with the most money, or with the 
most influential relations, will always come out on top. In this discourse it is said 
that personal enrichment is the main reason for people to take an official post. For 
example, Mauro Bautista, the outgoing ejido secretary, said to me that nobody has 
a public function for nothing: Politics always has its advantages, nobody does it 
for nothing. This also is an illustration of the fact that politics and organization 
are seen as intricately related. 
The model of organization which is presented in the personal politics discourse is more an 
imagery of power and politics than an accurate representation of organizational practices. As 
was shown in this chapter, in the ejido there are no people who abuse their "powerful 
position" as commissioner. The "personal politics" discourse of organization is above all 
used when people want to express their frustration with specific situations or with how things 
in general work in the ejido and in the bureaucracy. 
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The ejidatarios also have a two-sided attitude towards this discourse. They may complain 
about favoritism in the ejido management but at the same time will acknowledge that they 
themselves make use of these mechanisms. They may explain that this is a weakness in 
themselves, and say: as Mexicans, we ourselves are to blame for it or: it is hard to change 
these things as they form part of our life, of the way we are. At the same time they are proud 
of the fact that they as Mexicans know how to support friends and relatives. 
The accountability discourse, as well as the personal politics discourse of organization present 
models of organizing which do not exist in reality. They are used in conflicts and struggles 
in the ejido. The ejidatarios themselves also struggle with these contradictions in their 
reflections on the organization of the ejido. Law (1994a, 1994b) talks in this respect about 
the many organizational narratives which can be found in every organization. Law shows 
how participants in an organization may present very different and contradictory narratives 
about what the organization is about. These narratives can be contrasting and inconsistent. 
These narratives can deal with particular conceptions of agency, self-interest, activity, 
opportunism, and performance. According to Law these manifold narratives of organization 
show the decentered nature of organizations as no narrative can completely capture the 
dynamic of the organizing processes. All narratives are true and incomplete at the same time. 
In practice neither of these two extreme discourses in the ejido captures reality. 
A limitation of Law's work, however, is that he does not show the role of these different 
organizational narratives in processes of control and relations of power. Furthermore, the 
construction of the self in relation to the wider force field is not elucidated. The works of 
Pigg (1992, 1996) offer important insights on these issues. Following Pigg, I would say that 
the activity in which I found myself participating when the ejidatarios were reflecting on and 
theorizing about the organization of the ejido, "involved representations of self and other" 
(Pigg 1996: 161). In the same way as Pigg busied herself "documenting people's beliefs for 
purposes of scholarship" and "came across many people who were questioning their own and 
other's beliefs in the name of science" (Pigg ibid.), I busied myself documenting people's 
organizing behavior and came across people who were questioning and reflecting upon their 
own and other's organizational actions. That this was a debate with "modernity" became 
particularly clear when ejidatarios apologized to me for what they said was a total lack of 
organization in the ejido. After ejido meetings, they used to come up to me and say that they 
felt ashamed about the way that these meetings evolved and adding that I was probably 
startled by this chaos. Although I tried to convince them that it was not my aim to evaluate 
these meetings, they saw me as an "exponent of modernity" with whom they entered in 
debate. They knew what "modernity" looked like and they had often been instructed about 
it by government officials. 
Yet, although the ejidatarios' theorizing and reflecting may partly be analyzed in terms 
of a dialogue with "modernity", it also has to be seen in relation to preocupations with 
220 Chapter 6 
control and power. These reflections and contrasting discourses on organization in the ejido 
played a role in conflicts, in efforts to change situations in the ejido and in attempts to retake 
control over ejido resources. 
The Ejido Elections of 1991: the Preference for a Colorless Commissioner 
In October 1991 Gustavo's Romero's term as ejido commissioner would come to an end and 
a new executive committee was going to be elected. Obviously, the preparations for these 
elections were interesting for my research. By studying the mobilizing before the elections, 
I could find out the different interests at stake in the ejido and the possible existence of 
different factions. Yet, the elections of 1991 were another illustration of the unclear 
configurations in the ejido and only blurred the divisions which I had paimtakingly 
distinguished. It became clear that it was impossible to speak of groups or factions which at 
every election presented candidates for the executive committee. It was also impossible to 
distinguish interests or problems which divided ejidatarios according to more or less stable 
lines. However, what made the elections of 1991 interesting is that a group of ejidatarios 
with a "hidden agenda" managed to win the elections and opened the way for the execution 
of their "secret plan". 
The ejidatarios present planillas (slates of candidates) for the election of the executive 
committee. 1 In the election the ejidatarios vote for the planilla as a whole. Most of the time, 
there are two planillas. The custom is that the planillas are not made public until the day of 
the elections. However, although the organization of the planillas is surrounded by secrecy, 
it soon becomes clear who are actively preparing a planilla. For example, in 1991 I noticed 
that several weeks before the elections some ejidatarios frequently gathered. For example, 
several Romero men (Gustavo, Lorenzo, José) and Juan Alcazar often came together at the 
Tamarindo tree in the middle of the entrance road, where both Lorenzo and Gustavo live. 
Iginio Nunez and Salvador Lagos also often met in Iginio's corral. However, few ejidatarios 
showed any interest in the formœrning elections and only small groups of ejidatarios were 
preoccupied with it. In the weeks before the elections, I tried to study the way in which the 
two groups were mobilizing their networks for the election. 
Planilla 1 
I learned that Salvador Lagos and Iginio Nunez had decided to organize a planilla that would 
work on the many problems the ejido La Canoa is involved in, and especially on the case of 
the "lost land". Pedro Bautista and other ejidatarios of the "opposition" joined them, as well 
as some ejidatarios of La Canoa, who live in Autlân. Their choice of candidates was based 
on several considerations. Salvador and Iginio knew that they themselves would be 
unacceptable as ejido commissioner to the majority of ejidatarios. Not only had they both had 
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many personal confrontations with what they called the cacique families, but they were also 
considered to be too conflictual by many other ejidataios. As the organizers themselves would 
be unacceptable as ejido commissioner they had to look for an acceptable candidate. They 
chose Raúl Pradera. Raúl is a quiet, not conflictual and generally respected ejidatario of La 
Canoa. He had been treasurer of the ejido from 1985 to 1988. He is someone who never 
takes outspoken positions in conflicts and prefers instead to stay in the background. He 
seldom speaks out in ejido meetings. 
Iginio and Salvador then asked Vicente Garcia to be their candidate for secretary and 
Guadalupe Medina for treasurer. Guadalupe is a widow who inherited the ejido land from 
her late husband Miguel Romero. Guadalupe was Miguel's second wife. She owns a shop 
in the village and runs the public telephone. She had already been ejido treasurer from 1982 
to 1985 and she is a much respected woman in the village. Vicente Garcia was a young 
ejidatario who had never had much involvement in politics and who had never before had a 
post in the ejido. Although these were good candidates, given that the organizers of the 
planilla wanted to resolve the land conflicts of La Canoa and especially the "lost land", the 
choice for Guadalupe and Vicente puzzled me. First of all, Guadalupe's late husband Miguel 
was said to have been the main cause of the trouble with the "lost land". As I had noticed 
that Guadalupe always spoke well of her late husband, it amazed me that they would ask her 
to help resolve problems that her late husband had caused. Secondly, the choice of Vicente 
Garcia also seemed peculiar as he was very close to his uncle Ricardo who is one of the 
people who illegally possesses a part of the "lost land". 
I discussed my feelings of confusion with Salvador. I told him that knowing then-
intention to work on the "lost land", it seemed strange to me that they had asked Vicente 
Garcia and Guadalupe Medina to join their planilla. Salvador then explained to me that they 
had told Vicente that they wanted to resolve the problems with the land of La Canoa and that 
Vicente accepted the post in the planilla, knowing the intentions of the organizers. Salvador 
and Iginio had deliberately chosen Vicente in order to get votes from the Garcías in the ejido. 
With respect to Guadalupe Medina, Salvador said that when he and Iginio discussed their 
intentions to regularize the borders of the ejido with her, Guadalupe agreed to support their 
plans. Although Raúl Pradera seemed to be a strategic choice to win the elections, it was to 
be seen how far the organizers of the planilla would be able to manipulate him if they won 
the elections. 
Planilla 2 
The group, which gathered at the tamarindo tree and which I call the "establishment", had 
great difficulty in forming a planilla and had apparently not put much effort into it either. 
Several men asked José Romero, who was the outgoing treasurer, to stand for the post of 
commissioner but José refused. They insisted strongly but José persisted in his refusal. He 
was tired of all the trouble with the ejidatarios. As he said: As a local delegado one at least 
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receives a salary and people pay you when they slaughter animals, but as an ejido 
commissioner one does not receive anything. It takes a lot of energy if you are responsible 
and want to do a good job. The outgoing commissioner Gustavo Romero showed little 
interest in making any efforts to organize a new planilla for the elections. Before the 
elections of 1988, which they had won, a group of approximately twenty ejidatarios had 
gathered several times. However, this time most of these men showed little enthusiasm. 
Lorenzo Romero was not prepared to stand for a post himself either. As nobody showed 
much enthusiasm, nothing was done. Only a week before the elections they felt that they had 
to do something. A couple of days before the elections, Lorenzo visited Manuel Pradera and 
asked him to be their candidate for ejido commissioner. However, as usual, Manuel refused. 
This was a pity for them as Manuel would have been an acceptable candidate to all the 
ejidatarios. As Manuel refused to be a candidate it was decided to put Juan Alcazar forward 
as their candidate for commissioner. This was not a very good choice as Juan is known as 
a political person who is very close to the PRI-Romeros and who always tries to arrange 
things in a way that benefits him or his family. The candidate for treasurer was Ricardo 
Garcia Jr., the oldest son of Ricardo Garcia. José Romero was in the end prepared to be 
candidate for treasurer again. 
The Day of the Elections 
The 15th of October Rigoberto of the MAR arrived at La Canoa to organize the election of 
the executive committee. Sixty ejidatarios arrived at the meeting which is a high number 
when one takes into account that 37 of the 97 ejidatarios live outside the village. Rigoberto 
read out an official document in which the change of the executive committee was 
announced. Then he asked the people to present their planillas. Iginio Nunez and José 
Romero gave Rigoberto the paper with their planilla. Besides the three members of the 
executive committee there are twelve more people in each planilla for functions without 
much responsibility. Rigoberto first named all fifteen members of the first planilla (the 
"opposition") and then continued with those of the second planilla (the "establishment"). 
This caused a lot of confusion. Many members who were on the list of the second planilla 
had never been asked if they wanted to participate. Number five in the second planilla 
reacted: Nobody told me anything about this, I did not know that I was in any planilla! 
Rigoberto continued with the other candidates in the planilla but then several ejidatarios were 
called who were already candidates in the first planilla. Even the secretary of the first 
planilla, Guadalupe Medina, appeared in the second planilla. While Rigoberto continued 
calling the candidates of the second planilla a cheerful atmosphere developed in which people 
were laughing and started making jokes about what a mess this second planilla was. 
Rigoberto then put a lot of effort in changing and completing the second planilla. He 
asked the ejidatarios who appeared in both planillas, which one they wanted to be in. They 
all wanted to be in the first one as they had not been asked and knew nothing about their 
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participation in the second planilla. Rigoberto and several Romero men then tried to persuade 
other ejidatarios to take a post in the second planilla. However, several ejidatarios who were 
invited, refused stubbornly. The women ejidatarias in particular were asked but they all 
refused. It was difficult to get the second planilla completed. Only after great pressure was 
put on the ejidatarios and it was stressed that the twelve extra posts implied little 
responsibility, did some of them accept. In this way and with great difficulty they finally 
managed to complete the second planilla. 
Then the election could start. The ejidatarios had to fill in the ballot papers and put them 
in a box. After everybody had voted, they counted the votes in public. Raul Pradera's first 
planilla won by a large majority. He won with 42 of the 60 votes. The new executive 
committee was then formally installed and the various members took their oaths. The meeting 
was closed and people stood about talking in small groups and slowly left the building. 
Reflections After the Elections 
Many ejidatarios supported Ratil Pradera in these elections because he was a respectable, 
quiet, and unconflictual man. Raul gets along well with everybody, minds his own business, 
and has never been involved in political networks or doubtful practices. Even the members 
of the other planilla had no problem with Raul winning the elections. José Romero, for 
example, told me that Raul Pradera is a good man. José: The only problem with him is that 
he is a weak man. The men who pushed him to the fore for these elections, will try to 
manipulate him to their own interest. It is true that the organizers of the wimring planilla, 
Salvador Lagos and Iginio Nunez had promoted their planilla with the intention of having 
them work on the recovery of the "lost" ejido land. This had been a planilla with a hidden 
political agenda. Some ejidatarios were aware of this "secret pact", but not all. In addition, 
as we will see in chapter seven, even the members of this new executive committee had 
different ideas about what they had agreed upon. 
What is well illustrated by the elections of 1991 is that most ejidatarios prefer to have 
a commissioner who is not politically outspoken. Salvador Lagos and Iginio Nunez of the 
"opposition" are unacceptable to the majority of ejidatarios, as are Lorenzo Romero, Juan 
Alcazar, or Ricardo Garcia who belong to the "establishment". On the other hand, a well 
respected and quiet ejidatario who was always asked to be their candidate for commissioner 
by different and even opposing groups was Manuel Pradera. However, he always refused. 
The fact that it is important to most ejidatarios who becomes commissioner is illustrated by 
the high attendance at the election meeting. Although only a small number of ejidatarios were 
actively involved in the organization of planillas most ejidatarios were present at the election. 
More than trying to support "their man", they try to avoid "the wrong person" becoming 
commissioner. 
The central aim of the ejido politics of the Romeros seemed to be to avoid people from 
the "opposition" administering the ejido. This was not because these people would have too 
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much influence, but because they can be troublesome. The fact that the Romeros were more 
interested in preventing others from becoming commissioner than themselves having any 
control became very clear with the administration of Gustavo Romero (1988-1991) which 
tried to be as inactive as possible in all matters but they did not steal money from the ejido 
either. The other Romeros did not want to have a post in the ejido themselves. They only 
wanted to prevent "troublemakers" from becoming commissioner. The Romeros did not mind 
at all that Raül Pradera had become commissioner. He was considered to be a good guy. 
They had no intention of trying to control him or impose a better person instead. Their only 
fear was that other people would try to manipulate Raül. 
Conclusion: Decentered Management, Access to Resources, and Forms of Control 
Someone who would approach the ejido La Canoa from a formal organization perspective 
would easily arrive at the conclusion that the ejido administration is a mess. Rules are not 
applied and most ejidatarios do not seem to know the rules nor are they interested in them. 
Very few people come to the meetings and the meetings are not held very regularly. When 
there are meetings, many ejidatarios do not seem to be aware of these. Most ejido affairs are 
arranged informally and hardly anything is ever decided during official meetings. The ejido 
commissioner seems to have taken over the role of the general assembly and often operates 
on his own. From a formal organization perspective, the lack of attendance at the meetings, 
the lack of public accountability, and the lack of transparency would be explained as 
backwards and pre-modern. It would be argued that the ejidatarios of La Canoa should be 
better educated in their tasks as community members and that they must be made conscious 
of their tasks as a group with collective resources and interests. Actually, this is the kind of 
modernist development discourse which one often hears from government officials who say 
that ejidatarios lack certain skills and should be helped to organize themselves (see chapter 
nine). 
Yet, I have shown that there is only "apathy" and "disorganization" when we approach 
the ejido from a modernist organization perspective. On the other hand, when we study the 
ejido from a practice approach of organizing, we see considerable patterning and ordering 
with respect to the access to resources and forms of control, and accountability. The main 
task of the ejido administration concerns the management of the different types of land: 
individual ejido plots, but also large tracts of commons and the important urban zone. In 
addition, the ejido plays a central role in the organization of several government programs, 
such as the issuing of credit. For that reason, I studied the organizing processes around these 
different resources, and also looked at specific projects, and areas of conflict. 
Although the force fields around the ejido management differ according to the type of 
resources or conflicts involved (arable plots, common lands, urban zone, government credit, 
Organizing practices around the ejido administration 225 
etc.), a central factor in the way in which the ejido management developed is the dense webs 
of social relations through which people in the ejido and village are all connected to each 
other. At the same time, everybody operates in personal networks which can be mobilized 
against each other if necessary. The strong notions of individual responsibility and the private 
property character of land in all the different areas of the ejido give great freedom to the 
individuals involved, but also means that the ejido as the official "center of management" 
does not have much control over these resources (the situation of the commons will be 
discussed further in chapter ten). 
In the everyday context of ejido management, matters are organized in small groups in 
private spheres. Often these are loose, shifting constellations of people instead of enduring 
groups with long-lasting commitments. This dynamic obviously has important implications 
for the formal bodies of the ejido. It means that important decisions are not made in public 
meetings, but by small groups which are not directly accountable to the ejido assembly. It 
means that the ejido assembly has little influence in daily ejido matters. On the other hand, 
although the ejido commissioner and the people around him take decisions on their own they 
have very little room to operate in. Their decisions may concern whom they sell the pasture 
in the commons to, or how many trips they have to go on to Mexico City, but they cannot 
decide to evict somebody from an individual ejido plot or to take land back from somebody 
in the commons. In this way these historically developed organizing practices have led to a 
situation in which the executive committee of the ejido does not have the power that is 
generally attributed to it. We have also seen that several mechanisms of accountability and 
control exist outside the formal channels. The most important ones are personal contacts, the 
use of wider political networks, and rumor and gossiping. 
Ejido meetings have also acquired a meaning which has little to do with public 
presentation of information, decision-making and rendering of accounts by the executive 
committee. Public meetings can be dangerous as places where the honor of people can be 
attacked. For example, men who come to the meeting instead of their wives who are the 
official ejidatarias and could in this way become the object of laughter and ridicule. 
Similarly, people who are blamed for Ihings they did in the past and money they embezzled 
may be attacked. In that sense meetings are a place of performance, of possibly losing face, 
and of questions of honor. Meetings have become a place of bickering and accusations 
(Bailey 1969), but they have also acquired more symbolic meanings of showing who are 
insiders and who are outsiders, and attendance at meetings can be used to show support for 
or resistance to certain developments. 
However, we should not underestimate the role of the formal ejido structure and the 
agrarian law either. Although "formal organization is not what is happening" (Barth 1993: 
157), the official structure remains important in conflictual situations. We saw, for example, 
that the agrarian law is present in the form of a language of claims people make on certain 
resources and a language of differences in rights (between ejidatarios, non-ejidatarios and 
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sons of ejidatarios). In this way the law and the legal system remain important as they 
provide a language and forums for supporting or fighting existing orders (Merry 1992: 360). 
In the case of serious conflicts the official ejido structure is particularly important as the 
game is then played through official channels. Then we also see the mobilization of larger 
groups, and initiatives to take collective action. In these conflicts the majority of ejidatarios 
may try to give the ejido assembly and the ejido executive committee their official role again. 
Yet, as this goes against established practices and always hurts the interests of certain 
families in the ejido and the village, the social costs for some of those involved are always 
high. (Even when the official procedures are followed in serious conflicts, this is always 
combined with politicking in small networks in the informal spheres.) 
The ejidatarios themselves engage in frequent discussions about the organization of the 
ejido. I distinguished the "personal politics discourse" and the "accountability discourse" of 
organization. These discourses can be seen as organizational narratives which capture part 
of the organizing process and show that organizations are always of a decentered nature (Law 
1994a, 1994b). On the other hand, these discourses also need to be analyzed as part of 
"representations of self and the other" and as such a dialogue with a modernist discourse 
propagated by officials in which ejidatarios are depicted as "disorganized" and "backwards" 
(see Pigg 1996). Finally, these discourses play a role in concrete conflicts. The "personal 
politics discourse" is used when ejidatarios want to express disagreement with what is going 
on. This discourse is related to the culture of the state. Within this imagery of power and 
politics it is claimed that people only take official functions for their own benefit and that 
everybody in official posts favors themselves, their friends, and their relatives. For that 
reason, gossiping, backbiting, and speculations about what is going on always surround 
official positions and make these positions highly unpopular. The "accountability discourse" 
of organization, in which the importance of following the formal rules is stressed, is 
especially employed when ejidatarios think that the official rules can be helpful is specific 
conflicts. 
Notes 
1. While in former days the planilla that lost the elections automatically became the vigilance committee, 
today every planilla has to include candidates for the executive committee and their substitutes as well as 
candidates for the vigilance committee and their substitutes. Three more candidates have to be included for 
commercialization, credit, and production. So, a planilla consists in fifteen ejidatarios. However, the only 
posts of importance are those of the executive committee. 
CHAPTER 7 
THE "LOST LAND" I: THE PRTJEST AND THE LAWYER 
Land Conflicts and a Different Approach to State - Peasant Relations 
This chapter and the next one deal more explicitly with the relation between ejidatarios and 
the Mexican state. In these two chapters I follow the struggle for the "lost land" of La 
Canoa, in which the ejidatarios try to recover land that belongs to their ejido but which is 
in possession of several private landowners. For over 50 years the ejidatarios have tried to 
recover this land and have demanded that the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) resolve 
this conflict, yet, without significant results so far. Under the influence of the public speeches 
of President Salinas (1988 - 1994) in which he claimed that under his presidency land 
conflicts in Mexico would finally be resolved, several ejidatarios decided to make a final 
attempt. Their fight, which I followed closely for several years, shows well how ejidatarios 
organize themselves in relation to the Mexican state and illustrates the working of the hope-
generating bureaucratic machine and the influence of the culture of the state. 
The land conflict between the ejido La Canoa and several private landowners is not a 
special case. The legal status of a lot of land in Mexico remains ambiguous. "Agrarian 
reform proceedings are often stretched out over decades, and much land in Mexico is held 
without formal tenure status which, almost by default, usually means that it is treated as 
private property" (Binford 1985: 181). The non-resolution of land conflicts is also a common 
phenomenon and the agrarian arrears (rezago agrario) of the MAR are notorious (see Reyes 
et al. 1974, Zaragoza and Macias 1980, Bartra 1980, Binford 1985). Numerous studies have 
commented on the peculiarities of the MAR administration, such as, never answering letters 
or only answering them after several years and the practice of letting peasants wait in vain 
at the office for hours or days. It is also well known that MAR officials frequently ask for 
money for their services or receive presents and meals from ejidatarios. 
Schryer points out that many scholars argue that the law ultimately serves the interests 
of the rich and powerful (Schryer 1986: 308). This is explained by the pervasiveness of 
clientelism which makes the use of the law largely discretional and means that the "Mexican 
law is at the disposition of the political authorities, and always has a casuistic content, being 
applied only if and when the authorities ordain it" (Foweraker 1994: 10). In this line of 
tliinking the law is always on the side of the persons who are best placed within the political 
bureaucratic networks. If an ejido fails to receive attention "it must be because its patron in 
the state government has failed to do his job, or because community residents themselves 
have not been skillful or persistent enough in cultivating enough patrons, or the right patrons, 
in the right government agencies - 'the myth of the right connection"" (Cornelius and Craig 
1991: 57). 
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The dominance of these models is the reason why there are so few detailed anthropological 
studies which include the legal and administrative dimensions of land conflicts in Mexico 
(exceptions are Binford 1985 and Schryer 1986). However, Schryer (1986) shows in his 
study of land conflicts in Mexico that on certain occasions the law can also work in the favor 
of the lower classes. However, of even greater importance than the question of who the law 
serves, is the fact that in many cases land conflicts linger on for decades without resolution, 
in other words, that the law is not applied for the rich or the poor. I argue that more 
attention should be paid to how these conflicts linger on forever and are "played out" within 
specific force fields in which relations between peasants and the state are organized. For 
example, in the case of the "lost land" of La Canoa ejidatarios have been involved in this 
land conflict for over 50 years. One could say that this case is not worth paying much 
attention to as it is improbable that the ejidatarios will ever recover the land. But we could 
also ask what makes these ejidatarios go on for over 50 years? Why do ejidatarios spend so 
much energy and money on a case which they themselves on many occasions say that they 
are doomed to lose? Are these expectations, dreams, and fantasies not a central part of 
relations between ejidatarios and the Mexican state? 
Models of state-peasant relations based on corporatism and intermediation theories are 
highly inadequate for analyzing continuing struggles like that of La Canoa. These models do 
not set out to explain why ejidatarios go on fighting for something that is apparently 
impossible to achieve (the recovery of the "lost land"). They cannot explain why people 
mobilize, and why so much money and energy is spent over and over again on a "lost case". 
One way to account for this phenomenon would be to argue that such ejidatarios are simple-
minded and stubborn figures who have no idea of the working of the political-bureaucratic 
system. Yet, this goes against the fact that Mexicans are known to be very cynical about their 
own political system. Many studies (including large scale surveys) have argued that the 
majority of Mexicans think that power is highly concentrated, that they do not expect to 
receive attention or equal treatment from the bureaucracy and the police, and that they are 
cynical about their own ability to influence political decisions (Almond and Verba 1980, 
Cornelius and Craig 1980, 1991, Camp 1993, Foweraker 1994). So, how can we explain 
these continuing struggles in the light of this general distrust of the political system and the 
bureaucracy? As was said in chapter one, in order to explain this phenomenon we need an 
approach to the Mexican state which takes into account the cultural dimension of power. 
Imagining the Center 
In chapter one I argued, following Abrams, that "we should abandon the state as a material 
object of study whether concrete or abstract while continuing to take the idea of the state 
extremely seriously" (1988: 75). The ejidatarios themselves do never talk about "the state" 
and tend to use more decentered notions of power. They talk about el gobierno (the 
government), los caciques (local bosses), los ricos (the rich people), lospequehos (the private 
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landowners), los funcionarios (tie officials), elpresidente (the president) and nosotros, los 
pobres (we, the poor people) in their reflections. Yet, on the other hand, the ejidatarios 
believe in the existence - somewhere - of a center of control which can help them settle their 
conflict over the "lost land". In other words, they search for the state in the form of "a 
neutral arbiter above the conflicts and interests of society" (Alonso 1994: 381) or in the form 
of an influential figure (preferably the Mexican president) who is strong enough to make sure 
that the law is applied. This belief is what I call their "idea of the state". 
As their dealings with the bureaucracy and politics are so frustrating and unsuccessful and 
do not seem to get them anywhere, ejidatarios look for intermediaries who are more capable 
than they are in dealing with the bureaucratic machine. At the same time, brokers present 
themselves to the ejidatarios as the right person to resolve their problems. Unlike traditional 
approaches on intermediation, I argue that brokers do not necessarily have a role in 
effectively connecting communities or peasants with the state, but that they play a central role 
in the imagination of state power. In the search for the "right intermediary" and the 
presentation of themselves as the "right connection", ejidatarios as well as brokers are 
implicated in the construction of the "idea of the strong state". 
Becoming Enrolled in an Agrarian Conflict 
As this was a situation in which confidence, distrust, and gossip played an important role, 
I will outline what my own position in this conflict was. What certainly helped me in doing 
this research was the fact that I could return to La Canoa several times for long periods. In 
this way it was possible to establish enduring relationships with certain people. I became 
involved in this struggle through Lupe Medina, the treasurer of the ejido and the second wife 
of the late don Miguel. Lupe was a religious and independent woman who sometimes felt 
insecure in the male - dominated ejido world. She liked to talk to me, a woman outsider, 
about her problems and doubts in her private life and also with respect to the land conflict. 
Sometimes, in the beginning I felt that she was not able to assess situations in a realistic way. 
Later, when I myself was carried away by the fantasies around the "lost land", I realized that 
her views and expectations were not merely idiosyncratic constructions but that they reflected 
the working of the "hope-generating machine". As time passed, I got more and more 
integrated in the group that was fighting for the "lost land" and also established good 
relationships with several of the men. Some of them liked talking to me as they wanted me 
to write everything down about the problems of La Canoa and - what they called - the 
widespread corruption in Mexico. 
Towards the end of the research, my position in this group changed as they noticed that 
I worked in the MAR archives in Guadalajara and Mexico City and had interviews with 
officials and lawyers about the case. They started seeing me as possibly useful. They asked 
me to accompany them on missions and visits to the MAR and other offices. Then, they 
noticed that I was treated in a different way and sometimes had more access to officials than 
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they had. They were amazed by this as hitherto they had seen me as an eternal student who 
had never learned to speak Spanish without an accent. The officials, in their turn, treated me 
as a woman from Europe, doing research for a doctorate. This was something that seemed 
extremely interesting to some of the officials and much more interesting than the problems 
of the ejidatarios. In the beginning I tried not to speak up during meetings of the ejidatarios 
with functionaries and only wanted to be present without participating. Many of the officials 
actually assumed that I was Lupe's daughter, which was an easy "cover-up". However, after 
the ejidatarios had seen that I was sometimes listened to better than they were, they gradually 
tried to position me in the role of broker or adviser and wanted me to talk to the officials. 
This changed my research to a certain extent. Not only because it was no longer possible to 
take a passive role during these social interfaces with officials, but also because the only 
theme the ejidatarios really wanted to talk about with me was the "lost land" and how things 
were going. Every conversation with the people in this group went straight to this theme. 
Instead of trying to find out their theories and feelings, it now became much more a form 
of dialogue in which my own position and theories also became involved. This change of 
position made it possible to express more clearly doubts about my own theories and theirs 
and confront them with - what I saw as - contradictions in their views or actions. In this way 
more "dialogical" research relations were established (de Vries 1992: 70). 
My role as a "broker" did not help them much further in their struggle for the "lost 
land". They must have drawn the obvious conclusion that after all I did not have the 
necessary contacts and influence. What on some occasions made me feel uncomfortable was 
the fact that it became clear to officials of the MAR and the private landowners in the region 
that I was involved in the conflict case of La Canoa. Several times I was asked about this by 
MAR officials in Autlán. Although it never caused me serious problems, I also had my 
moments of personal doubt during the study of this case. I tried to maintain good 
relationships with some private landowners possessing part of the "lost land". Still, most of 
my sympathies were with the ejidatarios, fighting for what was rightfully theirs. 
Predicament of the Conflict 
The conflict of the "lost land" dates from the establishment of the ejido in 1938. Certain 
lands that officially had to be transferred to La Canoa ended up in the hands of some private 
landowners. As can be seen on the map in chapter two different tracts of land were involved 
in the conflict and they all have their own histories and specific legal agrarian aspects. 
There were different ways in which people referred to - what I decided to call - the "lost 
land". The ejidatarios talked about "the land below" as it belonged to the lower part of the 
ejido. Alternatively, they said "the land of the pequeños"(meaning the private landowners), 
or more vaguely, "that land" when they knew that the people present knew what they were 
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talking about. So, they used unspecific terms when they referred to this problem. Yet, when 
they were asked specific questions about this conflict they gave more detailed information 
and mentioned the names of the different fields (potreros) and landowners involved. 
About the Enemy: the "Pequeños" 
Most of the people who illegally possess parts of the "lost land" live in Autlán. Some of 
them acquired the land in 1938, while others inherited the land or bought it at a later stage. 
One of the owners of the land is Ricardo García, who is also an ejidatario of La Canoa and 
lives in the village. As we saw in previous chapters, he is disliked by people in the village 
because of his cacique attitude and things he did in the past. Héctor Romero, a former head 
of the public security police in Autian and cousin of many Romeros in the village, also 
possesses a part of the "lost land". He is not a pleasant person to have as an enemy as the 
police in general have a very bad reputation in Mexico. Héctor was also known for having 
beaten up people in jail. Another unpleasant enemy who owns land of La Canoa, is the 
lawyer Salvador Mendoza. Lawyers are generally distrusted by the ejidatarios (as well as by 
many other Mexicans) but this is especially true in this case as he is associated with 
assassinations in the region. He also has important political connections in Mexico City. José 
Luna, head of the regional association of horticulture producers is another of the many 
people who today possess part of the "lost land". Most of these people are not really 
influential anymore within the regional elite. Ricardo García and José Luna both went 
bankrupt and have huge debts and serious problems. Héctor Romero is considered by other 
regional powerholders to be a bad politician who never managed to rise above head of the 
security police and has retired from that job. The lawyer Mendoza does not live in the region 
anymore. 
Obviously, these pequeños propietarios deny that they illegally possess the land and many 
of them said that they were tired of the continuing accusations of the ejido La Canoa. The 
ejidatarios realize that the way in which these men oppose the ejidatarios' attempt to get this 
matter resolved is by bribing the bureaucracy and through their political connections in 
Guadalajara and Mexico City. Besides money and politics, there is also the threat of 
violence. Although many people in La Canoa do not personally know their enemies, the 
stories about them give enough cause for speculations about the bloody revenge that is to be 
expected if La Canoa were successful with their efforts to recover the land. Many people in 
the village have been murdered for lesser causes. Several ejidatarios say they have been 
threatened by the pequeños in the past. 
The General and the "Lost Land" 
Although the ejidatarios themselves did not mention General García Barragán as one of their 
main enemies in this conflict in the past (he died in 1979), I was particularly interested in 
knowing more about his role in this conflict. As the fight for the "lost land" was very much 
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a regional question (most of the illegal owners are from influential families in Autlán) I often 
asked the ejidatarios explicitly if the General had not had an active role in this matter. 
However, most people responded that although the General had been very influential he 
never had much to do with land questions, except for the plots he managed to get for 
himself. At the same time, the ejidatarios related incidents and anecdotes concerning the 
General and the "lost land". Several people told me that the unmarried sisters of the Michel 
family in Autlán, who are daughters of a famous regional hacendado family and who possess 
part of the "lost land", gave the General a part of their land in exchange for his support in 
defending their position against La Canoa. So, it was obvious that Barragán had interfered 
in this conflict and that his offspring were still involved. 
Yet, we see here the same process as we saw with the agrarian history of the region and 
the establishment of the ejido La Canoa (see chapter two). People tend to talk in terms of 
anecdotes and seemingly isolated stories. Histories and analyses of power are highly 
fragmented. The point is that although the influence of certain people at regional, state, or 
national level may undoubtedly be present, the actual dynamics of power always remain 
highly opaque. Who is pulling the strings at different levels, and who influences the officials 
of the MAR at which moments remains unclear. Even if one could trace that an official had 
received personal instructions from the General to hinder the investigation of this conflict, 
this would only have been one anecdote amongst many in an endless struggle that has been 
going on for over 50 years. 1 However, this does not mean that people are not aware of 
influences or lack the capacity to see broader structures. On the contrary, we could say that 
sociological and anthropological analyses sometimes impose a coherence in power games that 
does not necessarily exist for the people involved. By imposing this artificial order, there is 
a tendency to neglect one of the most important aspects of power relations in Mexico; 
namely, obscurity and opacity. This obscurity and opacity are central elements in the culture 
of the state and form part of the worlds within which people operate and theorize about what 
is going on. 
The Other Enemy: the Ministry of Agrarian Reform 
From the very moment the ejido was established the ejidatarios have tried to acquire all the 
land the ejido is entitled to. They have repeatedly demanded that the MAR resolve this 
conflict. In reality, the conflict with the pequeños propietarios has turned into a conflict with 
the MAR about the non-resolution of the conflict. The struggle with the MAR has focused 
on two elements. First of all they have requested that the MAR deliver the definitive map 
of their ejido. Although it may sound strange that the ejido has no map of its property this 
is quite common in Mexico. In the agrarian reform procedures were not always strictly 
followed or finished. Especially under Cárdenas (1934-1940) priority was given to handing 
over the land instead of following of the procedures to the letter. For that reason, many 
ejidos in Mexico do not possess a definitive map of their lands. So, the absence of a map was 
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not necessarily an indication of border troubles or land invasions. However, in the case of 
La Canoa this map has special importance as it would indicate which lands belong to the 
ejido and where the pequeños propietarios are invading their land. In the second place, the 
ejidatarios have demanded that the MAR measure their lands according to two other official 
MAR documents which clearly indicate the borders of their ejido and the total number of 
hectares they should possess: namely the presidential resolution of the endowment 
(Resolución Presidencial de la dotación) and the act of possession and marking of boundaries 
(acta de posesión y deslinde). So far, their pressure on the MAR has had little result: they 
never received the map nor was their land ever measured. However, the MAR did not 
resolve the conflict in favor of the pequeños propietarios either. The conflict was simply 
never resolved. For the ejidatarios this meant that they kept hoping and fighting for what 
rightfully belonged to them. For the pequeños propietarios it meant that all these years they 
were confronted with accusations from the ejido and formal MAR procedures which they had 
to counter. 
According to the ejidatarios the problem with the MAR is that the officials let themselves 
be bribed by the private landowners. The ejidatarios themselves are not against bribes, nor 
do they mind paying for the officials' services, but they feel that they can never pay as much 
as the pequeños. However, apart from possible corruption and bribing of officials, the 
opaque structure and procedures of the MAR already form an enormous obstacle for the 
ejidatarios. Without getting into the impressive organizational chart of the MAR we can say 
that many different delegations and offices within the MAR are involved in the case of the 
"lost land" of La Canoa. While the division of the MAR in Guadalajara was relatively easy 
to handle as it was only one building with different offices, the MAR in Mexico City was 
a nightmare. In Mexico City the MAR has, since the earthquake of 1985, consisted of many 
different buildings spread out over the city. Each building is a labyrinth in itself. 
Yet, visiting the different offices was a necessary evil. It was always stressed that people 
had to go and put personal pressure on the officials. Letters and documents easily ended up 
in drawers and might never have been answered if the ejidatarios did not personally present 
themselves at the offices. The ejidatarios knew from experience that letters were never 
answered or only many years after they had been sent or delivered. This left the ejidatarios 
little choice other than to go to the city. However, all these visits implied an enormous 
investment on the part of the ejidatarios. An investment in terms of money and time but also 
in terms of emotion and energy. The trip by from La Canoa to Guadalajara (via Autlán) took 
them approximately four hours. This means that they had to spend eight hours traveling if 
they wanted to make the trip in one day. In order to go to Mexico City, they first had to go 
to Guadalajara and then spend an additional eight hours on the bus to Mexico City: a trip of 
two days at least. Besides this time spent traveling, it was not easy for the people from the 
village to go to the metropolis. They were often taken advantage of by cab drivers and other 
people who immediately recognized campesinos visiting the big city. In addition, they had 
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to suffer humiliations at the hands of officials and others who often let them wait for hours 
or even days and treated them in a contemptuous way. 
Besides the complex organizational structure, the agrarian procedures are complicated and 
the documents use a language which is often difficult to disentangle. Although I studied the 
agrarian laws and procedures and received assistance from both within and outside the MAR, 
a great part of the documents and procedures remained senseless to me. To a large extent 
they contained formalities and references to other documents and different delegations in the 
MAR. So, I realized that for ejidatarios who generally were not very experienced in reading 
and writing, these documents were impossible to decipher. 
Storytelling about Don Miguel and the "Lost Map" 
There were many stories in the ejido about the "lost land". In these stories the late Miguel 
Romero played a central role. For example, one tract of land which the ejido lost was given 
by Miguel Romero to his brother Javier when Miguel was ejido commissioner. He gave this 
land as a loan and on the condition that it had to be returned to the ejido afterwards. 
However, this land was passed on to several other people and parts were sold as private 
property. This land never returned to the ejido. Although this only concerns a part of the 
"lost land", this is the story which was most related by the ejidatarios. Iginio Nunez, for 
instance, remembered that when he was a young boy an engineer from the MAR came to La 
Canoa and went to the fields with don Miguel. Iginio: 
Several boys from the village accompanied them and I was one of them. When 
they were at the lands, the engineer asked don Miguel: Do you agree that this was 
all ejido land? Don Miguel answered: Yes. Then the engineer asked: And did you 
give all this to your brother? Then don Miguel turned around and walked back to 
the village. He did not say a word anymore. From that moment onwards I knew 
what was going on. 
The other tracts of land concerned properties which the ejido should have received but never 
had in its possession. In these cases it was much less clear what exactly happened and who 
was involved. However, as don Miguel was one of the founders of the ejido and for a long 
period was the most influential man in local politics, he was held responsible by many 
ejidatarios for these problems as well. On the other hand, don Miguel himself made many 
efforts to recover the lands and to get the definitive ejido map. Several of his sons were also 
very active in the fight for the "lost land". 
The definitive map was a common theme in local story-telling. We have already seen that 
the ejidatarios have been asking the MAR to deliver the definitive map of the endowment for 
years. Many consider the absence of this map to be the central problem. The ejido has many 
provisional maps and maps of the extension of the ejido which do not help them any further. 
They need the definitive map of the endowment. Many speculations circulate about this map. 
Many ejidatarios say that this map, which clearly indicates the right ejido borders, existed 
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in former times. Several claimed to have seen it. Others said that they never saw it but they 
knew that it existed. It was said, for example, that don Miguel had documents concerning 
the ejido, which he kept privately. He told his wife Lupe that after his death, she should give 
these documents to the ejido commissioner. It was said that Lupe gave these documents to 
Ram6n Romero and that later they disappeared. However, the only thing Lupe remembered 
was that one day her husband Miguel sat round the table with two of the sons from his first 
marriage. They had a map on the table and talked about the land. Lupe thought that perhaps 
this was the map they always had looked for, but she never saw it again. 
There was another story that was often repeated although in different versions. In this 
story it was said that many years ago don Miguel himself went to Mexico City to do 
something about this problem. The ejido had given him money to pay for the hotels, the 
food, and everything and Don Miguel left for fourteen days to get the map. In one of the 
versions he returned to the ejido and said that he had lost the money. In another version he 
returned and told them that he had received the document but that he lost it on his way back. 
This story can refer to the same event or to different ones. But in both stories the conclusion 
is the same: don Miguel was given ejido money to get the central document and wasted it. 
Fifty Years of Fighting the "Enemy" 
Shifting Constellations Around the Ejido Commissioner 
During certain periods, core groups developed in the ejido which took up the fight and then 
when nothing was achieved, these groups dissolved again. A central figure in these groups 
was always the ejido commissioner. Without the support of the commissioner it was very 
difficult to work with the MAR as it is the commissioner who has to sign all the ejido 
documents and who is the only legitimate representative of the ejido. So, if there was a 
commissioner who did not want to tackle this issue, the case would rest for several years. 
On the other hand, with an active commissioner, an enthusiastic group and help from 
"knowledgeable outsiders" they could make headway in the bureaucracy and with agrarian 
procedures. This is clearly reflected in the number of documents one can find in the agrarian 
archives in Guadalajara and Mexico City about the different ejido administrations. Certain 
commissioners of La Canoa have been very active in this struggle for the "lost land" and 
many documents signed by them can be found in the MAR archives. 
Although the figure of the ejido commissioner has always been important in the struggle 
for the "lost land", the coordination of the activities and the process of decision-making had 
very little relation to the formal organization of the ejido. The struggle for the lost land 
followed the same organizing processes as were discussed about the management of the ejido 
in chapter six. It was often not discussed at the ejido assemblies and the decision to go on 
a mission was generally made by small groups, as was the contracting of a lawyer, the 
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spending of ejido money, and so on. Frequently, they needed more money than was available 
in the ejido. This was needed for the missions to Guadalajara and Mexico City and to pay 
the officials, lawyers, and others involved. This extra money was collected by the core 
group. They would register who cooperated and with how much money. The idea was that 
this financial contribution would be taken into account when the land would finally be 
recovered and distributed among the ejidatarios. 
In this small group around the commissioner, certain people often participated. Iginio 
Núflez, Ramón Romero, Salvador Lagos and Roberto Sánchez, for example often took part 
in it. Ejidatarios of La Canoa who live in Autlán also used to join, as well as a man called 
Federico Chavez, who is not even ejidatario in La Canoa and lives in Autlán. Federico's 
sister is an ejidataria in La Canoa and Federico hopes to be one of the beneficiaries of the 
land. Some people in La Canoa appreciated his help as he was better educated and knew how 
to handle the bureaucracy better. Also Monica, a teacher from La Canoa, who worked in 
Guadalajara tried to help. Sometimes the people stayed at her house when they had to go on 
a mission to Guadalajara for several days. Monica also hoped to be compensated with a plot 
of land in the future. Over the years numerous ejidatarios of La Canoa have actively 
participated in this struggle. This includes ejidatarios who today do no want to continue with 
this struggle anymore. In this way, the "lost land" has become important in shaping a 
collective memory of struggle even though at a particular point in time only a small number 
of ejidatarios were working on it. 
People who actively participated in missions to Guadalajara or Mexico City in former 
times, still like to recall those times. Stories go round that people only ate beans or even 
stopped buying beans in order to save money for these missions. Others remember how their 
father sold chickens or a pig in order to finance trips to Mexico City. It was said that the 
ejidatarios who went on missions sometimes hardly ate or only had water and a potato as 
they had no money to spend on food. People resentfully recalled how others in the ejido 
laughed at them when they talked about the "lost land" and how they were going to recover 
it. 
Recalling the Fight for the "Lost Land" in the 1970s 
It is interesting to pay some attention to the efforts made by ejido commissioner Macario Paz 
(1976-1979) in the struggle for the "lost land". Macario himself migrated to the United 
States, but many people still remember the activities during his term as ejido commissioner 
and there are also many documents in the archive of the MAR in Mexico City which refer 
to this period. His wife Teresa still lives in the village. Macario was supported in his work 
by fiie secretary and treasurer of the ejido at that time, respectively José Romero and 
Estanisloa Romero, both sons of Miguel Romero. Ramón Romero, Iginio Núflez and Roberto 
Sánchez also actively participated in Macario's activities. The ejidatarios received help from 
a lawyer of the Communist Party and most ejidatarios of the "group of the lost land" became 
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members of this party. As Ramon remembers, the lawyer never asked them for any money 
and said that they could always stay at his house. Ramon: 
He said, this is your house, you can sleep and eat here. I am going to get this 
matter arranged for you. After some time the lawyer suddenly disappeared and 
twenty days later he was found dead in a ravine with bullet wounds. Then things 
slowed down. We tried to get help from other places, the CNC and the Liga de 
Comunidades Agrarias, but didn't achieve much in all those years. Recently I met 
one of the men who used to be in a high position in the Communist Party at that 
time. He now is member of another opposition party and he suggested that I 
should visit him and talk about the case. He said that he had a friend who is 
deputy and who might help us. 
What makes Macario's efforts especially interesting is that he was illiterate, he could neither 
read nor write. His wife Teresa registered everything during his terms as commissioner. 
Ramon recalled: 
I had to read him everything, but he understood it very well. Despite the fact that 
he could not read, he was aware of everything, he knew what he had to do, he 
knew what he was fighting for. 
Teresa, proudly said about Macario: 
And if you had only known him! He was ugly and hardly received any education, 
he was an orphan, both his father and mother died when he was very young. But 
he was very good! He knew exactly what he had to do in the institutions. Once 
someone who had seen him operate in the office, asked him if he was a lawyer! 
But Teresa remembered above all the tensions and atmosphere of distrust at the time Macario 
was commissioner. Teresa: 
Macario went on many missions to Guadalajara and Mexico City. He was often 
threatened. The really dangerous person is the nephew of Salvador Mendoza, he 
is a lawyer. Once in Guadalajara he tried to kill Macario with a car but Macario 
escaped. Esteban Romero promised to let his beard grow as long as nothing would 
happen to Macario. When he died he had such a long beard! He and Macario put 
the cross on the hills near La Canoa. The members of the directive committee 
always went together to protect each other: Macario, José Romero and Estanislao 
Romero. José Romero often did not feel like going. He used to say: do we have 
to go again?! But in the end he always went along. Macario sometimes abandoned 
his work on the land to go on missions. 
During Macario's term as commissioner a MAR engineer was sent to measure the ejido 
lands. This engineer was recalled sympathetically by everybody. Teresa recalled: 
In the time that Macario was commissioner, an engineer came to measure the 
land. The ejidatarios here protected him day and night. He was cripple and 
sometimes they had to carry him to certain parts. He worked well but he never 
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finished the job. We have never seen him again. They made him disappear or they 
sent him somewhere else. 
Teresa still keeps the little book in which she wrote down who cooperated with how much 
money during that period. 
On an Impossible Fight and Sweet Dreams 
According to the ejidatarios, a problematic aspect of their struggle is that many people in the 
ejido are relatives or compadres of the private landowners who possess the "lost land". Most 
people are related to the Romeros or Garcías who possess part of these lands. For that reason 
it is said that they will not go ahead with the fight. Furthermore, the people know that 
ejidatarios of La Canoa can also be bribed. As we saw in the previous chapter, Ignacio 
Romero, who was ejido commissioner from 1985 to 1988 and had achieved a lot in the fight 
for the "lost land", was accused of having been bribed by the pequeños with a plot of private 
land. Ignacio said that he bought the land, but several ejidatarios claimed that the land was 
given to him in exchange for stopping the fight against the pequeños. Hence, in their own 
reflections on this conflict, the case is extremely complicated. The ejidatarios have to fight 
rich, powerful, and dangerous pequeños propietarios, corrupt bureaucrats, and last but not 
least, fellow ejidatarios who are on the side of the pequeños or let themselves be threatened 
or bribed. 
One may ask why the ejidatarios have persisted in this project when it seems impossible 
to bring it to a successful and peaceful end. This tenacity has to be explained in relation to 
two phenomena which were discussed in previous chapters: land scarcity and migration to 
the United States. Many ejidatarios would like to have a larger plot themselves. However, 
the prospects for their sons are even more important. Many ejidatarios hope that their sons 
would stay in the village or return from the United States if they could only acquire a plot 
of land. The "lost land" became even more desirable in the 1960s when it became part of 
the irrigation scheme. Since then, the value of the "lost land" for the ejidatarios has grown, 
as have the interests at stake for the pequeños propietarios. 
The ejidatarios knew that the situation was very difficult but they had one example which 
they often mentioned to prove that it was possible to win against the "rich and powerful". 
This was the case of Corral de Piedras on the coast of Jalisco. In that case ejidatarios and 
landless people succeeded in expropriating the land from private landowners who illegally 
possessed the land. This was approximately forty years ago. In that case influential politicians 
and even the state Governor became involved. Ejidatarios in La Canoa told me many times 
how the ejidatarios and landless people in Corral de Piedras finally won the battle against the 
pequeños and how several trucks of police came to protect them against the landowners. 
Although several people were killed, the ejidatarios and landless families finally recovered 
the land. The ejidatarios also used this story to stress the importance of unity. In Corral de 
Piedras the families of men who were killed or who were put in jail, were taken care of by 
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the other fighters. 
At the time of the research many ejidatarios had lost interest in the case. They thought 
that after so many years during which the land has been tilled by others, La Canoa has 
probably lost the rights to these lands anyhow. 2 Besides, they felt that it was a hopeless fight 
of the ejido against these influential private landowners and the MAR. Several people 
admitted that they were afraid of the private landowners. They thought that the ejido would 
never win the battle without bloodshed. For that reason, most ejidatarios wanted to leave this 
- in their eyes - useless fight behind. For the same reasons, they were against the spending 
of ejido money on missions to Guadalajara and Mexico City or on meals and bribes for 
officials working on the case. 
However, although most ejidatarios did not believe in a solution anymore, particular 
political conjunctures could raise their enthusiasm again. This was the case when President 
Salinas (1988-1994) announced a fight against corruption in the MAR and promised to 
resolve land conflicts in Mexico. 
Resuming the Fight Against the Pequeños in 1991 
Salinas and his Modernization Discourse: New Policies, New Hopes 
President Salinas* discourse on modernization and his speeches on the eradication of 
corruption in the MAR had a considerable impact in La Canoa. The change of article 27 of 
the Mexican Constitution and the agrarian law in 1992 and the accompanying programs to 
register all ejido lands were also well received. Although mixed feelings existed with respect 
to the plans to privatize ejido land, ejidatarios liked the fact that all the lands would be 
measured and that the ejido borders would now finally be established. At least, this was what 
the president had promised. Interestingly, it were the leftist and most critical ejidatarios, like 
Iginio, Salvador, Ramón and Roberto who seemed most favorably disposed towards this 
president and to have high hopes for the resolution of the conflict of the "lost land". 
Obviously, in the case of La Canoa the marking of boundaries had a special implication. It 
meant that a measuring would take place which they had not been able to obtain in more than 
50 years. They hoped that in this way the conflict with the pequeños would finally be settled 
in their favor. 
Salvador related with great enthusiasm that the Mexican president himself had said that 
he wanted to stop the invasion of ejido lands by private landowners and that the ejido 
boundaries would be marked within a year: The president himself says that he wants the 
ejidos to communicate with him if there are problems. These messages that the agrarian 
conflicts would be settled in a short time raised many expectations among the other 
ejidatarios as well. For example, Iginio said: 
I think the problem will soon be resolved. President Salinas said that all the problems will 
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be resolved in the last two years of his presidency. I cannot wait to see the changes. Let's 
see if the government is really going to help us! On another occasion Iginio said: Salinas said 
that he wants that all the lands that officially belong to the ejidos will be given back to them 
in 1991. That will help us this time. At the same time Iginio added that the stories about the 
changes in the ejidos and the support for the agricultural sector almost seemed too beautiful. 
But even people who had been very pessimistic about the possibility of ever recovering 
the "lost land", now became amazingly optimistic. Manuel Pradera, for example, who had 
always been very pessimistic and reluctant about the case and did not have much of a fighting 
spirit, said in December 1991: / think that we will finally recover the land. There will be 
conflicts with the pequeños but we will solve them peacefully. Yet, other people were less 
impressed by Salinas* promises. According to José Romero with the new agrarian law and 
programs it would be more difficult than ever for La Canoa to recover the lands: Now that 
the ejido will be privatized and cease to exist, it is very improbable that they will return land 
to the ejido. 
An Executive Committee (1991-1994) With a Hidden Agenda 
In chapter six we saw that a small group of ejidatarios who were motivated by Salinas' 
messages organized a planilla for the elections of the executive committee of the ejido in 
1991. They had a clear agenda in mind and had organized the planilla with the aim of taking 
up the fight against the pequeños if they won the elections. Their planilla won by a large 
majority and so the way was opened for them to manipulate the members of the committee 
for their project. We will follow this group from 1991 to 1994 and see that the strategies and 
the constellation of the group changed several times. Interestingly, the central person in this 
three-year period became doña Lupe, the widow of the late don Miguel. Women had been 
active in ejido matters before. For example, Teresa, Macario's wife had often participated 
in the meetings and the missions for the "lost land" in the 1970s. However, this was the first 
time in the history of the ejido of La Canoa that a woman had such a dominant and public 
role in ejido matters. I will first present the members of the executive committee and discuss 
their position with respect to the "lost land" when they took office in 1991. 
Raúl Pradera: Ejido Commissioner Against his Will 
As we saw in chapter six, Raúl was not very enthusiastic about being a candidate for ejido 
commissioner in the 1991 elections. He was a shy, not very decisive person and like the 
majority of ejidatarios he preferred not to have any responsibility in the ejido. He was 55 
years old and married to Magdalena, a niece of Ricardo García. They had never had 
children. Raúl only had a small plot of rainfed land and a couple of cows. However, he also 
administered the ejido plots of two of his brothers who were ill and without children. Iginio 
and Salvador had insisted strongly on him being the candidate for ejido commissioner and 
in the end he gave in. Raúl knew that Iginio and Salvador had proposed him with the idea 
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of tackling the question of the "lost land". He told them that he was prepared to work for 
the ejido but only with the support of the other ejidatarios and in a legal way. Like many 
other ejidatarios, Raul had mixed feelings about the "lost land". He had heard stories about 
people occupying lands of La Canoa and was willing to work for the ejido to try to get these 
lands back. Raul was also encouraged by the new government discourse of democracy and 
stories about the final settlement of land conflicts and marking of ejido boundaries. He 
thought that perhaps this could help them. On the other hand, Raul thought that it would be 
very difficult to win against the private landowners who would always go to the MAR in 
Guadalajara to bribe the officials. Raul clearly did not have a personal drive to go after the 
"lost land": he did not have children. So the unpleasant prospect of having children for 
whom there is no land available anymore and who "are forced" to go and find a living in the 
United States did not play a role for rum. The fight for the "lost land" was for him a service 
to the community. He wanted to do it for them. He saw it as his duty. 
Vicente Garcia: Ejido Secretary and Spy 
Vicente was one of the younger ejidatarios. He was in his thirties and had four young 
children. He had a special relation with his uncle Ricardo Garcia who had looked after 
Vicente after his father was murdered thirty years ago. 3 Vicente inherited his father's land 
and later bought private property lands. Salvador and Iginio had proposed Vicente Garcia as 
secretary in theplanilla as a strategic move to win the elections with Garcia votes. However, 
everybody around the executive committee seemed to have mixed feelings about Vicente. 
They knew about his close attachment to his uncle Ricardo who possessed part of the "lost 
land" and was one of the "enemies" in this fight. In the beginning they thought that perhaps 
Vicente would really be prepared to work for the "lost land". In 1991, shortly after the 
elections I asked Iginio if he felt sure about Vicente fighting against his uncle Ricardo. Iginio 
answered: He will have to. We will demand it from him. 
However, the idea that Vicente was a spy for his uncle in time became very strong. The 
feeling grew that Vicente informed his uncle about what the group was doing and even 
passed important documents on to him. These feelings about Vicente's loyalty to his uncle 
were probably correct. This became clear to me during an interview I had with Vicente and 
his wife shortly after the elections. When I was talking with Vicente about the question of 
the "lost land", Vicente's wife Ana interfered and wanted to know from her husband 
precisely what his position was and why he did not work more actively with the other 
members of the executive committee. 
Ana: But then you should join forces and you should accompany the executive committee on 
their trip to Mexico City. 
Vicente: Don't you understand?! I cannot do things like that. My uncle Ricardo would think 
that I am doing this against him. I cannot possibly do that. 
Hence, Vicente himself felt very uncomfortable with the situation and did not intend to 
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become a spy in the sense of secretly working for his uncle. His loyalty towards his uncle 
was primary to him and he wanted no secrets about it. 
Doña Lupe: Treasurer and Worrying Mother 
The case of Doña Lupe was especially interesting as she had been the second wife of the late 
don Miguel, the cause of all the trouble. Miguel had married Lupe when his first wife had 
died and most of his children were already married and had left home. Don Miguel was in 
his fifties then and Lupe was twenty five. Lupe was born in a village on the coast of Jalisco. 
At the age of five she lost her mother and at the age of eight she lost her father. A priest 
then brought her to the Michel family, an important hacendado family in Autlán. Two 
unmarried sisters of the Michel family agreed to look after the young girl. When she grew 
older, Lupe started working at the market place in Autlán. It is there that she met Miguel, 
who used to buy his coffee at her stall. 
After the wedding Lupe came to live with Miguel in La Canoa. Miguel and Lupe had 
seven children. Miguel died thirteen years ago when he was in his eighties. Lupe always 
spoke with great affection and admiration about her late husband. Miguel left Lupe eight 
hectares of rainfed land near the village, the house, and animals. Lupe had already started 
a shop years ago when Miguel grew older. For the last couple of years, she has also 
managed the only telephone in the village. She lived of the money she earned in the shop and 
the telephone and a small allowance she received after her husband's death. One of her 
daughters in the United States also sent her money on a regular basis. The land was 
administered by Juan, her only son in the village who lives with her in the house, together 
with his wife and young son. 
All of Lupe's children, except Juan, live in the United States, in Los Angeles and Las 
Vegas. Juan drinks a lot which makes Lupe despair. Sometimes she called her sons in the 
States and asked them to come back to the village. She said that her house was big enough 
for several families. They could also build more rooms outside the house as she owned quite 
an extensive terrain around the house. Lupe said that there was enough land and income from 
the shop for several families to live off. On several occasions she happily told me that one 
of her sons had decided to come back with his family. But they never came. Lupe worried 
a lot about her children in the United States and prayed for them often. She had good reasons 
to worry as one of her sons was involved in drugs and had been in jail together with other 
boys from La Canoa. When they had asked Lupe to be part of the planilla, she first refused 
and told them to look for a better person. However, when they continued insisting she finally 
accepted but said that she hoped that the question of "that land" would never be touched 
again. Lupe had heard rumors in the ejido that her late husband Miguel had given ejido land 
away to a brother of his. She said that she never knew about this but she did not deny the 
possibility either. Yet, despite her hesitations, Lupe was to become the fiercest fighter for 
the "lost land". 
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The Struggle Begins: Licenciado Salazar 
So far, we have seen that the central group in the ejido after the elections of 1991 was very 
heterogeneous. Of the executive committee (Raúl, Vicente, and Lupe) nobody was really 
interested in going after the "lost land". The "initiators" had to pressurize them to go on 
missions and put pressure on the MAR. The people who most actively wanted to fight for 
the "lost land" were Iginio, Ignacio, Salvador, Ramón, and Roberto. Two ejidatarios of La 
Canoa living in Autlán also participated. 
One of Raul's first official tasks as commissioner was to go to Mexico City where he 
was summoned with respect to problems in the procedures for measuring the ejido borders. 
On this visit he received one of the provisional maps the ejido already had in tenfold. For 
Raul this trip to the metropolis was a frightening experience, even though he was 
accompanied by two other men. After this trip, there were several general ejido meetings 
about the "lost land" and how they should deal with the problem. They also went on trips 
to the MAR office in Guadalajara. However, nothing spectacular happened until September 
1992 when Lupe had a talk with the parish priest of the church in Autlán. 
Doña Lupe was a very religious woman and maintained good relations with the parish 
priest Father López in Autlán. She kept in regular contact with him in order to organize 
religious events and pilgrimages to nearby villages. She would not easily bother him with 
"more earthly" problems but one day in September 1992, when she felt that their activities 
to get the ejido map were leading nowhere, she summoned up her courage and decided to 
talk about it with Father López. She made a phone call and Father López listened to her 
story. He said that he knew a lawyer in Guadalajara who was very experienced in agrarian 
problems and who could probably help them. By chance, the lawyer would come to Sayula, 
a town nearby, next Monday. According to Lupe: Everything was arranged, as if ordered 
by God. Lupe informed Raúl and it was decided that Lupe would go with Ramón to the 
meeting in Sayula. 
On Monday the delegation from La Canoa went to Sayula and met the lawyer Salazar 
who arrived with several bodyguards. Father López was present as well and Lupe and Ramón 
were cordially invited to an abundant meal with meat and fish. Salazar listened to their story 
and said that he had a lot of experience with agrarian matters and that he could certainly help 
them. He assured them that La Canoa would get the land back and he promised that he 
would personally take care of their case. He added that it would "rain money" in La Canoa 
as it was a large tract of land that they would recover. At this occasion they gave him 2.5 
millions ($ 830) from the ejido funds as a down payment. 
It had been Lupe's personal initiative to contact Father López and she had not discussed 
it with anybody. However, the others thought it was a good initiative. It was obvious that 
a priest could be an important broker and that was exactly what they were looking for, 
someone with influential contacts who could ensure that the ejidatarios of La Canoa were 
244 Chapter 7 
taken seriously. They all agreed that on their own they would never achieve anything with 
the agrarian bureaucracy. All the people working on the "lost land" were very enthusiastic 
about Salazar. As Salazar was a friend of a respected priest they were very optimistic. These 
were rare moments when a feeling of "togetherness" and team-spirit in the group developed 
and they all agreed about what to do. 
In the following months Salazar visited the region a couple of times. He had also taken 
up other cases Father López had asked him to look at. When Salazar came to Autlán he met 
with the ejidatarios at the church of Father López. On one occasion he visited La Canoa and 
went to the house of the ejido commissioner Raúl. Raúl was ill at that time and could not 
leave his house. This was the only time Salazar and Raúl met. Raúl preferred not to go on 
missions and was happy that others were prepared to do the work. 
Salazar made clear that he wanted more money from the ejidatarios. Not for himself, as 
he explained, but to bribe officials in the MAR. He explained to them that he did not 
approve of these practices and that he knew that it was illegal but that otherwise nothing 
would be achieved. The ejidatarios know from experience that nothing can be done without 
bribes and they were eager to use the money the ejido had earned with the sale of the pasture 
of the commons to bribe some officials. Anyhow, these bribes were nothing compared to the 
value of the land they were about to recover! So a delegation from La Canoa went to 
Guadalajara to visit Salazar at his house and paid him 11.5 million ($ 3,800). Lupe and 
Vicente went as members of the executive committee. They were accompanied by Iginio and 
Ramón. The following anecdote is illustrative of the way the ejidatarios move around the big 
city. They arrived in Guadalajara by bus and continued by train. However, Lupe got out of 
the train too early and they lost her. When the three men returned to the station where she 
got off the train, she had disappeared. The men were worried and decided to go to Salazar's 
house and see if she was there. But when they arrived at Salazar's house, it appeared that 
Lupe had not arrived or phoned. Now they were really worried. While they were talking 
about what to do, Lupe finally arrived. Fortunately, she had the address and the telephone 
number of the licenciado and she had arrived by taxi. She had been very worried herself as 
she carried the 11.5 million pesos for Salazar. 
Salazar showed them the letter he had written for the case of La Canoa and which would 
be sent to the President Salinas. The ejidatarios were very pleased with this letter and signed 
with gratitude. The letter was then sent away. The ejidatarios received a receipt for the 11.5 
million pesos they paid Salazar. During this first visit to Salazar's house, the ejidatarios met 
other members of Salazar's family: his wife and mother. The ejidatarios were impressed by 
the security measures that were taken. They had to pass several doors which were 
immediately locked with keys. Together with the bodyguards they saw in Sayula, they 
interpreted this as a clear indication of the fact that Salazar was an important man who had 
made many enemies in his fight for the poor ejidatarios. Salazar said that the matter would 
be settled in a couple of months. 
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For Vicente Garcia this visit to Salazar was the only occasion he participated in a mission 
during his period as ejido secretary. After this trip he asked Lupe for the documents to make 
some copies. Lupe was reluctant but as he insisted so much she gave him the papers. Vicente 
returned them the following day. However, everybody in the group was convinced that 
Vicente had made these copies to show them to his uncle Ricardo and tell him what they 
were up to with Salazar. 
The Letter to the Mexican President 
village: La Canoa 
municipality: Autlan 
state: Jalisco 
Subject: complementary execution and marking of boundaries of the endowment and extension grant 
Lie. Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
President of Mexico 
Raul Pradera, Vicente Garcia, Lupe Medina, respectively chairman, secretary, and treasurer of the executive 
committee of the ejido La Canoa, municipality Autlan, Jalisco appear before you through this letter, representing 
the ejidatarios belonging to the endowment and first extension of the agrarian community mentioned above, with 
the aim of asking for your valuable intervention as the highest agrarian authority in our country, with the object 
of resolving the agrarian problems affecting our ejido, for that reason we take the liberty with all respect, to 
relate the following history; 
On the 14th of July of 1937, our ejido was endowed by Presidential Resolution with 1843-00-00 hectares of 
pasture lands of which 20% was arable, encumbering the properties of La Canoa and La Herradura, in the 
municipality of Autlan, Jalisco. 
On the 11th of February 1938, the Presidential order of 14th July 1937, was executed, which endowed our 
agrarian community with 1843-00-00 hectares for 46 plots, including the school plot, for the use of the 
petitioners, leaving under reserve the rights of 67 individuals in order that the creation of an agrarian population 
center would be promoted, encumbering the estates La Canoa, La Herradura and La Piedra or Ixcuintle. 
On the 20th May of 1942, the Presidential Resolution was pronounced, that granted our ejido 191-00-00 
hectares of lands of different qualities, of which at the execution of the Presidential order we only received 76-
00-00 hectares in possession and which are those we till at the moment. 
But the point is, SR. PRESIDENT, that with respect to the endowment grant of our ejido, we lack 
approximately 540-00-00 hectares to arrive at the 1843-00-00 hectares that were granted to our ejido, and that 
at the moment we do not have them all, requesting from this moment a general marking of boundaries and at 
the same time the carrying out of the complementary execution in our agrarian community, interpreting 
faithfully the Presidential Resolution dated the 14th of July 1937. 
In the same way we have to clarify SR.LIC.CARLOS SALINAS that with respect to our first extension grant 
of our Ejido La Canoa, municipality Autlan, Jalisco, we were not given the total amount of 191-00-00 hectares 
of lands of different quality granted to us either, and that we only possess and use 76-00-00 hectares, for which 
reason we request that from this moment, the 115-00-00 hectares remaining be turned over to us in order to 
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fulfill the Presidential Resolution dated the 20th of May of 1942. 
This means SR. PRESIDENT, that the Presidential Orders that allotted our ejido an endowment grant and 
a first extension grant were not legally executed, and that in total approximately 655-00-00 hectares of which 
80% are arable lands and 20% mountainous pasture lands remain to be handed over, for that reason LIC. 
CARLOS SALINAS, it is urgent for us that as soon as possible you send instructions to THE MINISTER OF 
AGRARIAN REFORM, LIC. VICTOR CERVERA PACHECO, so that he gives instructions to personnel of 
the Dirección General de Tenencia de la Tierra and that they proceed with the execution of the Presidential 
Resolutions of the Endowment Grant and First Extension Grant, in the same way we request that the 
Presidential agreement of land purchase dated the 23rd of October of 1950, signed by the President of the 
Republic LIC. MIGUEL ALEMÁN VALDEZ, is carried out so that the lands bought from and paid to SR. 
ANASTACIO MICHEL can be incorporated into the ejido regime. 
What we presented to you here SR. LIC.CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI, PRESIDENT OF MEXICO, 
is the real truth of the problems our agrarian community is facing, and the urgent necessity of the execution of 
Presidential Resolutions, is because we need the remaining lands, as we have very little arable lands and the 
lands that by chance remain to be handed over to us are almost entirely lands that can be used for agriculture, 
which of course would benefit all members of our community by naturally making a fair distribution of the 
lands that can be used for agriculture among those who deserve to receive them according to the economic 
contributions made to resolve the present problem, which our ejido suffers, in the same way, we ask you with 
all respect to order the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, and more concretely, the Secretary of the Department to 
send personnel and to proceed with the constitution of the Center of Ejido Population, which is mentioned in 
our Presidential Resolution dated the 14th of July of 1937, marking of course the best place for the 
Establishment of the Population Center, which will be formed by the 67 ejidatarios with rights under reserve, 
and also by the sons of ejidatarios of the endowment as well as the extension grant of our ejido. 
We would like to thank you in advance SR. PRESIDENT CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI, as highest 
agrarian authority in our country, for the favorable solution to the problems we set out to you. 
Yours faithfully, 
La Canoa, mun. Autlán, Jalisco 8th October 1992. 
The Executive committee of the ejido La Canoa 
Raúl Pradera Vicente García Lupe Medina 
presidente secretary treasurer 
(signed by Iginio) 
ex . Lie. Victor Cervera Pacheco, Minister of Agrarian Reform, Mexico City 
c.c.C. Minister of Agrarian Affairs, Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Mexico City 
c.c.C. Director of Land Tenancy, Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Mexico City 
ex . Lie. Carlos Rivera Aceves, Governor of State of Jalisco 
ex. Lie. Alejandro Pelayo, Delegate of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in the State of Jalisco 
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The ejidatarios were very happy with the letter to the Mexican President. First of all they 
liked the fact that the Mexican President was addressed and in this way incorporated into 
their struggle. Being the highest authority in the country his involvement could make a real 
difference in their struggle for the land. Secondly, they liked the number of hectares Salazar 
had calculated. Not all the members of the group had an idea of the amount of hectares that 
La Canoa missed, but the amount of 540 hectares certainly seemed on the "right side". 
Thirdly, they were pleased by the reference made to the people who had always been active 
in the fight for the land and that they should be compensated for their efforts when the land 
was to be recovered. This letter to the President only circulated in the small group and was 
not presented at the general ejido assembly or to other ejidatarios. 
As it was through Lupe that Father Lopez had brought La Canoa into contact with 
Salazar, she seemed the right person to follow up on this relation. Furthermore, she was the 
one who managed the only telephone in the village which made her position even more 
central. Her central role was emphasized by the fact that she was the only one Salazar 
wanted to inform and always asked for. Raul, who would have been the more obvious person 
being the commissioner and official representative of the ejido, was glad to have Lupe take 
over this responsibility. He did not want to lose much time on the case and preferred others 
doing the work. Raul always felt insecure in relation to lawyers and engineers and did not 
feel very capable of handling these matters. So, gradually and without it ever being formally 
or informally decided, Lupe became "the person in charge". 
More Expenses and Fantastic Stories at the CNC 
When more paperwork needed to be done, the ejidatarios visited Salazar at his office at the 
CNC (the national peasant confederation, affiliated to the ruling party, the PRI). They were 
impressed by the number of secretaries working for him. There they also met the secretary 
general of the CNC Jalisco who talked about the problems he always had with large 
landowners in his struggle to obtain land for the ejidos. They also met Salazar and the 
secretary general at a CNC meeting in Autlan where they discussed what else had to be done. 
The latter told the ejidatarios that his brother was killed because of a land conflict he was 
dealing with. On another occasion Salazar described them how he himself had once been put 
in prison because he had succeeded in taking land away from large landowners which was 
then given to ejidatarios. Lupe and the others were very pleased with these stories as this 
proved to them that these men knew how to deal with difficult land problems and had a real 
fighting spirit. 
According to Lupe, Salazar had good connections with President Salinas and had direct 
access to Los Pinos (the presidential residence). She asserted that Salazar was one of the 
national leaders of the CNC. When I said to her that if that was true his name should appear 
in the newspapers and on television, she recognized that this was not the case. However, 
these logical objections could not temper her enthusiasm. These fantasies about the "right 
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connection" and influential positions, were also generated by Salazar himself. For example, 
on the many occasions that Lupe made a telephone call to Salazar's house to ask what was 
going on and why nothing had happened, Salazar or his wife used to talk about the other 
important matters he was involved in or the meetings Salazar had with the state governor or 
the director of an organization, and so on. 
On several occasions Salazar said that he needed more money and they took money to 
him in Guadalajara three more times. By the beginning of 1992 they had paid him 23 million 
pesos ($ 7,600): partly from ejido funds and partly from contributions by individual 
ejidatarios. Salazar explained that the total amount they would have to pay him was 32 
million pesos ($ 10,600), but that the remaining part could be paid when the ejido received 
the land. If necessary they could sell part of this land in order to pay him, he told them. The 
ejidatarios liked the prospect of selling part of the new land as in this way they could also 
recover the ejido funds which they already used for Salazar without the consent of the ejido 
assembly. The ejidatarios only received receipts for 14 million pesos ($ 4,600). Naturally, 
the question of receipts is rather awkward in an "atmosphere of bribes". However, the 
ejidatarios were well aware that in the future they, and especially Lupe, who was ejido 
treasurer, could be asked to render accounts of the spending of ejido money to the other 
ejidatarios. They knew that if everything went well, nobody would bother about the spending 
of this money. However, the question of receipts became increasingly important to them 
when they did not feel sure about the outcome of their actions. 
Every day Lupe became more enthusiastic about the prospect of new land for the ejido 
and her sons. People who came to her shop sometimes said that it would be better to save 
the ejido money rather than go on missions and spend it on a lawyer. But Lupe did not let 
herself be discouraged. Lupe was animated and full of hope. Salazar raised more hopes and 
expectations by asking the people what kind of project they would like to have for La Canoa, 
once they received the land. He could arrange an additional project for them. Salazar said 
that they could mink about a chicken farm for the ejido. However, Lupe thought of a paper 
factory as they could use the waste from the sugarcane refinery in the area for the production 
of paper. She even talked about her plans with Zufliga, leader of the sugarcane producers of 
the CNC in the region. Zufliga said that it seemed a good plan to him. With respect to the 
land they would recover, Salazar promised to bring police forces from Mexico City if things 
got out of hand. He told them again that they should be very careful that the private 
landowners did not know about the letter they had sent to the Mexican President. 
Expectations ran even higher in the small "group of the lost land" when Salazar asked 
them to make precise plans for the land they were about to recover. Part of the land would 
be used for a new residential area where houses could be built. Another part would be used 
for the building of the paper factory. The remaining part would be used for 25 plots of about 
three hectares for "sons of ejidatarios". They also incorporated plots of eight hectares for 
each of the pequenos propietarios who would lose their land. This was a generous gesture, 
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but it was also a way of easing their own minds. Lupe in particular sometimes felt bad about 
taking the land away from the pequeños. She hoped that by leaving them eight hectares each 
everything could be resolved without serious problems. She very much hoped that everything 
could be settled harmoniously. However, problems were to be expected not only with "the 
enemy", but within the ejido itself as well. The question of the 25 individual plots naturally 
was a delicate issue. There were a lot more than 25 "sons of ejidatarios" interested in plots 
of land. So, who was going to take the decision on the distribution of the new plots? 
Amusingly, this was decided by Ramón who was not even a member of the executive 
committee! He established the list in consultation with Lupe and Iginio. Raúl, the 
commissioner, was not even involved. Naturally, the sons of Lupe, Iginio, and Ramón were 
well represented in the list. They put two sons of Ramón who live in Guadalajara on the list 
as well as two sons of Iginio and two sons of Lupe who live in the United States. Raúl would 
also receive one plot. Monica, the teacher from La Canoa, who lives in Guadalajara and 
always supported them, was also listed as one of the beneficiaries. In order to justify their 
decisions to themselves when they talked about it, or to me when I asked about it, they 
repeated the stories about the sacrifices they and other people had made in the past, for this 
case. After they had made the decision, the list was sent to the MAR office in Mexico City. 
It was never discussed at an ejido meeting and never made public. 
Meetings in Small Groups and the Forging of a Conspiracy 
It was a loose configuration of persons who worked together for the "lost land", who took 
decisions and went on missions. In fact, they never all gathered together. Raul, Iginio, 
Salvador, Lupe, and Ramón visited each other frequently to talk about the issue. However, 
only two or three of them would meet and deliberate and then talk to one or two of the 
others. There were not long-standing relations of friendship or close kinship between them 
either. Naturally, there existed the long-standing relationships of people who have lived 
together in a small village for a long time and share certain knowledge and memories. But 
before this executive committee was elected in 1991, these people did not visit each other. 
In other words, they did not form part of each other's "socializing circles" (see chapter 
two). 
After they started working with Salazar they no longer discussed the question of the "lost 
land" at the ejido meetings. It was Raúl and Lupe (both members of the executive committee) 
together with Iginio Nunez and Ramón Romero (not members of the executive committee) 
who decided to use the ejido money for the bribes. Decisions about the missions to Autlán 
or Guadalajara were also taken within small groups. The ejido assembly was hardly ever 
informed about their trips nor about the spending of money. However, the "group of the lost 
land" did not feel completely at ease about their way of operating. They argued that actually 
the ejido assembly should decide on these trips and should at least be informed about the 
money that was spent. In December 19921 asked Lupe if they were taking all these decisions 
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with Salazar without informing the ejido assembly. She responded: Yes, at the moment we 
do not talk about this at the ejido meetings. But we will soon have to inform them about the 
spending of the ejido money. This has to be done with great discretion. For me it is a heavy 
burden. I am responsible for the ejido money and we have already spent 19 million. 
However, on the other hand, there were several good reasons justifying their silence. First 
of all, talking about their projects at a general ejido assembly would cause a lot of problems 
as a large number of people would be opposed to spending ejido money on this conflict. So 
asking for consent at the ejido assembly would probably mean that they would be hampered 
in their freedom of action. Secondly, they argued that few ejidatarios attended the meetings. 
Thus, convening a meeting would be useless anyhow. Thirdly, according to their 
"conspiracy" theories a high degree of secrecy was required. Otherwise, the enemy would 
know what they were doing and all their efforts would have been in vain. Salazar and Father 
Lopez had also emphasized that they should work as secretly as possible. Father Lopez had 
even warned Lupe that some people of La Canoa were talking too much and that they had 
to be more careful. 
Father Lopez himself was getting into trouble because of his involvement in the conflict 
of La Canoa. He was known as a politically involved priest and already had several enemies 
among the elite in Autlan. Not only did he try to help several ejidos who had problems with 
private landowners, but he also interfered in other political matters. For example, when 
Cardinal Posadas was murdered under suspicious circumstances at the airport in Guadalajara 
in 1993, Lopez wrote a critical article about the Mexican government in an important 
national journal. He also used to go to the meetings of the municipal authorities to hear what 
was going on. If people objected to his presence he said that he was sent by the bishop. 
However, most of the times the bishop had not sent him at all. On the contrary, the bishop 
had warned Lopez to stay out of politics. The private landowners in Autlan soon learned that 
Lopez was helping the ejidatarios of La Canoa. Lopez was told by one of the private 
landowners to stop mis interference, adding that Lopez was "playing with gunpowder". 
The Ejido Commissioner Becomes Nervous 
Raul, the commissioner, who had participated in this way of working from the beginning, 
started feeling increasingly uncomfortable with the situation. Rumors were being spread in 
the village about the lawyer and the ejido money. The total amount of money that the ejido 
had paid to the lawyer varied in the different stories, but most ejidatarios knew more or less 
what was going on. The ejidatarios also knew soon enough that a list had been made for the 
beneficiaries of the "lost land". However, as they did not believe in the recovery of the land, 
they were not bothered about the list either. What bothered them was the - in their eyes -
completely pointless spending of ejido funds. Although Lupe was seen as the central person 
in the matter, the ejidatarios held Raul responsible and in the streets they talked to him and 
criticized him for letting this happen. Although Raul felt uncomfortable and actually agreed 
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with the critique of the ejidatarios he did not want to jeopardize the efforts of the people 
working on the "lost land'', nor did he want to criticize Lupe. He became increasingly 
nervous and even signing documents seemed a tricky question for him. He feared that the 
pequenos and the MAR would get him to sign documents saying that La Canoa renounced 
their rights to the 'lost lands". As the official documents are written in an official procedural 
language that is hard to decipher for the ejidatarios, his fear was understandable. What for 
Raul was even worse than being criticized for letting Lupe arbitrarily spend ejido money was 
the idea that he could be blamed for the defeat of the ejido and forever held responsible for 
this by the entire ejido community. For that reason, Raul avoided signing all documents. For 
example, when he was called to come to sign documents at the MAR office in Autlan he did 
not go. Generally, these were documents that had nothing to do with the "lost land" but 
referred to other matters. 
More Dealings with Salazar and Growing Doubts 
In January 1993, Salazar told Lupe that he had finally obtained the definitive map of the 
ejido La Canoa. He would come to the ejido to measure the land and see whether the borders 
of the ejido coincided with the map. He asked Lupe to come to the plaza in Autlan. He 
would meet her there to give her the map of the ejido and the official letter of the land 
transfer, signed by the Mexican President. He said that La Canoa was the first ejido in 
Mexico whose problems would now be resolved. Lupe went to Autlan and waited the whole 
day. Salazar never arrived. Afterwards, Lupe was told that Salazar had had an accident on 
the way to Autlan and had been busy all day keeping the people who were involved in the 
accident out of prison. Lupe gradually developed mixed feelings about the licenciado and his 
heroic stories. She told me, for example: I do not believe that this letter is signed by the 
president. A president does not sign these documents himself. 
Lupe was in constant contact with Salazar and his family. She had his home telephone 
number and phoned him regularly. Most of the time Salazar was away and his mother or 
wife talked to Lupe. Some weeks later Lupe said to me that Salazar was lying to her all the 
time when he said that he was so busy. Lupe: When he wants to come to Autlan, they always 
call him away for other matters. The other day he planned to come to La Canoa, but then 
he had to inaugurate a dam.... Some weeks later Salazar told her that next week the 
engineers would come to measure the land and that he himself would visit La Canoa on 
Saturday. But Lupe was already preparing herself for new disappointments: / do not believe 
that the engineers will come this week. And Salazar won't come either. Lawyers do not work 
on Saturday. Sure enough, the engineers did not arrive, nor did Salazar. 
Several ejidatarios who had been enthusiastic about Salazar in the beginning were losing 
faith. However, they had no clear ideas about what exactly was going on. For example, when 
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I asked Iginio for his opinion he said that Salazar was not necessarily corrupt but certainly 
did not give priority to La Canoa. Raúl also said that it was difficult for him to judge Salazar 
as he only met him on one occasion. During a long period people were not sure about 
Salazar and were moderate in their opinion about him. The point is that it was very difficult 
for everybody to judge where the obstacles in their fight were coming from. They always had 
to base their opinion on scarce and contradictory information, insinuations, rumors, and 
unintelligible documents. When more time passed without anything happening, opinions about 
Salazar became more negative and he was considered to be a "corrupt th ief who had robbed 
La Canoa of a large amount of money. 
The actions around the lawyer and the "lost land" became the territory of an increasingly 
smaller group. The "group of the lost land" was reduced to two persons now, Lupe and 
Ramón. Raúl was often hardly aware of what they were doing or when they went on 
missions. Lupe liked to work with Ramón as he was one of the persons who knew most 
about the conflict between the ejido and the pequeños. Furthermore, he worked with great 
enthusiasm and did not mind spending time and energy on the case. He had a lot of 
experience from former missions for the "lost land" and according to Lupe he "talked well" 
when dealing with officials and lawyers. Salvador and Roberto were both too old to 
participate very much and Iginio was a difficult man to work with. He was very stubborn and 
always used to blame others when things went wrong. 
In the years in which Ramón had participated in missions and when he himself was 
commissioner, he had collected many documents of the ejido which he guarded in plastic 
bags in his house. Some documents were copies of documents of the ejido archive. Others 
were originals that were lacking in the ejido archive. This "private ejido archive" was of a 
great help when Raúl became more negative about the case and refused to give documents 
to Lupe. Then she could always ask Ramón for documents. Lupe often wanted Ramón to 
phone Salazar but although Ramón phoned him from time to time, they never did give him 
any information. The only person the licenciado and his family wanted to deal with was 
Lupe. 
Lupe also started incorporating Teresa as she did not like to be the only woman when 
they had to go on missions. As was mentioned above Teresa had had an active role in the 
struggle for the lost land 20 years ago when her husband Macario was commissioner. Teresa 
was still enthusiastic about the case. As Macario worked and lived in the United States and 
she did not have small children at home anymore, she could easily accompany Lupe. She 
lived in the house opposite Lupe's, so she often walked in to ask what had happened and 
how things were going. Teresa also hoped for land for her sons who were working in el 
Norte now. 
They were summoned by Salazar to come to Guadalajara several more times. On one 
occasion Salazar told them to come to Guadalajara in order to accompany the engineer who 
would do the measuring work in La Canoa. Lupe went with Ramón and they were both very 
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excited. They waited three days at the MAR waiting for the engineer and only left the MAR 
office to have lunch or to sleep. In these three days, they tried to phone Salazar, but he was 
always away. Finally, on the third day, they met Serrano, the engineer responsible for La 
Canoa, but he did not accompany them to the village. He said that the orders for the mission 
to La Canoa had already been in his office for several weeks and that all this time he had 
been waiting for them to come. Now that they had finally arrived he would prepare his work. 
He sent them back home and said that he would let them know when he would arrive in the 
village. In the next weeks they did not hear anymore from him. 
Two months later, Salazar told them to come to Guadalajara again. He said that he had 
elaborated a new map of the ejido as the old one had been lost. The new map was ready and 
they could come and get it. Salazar summoned them to come to the office of the SARH in 
Guadalajara. As the ejido had run out of money they had to collect money from the 
individual ejidatarios and other interested people for this trip. Another way of financing 
missions was for every person to pay her or his own expenses. But in the end Lupe paid 
most of the missions and other expenses. This time Lupe asked Teresa, Ramón and Ignacio 
Alcázar to accompany her. Ignacio is an ejidatario of La Canoa who lives in Autlán and has 
always been involved in the struggle for the "lost land". The group from La Canoa went to 
the office Salazar had told them, but he never showed up. They sat there in the office waiting 
and looking at each other. Ramón had to go back the same day as he had people working in 
the sugarcane whom he had to pay. Teresa had to go back for the same reason. Ignacio has 
milking cows and did not want to stay either. So, they returned without anything having been 
achieved. Afterwards, I asked Lupe what she thought was going on. 
M: What do you think is going on? Is Salazar too busy, has he been bribed... ? 
L: I think it is partly that. I think the people at the office work against it because of money, 
or friendships with the landowners. 
I often sat in Lupe's shop to talk about the case. However, when people came in we always 
stopped the conversation or changed the subject. Sometimes the situation became awkward 
when Ricardo García or his wife or daughters entered the shop to make a phone call. Lupe 
was always very friendly to them, especially to the daughters. She once said that she felt 
sorry for them as they would lose the land. But the fight had to go on otherwise La Canoa 
would'lose the land forever. On another occasion she told me that she regretted very much 
having talked about their fight with Rosa Romero. The point is that a daughter of Rosa is 
married to Pepe Mendoza, son of Salvador Mendoza, owner of part of the land that belongs 
to La Canoa. According to Lupe tilings went wrong from the moment she informed Rosa. 
She presumed that Rosa had talked to her daughter and that they had arranged things in 
Guadalajara. 
Although Lupe remained hopeful, after this visit to Guadalajara Teresa too seemed to have 
lost her faith in Salazar 
T: He is lying all the time and Lupe cannot get to him anymore. He is never at 
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home, or the telephone is occupied. His wife always says that he is on 
mission. But lawyers also have the weekends free! Another reason for my loss 
of faith is that at a previous meeting in Guadalajara, when we took him out 
for dinner, he did not want to eat. He only took some toast with fish. We 
invited him to have more but he did not want to. He feels, of course, that he 
is not doing his work well and for that reason, he did not want to have more. 
But if he does not have time for our case, he should just say so. Another 
reason for not trusting him is that he never brought us any valuable document. 
The only thing he gave Ramón is a project map of the ejido. But what is that 
worth? We already had many of those. Solazar is also inventing stories. The 
other time, when he had to come to Autlan, he supposedly had a car accident. 
Last time, it was even worse: he was caught in a exchange of fire because of 
a land conflict he is working on.... Instead of making progress, we only go 
backwards! 
M: But what precisely do you think is going on? Do you think they bribed Solazar 
or is he just too busy? 
T: From what I can see, he is forgetting us. 
This answer is interesting as it indicates that something is going wrong but she still does not 
define the cause of the evil. She does not characterize Salazar as a good guy or a bad guy 
either. Evil can come from many different directions and can affect all people. This position 
towards Salazar was characteristic for all the people of the "group of the lost land". 
However, while Raúl, Teresa, Iginio and Ramón could easily say that they did not 
believe in Salazar anymore, for Lupe the implications of "giving up" on him were more 
severe. As ejido treasurer she was responsible for the money they had spent on him. 
Furthermore, she was the one who had brought the ejido into contact with Salazar. So, for 
her the implications were more serious. That was the reason she held on. She wanted to 
believe in Salazar. She kept phoning him and never broke off the relationship with him as 
hopes or "wishful minking" lingered on. However, her faith in the licenciado was eroding 
seriously. She laughed about - what she now considered to be - the lies Salazar had told her 
before and which she had believed. The one with the accident and the other one with the 
exchange of fire on his way to Autlán. But the laughing was painful for her. She was deeply 
upset by the whole affair and wanted to visit her children in the United States. They had 
already sent her the money to come over. Two of her children were having their marriages 
blessed in church and three grandchildren were going to be baptized. For Lupe, these 
religious events were very important and she longed to go. However, she still hesitated as 
Salazar had suggested that people would come soon to measure the land. Salazar told Lupe 
that she had to be around for the marking of boundaries but that everything would be over 
by the 20th of May. Then she could leave for the USA. By the 20th of May nothing had 
happened. 
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Shifting Constellations and Individual Frustrations 
During the year that they worked with Salazar the "group of the lost land" that had initiated 
the project before the elections of the executive committee of 1991 completely lost their 
harmony and team spirit. 
Salvador Quits 
Salvador, who together with Iginio had been the main organizer of this executive committee 
and who all this time had participated in discussions and decisions in the small group quite 
abruptly left the group. It never became clear to the others quite why. He told them that he 
was tired of all those years of fighting. Afterwards he told me that his decision was also 
influenced by pressure from his wife and children to abandon the case and by the fact that 
they had recently discovered that he had a serious illness. His wife told me that she was very 
happy that he had abandoned the case as she was afraid of the problems it could bring them. 
The people who continued fighting for the "lost land" believed that fear of what might 
happen to his family was Salvador's main motivation to quit. Still it was strange that from 
one day to another he changed from a strong supporter of the case into a strong opponent. 
He started warning the others of the bloody consequences their activities might have. He said 
that the pequeños would never have their land taken away from them without bloodshed. 
Although this was something that everybody was convinced of, it was strange to hear this 
talk coming from Salvador who had always had such a fighting spirit and used to use a 
"revolutionary" language. 
Salvador said that at the start he had had great faith in Salazar, but that he had lost it in 
the meantime. Salvador was a very religious person and he did not want to blame Father 
López in any way. According to Salvador, Father López had only recommended the 
licenciado but he had nothing more to do with the case. He was annoyed that everybody 
talked so openly about Father López' involvement as it could be dangerous for him. He 
added: / am tired of unjust people, all these missions and the people who always work against 
the ejido. I do not mind anymore if La Canoa does not recover the land. I am tired of it. On 
another occasion Salvador told me that La Canoa would never recover the land, because of: 
this corporation of bastards, these lawyers who do everything for money. Salvador could 
grow very angry and emotional when he recalled his experiences with the MAR in 
Guadalajara: This cochinada of corruption. The officials hid their faces and they hid the law. 
Salvador had been one of the obvious persons to be put on the list of beneficiaries for 
the new land as he had always supported the struggle. So Ramón and Lupe had proposed to 
put two of his children on the list. But Salvador refused. He did not want to have any 
member of his family on the list. Salvador told them: If this goes ahead people will be killed 
and I do not want my children to be involved in this. Lupe had responded that he should not 
be afraid as Salazar had promised to send soldiers to protect them, but Salvador had replied: 
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And will they stay with us for the rest of our lives? On several occasions Salvador severely 
criticized his comadre Lupe. He would say that she should quit or that otherwise people 
would be killed. He also said that he would hold her responsible if people would be killed. 
Iginio's Anger 
At this point, Iginio became very critical about everything and everybody. He and Salvador 
had organized the executive committee of the ejido in order to fight for the "lost land". Yet, 
now he had lost his fighting companion Salvador and was being sidelined by Lupe who did 
not invite him to go on the missions anymore. Furthermore, he had lost faith in the 
licenciado whom he now called "Lupe's licenciado". Although at the start he had been 
convinced about Salazar's good connections, he now said that it was nonsense that Salazar 
had direct access to the Mexican President. At the same time he became more critical of 
Father López. He did not accuse him of deceit but he expressed his disapproval of a priest 
handling agrarian matters: Perhaps I should not say so, but I think it is absurd that a priest 
interferes in agrarian problems. 
The fact that Lupe when organizing private meetings and missions clearly preferred 
Ramón to Iginio was resented by Iginio. Although most people preferred not to go on 
missions because of the time lost and the tiresome and frustrating interactions with MAR 
officials, for those interested in the case missions had their advantages. Information gathered 
during the missions was often withheld or documents carefully guarded. So, the only way 
of knowing what was going on was to be there. Participating in the missions was the only 
way to be on top of what was going on and that was what Iginio wanted. However, as long 
as Lupe was the one who controlled their relations with Salazar, Iginio could not do much 
about it. On several occasions Iginio told me that he did not understand why Lupe always 
wanted Ramón to accompany her. Iginio told Lupe that Ramón, being a Romero, was not 
to be trusted. He likes money, he said. According to Iginio, 15 years ago when Ramón was 
ejido commissioner he made arrangements with the private land owners. As he put it: He is 
of the same race as the Romeros who stole this land from us. 
Iginio now also started to adopt the accountability discourse of organization (see chapter 
six). He said that the money they spent on the licenciado was money from the community 
and that therefore they had to render accounts of their activities to the community. They 
could not work in secrecy. So, Iginio now started criticizing a way of working he had agreed 
to and participated in before. He also argued that it was not right that Ramón had made a list 
of beneficiaries of the new land as this should be decided by the whole ejido. Hence, now 
that Iginio could not control what was going on anymore, and no longer belonged to the 
circle of people who made the decisions, he used the accountability discourse to "retake 
control". 
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Raúl Tries to Resign 
Raúl, the commissioner, had also lost faith in Salazar and agreed with the other ejidatarios 
that it was wrong to spend ejido money on a hopeless case. Raúl was heavily criticized by 
Iginio for not doing enough as ejido commissioner, for being too scared, and so on. Raúl 
became tired of the whole affair: a lawyer who did not keep his promises, ejidatarios blaming 
him for badly spending ejido money, and members of the small group who criticized him for 
being scared. To make matters worse, one of his brothers fell seriously ill and Raúl himself 
had a horseriding accident. He had made a serious fall and hurt his back. Raúl had had 
enough! He decided to quit as ejido commissioner. Iginio Núñez, who was formally his 
deputy, was more than happy to take over. Rumors soon went around. Raul presented the 
accident with his horse and the fact that he had to spend time with his brother who was very 
ill as the reasons for his resignation. However, he said to me that the most important reason 
for him was the situation with the "lost land". People were criticizing him from all sides, 
there was no unity among the ejidatarios themselves, not even among the people who agreed 
to work on the case. He was fed up with it. 
Iginio was eager to take over as he had very strong feelings about what was going on in 
the ejido and what had to be done about it. As commissioner he could also control Lupe and 
become involved in the matter again. However, there was strong opposition from the other 
ejidatarios to the idea of Iginio taking over. Iginio was considered to be a difficult man and 
was not acceptable as commissioner to the majority of ejidatarios. He was known for always 
criticizing everybody and everything and not being able to work with anybody. However, the 
ejidatarios understood that Raúl wanted to resign. He was considered to be too weak by 
some. Others said that he was a good man, who could not bear these problems. They noticed 
that he had become very nervous lately. As was discussed in chapter six, these questions 
were speculated about in many circles but were not openly discussed at an ejido meeting. By 
not attending the meetings which Raúl convened to make his resignment, they tried to put 
pressure on Raúl to stay on, which he finally did. 
However Raúl still felt very unhappy about the whole situation: / still would like to 
resign, these people want me to go on with something that has no solution. What bothered 
Raúl most about the whole affair was the lack of unity in the ejido. He was now very much 
opposed to decisions being made by small groups and also started using the accountability 
discourse of organization. Raul also disagreed with the fact that Ramón had made the list of 
people who would receive the new ejido plots. When I spoke to Raúl, he said to me that this 
had to be decided at a meeting of the ejido. Raúl: 
Decisions have to be made in public, at the ejido meetings. I would have 
continued with the case if there would have been a majority. But we are not 
united. There are only two, three persons with an enormous faith. We should give 
it up now. Something that never happened in the past is not suddenly going to 
happen now. Furthermore, the people who possess these lands, have influential 
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contacts in the government, or they pay money. That is what we need for this 
case, money. And that is what we lack. Besides, imagine all these years that they 
already possess this land. That will not be taken away from them anymore. Even 
if we recovered the lands, the present owners would not accept it. You can find 
people who commit a murder for a million pesos. That is what will happen then. 
What can we do? Everywhere it is the same, it is useless! 
Indirect Forms of Accountability 
Gradually, the voices in the ejido critical of spending ejido money on the lawyer grew 
stronger. Now that it had become clear that nothing was going to be achieved, several 
ejidatarios wanted the ejido money back. José Romero, who had been treasurer in the former 
executive committee and who had built the kiosk with ejido money was one of the people 
who was very angry about the spending of ejido money on an unattainable goal. However, 
Raûl felt sorry for Lupe. In his view it was wrong that she organized small meetings to 
discuss these affairs. However, he did not blame her for the things that went wrong with the 
lawyer or the loss of the money. Raul told the protesting ejidatarios that they could ask Lupe 
for the money at an ejido assembly if they wanted to, but that he would not endorse such a 
claim. Yet, the ejidatarios found it difficult to call Lupe to order directly. She was criticized 
by people in the village for being a clever woman who looked after herself well. It was said 
that she earned good money from the shop and the administration of the only public 
telephone in the village. However, criticism of her was never very harsh. She was generally 
respected and her integrity as treasurer of the ejido was never in doubt. This was in contrast 
to some previous members of the executive committee in the ejido who were accused of 
spending ejido money on their personal projects. This executive committee was criticized for 
spending ejido money on a lost case, but it was not suggested that they had appropriated 
ejido resources for their own use or pleasure. While everybody was talking about the lawyer 
and the ejido money in informal circles, nobody wanted to take the initiative to ask Lupe 
formally to render accounts. 
However, under pressure from the ejidatarios Raul decided that the ejidatarios would no 
longer make payments to Lupe, who was the ejido treasurer. Instead Raul would collect the 
money for the tax and the sale of pasture from the commons. Lupe was hurt by this decision. 
For her this was a motion of no-confidence and she became very emotional when Raûl came 
to tell her this decision. Raûl felt sorry for Lupe. Yet, the next payment for the sale of a part 
of the pasture was made to Raûl. When Raûl had received most of the money of the pasture, 
he immediately spent it on the building of water reservoirs in the commons. In this way Raûl 
made sure that the money could not be spent on intermediaries and nobody in the ejido 
seemed to object to his decision. 
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Lupe's Frustration 
Lupe felt very alone as hardly anybody supported her anymore. She said to me that Raul was 
probably working on behalf of the rich people (the owners of the "lost land") because his 
wife is a niece of Ricardo García. Lupe was also annoyed by the lack of support from her 
own son Juan. Juan laughed at her efforts to recover the "lost land" and thought it a waste 
of time. On one occasion José Romero asked Juan if they were not afraid of Héctor Romero, 
who as former police officer in Autlán can easily mobilize police forces against the 
ejidatarios. When Juan told this to Lupe it made her nervous, but she said: God put this into 
my head and therefore I will carry on. However, Lupe did not sleep well anymore and 
thought about all the things that might happen to them. She felt not so much scared for 
herself as for Juan and his wife and young son. Ramón assured Lupe that if she dropped the 
case, he would continue. However, despite her illness and fears Lupe did not really think of 
dropping the case. As she said: I will finish what my husband wanted to do but did not 
succeed in doing. She still lived with the dream of her children and grandchildren living in 
La Canoa with their own plot of land. 
Now that she was no longer sure of Salazar, she started to worry about the money she 
had spent. She only had receipts of 15 million pesos but they had paid much more. She 
would not be able to prove this to the ejido assembly. Now that she felt so isolated in the 
village, she appreciated my company more and more and wanted me to stay with her in the 
shop. Sometimes she showed me the documents to convince me that it was really true that 
a commission was appointed for La Canoa or that a new map had been made. Generally I 
did not see in the documents the things she wanted me to see. Most of the time the 
documents only referred to numbers of other documents and letters and did not contain 
concrete information about missions. I told her that I had my doubts about the contents of 
the letters and gradually she showed me more and more documents to comment upon. 
Lupe continued working with Ramón. Although Ramón was prepared to go on supporting 
Lupe, he had also stopped believing in Salazar. Talking about the problems with the 
bureaucracy Ramón said: Mexicans like money. Here everything works with money, Even if 
you kill somebody with your car, you can avoid problems with money. This remark is 
interesting for several reasons. First of all, Ramón talked about Mexicans in a general way. 
No distinction was made between, for example, corrupt people and honest people, or between 
the honest ejidatarios and the corrupt officials. In this view everybody in Mexico is corrupt 
(or can be made corrupt) and this is the way the system and society works. The example 
Ramón gave about killing people with a car refers to himself. People who worked for him 
had been drinking and driving and had killed people with Ramon's car. So, Ramón himself 
had paid to stay out of trouble. With respect to the dangers they were running, Ramón said 
that he was not afraid that anything would happen to him in the fight for the land. Ramón: 
/ have a belief, everybody has his destiny. People will always die for the land. But if one dies 
in the struggle at least one knows that it has not been for nothing and that others will benefit 
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from it. 
Then Father López went to the MAR in Mexico City and when he returned he said that 
things were going well. He had had a talk with the Mexican president and he had talked with 
Salazar. Father López said that the 23 millions they had paid Salazar was very little as the 
people at the different offices asked for enormous bribes. Father López told Lupe not to 
worry. He also promised her that he would use his personal relations with Los Pinos (the 
presidential residence) to help them further. Father López told me that he had been to school 
with one of the guards of President Salinas and in this way he was able to arrange certain 
things. He also knew the Governor of Jalisco from a party where they had had a chat 
together and this was also a contact he could use. 
Alternative Projects 
Raul Places His Hope on PROCEDE 
By March 1993 the new agrarian institute, the Procuraduría Agraria had opened an office in 
Autlán and had started its work in the region. The following anecdote illustrates well the 
atmosphere of obscurity, distrust, and insecurity around land issues. When the Procuraduría 
Agraria (PA) had just started working in the region and ejidatarios had not yet heard much 
about them, the executive committee of the ejido was asked to come to the PA office in 
Autlán and bring the ejido stamp in order to sign some papers. Raúl and Lupe decided not 
to go as they were afraid that this might be a trick of "the enemy". As the committee from 
La Canoa never arrived at the PA office in Autlán, the officials of the PA decided to go to 
La Canoa themselves. By coincidence they did not find any member of the executive 
committee the day they went: Raúl was working in the fields, Lupe was in the church, and 
Vicente was in Autlán. Then the officials of the PA returned to Autlán and made a phone call 
from the office to make an appointment with the executive committee for another day. When 
they visited the ejido again on the agreed day, they explained that the form the executive 
committee had to sign was an official request for assistance with the elaboration of the 
internal ejido rules (something that did not have any relation with the recovery of the "lost 
land", see chapter nine). However, Lupe and Ramón still did not trust them and decided to 
call Salazar before signing the document. Salazar told them that there was no harm in signing 
this document and so they signed. 
Although the young inexperienced officials did not impress the ejidatarios very much (see 
chapter nine), the ejidatarios liked the PROCEDE program which they were talking about. 
In this program all ejido lands would be measured, even the individual ejido plots. The ejido 
did not have to show any initiative as it was a program organized from above. The ejidatarios 
only would have to cooperate with the different procedural steps. Raul was particularly happy 
with this program. This meant that everything would be done automatically, without the ejido 
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having to go on endless missions, and without paying lawyers and bribing officials. 
According to Raul, the best thing was to wait and see what the government would do with 
the PROCEDE program. Now that Raul saw a new opening, he took a more active attitude 
again. 
Iginio Decides to Work with the CCI (Central Campesina Independiente) 
We already noticed that Iginio had distanced himself or - in other words - had been excluded 
from the group and had taken an independent position. Yet, he wanted to continue the 
struggle to recover the land and was looking for new entrances. A friend of his suggested 
that he should go to a meeting in the neighboring ejido Las Paredes where Pablo an engineer 
from the Central Campesina Indepediente (CCI) would be. The CCI is a so-called 
independent peasant organization which in practice is related to the PRI. According to this 
friend Pablo knew a lot about agrarian problems. Iginio went to see Lupe to make copies of 
some of the documents they had been elaborating with Salazar. Lupe did not want to give 
him the papers, but finally gave in and allowed Iginio to make some copies. At the meeting 
in Las Paredes Iginio showed the papers to Pablo. Pablo read the documents and said that 
nothing positive could be deducted from the papers. He commented that it was a bad sign 
that Salazar was "walking alone" (meaning that he went to the offices of the MAR without 
the people from La Canoa accompanying him). Pablo asserted that if he took the case of La 
Canoa, two people from the ejido would always have to accompany him. They had to see 
where he went and what he was doing. According to Pablo this is necessary as: Money is 
everywhere. Everybody can be bribed at a certain moment. Listening to Iginio's stories, 
Pablo said that it was quite possible that Salazar had been bribed at one of the offices. He 
added that the CNC, where Salazar supposedly worked, never helps a peasant: It is a nest 
of bandits, sons of caciques. He told Iginio to come to his office in Guadalajara if he wanted 
him to work on the case. 
Iginio was enthusiastic about this new broker and the next week he immediately went to 
Pablo's office in Guadalajara. He was impressed by the large number of people who came 
to the office and the fact that they were all common people (gente humilde). Pablo told Iginio 
that he needed the people of the executive committee of La Canoa to sign a document stating 
that they officially handed this case over to him. He said that the documents of the ejido were 
very incomplete and that he would get them all the documents they needed. Furthermore, he 
promised him that he would get them the money back that they had paid Salazar. Pablo 
added that the ejido had to cooperate and, among other things, had to pay certain 
"expenses". The expenses would consist of payments to the lawyers who would look for the 
missing documents and the payment of a couple of meals. Before returning to La Canoa, 
Iginio took Pablo out for lunch. 
Iginio was very happy with the new development with Pablo. In this way they would not 
only get all the documents they needed in their fight for the "lost land" but they would also 
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get all the money back they had lost with Salazar. Iginio informed Lupe about this new 
development, but she reacted very negatively, interpreting it as a manoeuvre against her 
projects. Raul was interested but preferred to work with the PROCEDE program of the PA. 
He asked Iginio to accompany him to the PA office in Autlan where he had been summoned 
to come. Iginio was pleased now with Raul whom he saw as working more enthusiastically 
on the case. At the PA office they had found out by now that La Canoa did not possess the 
definitive map of the ejido and for that reason could not participate in the PROCEDE 
program. They told Raul to go and get this map at the MAR office in Guadalajara. Once he 
had the map, they told him, the ejido could be incorporated into the new measuring program. 
The PA official who told them this had not yet studied the case of the ejido and was not 
aware of the problems involved. He thought that the ejido archive was just a terrible mess 
and that papers were missing but he was unaware of the fact that for over 50 years they had 
been fighting to get this map. The PA official assured Raul and Iginio that the map had to 
be at the MAR office in Guadalajara. 
So, Iginio and Raul went to Guadalajara to get the map. They decided to visit Pablo first 
so that he could help them with the MAR. Pablo wrote a formal request for the ejido map 
and with this letter they went to the MAR. There they were told that the letter had to be 
signed by the complete executive committee of the ejido. Furthermore, they needed the ejido 
stamp which Raul had forgotten to bring along. So they had to return to La Canoa to have 
it signed by the treasurer and the secretary of the ejido. However, the official added that 
there was no problem at all with the map and that once the letter was signed and stamped he 
would have the document ready in 10 to 15 days. It would only cost them 50,000 to 60,000 
pesos ($ 17 to 20). Iginio and Raul returned to La Canoa. Iginio had been very angry with 
Raul for not bringing the ejido stamp. He told Raul that he should resign if he was afraid. 
Raul felt very insulted by the insinuation that he was afraid. 
When Iginio and Raul went for the second time to Guadalajara to get the map, the 
official of the MAR office told them that Salazar was known as a swindler and that for 
500,000 ($ 167) he could search for the map or have it elaborate if it was not there. So, the 
price had gone up from 50,000 to 500,000. The official searched for documents of La Canoa 
in the archives. At a certain moment he told Raul and Iginio that he wanted to go outside and 
have a coffee. When they were having their coffee he told them that he wanted compensation 
for everything he had done for them that day. He had gone to different places within the 
building and made copies of several documents. He did not say how much money he wanted 
and Iginio told Raul to give him 50,000. The official said that this was not enough by far. 
Raul told him that they could not pay him more as they would not have enough money to 
return to the village. In the end, they gave him 100,000 ($ 33). The official said that next 
time they should not come to him if they had so little money. Obviously, he had not found 
the map and the documents he had given to them were already in the local ejido archive. So, 
it had been a useless trip. 
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Reflecting upon the situation Iginio thought that Pablo also wanted money from them. Pablo 
had not asked them any money this time, but other people at the CCI office had told Iginio 
how much they had to pay him. Iginio's suspicion proved to be right as the next time Pablo 
told Iginio that for 10 million pesos ($ 3,300) he would take the case of La Canoa and would 
also start a lawsuit against Salazar to get the money back they had paid him. Iginio had 
replied that he would have to ask the ejido about this first. Although it is common for 
officials to ask for money for the work they do, Iginio knew that under the present 
circumstances it was impossible to get ten million from the ejido. Furthermore, Raul had 
been insulted too many times by Iginio and no longer wanted to go on missions with him. 
As Iginio had no formal position in the ejido he could not do anything on his own. 
Conclusion: the Decentered Labyrinthine Bureaucratic Machine 
In this chapter we saw how the ejidatarios sought the "right connection" which could give 
them access to the "center of control" which would then resolve their problems. The 
ejidatarios could have decided to invade (part of) the "lost land" but, as far as I know, this 
was never contemplated. They preferred to enrol the Mexican President in their operations. 
The Mexican President can be seen as the personification of power in a society where 
personal relations are central for the organizing process. In fact, the ejidatarios create the 
fetish of the President and give the state a face by writing the President letters and trying to 
enrol him in their projects. The idea of the state suggests coherence, coordination, and 
consistent top-down working, from the President to the bottom. According to Abrams the 
state-idea is a "message of domination - an ideological artifact attributing unity, morality and 
independence to the disunited, amoral and dependent workings of the practice of 
government" (Abrams 1988: 81). Taussig following Abrams poses the question of whether 
it might turn out, then, that "the fantasies of the marginated concerning the secret of the 
center are what is most politically important to the State idea" (Taussig 1992: 132). Are the 
fantasies of the ejidatarios concerning the powerful center not what leads to State fetishism 
and "the cultural constitution of the modern State - with a big S?" (ibid.: 112) 
In this context of a decentered bureaucratic machine and the impossibility of getting 
"effective access" to the center, brokers thrive well. In the brokers the ejidatarios hope to 
find people who, unlike them, know the codes and invisible ways through the labyrinth. The 
ejidatarios search for brokers everywhere: in different networks of friends and relatives, in 
peasant organizations, political parties, or in the MAR itself. The ejidatarios work with 
several brokers at the same time in the hope that one or several together may have enough 
"political capital" to get the machine working. Yet, by searching for brokers with special 
access, the ejidatarios contribute to the imagination of state power. They invest in the idea 
of the state. 
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In their turn, brokers also invest in the idea of the state by presenting themselves as people 
who have privileged access and knowledge to make the machine working. An important 
strategy of brokers is boasting about their relations with influential people. They often claim 
to have special access to the presidential residence Los Pinos or even having direct contact 
with the Mexican President. They also tend to personally know the State Governor and 
frequently have meetings with him. These stories are a form of impression management 
which people employ "to influence the systems of meaning surrounding them and their 
activities" (Morgan 1986: 177). The fact that everything is played out in the context of a 
labyrmthine bureaucratic machine means that brokers can never be held responsible for things 
that go wrong. In this way the bureaucratic machine offers ample opportunities for different 
types of brokers. 
However, although officials and intermediaries all have their own personal agendas, it 
would be simplistic to assume that they always deliberately try to deceive the ejidatarios. For 
example, Father López was a well-known priest in the region. I have no indication that he 
was a swindler. My impression was that he did not have the slightest idea about agrarian 
matters but hoped that his relations were influential enough to help the ejidatarios in their 
fight for the land. Yet, he also exaggerated his influence and contacts with the Mexican 
President and often told the ejidatarios about his visits to Los Pinos. Engaging in this practice 
of impression management is part of the culture of the state in which access is a central 
component. If you want to convince people that you can make a difference for them, you 
have to impress them with your relations. 
Yet, the culture of the state not only consists of practices of impression management but 
also of practices of interpretation and reading. The ejidatarios were no passive recipients or 
"consumers" of fantasies but very much wanted to belief that their brokers were the right 
connection. The stories and fantasies had to take enormous proportions as the ejidatarios 
knew that only a person with "extraordinary qualities and access" could help them with their 
problems. In this context they could even prefer the dubious, influential lawyer over honest 
but powerless brokers. The lawyer with a great style of living, a big house, beautiful 
secretaries around him, driving around in big cars and with many bodyguards seemed more 
able to play a role in this highly opaque politicized bureaucracy and in the fight against the 
pequeños propietarios than people who looked more like the ejidatarios themselves (see 
Bayart 1993 on the politics of the belly). Hence, the ejidatarios interpreted many events and 
things in ways that would fit in with their fantasies. For example, Lupe always attributed the 
intermediaries with higher functions than they really had. As we will also see in the next 
chapter, according to her they were never normal employees of the CNC or other peasant 
organizations, she always assumed that they were heads of these organizations. In the 
beginning when everything looked fine with Salazar the ejidatarios not only believed his great 
stories but also drew conclusions about his importance on the basis of elements which equally 
well could be interpreted in another way. For example, the fact that he was always 
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accompanied by bodyguards, his luxurious offices, and the locking of all doors can be 
interpreted in several ways. However, this was "read" by the ejidatarios as a sign of his 
working for the poor peasants and his being threatened by the private landowners. This 
polyvalent nature of "reading" becomes clear when at a later stage Iginio says that he has 
more confidence in the man from the CCI as he has a poor office and only poor people come 
to visit him. Here the opposite signals are used to prove the same point. This "reading" by 
Iginio of the poor office appeared to be as arbitrary as the reading of the luxurious office, 
for this man also wanted a large amount of money for helping La Canoa. In the next chapter 
more examples of this "wishful reading" will be given. 
An important pillar of the hope-generating machine is the presidential system in which 
every new president introduces new programs and proposes important institutional changes 
(see chapter nine). This was shown in a clear way by President Salinas who, among other 
things, promised to bring justice to the Mexican countryside. This propaganda influenced the 
ejidatarios of La Canoa to launch another effort to recover the "lost land". However, La 
Canoa was not the only ejido: many ejidos with land problems tried to resolve their problems 
under the presidency of Salinas (see Torres 1994b). Despite bad experiences in the past, the 
introduction of new programs with every new president always raises some hopes among the 
population as sometimes things are indeed changed or achieved (see Grindle 1977). Yet, even 
in periods when the ejidatario had high expectations, or started to believe the most fantastic 
stories, doubts were always there. Confidence was never absolute. For the same reason, 
people never seem to be surprised when things did not work out in the way they had 
expected or hoped. They were disappointed but never seemed to be surprised. Irony played 
an important role in this process. People could laugh about themselves: about the stories they 
had believed in and how they had been deceived. But the laughter was always painful. As 
Beezley et al. point out, "the use of humor as a cunning commentary on contemporary 
affairs continues in Mexico... a kind of 'gallows humor* that turns the labyrmthine 
bureaucracy, the political fraud, and the devalued currency into jokes has become prevalent" 
(Beezley et al. 1994: xxv). Yet, the most remarkable thing is that these experiences did not 
lead to passive cynicism. The ejidatarios went on fighting, investing, hoping, and believing. 
In short, I argue that in their search for the right intermediary who can make the 
connection to the center the ejidatarios are implicated in the process of the construction of 
the idea of the state. The power of the state is to a high degree imagined and cultivated by 
the search for brokers, the reification of maps, the fetishization of documents and procedures, 
the incredible stories of the intermediaries and the fantastic beliefs of the ejidatarios. In the 
next chapter attention is paid to the "spatial aspects" of the relation between the ejidatarios 
and the hope generating machine and to maps and documents as techniques of imagination. 
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Notes 
1. I found one document in the archives of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in which a MAR engineer, who 
had started measuring work in La Canoa, was explicitly summoned by the head of the MAR in Guadalajara 
to stop the work immediately as serious problems were arising with private landowners in the region. 
2. They explained this by referring to the central rule concerning their own ejido plots: "land to the tiller", 
the rule that land could be taken away from somebody if he had not worked it himself for more than two 
years. As the "lost land" had been worked for more than 50 years by other people, they thought that the 
ejido had automatically lost the rights to this land. However, legally this case is different as the rule of 
"land to the tiller" concerns land use within the ejido. The land they are fighting for is land that officially 
falls under the ejido regime and is used as privately owned land. Here the agrarian law has always been 
very clear. Land that falls under the ejido regime can never become privately owned land. Not even after 
having been used in this way for many years. 
3. Mario Sanchez who sold his land to Gustavo Romero (see chapter five) was the brother of the murderer 
and therefore had to leave the village. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE "LOST LAND" II: THE ENGINEERS 
Introduction: Officials, Ejidatarios, and the Culture of the State 
This chapter continues to follow the same conflict of the "lost land", however the MAR 
engineers now play a central role. The unflagging efforts by Lupe and Ramón had not been 
in vain and the bureaucratic machine of the MAR was set in motion. In a period of eighteen 
months, five different MAR engineers in succession were ordered to investigate the case of 
La Canoa. While in chapter seven we saw flows of ejidatarios to many different offices in 
Autlán, Guadalajara and Mexico City, in this chapter we see flows in a different direction: 
engineers from Guadalajara visiting the ejido La Canoa. This continuous movement of 
ejidatarios, brokers, and engineers between the ejido and offices in different cities makes 
clear that "any theory of the state needs to take into account its constitution through a 
complex set of spatially intersecting representations and practices" (Gupta 1995: 337). 
We saw many characteristics of the bureaucratic machine which contribute to its hope-
generating nature. For example, the fact that agrarian cases are never "closed" and that the 
bureaucratic machine can always be set in motion again. Officials or intermediaries never say 
to the ejidatarios that they should give up. On the contrary, they always offer "new" and 
"better" openings and options to get matters finally resolved. Furthermore, it is always 
stressed that one should combine following the right procedures with putting personal 
pressure on officials to ensure that the case is really taken care of. In this way, "legal 
processes can easily take on a life of their own, in a nightmare of papers, procedures and 
authorizations" (Harris 1996: 10). But there is more to it. By stressing the importance of 
official procedures, by employing an unintelligible legal-administrative language, and by 
claiming that by following the official steps it is possible to recover the "lost land", officials 
and engineers contribute to the "idea of the state". They provide the techniques of 
imagination and give the ejidatarios new ideas for their struggle. The stress on the 
importance of formal procedures suggests that a logic exists in the operation of the 
bureaucratic machine. Yet, in reality the working of the bureaucracy is fragmented and 
dispersed and there is no "hidden reality of politics, a backstage institutionalism of political 
power behind the on-stage agencies of government" (Abrams 1988: 63). The hope-generating 
bureaucratic machine does not work according to functionalist principles but is, instead, made 
up of thousands of uncoordinated actions without a center of control. We could even argue 
that what gives the machine coherence are the enjoyments and pleasures, fears and 
expectations. It becomes a "deshmg-machine" (see Deleuze and Guattari 1988). 1 
Lower officials normally have little insight into what is exactly going on within the 
bureaucracy. Furthermore, they have little influence on political decisions in relation to land 
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conflicts. Officials are under pressure from different sides and develop their own styles of 
operation in a complex politicized bureaucratic world (cf. Arce 1993, de Vries 1997). As 
they seem unable to resolve La Canoa's problems, ejidatarios and officials together theorize, 
speculate, and gossip about what is happening behind their back and about who is the man, 
or the MAR department, working against the ejido La Canoa. In this process it is normal, 
for ejidatarios as well as officials, to handle contradictory information. They work with 
different options at the same time and will not easily discard a new possibility. Never 
discarding any option (even the most extreme ones) and never being completely sure about 
the position of anybody is an important attitude towards the "desirmg-rrracrrine". 
As I argued in chapter one, notions of governmentality as a complex aggregate of 
institutions and procedures and modern forms of discipline and ruling through which power 
is exercised over people (Foucault, Corrigan and Sayer, Miller and Rose) are of limited value 
for the Mexican case. These works stress the standardization of procedures through which 
people become impersonal clients of the institutions. Yet, here we do not find standard 
governmental techniques but an endless diversity of agencies and administrative procedures. 
New plans of action and openings to the system can be invented all the time. We do not find 
the impersonal treatment of the clients of the system. On the contrary, officials as well as 
ejidatarios will always try to "personalize" relationships as this is considered to be the only 
form of meaningful and useful interaction. On the other hand, governmental techniques such 
as stamps, maps, official (unintelligible) terminology, and the use of formal titles of officials 
play an important role as the everyday routines and rituals of the bureaucratic machine. 
However, as Comaroff and Comaroff argue, this routinization and ritualization of practices 
"always require careful and situated reading" (1993: xxiii). Although on occasions they may 
be in harmony with existing forms of domination, on other occasions they may acquire very 
different meanings. 
This chapter focuses upon the interaction between ejidatarios and officials. Here I follow 
Long (1984, 1989) who introduces the notion of the interface in order to analyze the 
encounters between different groups and individuals involved in the processes of planned 
intervention. The interface reflects different types of power relations and different patterns 
of negotiation between, for example, peasants and government officials. According to Long 
such interactional studies offer a middle-ground level of analysis which reveal specific aspects 
of state-peasant relations. Drawing upon Long's insights I set out to study what interface 
situations show about the culture of the state and the working of the hope-generating 
bureaucratic machine. 
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The MAR Engineer Serrano Arriving in the Village 
The Presumed Delivery of the Definitive Ejido Map 
In September 1993, David, one of the officials of the MAR office in Autlán, personally 
visited the ejido commissioner Raúl at his house to inform him enfhusiasticaUy that finally, 
after fifty years of waiting, the map of the ejido La Canoa had arrived. He said that a 
delegation of officials from Autlán and Guadalajara would come and deliver the map to La 
Canoa and he suggested that the ejido should at least prepare an abundant meal for them to 
celebrate this special event. Raúl and the other ejidatarios did not seem to believe that the 
"real" map would be delivered but a meeting was convened anyway. Raúl asked Lupe to 
prepare the meal for the officials as she was the ejido treasurer and lived near the ejido 
house, but Lupe refused. Ramón and Lupe were still working with Salazar and did not 
believe that David was telling the truth. They said that it was not necessary to offer these 
officials a meal. However, according to Raul, it would be very impolite not to offer them 
a meal even if they did not bring the promised map. In the end, Iginio's wife prepared the 
meal. 
At the meeting a delegation of five MAR officials arrived: the three officials from the 
Autlán office and two from the Guadalajara office. Some eighteen ejidatarios attended the 
meeting. David solemnly declared that they had come to deliver the map that was requested 
by commissioner Macario Paz in 1976. Then he pulled out several maps. Ramón was the 
first person to look at them. He passed them to Ignacio Romero and Iginio Nunez. They 
immediately said that these were the same maps they had already received on many 
occasions. These were the project map and the definitive map of the extension. Not the 
desired definitive map of the endowment. 2 Then a discussion started about the problems of 
the "lost land". David and the other officials declared at length that they had every intention 
of helping La Canoa and that the ejidatarios should come and see them at their office next 
week. After the meeting, the officials and several ejidatarios had a meal and abundant drinks 
at Iginio's house. Lupe and Ramón did not go. 
What is interesting about this event is that nobody seemed surprised or annoyed about 
the course of things. Ejidatarios are always prepared for deceptions. This event also shows 
how ejidatarios try to maintain good relationships with officials even if they do not trust 
them. In their turn, the officials offer the ejidatarios their help and propose new openings in 
the bureaucratic machine. As it is never clear what role each official plays in the obstruction 
or execution of the procedures or what his or her role may be in the future, the ejidatarios 
are very careful not to spoil relationships. This is also related to the general awe and caution 
with which those in authority are treated. Even though nobody in the ejido had expected that 
the real map would be delivered, they still considered it necessary to "treat the officials 
well". However, we should be careful not to analyze this as submissive behavior on the part 
of the ejidatarios. During the meal, ejidatarios and officials ate and drank together in a 
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pleasant atmosphere. There was much laughter and enjoyment. This is characteristic for the 
relation between ejidatarios and officials: one tries to enjoy the moments of transactions. 
Even if not much has been achieved, one at least tries to foster the relationship. 
Serrano Shows Up 
In chapter seven we saw that Serrano, an engineer from the MAR office in Guadalajara, 
received orders to go to La Canoa and do the measuring work in the ejido. Ramón, Lupe, 
Teresa and Ignacio Alcázar went to Guadalajara several times to talk with Serrano and ask 
him when he would finally arrive. He always gave them a date, but he never showed up. He 
also made several appointments to meet them in Autlán, but did not arrive there either. On 
one of these occasions, after we had been waiting the whole morning for him in Autlán, I 
walked away with Lupe and Teresa. They were laughing about all the lies they had been told 
by Salazar and Serrano which they had believed. They repeated every one of them and were 
making fun of themselves. 
The 25th of November 1993, Serrano said for the hundredth time that he would arrive 
that day in La Canoa. Lupe and Ramón were waiting in the shop for his phone call from 
Autlán where they would meet him. Ramón expressed his feeling as follows: between hope 
and disbelief. Ramón was in a negative mood. He talked about the infamous television 
newsreader (Zabludowski) who always acted as a spokesman of the PRI. As he put it: / do 
not believe in the Mexican President nor in politics anymore, I have been through so many 
things. Lupe and Ramón recalled everything that had happened to them in the last two years 
and laughed at all the promises they had believed in. While the three of us were waiting in 
the shop, Lupe decided to call Serrano's office again. The secretary told her that Serrano 
had left with his suitcases for La Canoa. However, even with this information we did not 
really expect him to arrive. Yet this time Serrano did arrive. 
He visited La Canoa in the evening. He was a man in his forties and was pleasant in his 
dealings with the ejidatarios. I introduced myself to him but he did not seem to be surprised 
at the presence of a foreign student in the ejido. He seemed more surprised to meet Raúl, 
the ejido commissioner of La Canoa. During his visits to Guadalajara Ramón had pretended 
to be the commissioner of La Canoa. Serrano was annoyed by this fact but Ramón did not 
mind. Ramón knew that pretending to be the commissioner was the only way to be taken 
seriously and he had achieved his goal. Upon his arrival in La Canoa, an ejido meeting was 
convened for twelve o'clock the next day. Serrano stayed in a hotel in Autlán. Lupe was 
tired and nervous; she took several aspirins. Rumors soon spread throughout the village. 
Nobody else had been aware that an engineer had been sent to do the measuring work in the 
ejido. Hopes were raised and more ejidatarios expressed their enthusiasm about this 
development. Even Iginio who was so critical about Lupe and Ramon's operations, thought 
that this would be their last chance to get things arranged. 
The next morning, the atmosphere was exceptionally harmonious. Lupe was happy as she 
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felt that the ejido was united again. She was pleased that other members of the directive 
committee were participating again. There was a general feeling of unity and generosity that 
was very rare in the ejido. When Serrano arrived, everybody entered the ejido building and 
the meeting started. Ramón was very nervous. Some twenty ejidatarios attended the meeting. 
Serrano read his work order and said that they gave him ten days for the job. He said: It is 
my duty to work in the interest of the ejido. This ejido has many problems and complications. 
We want to clarify that. If there are no legal or technical impediments, we will elaborate the 
definitive map. Serrano explained that he would start the measuring next Wednesday and that 
all the neighbors of the ejido had to be formally informed by then that lands of La Canoa 
would be measured and their common borders marked. The ejidatarios also had to organize 
teams to carry the measuring instruments around in the fields and clear some paths if 
necessary. 
Serrano opened a provisional map of the ejido and Ramón, Iginio, Raúl and Vicente went 
to have a look. Some other ejidatarios were also having a look. Other ejidatarios left the 
meeting and went outside. The men at the map were all talking at the same time. They often 
disagreed about the neighbors of the different plots who had to be notified, and it was clear 
that few ejidatarios had a view of the total situation. It was a long list of neighboring private 
landowners. It was agreed that Serrano would go to Autlán together with Ignacio and Alberto 
Alcázar, to write the letters to the neighboring ejidos and private landowners. The neighbors 
of the ejido were invited to a meeting with Serrano and the ejidatarios of La Canoa in the 
town hall of Autlán on the following Tuesday at 12.00. Everybody was very hopeful, 
especially Ramón. Ramón did not budge from Serrano's side. He felt that the arrival of 
Serrano was Lupe and his achievement. 
Everybody went slowly outside in small groups. Gabriel and Vicente Garcia went to Raúl 
and said that he should at least offer Serrano a meal. However, Serrano himself went to Raúl 
and asked him for the payment of his hotel night in Autlán and the expenses of his trip from 
Guadalajara to Autlán. Raúl said that he did not have any money at the moment but promised 
that they would pay him these expenses on Tuesday. Alberto and Ignacio Alcázar 
accompanied Serrano to the casa ejidal in Autlán where they found a typewriter to write the 
letters to the neighbors of La Canoa. Afterwards they took Serrano out for dinner. They 
delivered some of the letters together and then Serrano left for Guadalajara. Alberto and 
Ignacio delivered the remaining letters. 
Raúl, Ramón, Iginio, Roberto and Pedro stayed on at the casa ejidal in La Canoa 
discussing the latest developments. I asked Raúl why they were going to pay Serrano. Raúl 
said: That is usual and it is important to treat these men well, so that he will do a good job. 
Otherwise he might not finish the work. Iginio agreed with Raúl and repeated this point. 
However, they all hoped that Serrano would stay in the village next week as the costs of a 
hotel in Autlán were high. Ramón said that he was very pleased with this development, but 
that he was also worried and wanted to look after Serrano himself. 
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Ramón: / would like Serrano to stay at my place. In that way I can keep an eye on him. They 
have to let me win on this. The pequeños are now going to try to bribe the engineer. They 
can easily find him in the hotel in Autlán, but also in the center of La Canoa, whereas they 
will never come to my place [in the hills, at the outskirts of the village]. 
Pedro: But can you receive him? [referring to the primitive state of Ramon's house]. 
Ramón: We will arrange that. Lorenzo and José Romero are probably informing Héctor 
Romero now. 
M: But who says that they haven't already bribed Serrano in Guadalajara? 
Ramón: This order comes from Mexico City. 
M: But at the MAR they can have given him some instructions. 
Ramón: But the work order which he read out was very good, those are clear measuring 
orders. 
Iginio assented. 
Roberto: If you want to alter these orders you have to be very smart in corruption. Ramón 
to Raúl: from now on you have to be very careful about signing documents. You should not 
sign anything without consulting us! 
Ramón to all of us: This is a very happy day in my life! 
Organizing the Field Teams 
The next Sunday after the meeting with Serrano, an ejido meeting was convened to organize 
the teams that would accompany Serrano in the fields. Rumors had spread in the village 
about Serrano's visit and approximately thirty ejidatarios attended the meeting. The meeting 
started in a joyful atmosphere. Alberto Alcázar from Autlán had taken the position of 
chairman and was sitting at the only table in the room of the casa ejidal. He was often asked 
to lead meetings as he was a good speaker and could read and write well. However, not all 
ejidatarios liked the "know-all" Alcazars (Alberto and his nephew Ignacio) from Autlán. 
Different things were dealt with at the meeting, but I will only reproduce the part that dealt 
with the teams to be formed for next Tuesday. 
Alberto: We all have to be united now in this case! 
Ramón was visibly happy and exclaimed: How much time have Lupe and I been working on 
this case in secret! 
Ignacio Alcázar: Let's organize the teams for the first three days. But we have to be united. 
Unity makes strength (La unión hace la fuerza)! 
While they were talking about which twelve men would accompany Serrano each day, 
Ignacio Alcázar suddenly said: Ramón registered fifteen or twenty sons of ejidatarios on a 
list, isn't that true Ramón? [referring to the list of beneficiaries in case the land is 
recovered] 
Ramón starts to justify this, but Ignacio continued. 
Ignacio: My question is the following: if we get the land back, would a woman whom I know 
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and who is the sister of an ejidatario here, be considered for a plot of land? She would like 
to participate in the work and always participated in the missions. 
José Romero: If her expenses for the missions were not paid by the comunidad [meaning the 
ejido funds] yes, she will be considered, otherwise not. 
Lupe: Nothing has been paid by the comunidad, everything was paid out of our own pockets, 
by "cooperacha" [meaning: everybody contributes what they can or want to]. 
José: So, you are saying that the ejido still has all the money?! 
Ignacio: The money of the comunidad has been spent on one person [referring to Salazar]. 
Vicente Garcia: This engineer Serrano was sent by the government and nobody here has had 
anything to do with that. The ejido funds have been poured into a bottomless pit. 
Sebastián Romero (furious): When have they ever asked me for money to contribute to these 
missions, when was a meeting convened to discuss this? 
Emotions rose and at the entrance of the building people were also quarreling loudly. Raúl 
stood up and became nervous. Lupe rose as well as the meeting had become a complete 
chaos. The sons of Lupe and Teresa arrived and Lupe got very worried. She feared that her 
son would start fighting if he heard somebody speaking ill of her. 
Alberto tried to calm the people down and said: We are not dividing a cake; we are making 
a working plan. Neither Ignacio, nor me, nor Vicente is keeping the land. José Romero then 
went to the table to register for the work teams. Alberto wrote him down and José left. 
Matters calmed down and the other ejidatarios also went to the table to put themselves on the 
list or to pay for others to do the work in their name. 
What happened at this meeting was that the prospect of the possible recovery of the "lost 
land" gave rise to disputes about the distribution of this land. The list of beneficiaries of the 
"lost land", which was made by Ramón, had not caused any problem as long as nobody 
believed the land could be recovered. But now that "the impossible" seemed to have become 
"possible", this list became a point of dispute. Yet, for most ejidatarios it was too soon to 
get into that discussion as nothing was certain yet. It was also interesting to see that during 
this meeting a lot of references were made to the spending of ejido money on the lawyer 
Salazar, but that it did not lead to a general discussion or the taking of decisions on the 
subject. As usual, the executive committee was not directly asked to render accounts of their 
actions and the spending of ejido money. 
Despite the quarrels at the meeting, the atmosphere in the ejido was one of hope. People 
became more animated and even ejidatarios who had been against the fight for the "lost 
land", now participated in the field teams. For example, although José Romero had always 
been against the way in which Lupe and Ramón were operating, he participated in the field 
teams. All their hopes now rested on Serrano. 
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Waiting for Serrano 
On Tuesday several ejidatarios went to the town hall for the meeting with Serrano and the 
neighbors of La Canoa. One by one the pequeños propietarios entered the town hall. Finally, 
there were some six of them; much less than the total number of neighbors who had been 
invited to come. It was a tense atmosphere of confrontation of the ejidatarios and the 
pequeños propietarios; both parties in the conflict were waiting together for the MAR 
engineer who would resolve their conflict. Lupe was very nervous. Raúl was terribly nervous 
as well and started to apologize to the pequeños propietarios. He said to them: It seems that 
the endowment is not complete, but I do not know, I have no idea. An engineer of the 
SARH, who was asked by one of the pequeños propietarios to be present at the meeting, 
said: If you don't have a definitive map, they cannot do anything. 
After they had been waiting some time, Lupe went to a restaurant to call the MAR in 
Guadalajara and ask what had happened with Serrano. They told her that Serrano had not 
been to the office since last Thursday. They continued waiting in the town hall. After an hour 
a clerk asked for Raúl Pradera. He gave him the message that Serrano had just called to tell 
him that his car had broken down. Everybody reacted with disbelief. One of the pequeños 
propietarios said: His car broken down, nonsense! Why doesn't he come by bus then?! A 
form of reconciliation between ejidatarios and pequeños propietarios was felt. Both parties 
had been deceived by the MAR official. Raúl seemed relieved that a confrontation with the 
pequeños propietarios was avoided. Raúl and the other men from La Canoa shook hands with 
the pequeños propietarios and they all left the building. 
The next day Lupe called the MAR again. Serrano's secretary told Lupe that it was not 
true that his car broke down and that she had no idea what was going on. Serrano had not 
been to the office since last week. A couple of days later the secretary said that Serrano had 
arrived unshaved at the office one day to collect some documents and then left again. She 
repeated that what Serrano had said about the car breaking down had been a lie. Lupe also 
talked to Rarnirez, Serrano's boss. He said to her that he had no idea what was going on and 
that all this time he had assumed that Serrano was doing his measuring work in La Canoa. 
He instructed Lupe to go and look for Serrano in the different hotels in Autlán. Serrano 
never came to Autlán or La Canoa again. 
Lifting Part of the Veil 
Some weeks later Ramón and Lupe got hold of Serrano on the telephone. He told them that 
if the ejido was prepared to pay for it, he would do the measuring as a private project in the 
Christmas holidays. Then they did not hear from him anymore. Shortly afterwards, I made 
an appointment with Juan Fernández, head of the department of development and local 
organization of the MAR office in Guadalajara. I established contact with him through friends 
who were active with peasant organizations and whom he used to help with advice on 
agrarian matters. After a more general talk, I presented Fernández with the case of Serrano 
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in La Canoa. It appeared that Fernández knew Serrano well and had been his boss at another 
department of the MAR. To my surprise, Fernández summoned Serrano to his office before 
I had even finished talking. I was not very happy about this direct confrontation with Serrano 
but could not do much about it anymore. I will present part of the conversation that followed 
after Fernández had called for Serrano. 
M: What is the sense of calling for Serrano now. He will only give the official version of 
what happened. 
F: From the answers he gives I can deduce what has happened. 
Serrano entered the room displaying great deference to Fernández. 
F: What were you going to do in La Canoa? 
S: The demarcation of a land area that supposedly was bought for the ejido by the MAR and 
that seems not to have been completely handed over to the ejido. 
After a discussion on the technical side of the job in which Fernández disagreed with Serrano 
about the implications of his work in La Canoa, Serrano became uncomfortable. 
F: Why was the work stopped? 
S: Orders from the delegate [head of the MAR office in Guadalajara], he told me to stop. 
Fernández gave me a significant look and Serrano left. 
M: So the delegate himself stopped the work? 
F: He said so, not me 
So, apparently Pelayo, head of the MAR in Guadalajara, had personally interfered to stop 
the measuring work. As it was obvious that higher officials had to be involved in this land 
conflict and Pelayo had a bad reputation, this did not seem so strange. I told the people in 
La Canoa about my findings in Guadalajara. As usual, they listened with great interest and 
were not surprised. 
A New Broker: the Gatekeeper in Mexico City 
All this time Lupe and Ramón continued paying visits to the MAR offices in Mexico City 
to keep applying pressure for the measuring work to be done. Sometimes they were 
summoned to come to the offices in Mexico City to sign papers or to bring some documents. 
During one of those visits to the MAR buildings they met a man, Antonio Matías, who 
offered his assistance. There are always many "gatekeepers" at the offices of the MAR; men 
who worked at the MAR or the peasant unions before and know their way in the 
bureaucracy. As most of the ejidatarios feel lost in the MAR, these gatekeepers offer their 
assistance. This assistance is normally paid for in meals or money. These men can be useful 
to the ejidatarios as they lead them around and bring them to the right places. However, 
there are also people who only try to take advantage of the insecurity of the ejidatarios. 
Ramón and Lupe explained to me that at first they had been a little bit afraid as they did 
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not know Antonio but when they showed him their papers he took them to the different 
offices. He helped them a great deal and Lupe and Ramón were impressed that he seemed 
to know all the people at the different desks. Lupe stressed that he had been so nice and did 
not want to charge them anything. But they gave him 100,000 pesos ($ 33) which made him 
very happy. Antonio said that he would help them with everything and said that he did no 
agree with the insolent way in which ejidatarios are treated by the officials. 
During this visit to Mexico City Lupe and Ramón stayed with two sons of don Miguel's 
first marriage, stepsons of Lupe. The wife of one of them accompanied them to the offices 
of the MAR. She noticed that Lupe and Ramón were going around with Antonio and warned 
them that this boy would only "relieve them of their money". Yet, the fact that the people 
at the different offices appeared to know him and treated him well was interpreted by Raúl 
and Lupe as meaning that he was an important person who might be of great use to them. 
According to Lupe, Antonio was head of the Liga de Comunidades Agrarias (a peasant 
organization affiliated to the ruling PRI). According to a friend of mine, who did some 
research, Antonio Macias did indeed work for this organization, but was only one of the 
assistants of the head of the Liga de Comunidades Agrarias. Ramón told me that Antonio was 
their last hope. Yet, I was amazed that after two years of deceit, Ramón could believe in a 
person he had just met and be so enthusiastic about hrm. So, I asked Ramón: Don Ramón, 
how can you believe in Antonio when you just met him and do not know him? Ramón replied: 
It is not a question of belief but of hope. I hope that this will work out well. I do not believe 
in anything anymore. But hope is the last thing one gives up. 
After this visit to Mexico City, Antonio regularly phoned them (expensive collect calls) 
to ask how things were going. One day, Antonio offered to come to Guadalajara to "undo 
the knot" at the MAR office. According to him, the MAR office in Guadalajara was 
obstructing the procedures for measuring the land in La Canoa. Antonio wanted his airplane 
ticket and his expenses for the day paid for. Lupe did not want to go to Guadalajara as she 
refused to spend more of her own money on the matter. So, Ramón would go on his own 
to receive Antonio. Lupe and Ramón convened a meeting with the supporters of the fight for 
the "lost land" in order to collect the money. Some twelve people arrived at this private 
meeting but they did not collect the required amount of money and Ramón would have to pay 
part of the expenses out his own pocket. In Guadalajara, Antonio and Ramón went to the 
MAR office and Antonio asked for the work order which Serrano had received for the work 
in La Canoa. He made copies of it and gave one to Ramón. Ramón gave him 650,000 pesos 
($ 217) but Antonio said that that was not enough. He told Ramón that he not only needed 
money for the airplane but that he also had to maintain his family and his parents. So he 
asked Ramón for more money. Ramón also had to pay for his breakfast and the cab to the 
airport. Then he left for Mexico City again. 
On the basis of this visit Ramon's faith in Antonio decreased. The only thing Antonio 
did was to get Serrano's work order. However, Ramón was above all disappointed because 
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he noticed that Antonio was not the important man Ramón had assumed him to be. At the 
Guadalajara office nobody knew Antonio and they paid little attention to him. They asked 
him for an identity document which he could not give. According to Ramón, he only had a 
little piece of paper which did not impress anyone in the Guadalajara office. Ramirez, the 
engineers' boss, did not even want to receive him. All of this made Ramón conclude that 
Antonio was not an important person and could therefore never be of much help. 
When Antonio later phoned them and said that he wanted to come to Guadalajara again, 
Ramón told him that he should only come with orders from Mexico City. Yet, Lupe and 
Ramón remained in contact with him. When they were working with the different engineers, 
they also kept in touch with Antonio as they might perhaps need him in the future. In the 
beginning of December 1993 Antonio phoned them and told them to participate in a 
demonstration in Mexico City for Colosio, the PRI candidate in the presidential elections of 
1994, but they did not go. Sometimes Lupe became annoyed with Antonio as his frequent 
collect phone calls from Mexico City were very expensive. Lupe showed me the bills with 
all Antonio's collect calls from Mexico City. It was a large sum of money. 
Like Salazar and Serrano, Antonio made many promises and told them many things that 
appeared not to be true. For example, in December Antonio phoned Lupe to tell her that 
Serrano would come again to the village on the 20th of December. Lupe told me: Antonio 
always pretends to be an important person. Serrano did not arrive. 
However, in the beginning of January 1994 Lupe was very enthusiastic again after a 
phone call from Antonio. He called on Friday to tell her that he had gone to Guadalajara 
with the oficialía mayor (high official) of the MAR in Mexico City. According to Antonio, 
the oficialía mayor had been very angry with Pelayo, the head of the MAR in Guadalajara, 
and had asked him what was going on in Guadalajara. He gave Pelayo orders to start the 
work next week. Antonio told Lupe that the engineer would come on Monday and that he 
himself would visit La Canoa next Tuesday or Wednesday. However, he urged them to send 
him 700,000 pesos immediately as he did not have money to travel next week. He needed 
the money before Monday. Lupe believed Antonio but had her doubts as well. Together with 
Ramón she decided to collect the money Antonio had asked for but not to send it right away. 
When I was at Lupe's house on Monday, Antonio phoned from Mexico City. Lupe asked 
me to listen with her on the other telephone. The conversation between Lupe and Antonio 
went as follows. 
A: The work order will now be sent to Guadalajara by fax and then everything 
will start. 
L: You remember that you told me on Friday that they would come today? 
A: Yes 
L: / called Guadalajara and there they say that they know nothing about it. You 
know, people here lose confidence by these small things. For that reason I 
could not collect the 700 pesos. The people do not want to contribute 
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anymore. 
A: Don't worry, you know that the high official committed himself to la Canoa's 
case on Friday. I will call you tomorrow after they sent the fax. 
[Antonio phoned from his home and we could hear a baby crying in the 
background] 
L: What is the name of this official and what is his telephone number? 
A: His name is Raul Pineda. I don't have his telephone number at hand but I 
will give it to you tomorrow. Then you can check for yourself that everything 
is alright. But tomorrow I will phone you after the fax is sent. If you allow me 
to call collect again. Otherwise, I will let them call you directly from the MAR 
office. 
L: Tomorrow we are not here. 
A: You are not? 
L: No, we are going to Guadalajara to talk to the head of the MAR, Pelayo. 
A: But that is not necessary anymore, everything is arranged. 
L: Yes, but we have an appointment for tomorrow. 
A: I don't think it a good idea that you go to Guadalajara. Naturally, you have 
to decide yourselves, but it is a pity to make a trip if it isn't necessary. It is 
a pity because of the money you will spend on it. They are already working 
on the case here. But you have to decide for yourselves. I will call you when 
you are with Pelayo then. The fax will probably arrive at Pelayo's office at 
12.00. 
L: We have an appointment with Pelayo at 11.00. 
A: Then I will call you there. You will see that everything is fine. 
L: The point is that the people here have lost faith after all the experiences we 
have had. I haven't lost faith, but the other people have. 
A: They will arrive this week. But it will not necessarily be the same engineer 
that comes. 
Then the phone call ended. Lupe did not feel very confident about the distrustful way in 
which she had addressed Antonio. She liked the person of the high official in Antonio's 
stories: that sounded as an important person. On the other hand, she did not trust Antonio's 
stories and promises anymore. 
Several things surprised me in this phone call. First of all, it was clear that Lupe had 
become much more skillful in her dealing with brokers. She confronted Antonio with the 
contradictions in his own stories, but she did not directly say that she did not believe him 
anymore. She said that the others in the ejido had become distrustful, not she. Secondly, 
Antonio directly reacted to the changing attitude of Lupe. He was respectful and did not talk 
about money anymore. We can see here that actions labeled as "corruption" are made up of 
complex practices, with strong performative aspects (Gupta 1995: 379). It is a play one can 
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be good or bad at. It is not a vulgar way of wheedling money out of other people. When 
Antonio felt that he was losing ground, he changed his attitude and did not raise the issue of 
the money anymore. Another reaction could have been to become angry with this incredulity 
on the part of the ejidatarios and say that they are ungrateful for everything he had done for 
them. Actually, that is a much more common reaction of officials or brokers when they are 
confronted with criticism or distrust from ejidatarios. However, Antonio chose another way 
out. Nothing happened that week and Antonio did not call for quite some time. According 
to Lupe he certainly felt exposed. 
However, some time later Lupe herself decided to call Antonio again when they did not 
achieve anything through the other channels. When Antonio offered to come to Guadalajara 
again, she responded that it would be better for him to try to get a mission organized from 
Mexico City. They would then pay him afterwards when they received the land. Antonio 
never showed up anymore. 
The Priest Visiting the Head of the MAR in Guadalajara 
Lupe and Father López 
Lupe had lost faith in Salazar. When she phoned Salazar he never answered anymore; he was 
never at home, nor at his office. After a while Salazar moved to another house and also 
changed his telephone number. Salazar was unreachable. Lupe went so far as to say that she 
did not know whether she could trust Father López. After all Father López had brought them 
into contact with Salazar and why had he told them that Salazar was doing a good job? 
However, Lupe's faith in Father López was soon restored. During a visit Lupe and I paid 
to Father López, he said that he was very sad that Salazar had behaved in such a miserable 
way with La Canoa and had only been interested in money. He explained that his faith in 
Salazar was based on the fact that Salazar was the compadre of the former priest. However, 
according to Father López the ejidatarios of La Canoa were also to blame for the failure. 
First of all, they had done everything without the consent of the ejido assembly and secondly, 
they had let the news get out that they were fighting to recover the land. Salazar had caused 
Father López several other problems. Besides La Canoa, Salazar also had been dealing with 
other ejidos for Father López. Father López had tried to find out where Salazar had moved 
to and had discovered his new telephone number which he passed on to Lupe. Now he was 
trying to find out Salazar's new address, so that he could pay him a "surprise visit". 
Father López said that Héctor Romero, the former head of the security policy and one 
of the pequeños propietarios who possessed a part of the "lost land", had visited him twice 
now to tell him to abandon the case of La Canoa. Héctor had added that he was the godfather 
of the mayor of Autlán and that Father López should be very careful. Another pequeño 
propietario had also told him to stop and did not greet him anymore when he came to mass 
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on Sunday. However, Father López said that he was not afraid and that from now on he 
would spend more time on La Canoa. He wanted to take advantage of the time that Salinas 
was still in power. Then he could still use his influential contacts. After this talk with Father 
López Lupe was enthusiastic again. Some weeks later I met Father López in the street and 
he told me that the bishop had told him to stop interfering in agrarian conflicts. Father López 
did not agree with the bishop, he said, but sometimes he got tired of everything. He also 
complained about the fact that there was no unity in La Canoa. 
The Priest Meets the Head of the MAR 
In the beginning of 1994, Father López used his contacts in Mexico City to make an 
appointment with the head of the MAR in Guadalajara, Pelayo. Pelayo had the reputation of 
being very corrupt and, as we saw before, it was said that Pelayo himself had ordered the 
suspension of the measuring work in La Canoa. For Lupe and Ramón the prospect of 
meeting Pelayo was very exciting because they knew that he was very influential and they 
hoped that through Father López and his powerful contacts, Pelayo could be pressed to work 
in the interest of La Canoa. So, the appointment with Pelayo was a special occasion and we 
were all a little nervous. Lupe, Ramón, Father López, and I went to the appointment. Lupe 
tried to persuade Raúl to come as well but he did not want to go. He only gave his written 
authorization as commissioner. I had made an extensive file with copies of all the relevant 
official documents. 
The day of the appointment Lupe, Ramón, and I caught the 6 o'clock in the morning bus 
in Autlán in order to arrive at the 11 o'clock appointment in Guadalajara. Father López 
stayed the night before the appointment in Guadalajara. Ramón had dressed himself in a 
special way for the occasion. He had told me before about the importance of dressing well 
for the officials and of not going as the typical campesino. This time he certainly did not 
correspond to the traditional image of the ejidatario visiting the MAR (sombrero, guaraches, 
plastic bag with documents), but he looked rather weird. He had put on a long old coat and 
had an old bag across his chest. A pencil stuck out of the middle of the bag. When we 
arrived at the MAR, Ramón left for the bathroom to smarten himself up. He remained in the 
bathroom for a long time and returned with a wet face and wet hair. As we were early we 
left to have breakfast. Lupe and Ramón had not slept well the night before. They were too 
nervous to have breakfast. Lupe told us that she had had nightmares in which her son took 
her from La Canoa to the bus station in Autlán and while they drove on and on, they never 
arrived at the bus station. 
When we returned to the MAR we found Father López who presented us to an ejidatario 
of Tuxcacuesco. It became clear that Father Lopez's visit to the head of the MAR was not 
only to defend the case of La Canoa, but also those of the ejidos Tuxcacuesco and Apulco 
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and of the comunidad indígena of AuÜán, which all have serious land conflicts with private 
land owners. Apparently, Father López was becoming a broker in agrarian conflicts. At 
eleven o'clock Father López was called for the appointment with Pelayo. 
The five of us entered the room. Father López shook hands with Pelayo and did not 
further introduce us. 
Father López started to explain the reason for his visit. In contrast to the usual attitude 
of ejidatarios, the priest was self-confident and gave lengthy explanations. He carefully 
stressed the point that he was the friend of one of President Salinas* personal secretaries. 
Pelayo was a little irritated by all this talking but remained respectful. López noticed 
Peiayo's impatience but went on with his roundabout descriptions. He talked about the 
lawyer who had asked twenty million pesos from the ejidatarios of La Canoa and then 
disappeared. When López talked about the problems of La Canoa, Pelayo asked for more 
precise information. I will present part of the dialogue that followed. 
Pelayo: What kind of problems are you talking about? 
López looked at Lupe to answer the question. 
Lupe (insecure): Eh, we have a "rezago", a problem... 
Pelayo (irritated): But does it concern an agrarian action (acción agraria) that was never 
finished or internal agrarian rights? What is the problem about? 
Ramón took over and started with much enthusiasm a very unclear story about land that was 
taken away from the ejido. 
Pelayo phoned Ramirez and told him to come immediately to the office. 
Pelayo (irritated) to Lupe and Ramón: And who are you, are you members of the directive 
committee of the ejido? 
Ramón: No, I am not. 
Pelayo to Lupe: And you? 
Lupe: / am the treasurer of the ejido. 
Pelayo: And the ejido commissioner, he didn't want to come? 
Lupe: Eh, no eh, a relative of his is ill and he couldn't come, but he (pointing to Ramón) is 
the secretary of the ejido. 
Ramón: / am the substitute of the secretary (he said substitute at a very low voice so that 
only the word secretary was well heard). 
Pelayo: And don't you have any documents with you? 
Ramón came to me to get the documents I had with me and I gave him the ones I thought 
were most relevant. Ramirez, the head of the engineers, arrived now. He was very friendly 
to us and Pelayo gave him the documents and asked Ramirez: What is this all about?! 
Ramirez read the documents and said to Pelayo: This is what we were discussing lately. They 
started discussing the matter between the two of them in legal terms which were unintelligible 
to us. Pelayo read the work order of Serrano and asked the visitors: And this work has never 
been done? 
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Ramón (vehemently): No, he only came for one day, then he invited all the neighbors of the 
ejido to a meeting and never came back, then you apparently recalled the order, then on the 
telephone he offered to do the measuring work during his Christmas holiday but then we 
would have to pay for it ourselves'. 
Pelayo to Ramirez: This work has never been finished? 
Ramírez: No, I wanted to talk to Serrano about it but then the holidays came... 
Pelayo to Ramirez: What kind of work is this of these engineers! Issue immediately another 
work order for another engineer! 
Pelayo to us: We will immediately write a new work order. 
Lupe: Does that mean that they will measure all the ejido land and not only the 126 hectares; 
they are invading us on all sides. 
Pelayo: This commission only concerns informative work, which will be sent to Mexico on the 
basis of which they will elaborate the definitive ejido map. Where lies La Canoa, near 
Autlán? 
Father López started explaining to him in great detail how to get to the village. 
Pelayo: Perhaps we will come and visit you one day. 
Ramón and Lupe (happy): That would be fantastic! 
It was decided that next week an engineer would come to the village to finish the work. 
Ramón would return to Guadalajara next Friday to arrange everything with the new engineer. 
Practical issues were now discussed. Father López repeated several times that the MAR 
engineers, who came to any of the four ejidos he was taking care of, could always stay at 
his house next to the church in Autlán. When the discussion on La Canoa was finished they 
continued with the case of Tuxcacuesco. The same dynamic repeated itself. Pelayo asked for 
very technical and formal procedures and neither the ejidatario from Tuxcacuesco nor Father 
López could give any answers to these questions. Again many new work orders were 
immediately issued. When everything was discussed, Father López gave a final speech in 
which he explained that he, as a priest, preferred not to interfere in these matters, but in 
these cases thought it was necessary to intervene. He said: These people often have no idea 
about what is going on. They tell them that a commission will come and in the end nobody 
comes. And these are very poor people. Last time they prepared a birria for the people of the 
commission that would come and they did not show up.. Pelayo and Ramirez listened without 
any expression on their faces. Father López extensively and patiently thanked Pelayo and 
Ramirez and again dropped the names of the people at the MAR in Mexico City and the 
office of Salinas who had arranged this meeting for him. We all shook hands and said good 
bye. 
Father López, Lupe and Ramón were very pleased with the results of this meeting. Most 
of all they liked the fact that so many decisions seemed to have been taken and that a new 
engineer had been ordered to go to La Canoa. However, Lupe was bothered by the fact that 
Pelayo had said that the work only concerned information gathering. Ramón was full of 
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enthusiasm, although he said that he was not so hopeful as when Serrano had arrived. 
However, he thought that the priest's involvement had made a big difference. In my opinion, 
however, this all had been a theatrical performance by Pelayo and Ramirez as they had to 
be well aware of what was going on. The ejidatarios were treated very well during this visit. 
This in sharp contrast to other occasions when Pelayo and Ramirez had not been prepared 
to receive or talk to ejidatarios from La Canoa and had treated them very rudely. Ramón had 
had especially bad experiences with Ramirez before. The different attitude certainly had to 
do with the fact that Father López had used his contacts in Mexico City to make the 
appointment and the fact that he himself had come to the appointment. 
The conversation shows several characteristic elements of the interaction between 
ejidatarios and functionaries. First the usual questions in formal legal terminology, the 
question of documents, and the asking for the ejido commissioner. Then, when reference is 
made to irregularities on the part of the MAR office, the functionaries do not react at all. 
Although this time Ramón was very direct in his insinuation of Pelayo's involvement in the 
withdrawal of the work order, the ejidatarios do not easily call functionaries to account for 
irregularities. In his turn, Pelayo blames everything on Serrano, he reacts indignant at the 
way in which the engineers work and reacts with much action-power and immediately issues 
new work orders and appoints new engineers. In this way, he suggests that the problem is 
of a technical aáxninistrative nature and will soon be resolved. He raises hope by suggesting 
that he will visit them soon. 
The Second Engineer: Castañeda 
Two weeks after our visit to Pelayo, the next MAR engineer from the Guadalajara office 
arrived: Castañeda. Now quite a different situation developed. The directive committee of 
La Canoa and the neighbors of the ejido were summoned to a meeting at the town hall. This 
time there was an attractive young woman among the pequeños propietarios whom nobody 
from La Canoa knew. After Castañeda had read out his work order, the girl went towards 
him with some documents which he silently read in great detail. The other pequeños 
propietarios grew impatient and wanted to leave. Iginio asked the young lady who she was. 
It became clear that she was the daughter of one of the families that illegally possess part of 
the "lost land". After reading the documents the girl had given him, Castañeda asked the 
ejidatarios a lot of silly questions about the situation of the land he had to investigate and it 
looked as if he had not prepared for the job. He looked for a long time at the maps and then 
very slowly folded the maps one after the other. Everybody was watching him in 
astonishment and the ejidatarios of La Canoa started to get bad feelings about this engineer. 
Castañeda proposed to take a look at the fields. While we left the building Castañeda stayed 
on the staircase talking with the girl and a man who joined them. The people of La Canoa 
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noticed this and their distrust of him grew. The engineer was apparently establishing good 
relationships with the "enemy". The girl left to get her truck and said that Castañeda could 
come with her. Ramón, immediately joined the girl and Castañeda in her truck. The others 
all followed in other cars. 
In the field the atmosphere was very negative. Everybody realized that things were going 
badly. Castañeda was only reading documents and walking around with the girl in the 
sugarcane fields. Castañeda and the girl separated themselves from the ejidatarios and they 
talked in a confidential way as if they had known each other for a long time. They started 
eating some of the sugarcane in the field. The fifteen ejidatarios from La Canoa stood in 
small groups commenting that the situation looked unfavorable. After some fifteen minutes, 
Castañeda said: Let's go and draw up a report. Although everybody from La Canoa agreed 
that the engineer was not doing his job, nobody asked him a question. Castañeda said that 
he would draw up the report at the office of Albamex in Autlán (the company and home 
address of the girl's father). So, now a situation was created in which the ejidatarios were 
going to draw up a report at "the house of the enemy". We drove to the office of Albamex 
in different cars. 
At the office there were two other women with a victorious expression on their face and 
who were giving each other signals all the time. Again I had the feeling of being part of a 
theater play. The ejidatarios were worried but did not know what to do. At a certain moment 
I went to the table where Castañeda was writing. I introduced myself as coming from the 
Agricultural University of Holland and being very curious about the meaning of the task 
description in his work order: Localización topográfica (topographic localization). 
C: That is what we just did: looking at the field and then indicating that on the map 
M: So the work is finished now? 
C: Yes 
It was obvious that the ejidatarios would be deceived again on the basis of obscure agrarian 
terminology, but there was little that could be done. It was decided that Castañeda would 
finish his report on his own and that he would present it later in the afternoon in La Canoa. 
The ejidatarios left the engineer at the house of the "enemy" and returned to La Canoa. 
A Meeting with Castañeda in La Canoa 
The ejidatarios realized that this time they had been openly taken in by the MAR engineer 
and only some fifteen ejidatarios showed up at the meeting with Castañeda in the afternoon. 
They wanted to question Castañeda's work, but they did not know how to do this well. The 
meeting with Castañeda started in the following way. 
Ignacio: The Indians took it in their own hands [referring to the rebellion in Chiapas, which 
broke out at the beginning of 1994], we are not much Indian. 
Ramón: It would be good to be Indian, to be taken into account! 
Castañeda was chewing gum, had a very disinterested expression on his face and did not 
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react. The others started complaining about all these engineers who always come to the ejido 
and never finish their work. 
Ramón to Castañeda: How did you see the field, what land are we lacking? 
Castañeda: That is something that I have to calculate now. 
The ejidatarios gave Castañeda some documents to show that the land of the Pabellón, where 
they had been in the afternoon, had been bought by the MAR for the ejido. 
Ignacio: Here it says that the MAR paid for the land. 
Castañeda: / have searched for documents to prove that but I haven't found anything. 
Ignacio started a detailed explanation but Castañeda showed no interest and was looking at 
other papers. 
Ignacio: We did not expect you to do only the work you did today. 
Ramón started reading out another document that proved their point, but Castañeda did not 
react and continued reading his own material. 
Ignacio: In that case we take up arms, just like in Chiapas! 
The ejidatarios started making jokes among themselves and Castañeda continued reading. 
Ramón: El Pabellón is already known in the whole of Mexico; in all the different offices, even 
in Los Pinos (the presidential residence)! 
Castañeda now started reading out the report he had written about his activities. The report 
gave a description of the land area. Quarrels arose among the ejidatarios about many details 
in the report. Castañeda took advantage of the division among the ejidatarios and accused 
Iginio of giving him false information. 
Castañeda: And afterwards they will think that I deliberately made these changes. So 
everybody should know that you gave me this information! 
Ramón: The report says nothing about the land that is lacking. 
Castañeda: That is a calculation that I now have to make. 
Doubts were rising among the ejidatarios as to whether they should sign this report or not. 
Everybody felt that Castañeda was deceiving them. Several people went outside. They did 
not trust Castañeda at all. People were talking in small groups and deliberating about whether 
they should sign his report or not. The delegado of the village, who is also an ejidatario, 
joined the group outside the bunding. He noticed that the work order talked about work till 
the 28th of January, while today it was only the 24th of January. 
Raúl (fiercely): If we sign now, we will never recover El Pabellón! 
The general conclusion was that Castafleda's work was very suspect and that they should 
better not sign agreeing with the report. All entered the ejido building again. When 
Castañeda finished reading his report, Iginio was the first to bravely show the dissatisfaction 
of the ejidatarios with his work. 
Iginio: I do not agree, nothing has been measured! 
Castañeda (angry): And haven't we been to the fields then?! This cannot be measured. 
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After this angry outburst of Castañeda, the ejidatarios became insecure and changed their 
attitude. They started criticizing Iginio. They said that the work order only talked about a 
localización topográfica. Iginio himself also felt insecure now. 
Castañeda: I do what they order me to do. 
Vicente Garcia to all ejidatarios: Are we going to sign this or not? 
Ignacio Romero: I say yes. 
Alberto Alcázar: The fear of signing is natural after what has happened, but this report does 
not oblige us to anything. 
Ramón: I think it is correct. 
Vicente: Some say it is all right, others say it is not. 
In the meantime I tried to persuade Lupe to ask Castañeda why they gave him five days for 
this job while he finished it in one afternoon. Lupe did not dare to ask him. Then I asked 
Ignacio Alcázar who passed the question to Alberto Alcázar. 
Alberto to Castañeda: Why does it say five days on the work order? 
Castañeda: The other days are for the calculation in Guadalajara. 
Now there were no means left for the ejidatarios to judge or question the engineer. 
Nobody made a critical remark anymore and everybody signed the report. When he was 
packing his things together Castañeda accused the ejidatarios of having caused Serrano 
serious trouble by accusing him of corruption. As Castañeda put it: Rumors circulate in 
Guadalajara that Serrano asked 100 million to do the job and this caused him serious 
problems with Pelayo. Ramón and Lupe responded that Serrano had offered to do the job in 
his holidays but that he had not mentioned a sum of money. 
Afterwards it became clear that Castañeda had misled the ejidatarios in several ways. First 
of all, the work order of localización topográfica of the field El Pabellón implied that he 
should have stayed several days to measure the land. Secondly, Castañeda had received a 
second order for more measuring work in the ejido, which he never showed the ejidatarios. 
Although the result of this visit was unsatisfactory, this meeting is illustrative of several 
aspects of the relation between ejidatarios and officials. First of all, we noticed a strong 
atmosphere of dissatisfaction on the part of the ejidatarios. Yet, they preferred not to directly 
express their disapproval. At the start of the meeting this discontent was indirectly expressed 
by several references to the armed struggle in Chiapas. Although in this conflict many other 
things besides land problems are involved, the ejidatarios stress especially this aspect of the 
conflict. The ejidatarios in La Canoa started referring to Chiapas not only in the context of 
meetings with officials but also among themselves. They did not feel related to the Indian 
population, but they had great sympathy for the problems these groups had with the Mexican 
state and private landowners. 
Other indirect remarks by the ejidatarios also made it clear that they were dissatisfied 
with Castafieda's work. Actually this was one of the few occasions in which the ejidatarios 
The "lost land" II: the engineers 287 
openly, and in front of the official himself, questioned his integrity. The ejidatarios disliked 
direct confrontations with officials. In this case, obscure agrarian terminology was again a 
central weapon of the official. He could easily eliminate the opposition by lying about 
agrarian procedures and the meaning of certain administrative terms. When the official 
pretended to be offended by the distrustful attitude of the ejidatarios, the ejidatarios quickly 
lost their confidence and signed the report. It is also significant here that the ejidatarios do 
not want to break off relations with the MAR. Even though they distrust officials, they do 
not want to spoil the relationship. They want to continue the relation with the bureaucratic 
machine. Signing documents is one of the acts through which this relation is maintained and 
they invest in the idea of the state. 
Castañeda in his turn did not try to establish a friendly atmosphere. All the time he 
remained cool and distant. He lied about the procedures and acted offended when they openly 
criticized him. From the start of the meeting he tried to create dissension among the 
ejidatarios and took advantage of quarrels among them. His hand was also strengthened by 
the fact that only a small group of ejidatarios came to the meeting. 
Unmasking Ramirez, the Head of the Engineers 
Two weeks after Castañeda's visit to La Canoa, a large group of ejidatarios went to see 
Hernández, the new head of the Procuraduría Agraria in Autlán to discuss a problem with 
the commons. When they had finished talking about the commons, Castañeda's recent visit 
to La Canoa was mentioned. Hernández had been a MAR official before entering the 
Procuraduría Agraria and without saying anything he took the telephone and called 
Castañeda's boss Ramirez. He talked very cordially with Ramirez whom he apparently knew 
very well. Then he said that a representation of La Canoa was at his office and explained that 
they were dissatisfied with the fact that measuring work was never done. Ramirez told 
Hernández that a commission from La Canoa recently visited the MAR together with Father 
López to cancel Serrano's work. Obviously, this was a blatant lie by Ramirez. 
After the phone call Hernández explained us what Ramirez had told him. Lupe 
immediately reacted by saying that it was a lie what Ramirez told him as she herself was at 
that meeting with Pelayo and it had been precisely to ask why Serrano's work was never 
finished. The ejidatarios developed their speculations that the Guadalajara office was working 
against them. Hernández listened to all the stories and did not discard the possibility that the 
Guadalajara office was obstructing the procedures. He recognized that many things might be 
at stake. He suggested to them that them do everything directly through the offices in Mexico 
City and ask for an engineer from there if they felt that the Guadalajara office was hindering 
their efforts. He gave them a telephone number of the man of the MAR in Mexico City 
whom they should call and visit. He promised that next time he himself would come and 
inspect the engineer's work. 
The interesting thing about this visit is that a higher official does not deny the possibility 
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that people he himself knows very well are perhaps involved in dubious practices. He does 
not dismiss certain conspiracy theories out of hand. The point is that everybody knows that 
the bureaucracy and politics are highly intertwined and that anybody might become involved 
in one way or the other. Again a new entrance is presented to the ejidatarios: they get a new 
telephone number in Mexico City. Once more they are promised that an official will 
personally come and visit them. 
Lupe and Ramón were not sure if they should go on with the MAR in Guadalajara or 
abandon the Guadalajara office completely. Ramón said that he did not trust Ramirez and 
thought that he was playing a "double game". On the other hand, since their visit with Father 
López, Ramírez had changed his attitude and had become very friendly. Despite Ramirez's 
apparent lie Ramón said that he thought that Ramirez was now taking La Canoa's side. This 
clearly was a situation in which Ramón was confronted with conflicting messages about the 
trastworthiness and loyalty of one specific person and was constructing his "theories" in 
order to be able to continue the struggle. 
Distrust, Conspiracy, and Dealing with Contradictory Information 
As they were working through different channels and nothing seemed to work out well, 
mutual distrust as well as mutual accusations continued among the ejidatarios. I maintained 
contacts with the different people separately and they could express themselves in very 
negative terms about each other. For example, Ramón expressed negative views of Raul and 
Iginio. 
R: Raul is a fool and Iginio a shameless devil. Iginio works with the "other party". 
M: But isn't Iginio also working to recover the land? 
R: Yes, but through other channels. But he also works for the others; he probably received 
money..! 
In their turn, Raúl and Iginio accused Lupe and Ramón of operating on their own in the hope 
that they could keep the "lost land". Iginio: They hope to divide the land between the two 
of them. People blamed each other for everything that went wrong and insinuated that others 
had their own private agendas against the interests of the ejido. 
One phenomenon that bothered the ejidatarios fighting for the "lost land" was the fact 
that the private landowners always managed to know what they were doing. According to the 
ejidatarios, the pequeños always seemed to know about their missions and made sure to bribe 
the officials before they arrived at the office. Roberto Sánchez said: When we went on a 
mission to the MAR in Guadalajara we saw the pequeños in the bus coming back from 
Guadalajara. We always had secret meetings for this case but there was always a traitor. He 
informed the pequeños and they went to Guadalajara before we arrived. When we arrived at 
the MAR offices, the officials were already bought. Similar stories were told by others. Lupe, 
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for example, said that on their last trip to the MAR she saw Ricardo García at the bus station 
in Guadalajara. She assumed that he had been to the MAR to counter their actions. Teresa 
recalled that on one occasion in the past she and Macario had been waiting in a restaurant 
for somebody who would help them. When they looked through the window they saw the 
person they were waiting for, talking to "the other party". In Teresa's words: Sometimes 
you do not know who you can trust and who not. Not even of your own family. Sometimes 
it is better to work with outsiders. To stress this point she gave another example of a relative 
of Lupe who worked at the MAR and promised to help them with everything. Afterwards 
it became clear to them that she was working for the pequeños. So, according to Teresa not 
even relatives were to be trusted. 
In this way the ejidatarios were always speculating about the role of everybody else and 
an important component in their strategies was secrecy. Failures were often blamed on 
information reaching the "enemy". Information leakages were a main danger as the private 
landowners could directly impair anything La Canoa had accomplished. This caution about 
passing on information also concerned the ejido documents. We noticed that even within the 
loose configuration of people that was working on the "lost land", they were very reluctant 
to pass important documents to each other. However, plenty of other reasons, besides traitors 
who passed information to "the enemy", could always be found to explain why things went 
wrong. For example, somebody could argue that they had not reacted in time to certain 
letters, or that the commissioner had signed the wrong document. A common critique was 
also that they had not paid the engineer enough, or had not treated him "well enough". 
In their conspiracy theories the ejidatarios also speculated about the "location of evil". 
Some ejidatarios considered the MAR office in Guadalajara to be the main problem and 
thought that as long as everything was arranged through Mexico City it would be all right. 
They hoped that the officials in Guadalajara would be overruled by their superiors in Mexico 
City. Some also commented that the documents and the maps in Guadalajara were falsified 
and that the "true documents" were still in Mexico City. On other occasions it was said that 
the "real documents" were in Guadalajara but that the officials refused to give them. 
All these speculations were fomented by the continuous stream of contradictory messages 
they received from different sides. All the people they worked with said something different 
to them and all the time they received information they should act upon. Many times they 
were told to come immediately to Guadalajara and Mexico City to arrange some documents. 
On one occasion, for example, an official of the Guadalajara office told Iginio that La Canoa 
should hurry with their case as he had heard that a lawyer in Autlán was "legalizing" the 
illegal land titles of the pequeños propietarios for one million pesos per hectare. This was 
a disquietening message. However, fortunately it was followed by a much more hopeful 
message. Suddenly, one day, the happy news was spread in La Canoa that the Mexican 
President Salinas had said on television that La Canoa would be the next ejido to be 
measured. Several ejidatarios, Lupe, Iginio, Ignacio Alcázar, and others, passed me this 
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rumor. Some said that Salinas had made his declaration on television and others said it was 
on the radio, but all were equally hopeful and enthusiastic after this fantastic news. 
As Ihad been doing some research of my own, I gradually discussed with the ejidatarios 
the information I had found in the MAR and the conclusions I myself was arriving at. I felt 
that this might lead to difficult conversations as my ideas sometimes went against their views. 
However, it was obvious that the idea that there could only be "one valid theory" was my 
problem and not theirs. They had no difficulty with different theories. They always listened 
carefully when they received new information. They were looking for all types of data and 
were interested in all findings. But they did not necessarily arrive at conclusions about the 
truth or reliability of information. Nor did they try to arrive at coherent and absolute 
theories. They could live with contradictory information and opposite versions at the same 
time. For the same reason, they never seemed to be surprised by information that was in 
apparent contradiction with their own versions and beliefs. 
About "Hard Data" and Reading Maps 
As I myself became fascinated by this highly complex conflict and tried to come to grips with 
it, I studied many documents and maps. I also tried to arrive at a clear analysis of the 
situation and talked everything over with the ejidatarios. Yet, after some time of research I 
came to the conclusion that my use of maps, documents, and figures was different from that 
of the ejidatarios. First of all, I discovered that there was great uncertainty about the size of 
the "lost land"; figures about the numbers of hectares that were involved differed. Most 
ejidatarios said that they did not know how much land was involved. Others gave different 
figures. For example, Salvador said that it concerned approximately one hundred hectares, 
whereas Iginio told me that it was 200, almost 300 hectares. Manuel Pradera said that he 
heard people say that it concerned more than 100 hectares and 3 or 4 different land areas. 
Vicente Garcia told me that besides the fact that they did not know how much land they 
lacked, nobody actually knew how much land La Canoa had in its possession. Once when 
I mentioned the 540 hectares that were missing, according to the letter that Salazar had 
written to the Mexican president, Raul exclaimed: so many hectares?! Some time later, I 
worked one afternoon with Ramón and Raul to make a summary of the problems of La 
Canoa for Father López, who had asked for a clear and understandable explanation of the 
problems of the ejido. This analysis was above all based on Ramon's information. On the 
basis of what he told me about the different fields and problems I arrived at a calculation of 
approximately 260 has that the ejido missed. The greatest part concerned rainfed land, but 
an important part was irrigated land. 
Yet, after Salazar had sent the letter to the Mexican president, which said that they were 
lacking 540 hectares, the ejidatarios started using this figure. For example, Lupe who had 
never before mentioned the number of hectares involved, started talking about the 540 
hectares the ejido was missing. Iginio, who had before talked about 200 or 300 hectares now 
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also talked about the 540 hectares they were missing. In other matters I also noticed that 
people who had studied the documents sometimes gave exactly the same information as I had 
found in the archives. Hence, they seemed to use figures they had found in the documents. 
In this context I also developed mixed feelings about the role of the ejido map in their 
struggle for the "lost land". As we saw, the ejido map is the central object for the ejidatarios 
in their struggle. By recovering this map, they hope to win the conflict. So, I showed the 
ejidatarios several maps of La Canoa to explain to me the problems of the different fields and 
the problems with the existing maps. However, when I showed Lupe the map of the 
extension of the ejido on which the endowment lands were also indicated, and asked her to 
indicate the location of the lands that were "lost", she responded that she was not capable 
of doing so. She said that she could not do anything with the map and instead started 
explaining the situation to me in "physical terms" referring to certain points in the lands: a 
bridge, a house, certain fields etc. So, she did not know how to link the land she knew so 
well in practical terms with the lines on the paper. Teresa could not do so either. However, 
when I showed the map to Teresa she recognized the names of certain fields on the map and 
in the same way as Lupe she explained the physical position of these lands and their 
histories. Men who had not been actively involved in the struggle also could not "read" 
maps. For example, when I showed the commissioner Raul maps of the ejido and asked him 
if he could tell me where the "lost lands" were situated he said that he could not do anything 
with a map. 
As many people apparently could not "read maps", I developed the feeling that the map 
they were chasing after perhaps stood for something else. The men of "the group of the lost 
land" who for many years had studied documents, maps and the agrarian law, certainly had 
no problems in indicating the different parts of "lost land" on the map, but all their stories 
differed. Some gave more technical details to distinguish the "real map" from the "useless 
maps". For example, according to Iginio the name of this "real map" was the "combined 
map" (piano conjunto) and it clearly indicated the correct ejido borders. Iginio said that in 
order to distinguish between good maps and the bad maps it was important that the maps 
were signed by the right engineer. 
Naturally, the fact that people do not agree on the data concerning the "lost land", can 
be explained by the difference between the life-world of the ejidatarios and the official legal-
bureaucratic world. Furthermore, many different fields (potreros) are concerned in the "lost 
land" which all have different histories and are involved in conflicts with distinct legal and 
administrative aspects. As we saw, the establishment of the ejido has been unclear from the 
beginning; procedures have not been followed, lands have never been measured, and 
documents gave contradictory information about borders and areas. This explains why local 
story-telling about the "lost land" is to a certain degree shaped and changed by the 
interactions and experiences with the agrarian bureaucracy. 
Yet, the most interesting phenomenon is the way documents, events, and maps are read 
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and interpreted in the light of a labyrmthine bureaucratic machine. Their focus on the map 
should be seen as the embodiment of the conflict in an administrative artefact: a re-
enchantment of a governmental technique. Their concentration on the map makes it possible 
for the ejidatarios to establish a relationship with the bureaucracy; it is a recognized 
administrative document they can ask for. In this way, the map has become a fetish. Besides 
making it possible to engage the bureaucracy, the fetishized map also plays an important role 
in the local mobilizing of people; it is a material object upon which a collective sentiment 
is fixed (see Durkheim 1965 [1912] on fetishes). Although the ejidatarios disagree amongst 
themselves about the details of the conflict, the fetishized map can raise feelings of collective 
interests and makes people join forces when necessary. 
Contradictory Information 
This also explains why the ejidatarios have no problems in dealing with contradictory 
information and can easily switch positions. For example, after some time of research I 
individually told them that according to the official data a definitive ejido map of La Canoa 
was never made when the ejido was established. This meant that there was no map that got 
"lost" and that there was no map hidden somewhere in an office. I thought that this was a 
sensitive theme and that the men who were closest to the fight for the "lost land" would not 
be pleased with me talking about the possibility that the map had never existed. However, 
they did not mind hearing "another theory". For example, Iginio and Ramon listened to my 
findings with interest, but without drawing any conclusions. Others even seemed to like my 
theory about a map that never existed. When I said to Lupe that I believed that the definitive 
ejido map had never existed, she said that she agreed with me and that everybody had always 
falsely accused her husband of giving the land to his brother and getting rid of the map. She 
said: I never knew anything about that. The map that I saw here on the table perhaps was 
not the definitive map. May be it was only a big map of the surroundings... of the state of 
Jalisco..! Raul also liked "my theory" that the map was never made. He said that this 
information was new but convinced him that they could never influence the state of affair and 
should not spend any money anymore on the case. Raul felt that "my theory" strengthened 
his position. Again this shows that the map is an artefact, an embodiment of the fantasies 
constructed about the "lost land". It is the embodiment of a fight which people want to play 
out in different ways. At the same time, it is very probable that the ejidatarios who today are 
tired of the struggle and say that the map was probably never made, tomorrow again go after 
"the map that once got lost" when they try to recover the land. 
After they had lost contact with Salazar, Lupe and Ram6n easily distanced themselves 
from the data Salazar had given them which they had believed in before. For example, on 
one occasion, I carefully tried to say to Lupe that after a thorough study of their case it could 
appear that they really lacked much less than 560 hectares. But Lupe was not hurt by my 
remark. She said that she had never known the number of hectares they were fighting for 
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anyway. When I suggested that Salazar had perhaps written this letter to please them, Lupe 
reacted: Not to please us but to deceive us! When I talked to Ramón about the fact that the 
letter to the Mexican President and the list of beneficiaries for the "lost land" that they had 
established had, according to other people, not been done properly, Ramón reacted: The 
lawyer only did that to get money from us, he brain washed us... 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that in their struggle for the "lost land" the 
ejidatarios are always theorizing, speculating and "reading" messages and that this is related 
to the working of the hope-generating bureaucratic machine. The point is not that the 
ejidatarios "believe" everything officials or brokers tell them. Rather, they deal with many 
points of entry to the bureaucratic machine, work with many brokers at the same time, 
receive numerous often contradictory messages, and it is not clear precisely what is 
happening. In this labyrinth they try to construct a certain order or logic which helps them 
to decide how to go on. But they never hold on to their own theories strongly. They quickly 
change ideas and never seem surprised about anything. One day they can say of one of the 
ejidatarios that he is probably "bought" by the pequeños, and the next day they can work 
with him again. They have the same attitude towards brokers. They can have lost faith in a 
broker or official because of a bad experience or an apparent lie, but can work with him 
again shortly afterwards. 
The Third Engineer to Arrive at the Ejido: Morales 
The next time Raúl and Ramón visited the MAR in Guadalajara to demand the continuation 
of the measuring work, they found the building almost empty. They were told that everybody 
had gone to the funeral of one of the engineers: Serrano. Serrano had supposedly died of a 
liver disease. For the ejidatarios, Serrano was added to the long list of MAR engineers who 
had "vanished" after they had started a measuring job in La Canoa. 
After Castañeda a third engineer was assigned to La Canoa, but the man refused to go 
to the ejido. By now La Canoa had the reputation among the engineers of being a difficult 
ejido and nobody wanted to go there. Then another engineer was appointed who suddenly 
was called away for another job. Finally, a fifth engineer, Morales, was given the task. He 
was the third engineer in this period to arrive at the ejido. Morales arrived in La Canoa on 
the 15th of March of 1994. Lupe happened to be away then as she had left for the USA to 
visit her children. Her son Juan decided not to tell her anything about the arrival of Morales. 
Morales was in his thirties and had a pleasant, open attitude towards the ejidatarios. He 
knew many details about the land problems of La Canoa and had apparently done a thorough 
study of the case before coming to the ejido. He was the only engineer who brought the 
pieces of machinery for the measuring. The ejidatarios were delighted with this engineer and 
had a lot of confidence in him from the start. At his first meeting in La Canoa Morales told 
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the ejidatarios that they should say at the MAR office: If the measuring work is not done 
well, we will do the same as the people in Chiapas.... He said that the ejidatarios should help 
him with eveiything and that they had to be united. Morales had a populist style of operating. 
He was very capable in his dealings with the ejidatarios and the other parties. At the 
meetings he gave answers to the many unrelated questions people always ask about agrarian 
procedures and made many jokes. He said that he was a great admirer of Emiliano Zapata, 
the revolutionary fighter who demanded land reform in the beginning of this century. He 
stressed that the work had to be done quickly before Salinas left the presidency as then the 
MAR programs would probably be changed again. 
At the meeting at the town hall in Autlán in which the neighbors of La Canoa were 
informed again about the measuring work, the same girl arrived who had been walking with 
Castañeda. This time she arrived with a man who told Morales that he was a friend of the 
girl's family who owned lands that adjoined the lands of La Canoa. He said that they were 
prepared to help Morales with eveiything he needed. Morales said that the owner of the land 
himself should come or that otherwise they should come with a letter authorized by him. The 
man was displeased by Morales' answer and he and the girl left without saying anything. 
After this event, the ejidatarios were even more pleased with "their engineer". Although I 
understood that the ejidatarios liked this engineer much better than all the others, again I was 
surprised to see them so hopeful and enthusiastic. I asked Teresa how it was possible that 
people seemed to believe without reservation every time, when they had been deceived so 
many times. Teresa said: That is because we are exhausted and want this so very much to 
happen. You can compare this with the situation that you are very tired and very thirsty; then 
you buy a glass of water at any price. 
There was only one drawback with Morales. It soon became clear that he was an 
alcoholic. Although drinking by men was never considered to be a problem in the village, 
in the case of Morales people soon noticed that this was a serious case. He did not eat, drank 
enormous quantities and had trembling hands. However, the ejidatarios did not think that this 
was necessarily a problem for the measuring of the land. During the day Morales could 
function fine. It was only in the evening that he started di±iking and passed out. 
Morales stayed several days in a hotel in Autlan. The ejidatarios had several informal 
gatherings with him. He very much enjoyed talking about agrarian matters and explaining 
his views and theories. To my surprise, even Raúl, who I had never seen drinking before, 
was drinking during these meetings. The ejidatarios expressed their feelings, doubts, and 
presented their "conspiracy theories" about who was sabotaging them. Morales gave his own 
views on the matter and said: I am conscious of the fact that there are many interests in this 
zone that work in the favor of the private landowners. General García Barragán has had 
great influence here. According to Morales, Serrano's work was not canceled because of 
political pressures or because Pelayo, the head of the MAR, had been bribed by the pequeños 
but because the rumor was spread that Serrano had asked 100 million pesos to finish the job. 
The "lost land" II: the engineers 295 
He said that Serrano died of cirrhosis and had not left a report. About Castañeda, Morales 
said that he was corrupt: he never finished the job, did not leave a report, and it was 
rumored that he was walking around "in love". According to Morales, his boss Ramirez was 
honest otherwise he would not have sent him to do this job. Ramirez had only told Morales 
that it was a very difficult case but had not given him "special instructions". Morales gave 
the ejidatarios many copies of important documents he had found in Guadalajara and told 
them not to tell in Guadalajara that he had given those to them. When I took a photograph 
of him with the ejidatarios, he did not want the documents to appear on the photo and put 
them away. 
So, Morales claimed that the problems with the different engineers so far had little to do 
with bribing or political influences. On the other hand, he did not deny the possibility that 
people might try to stop him. He explained that he was aware of the influence of the late 
General Barragán and his allies in this region and suggested that they might try to influence 
the measuring work. He acknowledged that it was possible that pequeños propietarios were 
now talking to his boss to try to recall his work order. He therefore suggested that the work 
should be done very quickly and promised the ejidatarios that he would immediately inform 
them if his work order was recalled. He stressed the necessity of putting pressure on the 
offices. Morales was only sent to do the measuring of one land area, El Pabellón, and he 
said that as soon as he was finished they should demand that the MAR measure the next part. 
Morales advised that: If necessary you should go with large groups from La Canoa to the 
office and with the women as well. He gave the example of an ejido who arrived with a 
group of screaming women and explained that that is something they are very afraid of. He 
explained that the situation in Chiapas also worked in their favor as well as the fact that 
Salinas' term was coming to its end. According to Morales, Salinas wanted to finish most 
of the projects he had started. He suggested that if necessary, the ejidatarios should look for 
publicity in the newspapers and through other channels. So, Morales was giving the 
ejidatarios practical advice to deal with the MAR in a more political way. However, he also 
blamed the ejidatarios themselves for not knowing their own borders well and for quarreling 
among themselves. 
On another occasion when I was alone with Morales we talked for a long time about the 
problems of La Canoa and their dealings with the MAR. I explained to him why we thought 
that Pelayo and Ramirez were involved and had canceled the measuring. Morales listened 
carefully and said that it could be that they were indeed involved. He said that personally he 
did not like Pelayo and explained that when he had to arrange difficult matters he called his 
friends at the offices in Mexico City to ask them about the best ways to "play the game". 
Besides contacts at the MAR, he also had good friends in other government offices 
(gobernación) who could sometimes help him. According to him La Canoa was not such a 
difficult case. Morales said: People are much too scared. They always talk about killings and 
murders but in reality this does not happen so often. He said that he was against the uprisings 
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in Chiapas but that he used Chiapas if this helped him to pressure the MAR and search for 
fair solutions to land problems. Morales said that he loved his work at the MAR and that 
according to him there was no other job in which you experience so much. He hoped for a 
career through PRI networks and supported Colosio as PRI candidate for the presidency. He 
aspired to the position of Ramirez or even Pelayo with the change of president in 1994. 
Unfortunately for Morales, Colosio would later be killed and Zedillo become president. This 
meant that other PRI networks became influential. 
Measuring the Field 
The measuring of El Pabellón would take place on Saturday. Again there was a lot of 
gossiping going on. Teresa accused Iginio of sending his son Joaquin to assist Morales 
because he wanted to ensure that Joaquin would get one of the plots of the "new land". 
Iginio was speaking ill of Father López and said that he was to blame for the problems with 
Salazar. When Morales heard this he was pleased as he was very opposed to the Catholic 
Church. However, Ramón objected to them blaming Father López. Raúl was irriated by the 
fact that Lupe had not returned from the United States. However, despite the common 
gossiping and quarreling, there was an atmosphere of hope again. 
At seven o' clock on Saturday morning everybody was waiting at the ejido house in the 
village but Morales did not arrive. Then they decided to go to El Pabellón but they did not 
find him there either. Then they went to Autlán, where they found him at the hotel, which 
he was just about to leave. He had been drinking the night before. At a quarter past eight the 
work in the field started. There were thirty men, which was a high number as only 
approximately thirty ejidatarios possess lands in El Pabellón and not so many people were 
needed to carry the instruments. Teresa and I were the only women. Some men were paid 
to help with the measuring work by the ejidatarios who possessed plots in El Pabellón. 
Gustavo Romero, for example, paid for two men. Others who did not possess land in El 
Pabellón participated to see what would happen. Some were accused of only coming out of 
curiosity and others of participating out of interest in the land that might be recovered. 
Morales decided to measure the land that the ejidatarios actually possess. In that way he 
could later calculate how much they lacked. Ramón did not agree with this procedure as he 
preferred to measure the land that belonged to the ejido according to the "act of possession 
and marking of boundaries of the endowment of 1938" (acta de posesión y deslinde). Ramón 
did not agree with the point where they started the measuring operation either and the whole 
day he stood aside of the rest. For the measuring procedure sticks were put in the ground 
following the present borders of the ejido and a laser machine which stood at the next stop 
determined the distance to the stick. When this was done, the next part of the border was 
measured. 
Several quarrels broke out among the ejidatarios about where to put the stick. For 
example, Gabriel Garcia claimed that the border made a curve near the drain of the irrigation 
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system. However, this would mean that the drain fell within the land area of the ejido, which 
would only add some useless land to the number of hectares they had in their possession. 
Others said that there never was such a bend in the border. Morales got annoyed by the 
quarrels of the ejidatarios and decided for himself. Morales wrote everything down in great 
detail. He also noted the names of all the neighboring owners of the lands. It became clear 
that the ejidatarios who knew most about the problems with the "lost land", did not agree 
about which lands formally belonged to La Canoa. According to Ramón, they were missing 
lands on all sides, but according to Iginio and others they were only missing on the northern 
side of El Pabellón. Raúl said that he hardly ever visited this area as he himself had no plot 
there and he had no idea at all about fie right borders. As Morales only measured the land 
the ejido has in actual possession these disagreements about the right borders did not cause 
problems with the measuring work. Despite the disagreements, it was a pleasant day in which 
we walked, talked, ate, and laughed a lot. 
In the afternoon the measuring was finished and money was collected to buy beer and 
soft drinks. Ramón was offended when they asked him to contribute as he had already paid 
so much out of his own pocket for the missions to the MAR. Others immediately said that 
he was right and that he did not have to pay but Ramón was still offended and did not stay 
for the drinking session. It was a very relaxed drinking session and after the bottles were 
finished the group broke up and everybody left. Raúl, Iginio and Morales went together to 
Autlán. At two o'clock in the morning Morales arrived with Iginio. Morales decided to stay 
in the village and continued drinking with Iginio. He stayed in Iginio's house. In the 
morning he was invited to a party at another house. From there they took him to the football 
game in La Canoa and afterwards Morales left for Guadalajara. 
Morales' style of operation obviously differed from that of the other engineers the ejidatarios 
had been dealing with so far. Morales was ambitious, enthusiastic, and enjoyed being in the 
field with the ejidatarios. The fact that he slept in Iginio's house and stayed part of the 
Sunday in the village illustrates his different style. However, we can also see similarities in 
the way he deals with politics in the MAR. Like many officials, Morales did not deny the 
fact that political pressures influence agrarian conflicts and that the efforts to measure the 
ejido lands of La Canoa could be sabotaged from above. Again we find an official who will 
not deny the possibility that others or he himself may become involved in the political game. 
It is also apparent that he has no insights into what precisely is going on and who are pulling 
the strings. Although Morales appreciated Ramirez, he listened to critical theories about him 
and he did not deny the possibility that Ramirez might be playing a dubious role in this 
affair. In the case of Morales we find the same contradiction with respect to the management 
of political land conflicts as we found in the case of other officials. Although, on the one 
hand, he acknowledged the political pressures that probably work against the ejido, on the 
other hand, he used the formalist bureaucratic discourse which says that the case is not 
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difficult at all providing one follows the formal procedures. Yet, Morales is less legalistic 
in his advice than others and put more stress on the importance of political pressure. He 
suggested the ejidatarios put pressure on the MAR by going there in large groups with 
screaming women and looking for publicity. He also stressed again the importance of unity 
among the ejidatarios themselves. 
The Struggle Comes to an Unhappy Ending 
At the end of March, Morales told the ejidatarios that he had finished the job and that they 
should come to Guadalajara to demand the continuation of the measuring work. Morales did 
not say anything about the number of hectares he had calculated. They received a provisional 
map which Morales had elaborated of El Pabellón but nothing was said about the number of 
hectares that were lacking, nor about the people who were invading ejido lands. Many visits 
to the MAR followed. Morales was also elaborating the total map of the ejido but without 
measuring any of the other land areas. The group of the "lost land" realized that the map that 
was going to be elaborated would not include the "lost land". However, everybody was tired 
of these years of struggling and they seem to come to terms with the idea that they would 
never recover the "lost land". La Canoa was now confronted with new problems with the 
neighboring ejido La Piedra which had invaded a large part of the commons of La Canoa. 
For that reason many ejidatarios felt the urgent need to have a definitive map, even if it 
contained errors, to fight possible future conflicts. They agreed that Morales had done a good 
job and was not to blame for their problems. The ejido paid Morales ten million pesos ($ 
3,300) to finish the map. 
In May 1994 I left the region to go and settle in the neighboring state of Michoacán. 
Until the end of 1995 I paid several visits to La Canoa. At the beginning of 1995 Father 
López had been replaced and sent to another region. Before he left the region he had told 
Lupe that the ejido should be happy with the land they possessed and that they would get into 
serious trouble if they continued this fight. President Salinas' administration had ended at 
the end of 1994 and numerous scandals about murders, drug trafficking, and stealing by his 
administration had followed his leaving office. Lupe laughed about the hopes they had had 
when Salinas came to power and talked about helping the ejidatarios. 
Lupe about Salinas: He brought the campesinos down, we failed (nos hundió a los 
campesinos, no pudimos). Salinas also stole from Mexico; I saw that on television in the 
United States; there they say everything, here they don't. 
M: Would you try it again? 
Lupe: / have no faith anymore, it is impossible to beat the rich (Ya no tengo fe, contra el 
rico no se puede). In Chiapas the rich people possess everything. 
She made an additional remark about Serrano's death. 
Lupe: That was a suspicious death...he did not return to the village; he got cirrhosis, they 
say he worked well... perhaps they startled him. 
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Lupe was never called to account for the money she had spent on Salazar. No questions were 
asked about it at the ejido meeting in which the ejido accounts were presented. Raul had 
asked the other ejidatarios not to cause her any trouble as she had spent the money with good 
intentions and she herself had suffered a lot. Lupe was very grateful for this. 
Lupe said: They are good people, they do not blame me for anything. I can breathe quietly 
now. 
Ramon had also become resigned to the idea that most of the "lost land" would not be 
recovered in the near future, but he concentrated on the struggle for the land that was lacking 
in one small part of the "lost land", El Pabellón. He had found more documents at the MAR 
and Ramon thought that they would have a chance. Ramon had contacted the man who in 
former times had helped them at the Communist Party and this man had recommended two 
lawyers affiliated to the opposition party PRD to Ramon. Ramon continued working with the 
Alcazars and with two young ejidatarios who had never been involved in the struggle for the 
"lost land" before. So, a new configuration of people was formed and the struggle for the 
"lost land" continued. A never-ending story 
Conclusion: Modern Myths and the Culture of the State 
Considering the history of agrarian reform and land conflicts in Mexico it is improbable that 
the ejido La Canoa will recover the "lost land" in the foreseeable future. Only in the right 
historical and political setting would this be possible. At the same time, their famous 
examples of Corral de Piedras, as well as the recent problems in Chiapas, or the agrarian 
struggles at the beginning of this century show that these "right historical and political 
settings" always involve considerable violence and many deaths. This threat of violence is 
continuously felt in the struggle for the "lost land". It is felt in the threats and warnings 
made to the ejidatarios and the priest, in the presence of bodyguards, doors that are locked, 
lawyers who disappear or are found dead in a ravine, and engineers who never return or die 
mysterious deaths. 
Many academics and officials with whom I discussed this desperate struggle for agrarian 
justice and these repeating stories of hope and deceit told me that, although this was a 
common phenomenon in Mexico, not all ejidatarios let themselves be treated in this way. 
They used to say that the ejidatarios in La Canoa had to become more alert, and had to read 
documents more carefully in order to deal with the officials on equal terms. Naturally, it is 
true that ejidatarios with more nerve will be treated with more care and will perhaps be less 
easily deceived than others. For example, during the time of the research Lupe became much 
more clever in her dealings with brokers and officials. Ramon had already many years of 
experience in the fight for the "lost land" and had a much less submissive attitude towards 
officials than most ejidatarios. However, their increasing skills in dealing with the 
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bureaucracy would not fundamentally change the force field around this land conflict (in the 
next two chapters I return to this discussion). 
In the interface situations between officials and ejidatarios we can distinguish, what by 
others would be called, "rituals of rule and resistance" (Beezley et al. 1994). Rituals in terms 
of symbolic practices which form part of "more embracing 'discourses' and 'technologies' 
that establish or contest regimes of rule" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993: xvi). These rituals 
form part of the culture of the state. Elements in these rituals are first of all the establishing 
of a position of authority by the officials. There may be a certain severeness in the way 
officials address ejidatarios, while ejidatarios behave very politely using the titles of the 
officials, not taking too much of their time, apologizing for their problems, thanking the 
officials extensively when they leave again, and offering presents and meals. When a more 
workable relationship has been established between ejidatarios and officials, the rituals can 
become much more festive. Ejidatarios and officials both celebrate their deals together in a 
pleasant atmosphere. 
In the interfaces, the officials can use more specific techniques to dominate the 
ejidatarios. Firstly, they have access to unintelligible legal terminology and procedures which 
they can easily use as a weapon to eliminate the opposition of the ejidatarios. Secondly, they 
can deliberately engage in the practice of fantasizing, theorizing, and boasting about their 
relations. It is obvious that the interface situations do not follow a fixed script as they have 
a performative dimension (Gupta 1995) which manifests itself in the different "operation 
styles" of the officials (de Vries 1997: 97). Some officials, like Pelayo (head of the MAR 
Guadalajara) and Castañeda have an authoritarian operation style, while Serrano and 
especially Morales use a much more populist operation style with the ejidatarios. In Morales' 
case this operation style formed part of his political project within the PRI and the MAR. 
Ejidatarios also deal differently with interface situations. Ejidatarios are very careful with 
authority relations but sometimes openly contest the position of officials. The ejidatarios can 
be extremely hopeful and cooperative with the engineers when they come to do the measuring 
of the land. However, at the same time they are reluctant and look for signals to know 
whether the man is to be trusted or not. In all these situation trust is very important but can 
never be absolute. During the same meeting with government officials, one can find elements 
of enthusiastic cooperation and agreement, but also distrust and cynical jokes by the 
ejidatarios. The ejidatarios know that officials may be under pressure from different sides. 
They recognize that they are not necessarily bribed but can also be threatened or just taken 
away from the case by their superiors. However, the ejidatarios want to maintain their 
relation with the bureaucratic machine as that is the only way in which their problem can be 
solved. So, while in other situations (see chapter five and six) we sometimes find strong 
forms of distantiation or resistance to the "state machine", in this case they need the "state 
machine" to operate on their behalf. 
In the struggle for the "lost land" imaginations play a central role in trying to gain 
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control over a messy labyrmthine machine. The ejidatarios construct theories which help 
them to find a certain order or logic and in this way makes it possible to decide how to 
proceed. By attributing a logic to the uncoordinated actions of the bureaucratic machine, 
ejidatarios as well as officials become implicated in processes of fetishization and reification. 
Maps, presidential resolutions, and agrarian documents can all become "sacred objects", 
fetishes. The definitive ejido map on which the ejidatarios focused their struggle, is the 
embodiment of the conflict in an admMstrative artefact; a re-enchantment of a governmental 
technique. This becomes especially clear when we realize that most ejidatarios cannot read 
maps in an administrative way. Yet, their imagination around the map is one of the things 
that help the ejidatarios to deal with the bureaucratic machine. The map is the source of 
much local story-telling, speculation and fantasies, a kind of myth. But it is a "modern" form 
of mythology; a mythology which developed in relation to a "modern" administration. As 
Comaroff and Comaroff (1993) point out, modernity has its own enchantments and rituals. 
In the introduction I pointed out that more attention should be paid to the spatial 
dimension of the working of the state machine. In the struggle for the "lost land" we see 
"flows" of people, documents, and telephone calls going into different directions. Ejidatarios 
travel to government offices in Autlan, Guadalajara, and Mexico City. In their turn, MAR 
engineers and brokers travel back and forth between Mexico City, Guadalajara, and La 
Canoa and often "disappear" on their way. Documents concerning the "lost land" are 
scattered over many offices in different cities. Letters and documents move from one place 
to another, sometimes taking years to arrive, or "disappearing from the face of the earth". 
Important documents may be found in plastic bags in the private houses of ejidatarios, or at 
one of the numerous desks of officials of the MAR. Many phone calls are made to offices 
and private houses in different cities. These manifold activities and travels not only 
characterize the decentered nature of the bureaucratic machine but also point to the "spatial 
matrix materialized in the operation of the state system" (Alonso 1994: 384). Another 
important "spatial element" of the operation of the bureaucratic machine are the encounters 
in different "locales" such as offices, private houses, restaurants, and other places in which 
all kind of transactions are negotiated and celebrated by meals, breakfasts, drinking sessions, 
and parties. These encounters show that the "symbolic and material organization of social 
space" are central elements in the construction of the idea of the state (Alonso 1994: 381). 
All these flows and situated actions contribute to the construction and imagination of 
places with specific significance (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). We find theories and 
imaginations about what happens in the different places, reflections about the localization of 
evil, the localization of the fetishized map, or of centers of power. At certain moments, the 
ejidatarios located evil in the MAR office of Guadalajara, and at other moments in one of 
the agencies in Mexico City. The bureaucratic machine itself contributes to these spatial 
constructions and imaginations. Ejidatarios are summoned to come to different places in the 
bureaucracy and the officials participate in the theorizing about which offices they should 
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avoid and which places the obstacles come from. In this way, the bureaucratic machine 
contributes to the imagination of "evil places". 
In the next chapter we see that the processes of imagination and fantasizing which have 
been described in the last two chapters for the ejidatarios are not specific to the peasantry. 
We will see how also officials "within the bureaucratic machine" became entrapped within 
fantasies inspired by the Salinas regime. 
Notes 
1. Several authors use the metaphor of the desirmg-machine introduced by Deleuze and Guattari (1988). In 
his study on the working of the development bureaucracy in Lesotho, Ferguson points out that his use of 
the "machine" metaphor is motivated not only "by science-fictional analogy, but by a desire (following 
Foucault [1979,1980] and Deleuze [1988]) to capture something of the way that conceptual and discursive 
systems link up with social institutions and processes without even approximately determining the form or 
defining the logic of the coutcome" (Ferguson 1990: 275). Ferguson defines the "machine" as "an 
anonymous set of interrelations that only ends up having a kind of retrospective coherence" (ibid.). 
Goodchild (1996) discusses how knowledge, power and desire operate in Deleuze and Guattari's texts. 
He explains that in their views the machine is made up of thousands uncoordinated actions and does not 
have a center of control. The consistency and power of the abstract machine are desire; it is a "desiring-
machine" (Goodchild 1996: 50-51). 
2. On another occasion, when Raul and I were working in the local ejido archive, we found more than ten 
maps of the extension of the ejido. It seems this was the map they always received when they asked for 
the definitive map of the ejido. 
CHAPTER 9 
INSIDE THE "HOPE - GENERATING MACHINE 
Introduction: Officials and Institutional Projects 
In tiie previous chapters we saw that the ejidatarios have a long history of experiences with 
the state bureaucratic machine. Yet, despite its central role in agrarian matters, the Ministry 
of Agrarian Reform is a largely neglected subject in the academic literature. The MAR is 
generally depicted as a highly corrupt political instrument which has only contributed to the 
continuing exploitation of the peasantry. The bureaucracies responsible for rural areas and 
the peasantry have above all been analyzed in terms of their role in rural class struggles and 
in the reproduction of the Mexican state. For example, several studies have shown how large 
parts of the resources destined for rural areas have only led to the reproduction of the 
bureaucracies and to the increase of existing differences between rural producers (Gordillo 
1984). Although these are important insights, I think it is also necessary to pay attention to 
the internal operation of the bureaucracy. Despite a few good studies (Grindle 1977 and 
Hardy 1984) "there has been far too much loose theorizing and too few concrete studies of 
the internal structure and functioning of Mexican government organizations" (Binford 1985: 
197, see also Zepeda 1988 for a similar critique). 
Interesting views on the operation of the bureaucracy have been developed by scholars 
who have focused on the implementation of government programs (Appendini 1988, Arce 
1993, Long 1988, 1990, van der Zaag 1992). Their work on the different institutional 
projects of government officials and the interaction between functionaries and "clients" 
demonstrates that state intervention exhibits its own dynamic, manifested in the 
transformation of programs on the basis of power struggles within and between institutions 
and by the different strategies that "clients" develop to appropriate, resist, or negotiate 
intervention (de Vries 1997). In this chapter I continue this line of work by paying special 
attention to the way in which officials and their "client-ejidatarios" interact in the 
implementation of several new government programs for the ejido sector. 
Much attention will be paid in this chapter to the reflections of the officials on then-
work, the bureaucracy and their relation with ejidatarios. Interestingly, within the 
bureaucracy there is much more discussion about corruption and how to fight this 
phenomenon than among ejidatarios. For ejidatarios paying for services is an essential part 
of their relation with the bureaucracy. It is a social given and they do not theorize much 
about it. On the other hand, for officials concern with corruption is related to their own 
search for legitimacy. Officials talk a lot about acceptable and unacceptable forms of 
compensation for official services. This concern with corruption is related to government 
discourses which stress the fight against corruption in government agencies. 
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This governmental discourse against corruption played an important role in the propaganda 
around the change of article 27 of the Mexican Constitution in 1992, which changed the legal 
basis of the ejido system. In this chapter I discuss how the programs which accompanied the 
change of article 27 propagated a new style of intervention, in contrast to the so-called 
corrupt practices of the MAR, and how this raised high expectations among young officials 
of the new institute, the Procuraduría Agraria. In these new agrarian programs considerable 
emphasis was also put on the importance of local forms of organization and of initiatives 
from the ejidatarios themselves. However, case studies from the region of Autlán make clear 
that this "new bureaucratic style" and the enthusiasm with which young officials implemented 
the new programs could not possibly change the historically developed relations between 
ejidatarios and officials. Although the law was changed and a new institute was established, 
situations soon returned to "normal" and the old stereotypes of the lazy ejidatarios and the 
unreliable officials were reinforced in the interactions between ejidatarios and officials. Yet, 
this time the "machine" had not only raised many expectations among ejidatarios, but also 
among officials. This shows that officials who start taking the messages too seriously may 
also fall prey to the "fantasies of the machine". 
Before analyzing how the stereotypes reproduce themselves in relation to the working of 
the hope-generating machine, a short analysis is provided of the interrelationship between the 
bureaucracy and politics in Mexico. 
The Interrelation between Politics and the Bureaucracy 
Much has been written on the Mexican political system. Without entering into the manifold 
debates in political science, I will present the characteristics of the Mexican political system 
that are most important for understanding the working of the agrarian bureaucracy. One 
central element in the Mexican political system is the dominance of the PRI, the official 
party, since its establishment in 1929. Although recently, opposition parties have been 
gaining influence and the system seems to have opened up, the PRI apparatus remains strong 
in many areas. The party has officially won all presidential elections so far. Another 
characteristic of the Mexican political system is the centralization of power in the office of 
the presidency. "The president, operating with relatively few restraints on his authority, 
completely dominates the legislative and judicial branches" (Cornelius and Craig 1991: 24-
25). Once the new PRI candidate for presidency is appointed by the outgoing president (the 
famous dedazo), everything is reorganized around this new man. He is destined to be the 
man of almost "absolute power" for the next six years (el sexenio). Characteristically, every 
president introduces his own government programs and the projects of his predecessor are 
criticized and stopped. Until recently the president did not encounter much opposition from 
the PRI dominated congress and the real debates and struggles were fought out in the 
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informal circles of the mighty PRI family. 
The figure of the Mexican president has been a favorite theme in discussions on Mexican 
politics. We saw in the previous chapters that the ejidatarios in La Canoa hoped for personal 
intervention of the Mexican President Salinas to resolve their land problems with the 
pequenos propietarios. The ejidatarios wrote him a personal letter about their problems, and 
the rumor was spread that Salinas lumself had talked about La Canoa in the media. Several 
intermediaries also claimed to have special access to the president. These stories in which 
the president liimself becomes enrolled are very common in Mexico. Lomnitz explains how 
in the nineteenth century a sharp distinction was already made between local and national 
authorities, especially the president of the republic. "The ideology was that even though there 
could be injustices propagated by selfish politicians at all levels of the system, the president 
himself was innocent of these processes, and direct contact with the president would result 
in the impairment of justice" (Lomnitz 1992: 307). As he puts it the power of the president 
is the "result of the persistent importance of personal relations in Mexican political power. 
Because people know that personal links are the prime form of access to political favor - and 
because this is especially so at the level of the presidents ... it is no wonder that in Mexico 
the president of the republic makes public appearances like a kind of deus ex machina who 
heals by mere contact" (ibid.: 308). 
Another important characteristic of the Mexican political system with important 
consequences for the working of the bureaucratic machine, is the close connection between 
the bureaucracy and party politics. There are different factions within the PRI party and a 
long time before the outgoing president announces who will be the PRI candidate for the next 
elections, bureaucrats align themselves with the pre-candidates. There is a high element of 
risk in this support of pre-candidates. If one lines up with the pre-candidate who becomes 
the official PRI candidate for presidency, one is assured of a good position for the next six 
years. However, if one supports the "wrong" pre-candidate, one has to look quickly for other 
ways to assure one's position. With every change of president almost all high and middle 
level personnel in all government bureaucracies are replaced. This does not mean that the 
people who are removed from their post remain unemployed. Many find a job at another 
government institution. So, an enormous shift of personnel occurs in which only some (who 
have poor connections with the" new political networks) will fail to find a new position. 
However, they know that they have the possibility of re-entering at a later date. The frequent 
turnover of high and middle level personnel also means that officials are often placed in 
charge of organizations and programs they know little about. 
Since the mid-1980s, however, the electoral process has become more competitive and 
the Mexican political system is slowly changing. However, although the changes in the 
electoral process and the growing importance of other political parties besides the PRI have 
received ample scholarly attention, "the relationship between the electoral process and the 
issue of political culture has hardly been examined" (Pansters 1997: 30). For the moment, 
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there remains a strong interconnection between politics and the bureaucracy in Mexico. 
The relation between politics and the bureaucracy has been demonstrated by Grindle 
(1977) in her study of CONASUPO, Mexico's staple commodities marketing agency, under 
the presidency of Echeverría (1970-1976). As I found it in my fieldwork, her analysis is still 
valid for a large part of the bureaucracy. For that reason I discuss her work extensively. 
Grindle shows how with the approach of the day of the change of president, officials are 
increasingly engaged in politics instead of doing their work. By the fifth year of the sexenio, 
the shadow of the upcoming presidential selection already begins to be felt, but the last year 
of the sexenio is really characterized by intense behind the scenes politicking and by equally 
intense inattention to official duties. Because all bureaucratic positions which become 
available depend upon personal appointments, future employment possibilities depend upon 
the cultivation of personal and political ties to individuals who might be influential in the 
future (Grindle 1977: 49). However, the networks through which individuals are tied into 
extended coalitions and alliance structures within the government are not entirely stable or 
durable. The individual's future generally does not depend upon relations with a single 
influential person but on the ability to call upon a wide range of contacts and alliances (ibid.: 
51). 
According to Grindle the influence of the bureaucratic elite cannot be overestimated. The 
bureaucratic elite is linked to the political elite and to economically powerful people in the 
private sector. However, on the other hand, the bureaucracy also plays a central role in the 
political process. Bureaucratic positions and the resources that go with mem can be used for 
political purposes. These characteristics of the Mexican political and bureaucratic system are 
accompanied by another well-known phenomenon: cooptation. "The Mexican regime is 
sophisticated in its use of cooptive mechanisms such as the timely distribution of government 
jobs in order to ameliorate potential or actual opposition" (ibid.: 45). The different Mexican 
governments have always been very able to offer positions to professionals and intellectuals 
who were dissatisfied with government policies and political repression. 
On the other hand, Grindle also draws attention to the fact that the bureaucracy is 
accessible to the wider population. She shows that bureaucratic positions are widely spread 
throughout the population. Most members of the middle class, have held a political or 
governmental office at one time of their lives or else have had a relative or compadre 
involved. For ambitious individuals among the lower socioeconomic groups, the same 
possibility also exists (ibid.: 46). All this makes it clear that the bureaucracy cannot be seen 
as an apparatus separate from the rest of society. It is directly linked to high and low politics 
and everyone, from lower social groups to members of the opposition, in one way or another 
may be or become part of the bureaucratic machine. 
Yet, this does not mean that job performances do not play a role and that everything 
within the bureaucracy is organized according to political considerations. As Grindle points 
out "It is wrong to assume that there is little pressure on the individual to perform 
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satisfactorily the responsibilities assigned to him. ... Within the bureaucracy, there is 
frequently great pressure on confidence workers to achieve the performance goals" (ibid.: 
50). "Most middle and high level officials will be found in their offices, long after the work 
day has officially ended, concentrating on the tasks they have been assigned ... Successful 
job performance, implying expertise, innovativeness, and efficiency, does indeed play an 
important part in ensuring one of a brighter future within the government" (ibid.: 51). 
Hence, there exists a tense coexistence of the two principles for success in the bureaucracy: 
good job performance and the cultivation of personal/political relationships. 
Grindle stresses that although this system implies that a lot of time and resources are lost 
in the political reshuffling every six years, it also makes it a very dynamic system. Every six 
years, new people develop policies which are implemented with enormous zeal and 
enthusiasm. Each administration tries to introduce new programs and leave an impact. During 
the first years of the term of a president, new programs and projects are developed and 
implemented with enormous force. People at the right place and with the right connections 
may achieve a great deal during this period. They only have to try to finish in time and re-
mobilize their contacts and energy towards the end of term. 
Although Grindle provides one of the best analyses of a largely neglected object of study in 
Mexico, the bureaucracy, there are several limitations in her work. Grindle is above all 
interested in analyzing the Mexican political system which she describes as a "corporate and 
authoritarian regime, dominated by a party-bureaucratic apparatus and pervaded by extensive 
clientelist relationships among the population and the political elite" (ibid.: 177). In the same 
way she characterizes the bureaucracy as "a highly politicized, particularistic, and ascription-
oriented administrative apparatus" (ibid.: 175). Although this type of analysis is shared by 
many other analysts of the Mexican political system (see for example Cornelius and Craig 
1991 and Camp 1993), in my view it does not pay sufficient attention to cultural processes 
and forms of dialogue within the bureaucracy. Officials are treated too much as goal-oriented 
strategizers and not much attention is paid to the ways in which officials constantly 
problematize ongoing issues and how they themselves deal with the contradictions created 
by the hope-generating machine. 
Grindle, as well as most other political analysts, sees corruption as a direct result of the 
close relationship between party politics and bureaucratic practices. However, corruption is 
a label which is used for a wide range of activities and this makes it a "slippery object". The 
talk of corruption is also a way of constructing the phenomenon and therefore we should pay 
more attention to the role of the "discourse of corruption" in politics. Furthermore, by 
analyzing "corruption" only as a dysfunctional side-effect of the bureaucracy, many 
dimensions of so-called corrupt practices have not received enough attention. These include, 
for example, the performative side (Gupta 1995), the strong feelings of personal care for 
others in doing favors (Lomnitz 1992) and the enjoyment and pleasure in "playing the 
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game". The aim of this chapter is to show how officials deal with the political dimension of 
their job, the role which the discourse of corruption plays in the bureaucracy, and how 
officials reflect on their work in the "hope-generating machine". 
Doing Research in the Agrarian Bureaucracy 
The research with officials in the bureaucracy differed greatly from the work in the ejido, 
and therefore I will discuss some peculiar aspects of this part of the research. The fact that 
politics and bureaucratic practices are intricately related, can immediately be felt in any study 
within Mexican institutions. First of all, there is always much politicking going on and 
officials will be careful about providing sensitive information. However, the high mobility 
of personnel in the institution also makes it possible to meet people who are about to leave 
office and who are prepared to talk more freely about what they know and mink. So, in this 
sense the politicized character of the bureaucracy can be both an advantage and a drawback 
for research at the same time. 
A common strategy in conducting research within an institution is to use "contacts" in 
order to get access to certain people. Often people themselves offered certain "entrances" 
in the institutions when they knew what I was interested in. Many officials I met gave me 
new contacts and in this way networks within the bureaucracy could spread out in many 
different directions. I was also sometimes warned to avoid certain people. People would say, 
for example, that I should talk with Felipe but that I should avoid any contact with Felipe's 
superior as he would make it difficult for me to hang around and ask questions. Officials 
tried to help me through their personal friends within the institution and never in formal 
ways. When I asked them, for example, where I could get certain information they never 
answered in terms of the departments I should go to. They always thought about whom they 
knew at certain offices who could help me. So, their help consisted in giving me the right 
contacts. 
Although these contacts always helped, a strong atmosphere of caution reigned in the 
MAR. Many MAR officials, and especially the ones in higher positions, clearly did not like 
people sneaking around in the institution. Even if I entered the institution through personal 
friends, I could obviously not be placed within political bureaucratic networks. On the other 
hand, they wanted to give the impression of being as polite and helpful as possible. The 
following episode is an illustration of this atmosphere of secrecy. Through one of "my 
contacts" I contacted Figueroa, a middle aged man who had worked at the MAR for many 
years and knew all the ins and outs. Although he was extremely busy, he received me in his 
office together with several of his assistants. After I had given my "standard introductory 
speech", people were sent away to get the files on La Canoa. Then Figueroa excused riimself 
for being so busy and brought me to Laura who would explain everything I wanted to know 
about the MAR procedures to me. Laura was sitting at a desk outside Figueroa's office and 
for that reason I had assumed that she was the secretary. However, she was a young lawyer 
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who obviously did not belong to the confidential group around Figueroa. Laura was 
immediately interested in my research and remembered that she had worked recently on the 
dossier of La Canoa. I also remembered having seen her name on several letters in the ejido. 
Figueroa found some documents about La Canoa but he did not want to show them to me. 
However, Laura skillfully took the documents from his hands, saying that with these 
documents she could explain the general agrarian procedures to me. She searched for more 
documents in her cabinet and carefully showed me the correspondence she had in her desk 
so that I could write everything down in my note-book. However, she put the files away 
when Figueroa came to see what we were doing. Figueroa came to us all the time as if to 
check up on what we were discussing. When he came, Laura stopped discussing the 
problems of La Canoa and started talking about general agrarian procedures. 
This and other similar experiences strengthened my feeling that officials in the MAR 
worked in different networks and that there was considerable distrust and tension within the 
ministry. It was also made clear to me that it was important to strike up strategic alliances. 
On the basis of mutual sympathy or interests officials could decide to establish a certain 
rapport with me as researcher. In the case of Laura she had only entered the MAR a year 
and a half ago to learn more about agrarian law. She intended to leave the MAR at a later 
stage to work at a private lawyer's office of some friends. She said that she detested the 
corruption at the MAR and that she was happy to provide me with information. She hoped 
that I could help the ejidatarios of La Canoa. So, within the MAR there were officials with 
different personal projects and not only was there distrust towards "outsiders" but also 
among themselves. 
In the beginning I assumed that there was one central archive of the MAR in Mexico City 
in which they would have all the documents of the ejido and an overview of the official state 
of affair of the different procedures. So, one of my main aims in Mexico City was to try and 
get access to this central archive. However, the description of the MAR archives given by 
Zaragoza et al. still seemed very accurate: "The archives of the agrarian files probably 
constitutes one of the most archaic forms to keep documents. There is no registration or 
control of current files. ... There is nowhere where one can get information about the 
processes that are going on with respect to a file in the different offices and departments of 
the MAR" (Zaragoza et al. 1980: 586 own translation). This was exactly what I found in the 
MAR. Many departments had some bits and pieces of information on La Canoa. Several 
divisions could get some information about the ejido on their computer. But this information 
was very fragmented and a general overview of the state of affairs was nowhere to be found. 
Officials also told me that they themselves sometimes had great difficulty in locating specific 
files for their work. 
I finally found out that the MAR kept several archives some of which were open to the 
public, while others were not. During the time of my research there was one public MAR 
archive in Mexico City where they kept all the agrarian files of ejidos. There was another 
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division of the MAR where all the maps of Mexican ejidos were kept. The general archive 
proved to be very incomplete. MAR officials were allowed to take files out of this archive, 
which implied that files of an ejido could be spread out over many offices in Mexico City 
and could stay there for many years. Indeed, I found files of La Canoa on the desks of 
different departments I went to. This also meant that if one was looking for specific 
documents it was impossible to find out where they could be and if they were still there. 
Documents could easily get lost after some years on a desk. As Laura rightly put it when I 
asked her if it would be difficult to get access to the MAR archives: You will get access to 
certain archives. But the problem is to find out why papers are lacking, why maps have not 
been made and in whose interests that has been Furthermore, there are certain 
departments within the MAR which never give any information. For example, the department 
that deals with payments by the MAR for confiscated land does never provide any 
information. 
In conclusion, during the time of the research I noticed an atmosphere of suspicion and 
conspiracy in the different offices of the MAR. Even when it was possible to establish 
valuable relations with certain officials, there always was much discretion and caution. 
Irrespective of the information gathered in the different interviews, this atmosphere in the 
MAR coincided very well with the public image of the MAR as a highly politicized institute. 
Officials about La Canoa and "Normal" and "Abnormal" Irregularities 
In the previous chapters we have seen that officials reacted to La Canoa's problems with the 
"lost land" in a number of standard ways. Even after they had recognized that political 
influences probably interfered with the measuring of the land in La Canoa, and after they had 
drawn the conclusion that the ejidatarios in La Canoa would probably never recover the land, 
they could give a long explanation of the procedures to be followed. In addition, they gave 
long lists of recommendations to make the struggle of the ejidatarios of La Canoa possible: 
they had to draw up formal contracts with all the professionals they were working with; they 
should carefully study all the work orders before signing their agreement with the work of 
the engineers, and so on. In sum, the ejidatarios should go on focusing on the procedures and 
putting pressure on the MAR. This contradiction of stressing the importance of procedures 
while acknowledging that the real basis of these conflicts is distinct, becomes clear in the 
following example. 
An external agrarian lawyer's assessment of the case 
1 will present part of a conversation I had with Manuel, an agrarian lawyer in Mexico City 
who had worked for many years in the MAR and was fmshing a book on agrarian law in 
Mexico. Manuel worked for the agricultural office of the PRI in the Mexican Congress and 
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I had already had several conversations with him about land rights in Mexico. The day that 
Serrano did not arrive at the town hall (see chapter eight) I decided to call Manuel and ask 
his opinion about the situation of La Canoa. I explained him the events surrounding Serrano 
who had not turned up. 
Manuel: And didn't they phone him at the MAR to ask what had happened? 
M: The engineer himself phoned the town hall to say that his car had broken 
down and that he would be there in four days. 
Manuel: But he has to come now, because they gave him these days to do this 
measuring job, he cannot wait four days. What kind of land is it? 
M: Irrigated land. 
Manuel: Then it is very probable that the case has been stopped by the private 
landowners, especially as it concerns irrigated land, and the MAR itself is 
probably heavily involved in the matter. Do the people of la Canoa have a copy 
of the work order of the engineer? That is very important; it is important that they 
keep on putting pressure on. 
M: I don't know whether they have a copy of the work order, but anyway what 
is the sense of putting pressure on when they have been fighting for this case for 
more than fifty years and these officials have always been bribed..! 
Manuel: What kind ofKafkesque ideas are these? Let them come to Mexico City. 
M: They have been there recently but they told them that the case is sabotaged in 
the office in Guadalajara. 
Manuel: And does the office in Mexico City have no authority over the office in 
Guadalajara?! They have to keep on putting pressure on. And they have to come 
to Mexico City to "buy functionaries". 
M: They have recently paid a large amount of money to a private lawyer in 
Guadalajara who was going to help them and then disappeared. 
Manuel: They shouldn't pay private lawyers but functionaries of the MAR! 
The interesting element of this conversation is the fact that Manuel accused me of Kafkesque 
ideas when I talked about the impossibility of the case proceeding any further, whereas he 
himself made clear that this is a political case which has probably been stopped from above. 
Another interesting element is that although he said that it is a political case, he kept 
stressing the importance of formal documents and of following the official procedures. This 
contradictory attitude is typical of officials. They will immediately admit the political side 
of land conflicts but afterwards will continue to stress that the legal and administrative 
procedures have to be followed. Although Manuel has nothing to do with the case and has 
no personal interest in it whatsoever, he also suggests that the ejidatarios should do things 
differently: that they should go to Mexico City and buy officials instead of paying a lawyer 
in order to speed up the bureaucratic process. This also is a general phenomenon. Lawyers, 
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officials, and others always know the "right way" to get these things resolved and can always 
tell you why things are going wrong. In this way, the officials also live in a world of 
contradiction which they themselves help to reproduce by suggesting new ways of handling 
(unresolvable) conflicts and by offering new openings and raising hopes again. Actually, this 
is the same kind of dynamic as we have already seen among ejidatarios: "knowing how 
things work", but at the same time "hoping and believing" in the rationality of formal 
procedures. In this way, both ejidatarios and officials actively engage in the cultural 
representation of the state. 
In their own daily work, this reification of procedures by officials is even more 
understandable as they have to deal with a myriad of procedures and bureaucratic steps. They 
only operate in a very small part of the whole administrative process and normally do not 
have an overview of the whole problematic of specific ejidos. They tend to concentrate on 
technicalities and numbers of files. They know that within the MAR many activities concern 
a legalization of illegal transactions (see chapter five) and they know that serious land 
conflicts are negotiated at other levels. They themselves may become involved in a small part 
of these negotiations but most of their time is dedicated to a small technical part of the 
administrative bureaucratic process. Even if an engineer receives orders from above to 
change a map in favor of certain private landholders, he can still dedicate a great deal of time 
and skill to producing a technically well elaborated map. 
About Normal and Abnormal Irregularities in Agrarian Procedures 
This formalistic way of working meant that I had to adapt my "research strategy" with 
officials. When I explained the problems of the ejido La Canoa in "normal terms" officials 
did not take me seriously. They often became annoyed - in the same way as they did with 
the ejidatarios - that I could not express myself in official tenninology. Hence, I undertook 
an extensive study of agrarian legal procedures in order to understand the legal side of the 
problems of La Canoa and in order to have an "intelligent" conversation with officials. 
Yet, even when I explained the problems of La Canoa in formal terms, the many 
irregularities did not interest the officials. The fact that the map of the ejido La Canoa was 
never made and that engineers never finished their measuring work, were considered to be 
normal phenomena. The fact that not all land had been handed over to the ejido was also 
very usual according to the officials and could be related to many different factors. Hence, 
all these "abnormalities" were not exceptional and did not deserve special explanations. 
However, in the many talks I had with MAR officials they often studied the technicalities 
of the documents of La Canoa and in this way I discovered two administrative flaws that 
amazed them. Namely, the fact that the presidential resolution of the endowment of the ejido 
was never published in the Federal Gazette and, secondly, that an extension of the ejido had 
been executed without the endowment having been completely finished (without publication 
in the Federal Gazette and without a definitive map). To me this did not seem very 
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interesting. After the many irregularities I had found, these only seemed insignificant details. 
However, for the officials this was very different. Their attitude completely changed when 
they found out about these two matters. Many said that this was impossible and that they had 
never heard of such a case before. I will illustrate this point with parts from two interviews. 
The first is from a talk with Laura at the MAR. 
Laura about irregularities at the MAR 
During my talk with Laura she looked through the documents in her desk to explain to me 
what was going on in La Canoa. After having read the documents, she said that the 
ejidatarios of La Canoa had sent a letter to the MAR in 1977 in which they asked for the 
map of the ejido and the measurement of the ejido lands. As the MAR did not react, the 
ejido started a lawsuit against the MAR (an amparo) which they won. The judge ordered the 
MAR to pay several fines and to answer the letter. In 1993 the MAR finally answered and 
said that they could not comply with La Canoa's request as neither a provisional, nor a 
definitive map of the endowment of La Canoa existed. 
L: That is the way in which matters are settled: purely formally. 
M: Isn't it strange that a letter from 1977 was only answered in 1993? 
L: That is quite normal, there are much worse cases. 
So, the answering of letters after more than fifteen years also belonged to the category of the 
"normal irregularities''. Yet, Laura was extremely surprised when she found out that the 
extension of the ejido was carried out without the endowment having been finished. We 
talked about this with her boss Figueroa who also said that this was impossible. However, 
the information he had gathered in the archive on La Canoa said the same. He was also 
amazed and said that this could not be true. 
Alejandro about the peculiarities of La Canoa 
Another day I spoke with a lawyer Alejandro at another office of the MAR (the office of the 
cuerpo consultivo agrario). He looked up the information he had on La Canoa on cards in 
the office. Alejandro also noticed that the presidential resolution of the endowment was never 
published in the Federal Gazette. 
M: Is it usual that the presidential resolution of the endowment is not published? 
A: In some cases it has not been published. But this case of La Canoa is very weird as an 
extension of the ejido took place afterwards. 
M: What can be the reasons for not publishing the presidential resolution of the endowment? 
A: Political reasons, a mistake, that it was left on a certain desk. Then a new investigation 
is necessary and a new judgment by this office of the MAR. 
Alejandro reading further. 
A: But this is a strange case. They published the presidential resolution of the extension but 
for the publication of the extension they needed the data of the publication of the 
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endowment.... 
Alejandro started reading the cards again. 
A: In times ofCdrdenas, very strange things happened. For example, in some cases they first 
executed and only afterwards formulated the presidential resolution. I know of more cases 
in which there was no publication of the presidential resolution, but I know of no other 
case in which they got an extension without the endowment having been published in the 
Federal Gazette. 
Several elements are interesting in this context. First of all, it is clear that in this MAR world 
full of irregularities, some irregularities are "normal" and others are "abnormal". It was 
"normal" that presidential resolutions under the presidency of Cardenas (1934-1940) were 
executed before the presidential resolution was formulated. It was "normal" that the MAR 
took ten or twenty years to answer a letter. It was "normal" that no definitive map of the 
ejido was made after the execution of the presidential resolution. It was "normal" for ejidos 
to request the measuring of their land from the MAR and never get a response. It was 
"normal" that engineers arrived to do a measuring job and suddenly disappeared. These were 
all common practices in the MAR that did not surprise any official. Yet, the fact that the 
presidential resolution of an endowment was never published in the Federal Gazette was 
certainly "not normal". The fact that an extension followed an endowment that had never 
been completely finished was "not normal" either. These irregularities were highly 
exceptional. Although to me these two elements did not seem especially interesting, I had 
finally found the way to get the attention of officials and talk to them on their own terms. 
This information always triggered their professional interest and made it possible to have a 
dialogue. 
Another interesting point is that while these were the most important irregularities for the 
officials, the ejidatarios of La Canoa were not even aware of these "highly uncommon and 
special details" of their ejido. When I discussed these points with the ejidatarios, it appeared 
that nobody of the group of the "lost land" knew about them, nor were they very interested. 
However, in order to be taken seriously by the officials it would have been better to have 
started with these two points instead of talking about stolen land and missing maps. On the 
other hand, while the ejidatarios would certainly have received much more attention from the 
officials if they had started their talks with these two points (as I eventually did), it would 
not really have mattered. Better communication between ejidatarios and officials would not 
have changed anything about the political influences in agrarian issues. The primacy of 
political over legal-administrative principles in serious land conflicts between ejidatarios or 
comuneros and private landowners is obvious in Mexico (as recent events in Chiapas 
illustrate). 
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Officials Theorizing about Corruption and the Ways to Fight it 
Besides the "big land conflicts", like the "lost land", we saw in chapters five and six that 
there are many other ejido affairs in which the MAR plays a role. These include, for 
example, internal ejido conflicts over plots, the selling and legalizing of land sales, and 
problems in the urban zone. In these matters the role of the MAR was also notorious and we 
noticed several well-known practices. We saw, for example, officials who asked ejidatarios 
for money for a certificate which is officially free; officials were taken out for dinner in 
exchange for assistance with procedures and legalizing illegal transactions; officials who 
asked for presents in exchange for falsifying papers or making papers disappear, and 
engineers who received money to elaborate a map. 
Ejidatarios on Corruption 
Although the ejidatarios pay for many services of the bureaucracy they will not easily use 
the term corruption when they talk about these practices. They see this as normal transactions 
in which an exchange of services or favors takes place. That is the way we are used to it in 
Mexico, is a usual expression. All people pay money to get things arranged, documents 
changed, etc. It is part of life. The ejidatarios try to use the influence of their relatives, 
compadres, or friends in bureaucratic positions if necessary. So, ejidatarios do not see the 
functionaries as corrupt in contrast to themselves who are honest. Furthermore, the 
ejidatarios do not mind paying when they feel that they are treated well and get what they 
want. On the contrary, these successful transactions make them feel very pleased and give 
them the feeling that they are capable of dealing with the bureaucracy. If the transaction was 
successful, they will try to continue their relationship with this same official. These 
transactions often take place in a pleasant atmosphere of partying and abundant meals and 
may strengthen useful relationships. So, when ejidatarios pay the official at the MAR office 
in Autlan to register the inheritor of their land in the MAR office in Guadalajara, they do not 
call this corruption. When they invite officials to big meals in exchange for all the paperwork 
they did, this is considered to be a normal compensation and an act of gratitude. The bribe 
(mordida) which is paid for help with illegal actions, such as the legalizing of illegal land 
sales, is also seen in the same light. 
On the other hand, these same favors or compensations may be called corruption when 
they take place in unbalanced exchanges; when ejidatarios feel that there is no balanced 
reciprocity. Hence, ejidatarios use the label corruption when they pay money or do favors 
and this does not bring them the services they expect in exchange. When, for example, they 
pay a lawyer and nothing is accomplished or when they pay an engineer who never finishes 
the work, or when amounts of money are asked for which are considered to be too high for 
the favor done, they may talk about corruption. However, no fixed rules can be given about 
what are considered to be acceptable transactions and what not. This very much depends on 
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the situation and the people involved. Furthermore, as it is often not clear to the ejidatarios 
what exactly is going on or what exactly officials or intermediaries are doing for them, they 
tend to be careful in their judgment. Hence, corruption is not so much seen as a personal 
characteristic, but above all as a characteristic of society in general. Ejidatarios know that 
all engineers will be confronted with different kinds of pressures. Some will yield more 
easily to these pressures than others, but all are moving within certain limits and conditions 
set by wider influences. 
However, the ejidatarios use the term corruption above all in a general way, to refer to 
the "way in which the system works" and to refer to the fact that "justice is never done". 
So they tend to use the term as a form of social criticism, referring to the accumulation of 
experiences in which they have been deceived, promises were made that were not kept, and 
money was accepted while nothing was done in return. 
Officials on Corruption 
Officials, in their turn, talked in much more specific ways about corruption. In the different 
chapters, we saw that the awkward agrarian rules and procedures gave ample room for 
manipulation by officials. However, not all officials take advantage of the many opportunities 
offered by these situations and not everybody operates in the same way. Officials could 
reflect extensively about different colleagues and what was acceptable behavior and what not. 
For example, Rigoberto of the MAR office in Autlán expressed very negative views of his 
colleague, David, who during all these years had greatly enriched himself by asking for 
money for every service and never said no when people asked him to arrange illegal matters. 
Although Rigoberto himself also accepted money in exchange for favors, in his view, David 
was "over-demanding". Actually, this view was shared by many people in the region, 
officials as well as ejidatarios. For example, Federico the municipal official of Autlan who 
was responsible for agrarian matters in the hamlets that fall under Autlán (coordinación de 
agendas y delegaciones) and later for the PRONASOL program, once said: 
F: At the MAR they are very corrupt, especially David. We all like money but that man 
exaggerates! Some years ago he came to deliver quite a number of ejido certificates in 
the region and he charged 500,000for each certificate! 
M: He cannot do that, can he? 
F: Yes he can, but it should not be done. 
Again we see that an official does not deny that he himself also receives money (Federico: 
we all like money) but that he makes a distinction between reasonable forms of exchange and 
abusing one's power. The moment that an official is seen to be only oriented towards 
personal enrichment, the term corruption is used. Naturally, again there was no absolute 
standard for corruption. But there were some broad agreements. For example, everybody in 
the region talked about the corrupt David, but I never heard Federico and Rigoberto being 
labeled in that way. 
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Even when I spoke to officials for the first time, they often started talking about corruption. 
For example, in September 1993 I had a long interview with an official who was sent to the 
SARH office in El Grullo for the cartera vencida program. This program was introduced to 
organize the repayment of the debts that many ejidatarios had at BANRURAL (see chapter 
six). Francisco was the third official to be sent to do this job in a period of two and a half 
months. After we had been talking about the program Francisco himself started talking about 
what he called "the problem of corruption". For Francisco corruption was to be found among 
ejidatarios (abusing credit given to them) as well as among officials (accepting favors). He 
talked in a very negative way about ejidatarios, who according to him have a very low 
cultural level. However, he also spoke derogatively of his colleagues who accepted meals, 
cars, and women in exchange for favors. 
F: On one occasion a friend of mine offered me two women and a holiday to the United 
States. I told him that I would not accept it and that if he wanted to negotiate he had to 
come up with something much better. What he offered me was nothing compared with 
what he was asking me to do. This friend got very angry. 
I never accept anything from anybody and that is the reason that I have been selected for 
this work. The only thing that I accept are meals but nothing more. 
M: But sometimes it may be understandable that officials accept things, when salaries are 
very low. 
F: (firmly) That is never an excuse! If you need money, there is only one solution: to work! 
And you are always much better off in a government post than in the private sector. I 
know that from experience as for a while I combined a government job with a job in the 
private sector. If people offer me things, I say: with all respect, I cannot accept that. 
Then people ask me: why not? and I say to them: because of my own conviction. For me 
the most important thing is to be loyal to myself, not loyal to the head, not loyal to the 
institute, not even loyal to the Mexican President, but loyal to myself. 
Other officials also felt the need to define their own position towards the phenomenon of 
corruption even when I had not touched this theme. Manuel (who worked in the Mexican 
congress), for example, commented that his friend who worked at the office of tierras y 
aguas of the MAR (and who would help me to get some maps of the ejido La Canoa for 
free) was a "little corrupt" but not much. To stress the difference between forms of 
corruption, Manuel then gave the example of a MAR official who had asked for a pair of 
socks from a very poor woman. Manuel: that goes too far! However, I felt that this example 
was more to assure me that Manuel also had certain moral standards than that the example 
itself was particularly significant. Yet, Manuel did not pretend to be a "good soul". He 
enjoyed talking about his own games in the "corrupt" atmosphere. 
In many other occasions, fun and joking accompanied discussions about the phenomenon, 
even in public meetings. For example, in January 1994, the head of the SARH in the region, 
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Olivar gave a talk about the organization of the PROCAMPO program at the ejido house in 
Autlan. The meeting took place in a pleasant atmosphere. There was much confusion about 
the payment in the subsidy program. Olivar explained that people who had registered in the 
first stage of the program would soon receive their cheque, but the others who had only 
recently joined the program would receive their cheques at a later point. So, they should not 
worry if they had to wait longer than others. Olivar (jokingly): / say this, so that people 
won't think: ah, Olivar naturally keeps my cheques.... Furthermore the cheques arrive in the 
persons' names, so nobody else can do anything with them. Are there any more questions? 
So, corruption was a "hot issue" within the bureaucracy. Discussions on the subject 
occurred much more among officials than among ejidatarios. Officials apparently felt it 
necessary to define their position in relation to this theme. In their comments they tend to 
make elaborate distinctions between different forms of favors. Naturally, this is an indication 
of the political importance of the phenomenon which is also reflected in the attention given 
to it in the media and government discourses. However, I argue that the "talk of corruption" 
by officials is more than an attempt to conform to a politically powerful discourse. By 
reflecting on corruption, officials also problematize the wider workings of the agrarian 
bureaucracy, the ongoing changes in the Mexican political economy and their own role in 
this process. 
Officials about Solutions for Exploitation by the "Corrupt Bureaucratic Machine" 
Officials had elaborate ideas and theories about agricultural development. Most officials 
blamed the Mexican government for its bad policies in agriculture and animal husbandry. 
Many also blamed the United States which was depicted as the main enemy of Mexico. They 
argued that the USA intended to destroy Mexican agriculture in order to avoid competition 
with Mexican products on the markets which were opening up under NAFTA (the North 
American Free Trade Agreement). On the other hand, in the case of the ejidos, officials also 
used to blame the ejidatarios themselves for their difficult situation. Ejidatarios were depicted 
as lazy, uneducated, and lacking initiative. Officials always commented upon the widespread 
interpersonal distrust in the ejidos and the existence of factions which impeded the 
development of local projects to the benefit of all people. So, besides being distrustful and 
lazy, ejidatarios were also characterized as conflictive and uncooperative. Together with bad 
government policy and the USA as enemy this seemed to be the worst scenario for 
development and progress. 
Even among progressive bureaucrats, the figure of the "distrustful, closed and distant" 
ejidatario deeply informed their thinking and was reinforced by experiences with ejidatarios 
in their daily work. The point is that ejidatarios often do not show much interest in new 
government programs and do not attend meetings or walk out in the middle of them. They 
also tend to make cynical comments about the officials' speeches and show little faith in the 
governmental discourse used by them. Obviously, this attitude of "passivity" and ejidatarios' 
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distrust of officials and new government programs has developed on the basis of many bad 
experiences in the past. When I confronted officials with this explanation, they would 
immediately recognize the point. Yet, they still felt that ejidatarios had to change their 
attitude for their own benefit. Many officials who wanted to work on behalf of the ejidatarios 
had become frustrated by these experiences. This has led to the contradictory situation in 
which, on the one hand, the ejidatarios are considered to be "the victims of a corrupt 
system" and, on the other hand, they are considered to be responsible for this situation due 
to their "apathy". This contradiction can be felt in a conversation I had with Rigoberto of 
the MAR about the new agrarian law in Autlan in April 1993. 
M: I have the impression that in the ejidos people know very little about the new law. 
R: They know about it everywhere. 
M: But they take a wait and see attitude; they seem to think that is does not matter as long 
as nobody touches their land. 
R: That is the way they always are, they have little interest, they should make the effort to 
be better informed. 
M: But I have the impression that their lack of interest has to do with their past experiences 
with the bureaucracy. The fact that one official says this, and the other that, and that 
rules seem to vary according to the official they are dealing with. 
R: That is true, and these things really have happened. But the ejidatarios always remember 
those bad things that happened on one occasion many years ago. 
This "lack of initiative and education" on the part of the ejidatarios was seen by officials not 
only as an enormous hindrance to development but also as an obstacle in the fight against 
corruption. During my research I spoke to many officials and people working for other 
organizations who tried to fight corruption in general and in the agrarian bureaucracy in 
particular. Their ideas about the solution were very consistent: education and organization. 
These were the means through which the ejidatarios could defend themselves against a 
corrupt government bureaucracy. This leads to the paradoxical situation of officials trying 
to improve the situation of the ejidatarios by helping them to organize themselves against the 
state machine. This is illustrated in a talk I had with Saldana, a SARH official in the region 
of Autlan who was known as a leftist who supported the ejidatarios. I will present part of a 
dialogue I had with him on the reform of the agrarian law in 1992. 
S: In my opinion the law is positive, but what is going to be decisive is a process of 
profound education and consciousness raising (conscientizacidn) among the ejidatarios. 
Otherwise the danger of a monopolization of plots exists. 
M: But why education, isn't it more a political problem? 
S: Exactly, that is true, but for that reason the consciousness of ejidatarios has to be raised. 
They have to organize themselves against this. In many ejidos they don't know what is 
happening. Therefore I said: train the ejidatarios. There is a lack of knowledge. We want 
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to give the ejidatarios information, so that they become restless and pay attention to what 
is going on. 
M: And who should give this education? The same government with whom the ejidatarios 
have had so many bad experiences? 
S: The government should implement this. Those who have most interest in all this are the 
ejidatarios themselves. It's unfortunate that not all of them are enthusiastic about this. 
And the change is drastic. 
However, Saldana knows very well that even under the former agrarian law if a big 
entrepreneur wanted to buy ejido land in the region, neither the law nor well-educated 
ejidatarios were able to stop him. So, although officials may acknowledge the political 
underpinnings of the problems, they look for solution in non-political terms. 
In the same way as the ejidatarios, these officials are not naive about their society, but 
they are entrapped in a world of contradictions. While the ejidatarios may distance 
themselves from the bureaucratic machine and react cynically, for the officials the 
bureaucracy is their world of work. Officials have to believe in the new projects and 
programs and in the potentiality of the bureaucratic system in order to be able to work. They 
themselves are part of it. This leads to the image of the optimistic official and the skeptical 
peasant. An image one often comes across when officials come to introduce new government 
projects. 
The Reform of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution 
I will now discuss the way in which the change of art 27 of the Mexican Constitution, which 
formed the basis of land rights in Mexico, was presented in 1992. The public debate around 
the reform of article 27 clearly shows the political importance of the discourse against 
corruption. Together with the change of article 27, the agrarian law was changed. The 
changes in the law were rather drastic and caused many emotional debates. 1 The most 
important elements of the new agrarian law in comparison with the old federal agrarian 
reform law are the following. Firstly, the Mexican agrarian reform has come to its end, land 
will no longer be expropriated in order to establish or enlarge ejidos. Secondly, the ejido 
form of land tenure will continue to exist, but in a "modern" form. As was discussed in 
chapter five, in this new form, ejidatarios will be allowed to sell, buy, rent, or lease their 
land, activities that were all forbidden under the old agrarian reform law. Thirdly, the law 
opens the possibility for ejidatarios to work in association with private enterprises 
(stockholding companies) and individual investors. Furthermore, a new program was 
introduced, PROCEDE, aimed at measuring all the individual ejido plots. Hence, for the first 
time in history, ejidatarios would now have their individual plots registered and receive 
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individual land titles.2 Once the land was registered, ejidatarios could decide to change from 
the ejido regime to private land ownership. In the government propaganda accompanying the 
changes it was claimed that all these transformation would bring more legal security in land 
tenure for ejidatarios. Furthermore, ejidatarios would now be able to mortgage their land, 
obtain credits at commercial banks, and become "dynamic entrepreneurs". According to the 
official propaganda all these improvements would finally lead to an increase in agricultural 
productivity. It is no coincidence that this argument carried weight at a time when Mexico 
was negotiating the free trade agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States. 
The most important institutional change that accompanied the reform of the agrarian law 
was the creation of the Procuraduría Agraria (PA) (Attorney General's Office for Agrarian 
Affairs) in March 1992. In government publications the widespread corruption in the MAR 
was presented as the main source of agrarian problems in the country and the cause of the 
continuing exploitation of the ejidatarios. It was declared that drastic changes were required 
and a new agrarian institute, the PA, was established which would bring justice to the 
Mexican countryside. This public blaming of corruption in a certain institute as the cause of 
the problems, and presenting the solution in terms of new programs is not new. The same 
happened, for example, with CONASUPO under the presidency Echeverría (Grindle 1977). 
The new PA would now deal with agrarian problems and would direct the different 
programs, such as PROCEDE, that would make the transfer from the ejido regime to private 
land ownership possible. However, the MAR still had to settle the huge number of 
unresolved agrarian conflicts, the famous rezago agrario (agrarian arrears) which included 
cases such as the "lost land". 
However, as we will see, the fascinating part of this story is not so much the legal and 
institutional transformations but the fact that large parts of the population, not least in 
intellectual and academic circles, let themselves become inspired by this governmental 
discourse of democracy, the cleaning up the institutions, and new ways of governing. As we 
will see, not only the ejidatarios were inspired by this propaganda (chapters six, seven and 
eight) but also large sectors of the bureaucracy. 
First Reception of the Changes in the Region of Auction 
Shortly before the new agrarian law was to be issued, government officials from different 
institutions in the region were mobilized to inform the ejidatarios about the coming changes. 
The SARH, the MAR, the municipality in Autlán, BANRURAL, and FIRA, 3 among others, 
were all involved in the effort. After taking a short course on the new law in Guadalajara, 
the officials were sent to the ejidos. In La Canoa a meeting was held on December 8, 1991. 4 
This meeting deserves some attention as it shows how the officials had totally adopted the 
Salinas discourse of radical change and democratization. It also gives an idea of the usual 
reaction of ejidatarios to new government programs. Two officials from the SARH and FTRA 
did the presentation in La Canoa and 22 of the 97 ejidatarios attended the meeting. 
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One of the officials talked extensively about past government corruption and failures and 
declared that all this was about to change. He referred repeatedly to the theme of social 
transformation. The image of the President played a central role in his narrative, with Salinas 
cast as the great initiator and mover of the new transformations. The official stressed that he 
had been sent by representatives of the President himself. 
Official: The President has become aware of the situation in rural areas. He is conscious of 
the low living standards and therefore has decided to take these initiatives. He wants 
communities to have a better life. 
It was a discourse of modernization and liberalization: the rural areas are poor but the 
government will invest heavily to improve the situation. Agricultural enterprises should be 
big and modern, and farmers should work together and with agro-industrial enterprises. 
There was a strong emphasis on joining plots and working in associations. He made much 
reference to responsibilities, rights, and obligations. The functionary made it clear that 
paternalism would come to an end and that farmers would have to take responsibility for 
themselves: if they take out bank loans, they should repay them; if they want services from 
the SARH, they will have to pay for them, etc. The functionary made the point that the 
ejidatarios themselves are responsible for deterrnining the future of the land. 
The ejidatarios toned the functionary's message down by relating it directly to concrete 
situations they are involved and interested in, such as the case of the "lost land". If the 
official gave an example from a distant ejido, the ejidatarios responded with examples from 
neighboring ejidos. They also tried to elicit information with direct bearing on particular 
personal situations, such as their debts with BANRURAL. They showed minimal interest in 
the official's calls to work together and form associations. Most ejidatarios did not 
participate in the discussions, preferring to "wait and see". Those who did participate 
expressed their dissatisfaction and frustration with the bureaucracy. For example, the 
following dialogue. 
Iginio Nunez: But can we still receive land that has never been handed over? 
Official: Yes. 
Iginio: We've got to support these changes! 
Another ejidatario: And now the engineers are willing to do the surveying, right? 
Official: Yes. I know about the problems you've had with the engineers who never came, 
who didn't take the measurements properly, etc. But from now on it will be different. 
Another ejidatario: But they never come to measure the land. 
As will be clear, all these remarks were related to the struggle for the "lost land". 
In the following part of the dialogue they referred to the problems with BANRURAL. 
Salvador Lagos: BANRURAL has treated many of us very badly. For example, we wanted to 
plant in May but we didn't get our loans from BANRURAL. We only got the money much 
later. In the meantime, the people at the bank were speculating and making money on our 
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loan money! 
Iginio Nunez: The government is going to invest a lot of money in agriculture. In years past, 
the government money never reached us. 
Official: If you 're talking about people who used to monopolize the money, we want to put 
a stop to that. 
So, the functionary enthusiastically used the official discourse to present the changes to 
the ejidatarios, but could not conceal the effects of past experiences. Elements of radical 
change, modernization, blaming the corruption of the MAR, and an end to paternalism were 
central in his speech but did not convince the ejidatarios. In this meeting the ejidatarios 
assumed their usual skeptical attitude. Their distrust towards new government programs was 
apparent, as well as their lack of faith in government officials. 
Young Officials Dealings with Ambiguous Institutional Environments 
The establishment of the new Procuraduría Agraria (PA) was fascinating from an institutional 
and political point of view. The head of the new institute was Arturo Warman, a recognized 
academic who had published excellent works on the way in which ejidatarios and landless 
peasants in Mexico had been exploited by the Mexican state. 3 According to some people the 
appointment of Warman was a clear case of the famous cooptation of critical outsiders by 
the Mexican state. However, many other people considered it to be an indication that the 
government really was prepared to do things differently. Warman repeated the government 
rhetoric about doing justice to the Mexican countryside. He expressed this goal in Espacios, 
a magazine published by the PA. 
Our goal is to resolve issues. ...It is also to treat the peasants with respect. We must play 
a key role in creating a new agrarian culture that rejects paternalism and puts peasants in 
charge of their own lives. (Warman in Espacios no. 1 March-April 1993, p . 3 own 
translation). 
The PA tried to develop a "modern" institutional identity that would contrast with the 
MAR. PA functionaries should establish friendly and egalitarian relationships with the "new 
rural producers". Its new ideology and energetic institutional identity extended to all PA 
offices, from Mexico City to Guadalajara to Autlán. Many young PA officials started their 
work with great enthusiasm and expectations. To underscore the contrast between themselves 
and the MAR, some of the new PA functionaries even refused offers of soft drinks when 
they visited the ejidos, emphasizing that it is strictly forbidden for them to accept anything 
from the ejidatarios. The young professionals from the PA were very proud of their different 
style. Federico, one of the new PA officials, for example, said: The ejidatarios are often 
amazed to see how young we are. It is a different image. Sometimes they think we work in 
the same way as the people before. They prepare meals for us and offer us money. Or they 
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bring home-made cheeses to the office. We can't accept these things, but we have to refuse 
them tactfully.... This causes trouble with the MAR.... They want to make money out of 
everything. 
The fact that Warman was the head of the new institute was a source of inspiration for 
many young officials. 
At the higher levels within the PA, officials were well aware of the political aspects of 
land questions and the many problems the implementors would find in the field. I had several 
interviews with officials working at Arturo Warman's office in Mexico City, who developed 
the new programs of the PA. They were bright, enthusiastic people who enjoyed having 
critical discussions about the agrarian problems in Mexico. Yet, in the same way as many 
other critical officials I had talked with, they also seemed to see the "solution" to the 
exploitation of the ejidatarios in terms of education and organization. They used a strong 
discourse of raising consciousness among ejidatarios and making them "take control of their 
own lives". They hoped to counter the influence of local and regional powerholders by 
educating the ejidatarios. 
An Enthusiastic Head of the Regional PA Office 
The Autlân office opened its doors in March 1993. It was one of five offices of the PA in 
Jalisco and covered 20 municipalities encompassing 244 ejidos. The staff of the Autlân office 
included 6 agrarian specialists and lawyers (visitadores) and 16 assistants. The specialists 
were professionals with varied academic backgrounds: for example, a biologist, agricultural 
engineers and lawyers. Their work consisted primarily of resolving disputes over land in the 
ejidos and initiating the PROCEDE program. Like other PA offices, the Autlân office started 
with young people recently graduated from the university and with little or no experience 
with agrarian issues in Mexico. After having completed intensive courses on the old agrarian 
reform law and the new agrarian law and six months of fieldwork, these staff came to the 
PA office in order to prepare for the survey of ejido land (PROCEDE) and settle land 
conflicts. 
When I first met José Luis, the head of the Autlân office, in April 1993, I found an 
enthusiastic, informally dressed, ambitious young man in his twenties. He appeared to be a 
social worker instead of the lawyer I had expected. José Luis explained to me that before 
entering the PA, he worked in a hospital. When he saw the announcements for the PA he 
decided to attend the training course. He asked for leave of absence from his job to do the 
course. The course went very well, so José Luis decided to leave his job at the hospital and 
go and work with the PA. I asked José Luis what he hoped to achieve in his work for the 
PA. 
José Luis: What I intend to do in this job is to bring progress to rural Mexico, so that the 
campesinos won't be deceived anymore. If I can make a contribution, that's it. If one of the 
244 ejidos under my responsibility makes headway because of my involvement, I'll be 
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satisfied. 
Another example that José Luis stressed of the new approach was that they were going 
to listen to the ejidatarios and treat them as adult people. Ejidatarios could receive free legal 
assistance at the PA and if ejidatarios arrived with lawyers, the lawyers would be ignored. 
José Luis: When ejidatarios visit the office with a lawyer, the lawyer often starts talking. We 
tell them to let the ejidatarios speak for themselves. Then the lawyers often react by saying 
that the ejidatario is not able to talk about it very well. We then say that the ejidatarios are 
very able to talk about it and if not we will find another form of understanding each other. 
We ask the lawyer to keep quiet or to wait outside. After the talk we tell the ejidatarios that 
they can get a free lawyer at our office. 
Naturally, this sounded like a very sympathetic aim. But after the many conversations 
I overheard between officials and ejidatarios I did not see quite how officials and ejidatarios 
would find "new ways of talking to each other". This was another clear example of the new 
approach adopted by the PA. José Luis talked in caring terms about the exploited ejidatarios. 
He had made pictures of ejidatarios and meetings of ejidatarios which he had put in the 
entrance hall of the PA building and he enjoyed explaining the photographs to me. 
In the talks I had with José Luis it became apparent that he knew most of the articles of 
the old and new agrarian law verbatim and became angry with himself if he made a mistake. 
Yet, it was difficult for him to distance himself from the books and talk about real-life 
agrarian issues. He had fully adopted the discourse and ideology of the new institution and 
tended to answer my questions and doubts in terms of articles of the law. I explained this by 
the fact that he had never had any experience with rural people and agrarian problems and 
seemed to be "brain-washed" by the PA courses. Yet, he was the head of a regional office 
responsible for 244 ejidos! 
Antonio: Living the Tension between Reality and a New Institutional Project 
Antonio was one of the assistants who, in contrast to the university educated visitadores, 
came from a rural village. Instead of being proud of using a different institutional style he 
saw the problems of suddenly changing common practices to which people had become used. 
Antonio: People are often offended when we do not want to stay for a meal. They say: we 
are poor, but you can eat here; the food isn 't poisoned. But we hardly ever accept. 
Sometimes it is a pity, especially in the more isolated villages. There people are used to being 
hospitable and they automatically serve you a plate of food. They do not want anything else 
from you. But others start talking business. 
He was one of the few PA officials who from the start was skeptical about the possibility 
of recovering lands. After a talk between Ramón Romero and Antonio in which Ramón had 
told him about the "lost land" and that he expected that they would soon recover these lands, 
Antonio talked to me when we left the village. 
A: That man thinks that they will recover the land, but that will never happen. 
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M: But if these lands officially belong to the ejido? 
A: The private landowners are politically very strong. No land will be taken away from them 
anymore. 
This went against the optimistic legalistic PA discourse that maintained that in the end all 
conflicts would be legally settled. However, although Antonio was one of the few PA 
officials who expressed himself in a more realistic way about the possibilities for change, on 
other occasions he also used the strong legalist discourse of the new institution in his 
relations with ejidatarios. An example is the following dialogue with Ramón Romero. 
R: Two people here in the ejido recently sold their plots. 
A: That is not yet allowed by law. First the land has to be measured; then when the new 
certificates are issued, ejidatarios can sell their land. 
R: You say that because that's what is written down, but the reality is different! We are very 
cunning in finding other ways to get things done. These people got their papers, went to 
a notary, and completed the sale. 
A: But these land sales can be annulled. 
R: Maybe according to the books. But it's not registered as a sale; they say that the rights 
were ceded to the new buyer. 
A: In that case nothing can be done about it. 
R: We are very clever. That's how we used to sell our land. 
A: But do you think it's okay to let people tinker with the rules? 
R: Maybe not. David at the MAR office has bent the rules a lot. That office is terrible; it's 
a snake pit. 
A: Why do you go back to these people when you know they are corrupt and that we provide 
free services? 
R: Why do you think? Because David knows the law so well and he knows how to get around 
it, whereas you just say that we can't sell the land. 
This exchange sheds light on the double attitude of the ejidatarios towards the corrupt 
practices at the MAR. On the one hand, they detest corruption when it hinders their efforts 
to get fair treatment in their conflict with the pequeños proprietaries. On the other hand, they 
themselves use the services of "corrupt" officials, when necessary, to arrange matters outside 
the law. So far, the young functionaries of the PA had not been able to convince the 
ejidatarios that their new institutional style was a feasible project. 
On the other hand this dialogue is also interesting with respect to Antonio's position. 
Antonio Wmself comes from an ejido and knows from experience that Ramón is right. 
However, he now has a job in which programs are presented in a legalistic way. Ejidatarios 
like Ramón who seriously doubt the feasibility of the new project make Antonio's work 
difficult from the very start. Actually, Antonio was very displeased after this conversation 
as his authority had been seriously questioned. This shows well the difficult position of 
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officials who have to introduce supposedly legal, modern, democratic programs into 
situations which are characterized by negotiations between ejidatarios and officials. 
Afterwards, Antonio expressed his frustration with the ejidatarios of La Canoa. He visited 
the ejido on several occasions and said to me that he was irritated by the fact that people did 
not come to the meetings, showed so little interest in their own affairs, and did not know the 
rules. 
Encountering a Difficult Reality 
Despite their enthusiasm, the young PA staff in Autlân soon encountered severe problems. 
Most of the specialists had never lived in rural areas or worked with farmers or ejidatarios. 
Since they came with good intentions, determined to change established practices in the 
agrarian sector, they were surprised by the ejidatarios' mistrust. While the staff was eager 
to start the work that lay ahead, the ejidatarios often showed little interest in cooperating. 
Ruben, one of the lawyers of the PA office in Autlân, was from Guadalajara. He was the 
first of his group (of politically active lawyers) to move to the agrarian sector. According to 
Ruben: Our work in the ejidos isn't easy. The people are very distrustful. The point is that 
policies have changed 180 degrees and people still have to get used to that. Others 
complained about the fact that the ejidatarios are such closed people and not prepared to 
settle their conflicts harmoniously. So, while they started their work with the image of the 
good farmer who had been exploited for so many years, they now started repeating the same 
old stereotypes. 
The PA staff also became frustrated by the fact that they were presented as the initiators 
of change but in practice had little influence. They discovered early on that they lacked 
authority. For example, when they couldn't get the disputing parties to reach an agreement, 
they had to send the case to the new agrarian tribunals, even when it was very clear who was 
in the right. Moreover, the situations before them was much more complex than they had 
been told. The very legalistic and transformationist discourse of the PA was not much help 
in conflicts with long histories and in which multiple interests were involved. In these highly 
political conflicts over lands, in which the MAR is often directly involved, the PA officials 
felt that they could do nothing, exacerbating their feelings of powerlessness. 
So, they had to deal with distrustful ejidatarios in complex and conflictual situations in 
which they lacked authority. Last but not least, the work load was enormous, with 6 officials 
responsible for 244 ejidos. Moreover, there was great emphasis on extensive registration of 
all activities in the PA. The officials had to fill in many forms and were working all the time 
to have their reports ready before deadlines. I often found them working until late in the 
evening. Besides their daily work they also had to continue with courses and examination on 
agrarian matters. 
By the time of my later visits to the Autlân office, the atmosphere was changing. 
Although they were still friendly, the functionaries were always worried and tense. José Luis 
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had changed from an enthusiastic, relaxed person into a harried boss. He tended to answer 
my questions more and more in terms of the standard PA discourses, articles in the agrarian 
law, and by giving me PA booklets. After six months of being head of the PA office in 
Autiân José Luis was sent back to the PA office in Guadalajara where he had to work as a 
visitador. This was a demotion. Some time later I happened to meet him there. He was very 
friendly and relaxed and said that he was happy with the new situation. In his new position 
he could learn many things. José Luis was not the only person to be changed position. Many 
of the PA officials in Autlan disappeared after some time. Some of them had been fired, 
while others were sent to other offices. There was much reshuffling of personnel at the PA 
at all levels. In October 1994, the visitador who had been responsible for La Canoa was also 
moved to the PA office in Guadalajara. Several secretaries of the Autlan office also left the 
institute. 
The PA and the MAR Growing Closer 
José Luis was replaced by Guillermo, a much older agricultural engineer, with years of 
experience in the MAR! I asked Guillermo how he had arrived at the PA. 
Guillermo: I never thought of applying for a job at the PA since they wanted young people 
and nobody from the MAR. However, I had previously worked on a project with Arturo 
Warman (now head of the PA) and his people, and they wanted me in the new institute. I had 
to take the course with all these young people who had just finished university, and I came 
out among the top 5 of 215.... They offered me my choice of state, and I decided to come 
back home, to Jalisco. 
Guillermo also had a social motivation for the job: 
There is still much inequality in Mexico and very bad government. I will only be happy when 
the poor in Mexico, including the peasants, have a dignified life. The stories that everything 
is changing and the people are having a better life now are nonsense. I once started a book 
about my experiences, but you do not earn anything with books. 
It is interesting that Guillermo was asked by former colleagues at the MAR to "come 
over" to the new institute. Here we see again that with new projects and programs, political 
changes are made in the bureaucracy and the new heads try to take people with them whom 
they have worked with before. It also is an indication of the fact that in the end the break 
with the practices of the MAR would not be that drastic. Gradually, more and more officials 
from the MAR entered the PA. The higher positions in particular were filled with people 
from the MAR. The head of the PA delegation in Jalisco, for example, also came from the 
MAR. The fact that certain "cliques" in the MAR moved to the PA reinforced 
interinstitutional networks between the two organizations and caused more frustration among 
the young PA officials. 
In October 1994 I had a talk with Cristina, a young lawyer and one of the visitadores of 
the PA office in Autiân, who had then been working there for one year. When I remarked 
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that I had noticed that many MAR officials had entered the PA, she said the following. 
Cristina: They told us that they wanted new people, but the reality is different. The high PA 
functionaries come from the MAR. The best positions are taken by MAR people; they are more 
experienced. There have been many frictions and problems between the PA and the MAR. A 
fight. They tell us that we have to temper the situation, but that is difficult, they hinder you 
in your work. The MAR offices in Autldn and La Huerta are the most difficult ones. There 
are things we cannot do. The new head of the PA in Jalisco comes from customs; these are 
all political appointments; they sometimes put people in charge who have no idea at all about 
these matters. 
Defining a new institution that was clearly differentiated from the MAR had been a theme 
present in all the offices of the PA. However, the relationship between the PA and the MAR 
became a different one. In fact, from the very start the two institutions were not separate at 
all; they were closely related, both in their formal organizational structure (the PA falls 
officially under the MAR) 6 and in their interpersonal networks. The PA and the MAR also 
overlapped in their tasks. Although responsibilities and tasks were supposedly different and 
separate, in practice they often converged (for example, both agencies advised and assisted 
in many ejido affairs). This led to a complicated relationship between two parallel, 
competing, and overlapping institutions. 
Forms of competition between the local offices of the two institutions in Autlan 
developed. For example, the three officials of the MAR office felt threatened by the arrival 
of the PA office in Autlan. Under the new agrarian law, the role of the regional assistance 
offices of the MAR was abruptly curtailed; activities that previously required assistance from 
MAR officials could now be undertaken by the ejidatarios alone. For example, the MAR 
would no longer investigate plot usage (the IUP), and elections of the executive committee 
in the ejido would not require the involvement of a MAR official. Furthermore, newly 
arriving officials from the PA would be advising on agrarian problems, establishing 
procedures for conflict settlement, and directing the program of land surveys. So, a form of 
competition and obstruction developed between the offices of the PA and the MAR. The 
MAR officials refused to allow the PA to see ejidos' files and the PA tried to cancel illegal 
land sales which David of the MAR had organized. In March 1994, Guillermo, head of the 
PA office in Autlan, expressed frustration over his lack of authority vis-a-vis the MAR. 
Guillermo: / even received orders from above to avoid conflict with the MAR since "in the 
end we are one and the same organization". These tensions between functionaries reflect the 
ongoing power struggles within and between the two institutes at higher levels. However, this 
was not primarily a conflict between two institutions. It would be better described in terms 
of a clash between different institutional projects related to political struggles that cross-cut 
institutional borders. 
The institutional experiences of the ejidatarios of La Canoa with the PA have not been 
very different from their earlier experiences with the MAR and other government institutions. 
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In the beginning the atmosphere in the PA was certainly very distinct from the atmosphere 
at the MAR. There was a more open, cordial and relaxed ambiance. But soon the same 
practices which they had condemned so much in the MAR, entered the PA. Appointments 
were made with ejidatarios but the officials never showed up. Many promises were made to 
the ejidatarios which were not kept. Ejidatarios who came from far away had to wait for 
hours in the building to speak to an official. So, also the image of the waiting ejidatarios was 
reproduced. Officials refrained from interfering in political sensitive matters and did not 
interfere in many cases, even if they were explicitly asked to do so. In many cases they could 
not really do anything. Together with the other problems, the atmosphere in the offices also 
changed and became much more like that of the MAR. According to most ejidatarios in La 
Canoa, the officials of the PA will end up just like those of the MAR. 
The idea was also growing among the officials that in the end things might work out in 
a different way and that the PA might develop characteristics similar to other institutions. 
Several enthusiastic young officials at all levels left the institute disappointed. At the top, 
Arturo Warman was replaced under the new President Zedillo (1994-). The atmosphere of 
optimism and radical change had disappeared. A third head of the PA office in Autlan was 
appointed. I spoke to him in July 1995. Instead of using a legalist, modernist discourse 
claiming that everything would soon be different and that lands would soon be measured and 
conflicts settled, he said that they found many problems everywhere. Whereas the PA had 
started with the declaration that all lands would be measured within a short period, this new 
head said that PROCEDE would take at least ten more years. Distance was taken from the 
rhetoric of the former President of the republic Salinas and from the former head of the PA, 
Warman. 
The Project of the Internal Ejido Rules in a New Institutional Environment 
It is worthwhile paying some attention to one of the programs that was introduced with the 
new agrarian law, the Internal Ejido Rules (Reglamento Interno) project. The implementation 
of this program shows well what may happen when the "initiative of the local people" and 
the "local organizing capacities" are made central to government programs "imposed from 
above". This case-study also illustrates how some people may take advantage of the 
unexpected and unintended opportunities created by a new program (Long 1984, 1990). 
The possibility of formulating Internal Ejido Rules (1ER) already existed under the old 
agrarian reform law, but was given new preiminence by the PA. In the 1ER each ejido could 
specify more specific rules concerning the internal administration of the ejido at the local 
level. According to the official PA propaganda the ejidatarios had to become "independent" 
and "self-reliant", after more than a half-century of state tutelage. The 1ER was presented 
as the perfect way for the ejidos to show their self-determination. The 1ER project was based 
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on the idea that consciousness raising and local organization were central to progress in the 
ejidos. Each ejido had to formulate its IER according to its particular local situation and the 
aspirations of the ejidatarios. 
Although this project may sound good in general terms, it becomes much less appealing 
when we take into account the reality of ejido organizing practices as they have developed 
over time. In the previous chapters it was shown how organizing practices have developed 
in La Canoa around different ejido resources. We noticed that forms of ordering evolved in 
which the ejido commissioner and the ejido assembly do not have much influence anymore. 
We also found that the official rules only have a limited and indirect influence on these 
practices. Taking this into consideration, the project of formulating local rules becomes much 
less appealing. On the contrary, one might ask, what could be the use and the effect of more 
rules? I will now present the experiences of La Canoa with this program. 
At the start of the IER project in the region of Autlan, the SARH, the MAR, and the PA all 
participated. But gradually the MAR started taking over and the other institutions withdrew 
from further activities. In May 1993, Raul Pradera, the ejido commissioner, was visited at 
his house in La Canoa by the head of the MAR office and David. They told Raul to sign a 
document in which he asked the MAR office in Autlan for assistance with the elaboration of 
the IER. Raul signed the document but he felt very unsure about the matter. He did not like 
working with the MAR again. He was afraid that David would ask the ejido for money in 
exchange for his assistance with the IER. Actually, Raul had hoped that from 1992 onwards 
everything would be taken over by the PA. So, the next day Raul went to the PA office in 
Autlan to ask if they could not help the ejido with the IER. However, not only did the PA 
official show little interest in becoming involved in the IER project, but he confirmed that 
the MAR was the institute elaborating most of the IERs in the region. For the ejidatarios this 
was one of the many disappointments they would have with the new PA. 
As I had several contacts with officials and had much documentation about the new laws 
and programs, Raul and the others started relying more and more on my information and 
advice. I gave them booklets about the changes which I had received at the offices and 
several copies of the new agrarian law. I also informed them about the PROCAMPO subsidy 
program that would soon start and provided them with details about the progress of the 
PROCEDE program. Raul asked me to accompany him to the different offices and be present 
at meetings with officials more and more. 
In June 1993 a meeting was held in the ejido about the IER. I was surprised to see the 
head of the MAR office in Autlan, Manuel, himself at the meeting. He never used to visit 
the ejidos. Later I learned that he was under great pressure from the Guadalajara office to 
finish IERs. Manuel explained that a small committee had to be formed in La Canoa which 
could elaborate the IER. He said that he would personally give assistance to this committee. 
He stressed the importance of the IER for getting loans in the future. After various questions, 
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a discussion started about who should be in the IER committee. Two young men were 
proposed, sons of ejidatarios who had received secondary education, Joaquin Nunez and 
Sergio Sanchez. Joaquin and Lupe proposed me for the committee. Then it was decided to 
have some older experienced ejidatarios as well. So Miguel Romero and Ignacio Romero also 
became part of the committee. The five of us signed the papers of the IER committee. The 
meeting came to its end and it was decided that the IER committee would meet with Manuel 
the next day at his office. 
At the meeting with Manuel at his office the next day, his attitude was less friendly. He 
made it clear that he did not have much time to work with us. He said that he had written 
down ten points to start the work. He read out the points which were formulated in a very 
legalist terminology. Manuel asked if we understood all the legal terms. Joaquin answered 
that he did not understand the term juridical person and Manuel explained it to him. Then 
I asked Manuel if these same ten points were given to all ejidos. Manuel was visibly annoyed 
with my question and said that he had made this list especially for La Canoa as the situation 
in all ejidos was different. However, it was obvious that the ten points he had written down 
came directly from the agrarian law and had nothing to do with the situation in La Canoa. 
Towards the end of the meeting, Manuel turned to Miguel Romero, the oldest man and only 
ejidatario present (Ignacio Romero had not come). He asked Miguel for his opinion on the 
latest developments with the ejido legislation. Miguel reacted in the following way: Fine, 
fine, I read about the IER and also parts of the new law and it all seems fine to me.. Some 
days later Miguel told Joaquin that he did not see the point of the IER and he did not come 
to the meetings anymore. 
I started to feel that the whole project of the IER was a ridiculous endeavor. Framing this 
document was too big a challenge for the ejidatarios. The rules had to be based on the new 
agrarian law, but the law restricts what themes can be addressed. Therefore, the ejidatarios 
first had to know the law in detail in order to know where variation was possible. On the 
basis of that study, they could then formulate their own Internal Ejido Rules. Since many 
ejidatarios can barely read, this task of studying the agrarian law was all but impossible. 
However, more importantly, the new agrarian law appeared to be open to various 
interpretations and again education did not seem to be the only issue here. This became clear 
when a university-educated Mexican friend who was working in another region helped an 
ejido to establish its IER. This IER was then rejected by the RAN for including local rules 
which went against the agrarian law. In this way, it seemed that the new laws were used to 
stifle local creativity and only strengthened the practice of legal reification. 
Some entrepreneurial types soon grasped that the new program offered interesting 
possibilities and they went to the ejidos to offer their services in developing the IER, in 
exchange for substantial payment. For example, the MAR office in Autlan offered its 
services to several neighboring ejidos, for 20 million pesos. David had also told Iginio Nunez 
that La Canoa would have to pay 20 million pesos for assistance with the IER if the 
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committee did not succeed in doing the job on its own. In other ejidos people from outside 
the region arrived to offer their assistance with the IER and charged large sums of money. 
However, some officials of the SARH office in El Grullo became aware of this and managed 
to convince the ejidatarios not to work with these people. According to these SARH officials 
these people had to be (ex-) government officials as they knew everything about the IERs. 
They also knew very well how to deal with the ejidatarios and which ejidos they had to go 
to have some success. A drawback for these entrepreneurial types was that in many ejidos 
the ejidatarios didn't see the value of developing the IER. So, these types threatened the 
ejidatarios that without an IER they wouldn't get credit from the banks anymore. Although 
this threat seemed to work in some cases, in most ejidos the people were not impressed, and 
the price for assistance with the IERs dropped (in the Autlan region, the price fell from 20 
million pesos to between the 3 and 5 million pesos). 
Officials of the PA office in Autlan were very well aware of what was going on. 
However, there had been many tensions between the PA and the MAR at many different 
levels and the PA office in Autlan was operating very carefully and trying to avoid conflict 
with the MAR office in Autlan. So, there was little support for the ejidatarios from that side. 
I even learned that ejidatarios had come to the PA office on several occasions to lodge 
complaints against MAR officials but had been discouraged from doing so by the PA 
officials. 
When the two older ejidatarios on the IER committee of La Canoa withdrew from further 
activities, I was left on the committee with two young men who were not even ejidatarios. 
So, there seemed little reason to continue with the job. Furthermore, most ejidatarios did not 
show any interest in the project and I myself did not believe in the usefulness of more rules. 
However, the ejido commissioner Raul urged us to go on. He was afraid that otherwise the 
officials of the MAR office in Autlan would take over and charge the ejido a large sum of 
money. So we continued the work and I was amazed by the zeal and enthusiasm of the two 
young men, who clearly hoped to become ejidatarios in the future. 
The work on the IER led to many interesting discussions as we had several meetings with 
a group of ejidatarios. The ejido commissioner Raul, the two young men and several 
ejidatarios certainly did not share my distrust of rules. They believed in the usefulness of a 
more formalized way of operating in the ejido and of formulating strict rules for themselves. 
They thought that this might help them to solve the many internal problems of the ejido, and 
especially the problems with the urban zone and the commons (see the accountability 
discourse discussed in chapter six). They talked with great enthusiasm about how they would 
fine ejidatarios who did not attend ejido meetings. They also fantasized about strict rules for 
the use of the commons, but there was no agreement on the type of rules. Iginio, for 
example, wanted coamiles to be taken away from the non-ejidatarios and all the commons 
to be divided among the ejidatarios. This drastic proposal was not supported by the others. 
They also talked about the possibility of including a rule that ejidatarios who sold their plot 
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had to pay a certain percentage of the purchase money to the ejido. Yet, there was a lot of 
discussion about how much the percentage should be. The most interesting thing was that 
talking about rules and new ways of organizing ejido affairs raised so much enthusiasm 
within this group. On the other hand, the majority of ejidatarios showed little interest in this 
project of new ejido rules. 
At the request of Raul, I had gathered together some IERs of other ejidos and on the 
basis of the agrarian law and these examples we formulated a framework in which the local 
rules could easily be integrated. After several discussions in small groups we elaborated a 
provisional IER in which the local ideas were "translated" into a formalist legal terminology. 
The idea was that this provisional IER would be discussed at the ejido assembly which would 
take the final decisions about the different rules. When Joaquin and I visited Raul to discuss 
this provisional document, Raul did not react very much. After asking several times what he 
thought about it, he said that several things were unclear to him. On further questioning it 
became apparent that he had not understood anything of the formal language. As it seemed 
ridiculous to have an IER that not even the ejido commissioner was able to understand, we 
talked about the possibility of writing a short IER in normal language for use in the ejido and 
a formal legalist IER in order to deal with institutions. Raul was very enthusiastic about that 
idea. 
In conversations with officials at the headquarters of the PA in Mexico City in August 1993, 
I learned that they were well aware of what was going on in the field with respect to the IER 
project. Two young lawyers working for Arturo Warman realized that not only was the IER 
program failing to promote the new ideology of an independent ejidatario, it was creating 
new opportunities for people who wanted to exploit ejidatarios. Their boss Fabiola, who was 
an anthropologist and part of the head team of the PA, had just returned from a meeting with 
Warman and said: 
I just received orders to work further on an instruction booklet for the IER. We wanted to 
distance ourselves from former practices in which the MAR dictated everything. We wanted 
the ejidatarios to do it themselves. It now appears that it did not work that way. The regional 
assistance offices of the MAR jumped in and now ask for money from the ejidatarios: they sell 
IERs. For that reason we decided to make an instruction booklet after all. When we talked 
about the problem that the RAN only accepts officially formulated IERs, Fabiola said: 
One of the problems is that the RAN only accepts formal IERs that follow a certain model. 
We want to make different types of IERs, for example IERs in which certain matters are not 
dealt with yet. On certain matters we want to wait until the ejidatarios themselves are ready 
for them. But the RAN does not accept that. We will have to negotiate about that with the 
RAN at a later stage. 
So, the central office of the PA had finally decided to publish a booklet in which the 
project of the IER was explained and in which a sample of IERs was presented which the 
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ejidatarios could copy, filling in sections where there was room for variation. Hence, the IER 
project had turned into an arena of conflict between different institutions of the agrarian 
bureaucracy (the MAR, the RAN, the PA), and in which some ejidos were the "victims". 
When I returned to La Canoa, I informed them about this latest development and we 
decided to wait for the new PA booklet before continuing with the IER. However, the MAR 
office was not happy with our taking such a relaxed attitude. Manuel was under great 
pressure from the Guadalajara office to finish more IERs in the region. Autlan was the 
regional assistance office of Jalisco that had the fewest IERs finished. So, on several 
occasions Manuel talked to Raul and to me and asked us why we did not work harder. We 
all gave evasive answers as we did not want to mention the forthcoming PA booklet. Manuel 
had already shown his frustration with the new PA on many occasions. However, Manuel 
had to report about the progress of the IERs to his superiors and he suggested Raul write a 
letter saying that La Canoa did not want an IER. In that way it was no longer Manuel's 
responsibility. However, that was something that had to be avoided. We tried to keep Manuel 
on a string and avoided him as far as possible. 
In September when I was working in the local ejido archive of La Canoa, I was amazed 
when I suddenly found an IER of the ejido that had been elaborated two years before. I 
showed it to Raul who was also surprised and said that he had never known of its existence. 
He asked me to read it and explain what it said to him. I talked about it with other ejidatarios 
but only Iginio seemed to remember that a couple of years ago, under the ejido 
administration of Gustavo Romero, they talked about an IER. But it was never heard of 
anymore and was never presented at a general assembly. The others were astonished to hear 
that the ejido already had an IER and had never heard about it either. The IER had been 
elaborated by Rigoberto of the MAR office in Autlan and was very extensive and well done. 
Many of the rules that the ejidatarios wanted to include in the new IER, such as fines for 
people who did not attend the meetings, were already in this IER. After having found this 
IER, I became even more convinced that the formulation of more new rules was a useless 
endeavor. 
The PA booklet about the IER appeared in December 1993, almost a year after the IER 
project had begun in the Autlan region. As the booklet was published by the PA, most 
ejidatarios never learned of its existence; the IER projects in Autlan were in the hands of the 
MAR. We had some more meetings in La Canoa and together with the booklet we made a 
provisional IER. Fernandez, the head of the organization and rural development division of 
the MAR in Guadalajara (and Manuel's boss) told me that specialized assistants were soon 
going to be sent to the region to give free help with the IERs. We decided to wait for the 
assistance of this specialized MAR official from Guadalajara to do the final work. By now 
Manuel had become very angry with our "laziness" and everybody tried to avoid him. Raul 
feared that Manuel would visit him at his house and make him sign letters. 
However, in March 1994 Manuel arrived at a meeting in the ejido together with the 
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official. The young official presented himself and explained that he had been sent with the 
special task of helping ejidos with the IERs. He would be the person responsible for the IER 
in the region of Autlán. It now became clear that the ejido commissioner Raul had positioned 
me in a broker's role. When the official tried to fix a day with the ejidatarios to work on 
the IER, Raúl asked me if that day would suit me. I explained to him that I would be away 
for some days. Raúl then told the official that they wanted me to be present at the meeting. 
I started feeling very uncomfortable with the fact that he was publicly questioning the 
trustworthiness of the official and putting me in a position between the ejido and the 
bureaucracy. The young official reacted in a very friendly way and said that they could still 
start the work and then discuss it with me later on. Salvador Lagos then added: You can do 
the work but then you should give it to her so that she can judge the work. This was a clear 
manifestation of the distrust of the ejidatarios towards the institution. After the meeting Raúl 
asked me what they should do. I said that I saw no harm in working with this man as long 
as they did not have to pay. As I was finishing my fieldwork period in the region I could not 
participate in the meetings with this official. But the ejidatarios later told me that they had 
several good meetings with this official and that he finally finished the IER. 
The Researcher Positioned in the Role of a Broker 
Although the ejidatarios had positioned me in a broker's role, I was not one of the most 
usual and useful types. I did not give the impression of being a very knowledgeable and 
politically well placed person. Although I traveled a lot and had many contacts outside the 
ejido, it was clear that I did not have the right connections to help the ejidatarios. However, 
I gradually became a sort of information broker (see Grindle 1977: 155) in the sense that I 
gave them all the details I found in the archives and discussed with them information about 
different government programs. However, it was not only ejidatarios, but also officials who 
started to approach me as an intermediary for La Canoa. They said, for example, that it was 
good that I was helping the ejidatarios with the IER and they passed information on to the 
ejidatarios through me. Some suggested that I could ask for money from the ejidatarios for 
my activities. Other officials stressed the fact that I should help the ejidatarios more in their 
contacts with the bureaucracy and advised me to accompany them on their visits to the 
offices. Several higher officials promised after an interview with me that they would 
personally study the case of La Canoa and that I could visit them together with the 
ejidatarios. An example which is illustrative of the role I was gradually positioned in, was 
a phone call with Federico in March 1994. Federico worked for the municipality of Autlán 
and was responsible for the coordination of government projects in the villages. In this 
position he was also responsible for the PRONASOL projects, including the crédito a la 
palabra program. As Raúl did not know much about this last project and wanted more 
information, I decided to talk to Federico. I had already established a friendship relationship 
with Federico and we often talked about various matters affecting the region. This is part of 
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the conversation we had. 
M: How is that program organized? How many people from La Canoa can apply for credit 
in this program? 
F: In La Canoa 20 people can apply. 
Then he added: 
Are the people in La Canoa good at paying back their loans? 
M: I have no idea, you should not ask me. 
F: How many ejidatarios does the ejido La Canoa have? 
M: 97 
F: Then, make it 25 who can get a loan. 
Then Federico continued explaining the procedures and how the ejidatarios should apply. 
The amazing thing in this talk was that I felt that Federico started negotiating the number of 
people in La Canoa who could get a loan with me. The fact that he added five extra loans 
was as if he was doing me a personal favor. Although my first reaction was one of 
amazement, I later realized that this was a clear example of how people started to see La 
Canoa as falling "under my care". This makes clear that the institutions are also searching 
for relations with individuals, intermediaries, whom they can use in their work in the 
different villages and ejidos. For certain matters, I was placed in the position of a broker 
between La Canoa and the institutions - a role which I had not sought and which I was not 
ready to play for a long time. 
Some Reflections on a New Law and a New Institute 
Looking back on this period, it is clear that Salinas' discourse on democracy and his promise 
to eradicate corruption was extremely successful in raising hopes regarding the possibility 
of bringing about fundamental changes in society. The deception when he left the presidency 
in an atmosphere of economic crisis, political murders and drug trafficking in which he 
apparently played a central role, was all the more severe. As we saw in the previous 
chapters, his projects for the agrarian sector made some ejidatarios believe that they would 
finally recover lands that belonged to the ejido. However, many officials also thought that 
with the support of this president they could fundamentally change the agrarian situation. 
They hoped that justice would finally be done. All were in the end deceived. 
PA officials as well as ejidatarios realized after some time that nothing had changed and 
that they had to readjust their aims. A new agrarian law and the establishment of a new 
institution obviously did not change the political character of many land conflicts in Mexico 
nor the established practices in the relationship between ejidatarios and the state 
bureaucracies. The old practices and stereotypes (about ejidatarios as well as officials) soon 
re-emerged, seemingly stronger than before. It was obvious that the political conjuncture had 
not changed in favor of the ejidatarios or landless peasants. On the contrary, despite an 
official government discourse in which the ejidatarios would finally receive what rightfully 
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belonged to them, the Salinas regime supported the large private landowners. 
Conclusion: Officials in a World of Contradiction 
In this chapter we have seen that we need a sophisticated approach to analyze the dynamics 
of the government bureaucracy and its officials in order to understand the relation between 
ejidatarios and the "Mexican state". The image of the "corrupt and unscrupulous official who 
only tries to exploit the poor peasants" is a stereotype that does little to increase our 
understanding of this relationship. The state bureaucracy is a complex constellation of people, 
projects, social networks, and more or less organized groups which seem to be in continuous 
movement. Officials develop certain professional standards for their work, while at the same 
time they are part of a politicized bureaucracy in which they have to ensure their own 
position. Like ejidatarios they may sometimes feel more like "a victim" of the bureaucratic 
machine with little room for manoeuvre, than "an implementor" of the state programs. The 
majority of officials try to do their job, while at the same time they enjoy the favors of being 
part of the state bureaucracy and certain political networks. Most officials do not deny that 
they themselves ask favors or sometimes operate on political/personal instead of 
professional/bureaucratic grounds. Undoubtedly, there is considerable pleasure in "playing 
the game". As Gupta (1995) demonstrates well, the practice of bribing is not simply an 
economic transaction but a cultural practice that requires a great degree of performative 
competence (Gupta 1995: 379). It is obvious that people develop different standards and 
degrees to which they agree with favoritism, or follow formal standards. For that reason, 
"there are always divergent and conflicting assessments of whether a particular course of 
action is 'corrupt'" (Gupta 1995: 388). However, ejidatarios, as well as officials, are 
confronted with contradictory demands in their daily lives. Yet, the difference between 
ejidatarios and officials is that in the world of the official, party politics and political 
lobbying are much stronger and dominate a much greater part of one's life than in the daily 
lives of most ejidatarios. 
Many authors have endeavored to come to grips with these opposite principles which 
determine the working of the bureaucracy and of society in general. DaMatta (1991), for 
example, argues that in Brazil two conflicting but complementary notions operate 
simultaneously: the notion of the individual and the notion of the person. The notion of the 
individual emphasizes the universal application of the law to all subjects. On the other hand, 
the complementary notion of the person demands a singular application of the law, which 
should be bent especially for the person in question (DaMatta 1991: 180-182). Hence, "the 
realm of individuals is to be found in this impersonal world of laws, decrees, and rules as 
they are applied and implemented in practice" (ibid.: 186). In contrast, in the realm of the 
person "reciprocity, loyalty, charity, and goodness are basic values for which the core and 
Inside the "hope - generating machine" 339 
focal point is a system of persons" {ibid.: 183). According to DaMatta one notices in 
Brazilian society a complex dialectic between these two notions. In the same line of 
argument, Lomnitz (1992) talks about the coexistence of legal bureaucratic rationalism and 
personalism in the Mexican bureaucracy. Lomnitz argues that "during the whole regnum of 
the PRI (1929 to date), there has been tremendous tension between rational-bureaucratic 
practices and practices that are founded on other kinds of principles, such as friendship, 
kinship, and personal loyalty" (Lomnitz 1992: 297). Although the tension between these 
opposing principles is very clear, in my opinion, we could arrive at a deeper understanding 
of this phenomenon by paying more attention to the role of discourses of corruption. 
On the one hand, the discourse of corruption forms part of the "culture of the state" and 
"analyzing the discourse of corruption draws attention to the powerful cultural practices by 
which the state is symbolically represented to its employees and to citizens of the nation" 
(Gupta 1995: 385). In government propaganda in Mexico the fight against corruption is 
presented as a central facet of a successful modernization of society and the lack of the 
effectiveness of the government apparatus is often blamed on corrupt elements within the 
system. Furthermore, accusations of corruption have become a powerful weapon in the 
political power game. In this context the discourse of corruption deflects attention from more 
fundamental types of criticism of the regime and has conservative effects. By blaming 
"corrupt elements" for things that go wrong, the "idea of the state" as "a neutral arbiter 
above the conflicts and interests of society" remains intact. Within these theories no radical 
changes are necessary. Once the "rotten" parts have been removed from the system, "the 
state" can do its work. Agencies are closed, programs canceled, and new initiatives are 
presented with great enthusiasm and optimism. The hope-generating machine continues. 
As we saw, ejidatarios use a discourse of corruption which differs from this 
governmental discourse of corruption. Ejidatarios use the label of corruption above all as a 
form of social critique, referring to the accumulation of experiences in which they have been 
deceived. The ejidatarios do not mind paying large sums of money as long as they get what 
they want. In these cases they talk about successful transactions and do not use the term 
corruption. On the other hand, what frustrates them is that they often do not succeed in these 
negotiations. In the case of the "lost land" they paid large sums of money but never got 
anything in return. They were lied to and deceived all the time. The fact that they are fooled 
around with or are made to pay excessive sums of money makes them feel stupid and in this 
context they complain about the corruption of the government agencies and shameless, 
corrupt officials. Hence, when they complain about corruption they are not so much "voicing 
their exclusion from government services" but are rather expressing "their frustration because 
they lacked the cultural capital required to negotiate deftly for those services" (Gupta, 1995: 
381). 
In the case of officials, we found much more specific talk about different types and 
degrees of corruption. Officials often themselves started talking about what they called "the 
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problem of corruption" in the bureaucracy and they felt the need to define their position in 
relation to this phenomenon. This preoccupation with corruption is obviously related to the 
fact that it is such a strong theme in public debates. However, by reflecting on the subject, 
officials not only subject themselves to a dominant discourse but also problematize their role 
as officials and the working of the bureaucracy. We have seen that this leads to several 
contradictions in committed officials' theorizing. On the one hand, the discourse of 
corruption defines different categories of people such as the innocent and credulous 
ejidatarios and the "corrupt" official. Functionaries often talked about ejidatarios as victims 
of the corrupt bureaucracy. On the other hand, officials also blamed the ejidatarios for being 
distrustful, not willing to change, and doing nothing to improve their own situation. 
In their strategies to fight corruption officials tended to stress the importance of the 
organization and education of the ejidatarios. In the light of the history of relations between 
ejidatarios and the state bureaucracies, the stress on the organization and education of 
ejidatarios is extremely ironic. Stressing the solution in forms of organization ignores the fact 
that the "hope-generating machine" tends to frustrate collective forms of organizing. By 
stressing the importance of educating ejidatarios in the fight against corruption, it is 
suggested that there is a "logic" in the operation of the machine which one can learn. Yet, 
we have seen that the more political a conflict has become and the higher the interests at 
stake, the lesser the bureaucracy follows formal logics. In previous chapters I argued that by 
stressing the importance of the official rules and procedures officials contribute to the "idea 
of the state". By putting emphasis on the rules they suggest that an administrative 
bureaucratic logic exists in the operation of "the machine". By stressing the importance of 
education for the ejidatarios, they also contribute to the "idea of the state". Yet, like the 
ejidatarios, officials are not naive and know better than anybody else that many matters are 
not arranged according to official rules but according to other criteria. However, by 
recognizing this reality their own legitimacy as officials is at stake. 
The officials live in a world of contradictions. Like the ejidatarios, the officials may be 
deceived once they start believing the fantasies created by the hope-generating machine. We 
saw that this happened with the change of article 27 of the Mexican constitution and the 
establishment of the Procuraduría Agraria. Officials who worked with enormous enthusiasm 
and believed that they could change established bureaucratic practices, were in the end as 
deceived as the ejidatarios. In the previous chapters we saw that ejidatarios are always 
promised that their problems will be studied and dealt with. The bureaucracy will never say 
no. On the contrary, it will always raise hopes and be very optimistic. It is argued that this 
characteristic of generating hope is an important element of the culture of the state. It is also 
expressed every time with the inauguration of a new president. Problems in society are 
defined and the malfunctioning of the government is admitted. Massive new programs are 
introduced to improve society. Although many people react cynically to all these promises, 
at the same time they start believing in some of them. This is not a form of false 
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consciousness but it is a form of fantasizing; and sometimes part of the fantasies may come 
true as many things happen and change in society. However, for the officials, the new 
programs and promises are more than fantasy; they are their daily work environment. 
Although upon reflection they may recognize the impossibility of the programs and the 
contradictions in their own theories, believing is the only way to survive and make headway 
in the bureaucratic machine. 
Notes 
1. See Nuijten 1993, for a discussion of the public debate around the reform of article 27 of the Mexican 
Constitution. 
2. The aim is that the program of PROCEDE will be applied to all ejidos. In this program all ejido land and 
individual ejido plots will finally be measured and registered. Ejidatarios will then receive individual 
certificates for their plots. Once they have these certificates, the ejido can decide to transform the ejido 
domain into private land ownership (pleno dominio). If the majority of ejido plots have been measured, the 
ejido assembly can authorize the concerned ejidatarios to adopt full domain over their plots. If all ejido 
members decide to adopt full domain over their plots the ejido regime comes to an end. Only if 20 percent 
of the ejidatarios (or at least 20 ejidatarios) decide to continue, they can continue as ejido. 
3. Institution which organizes second-level government funding for agriculture. 
4. For an extensive description of this meeting, see Nuijten 1995. 
5. Warman's most famous books are Los campesinos: hijos predilectos del régimen (1972) and Y venimos 
a contradecir (1976). 
6. According to the new agrarian law, the PA is a decentralized agency of the Federal Public Administration 
falling under the MAR. 

CHAPTER 10 
ORGANIZING PRACTICES IN THE MEXICAN EJIDO: 
A CONCLUSION 
Introduction: Organizing, Power, and Development 
This book began with the argument that anthropology should pay more attention to the 
relationship between organizing processes and relations of power (cf. Wolf 1990). I situated 
organizing practices within wider force fields, thus highlighting power relations without 
assuming the nature of certain configurations of power beforehand. The in-depth study of the 
ejido La Canoa offered the possibility of a deeper understanding of manifold forms of 
organizing, such as the struggle for the establishment of the ejido, the construction of support 
networks among migrants, the organization of village projects, the arrangement of illegal 
land transactions, the organization of the fight of ejidatarios against pequeños propietarios, 
the management of the commons, and forms of organizing around new government 
programs. Besides providing insights into the many aspects of the Mexican ejido, the life of 
transnational ejidatarios and state-peasant relations in Mexico, the study of these diverse 
forms of organizing helped me to develop an analytical framework for the study of 
organizing practices in an increasingly "deterritorialized" world. 1 
In this chapter the conclusions of the work are presented and I draw out some of the 
implications of the research findings for the debate on "organization for development". I 
argue that both the labeling of existing organizing practices in the ejido as "disorganized", 
"chaotic", and "corrupt" and the widespread belief that "modern", "democratic", and 
"collective" forms of organization can improve the situation of "poor peasants", form part 
of broader discourses of development (cf. Ferguson 1990, Escobar 1995, Apthorpe and 
Gasper 1996, Grillo and Stirrat 1997). I also contend that besides ignoring the logic and 
value of existing forms of organizing which generally are of a more fragmented nature, many 
theories neglect the fact that all forms of organizing - including the so-called democratic and 
modern ones - create or strengthen power differences. This chapter sets out to show that one 
can certainly formulate suggestions for supporting "local" organizations as long as one takes 
into account existing organizing processes and the force fields in which these have developed. 
However, before presenting these practical suggestions, I briefly return to the theoretical 
discussion started in the first chapter. 
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Organizing Practices in Multiple Force Fields 
The argument of this book is that organizing practices develop within multiple force fields 
with differing dynamics, rather than within one over-arching field. Force fields cohere 
around certain problems and resources and lead to forms of ordering in which we can 
distinguish socio-political categories with differing positions and interests. It is argued that 
these socio-political divisions are not always the same. Around the different resources and 
problems discussed in this book we found, for example, ejidatarios pitched against landless 
villagers (village projects, the commons), ejidatarios against pequenos propietarios and 
officials (the "lost land"), and divisions based on age and gender (inheritance questions). The 
concept of force field helps us to analyze the weighting of different kinds of socio-political 
networks, the influence of law and procedures, and the role of the state bureaucracy. 
An analysis in terms of organizing practices within multiple force fields shows that in 
relation to certain resources or problems people may have much "room for manoeuvre" 
(Long 1984, 1990), while around other resources they may have little individual influence. 
For example, while the ejidatarios have developed a high degree of autonomy around the 
arable land and the commons, around the "lost land" they obviously operate in a force field 
in which they are relatively powerless. At the same time, force fields are always in flux. For 
instance, the force field around the common lands in La Canoa is changing in that differences 
in the interests of ejidatarios and landless families are becoming more pronounced, and 
interference from different state agencies is increasing. This will certainly lead to changes 
in the organizing practices around the commons in the future, although not in predefined 
ways. 
I have stressed throughout the book that the patterning which develops in organizing 
practices and the accompanying forms of domination and struggle are related to active 
dialogues, self-reflection, irony, and the production of multiple meanings through imagination 
and the work of interpretation. These reflections and dialogues around relations of force were 
explicitly discussed for the ideology of the land (in the context of ejidatarios' domination 
over landless villagers), the ideology of the family (in the context of inheritance decisions 
in an increasingly transnationalized setting), the different discourses on organization (in the 
context of tensions in ejido management), and for the amazing forms of imagination 
surrounding power and the state (in the context of the struggle for the "lost land"). These 
dialogues reflect a continuous active engagement of social actors with the world around them 
and should not be seen merely as enactments of dominant discourses. 
Of course, the existence of multiple fields of power impinging on different dimensions 
of our lives has always been a reality. But today in a world where media and migration have 
a strong effect on the "work of the imagination as a constitutive feature of modern 
subjectivity" (Appadurai 1997: 3) the existence of multiple force fields is even more evident. 
Ejidatarios live in a transnational world in which identity formation and socio-political 
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processes can no longer be seen as automatically tied to certain localities or even nation-
states. This is a widespread phenomenon and several authors have stressed that the 
deterritorialized and transnationalized world we are living in today not only forces us to look 
"outwards", but also calls for different theoretical notions (Appadurai 1997, Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997). Thus, I argue that the study of organizing practices within determinate force 
fields, as developed in this book, provides an analytical strategy that can help us to 
understand these new (and old) realities (see appendix six for a schematic overview of the 
organizing practices and force fields which were discussed in the different chapters of the 
book). 
Returning to Resistance, the Culture of the State, and State Intervention 
In chapter two I said that in the same way that we cannot assume the existence of a 
hegemonic state project, we cannot assume the existence of a popular project of resistance 
to the state either. In the subsequent chapters interactions between ejidatarios and officials 
were described in many different settings. On the basis of this material I conclude that in the 
Mexican context the basic problem with the notion of resistance is that people often do not 
have clear images of the "opposing class" or the categories they are fighting against. They 
may talk in broad terms about los ricos, los pequenos, or the "corrupt officials", but in 
concrete situations it is very hard to determine if somebody should be resisted or cooperated 
with. 
Ejidatarios often do not know if they have to be in favor or against a state official or if 
they should support or resist a new government program. They have ample experience with 
projects and programs that they perceive to be highly corrupt. Hence, the apparent distrust, 
disinterest, and the wait and see attitude that officials complain about manifests a sensible 
skepticism with regards to the hopes and expectations raised by the bureaucracy. It is in the 
process itself that attitudes and positions develop and they often remain ambivalent. A 
government official should be received with some suspicion but can in the end prove to be 
a "good guy". Alternatively, he could prove to be a man with good intentions but who is 
manipulated by his chiefs. 
So, when ejidatarios do not show much initiative or do not participate in new government 
programs, it is not that they deliberately refrain from every form of action that is initiated 
by the government, or that they manifest a form of resistance against interference from 
outside. The distant and distrustful attitude can best be described as a form of "keeping a 
distance". This "keeping a distance" is not part of a larger project and their attitudes can 
change according to how the situation develops. In this way we find complex attitudes which 
combine elements of resistance and compliance at the same time. In addition, any initiative 
or program can develop and be appropriated in unpredictable ways (Arce 1993, Long 1988, 
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1990, de Vries 1997). 
When the ejidatarios really felt that they were being deceived, they could make this clear 
to the officials. In many meetings they made objections to and cynical remarks about the 
propaganda talk of officials. Their awaiting attitude, cynical jokes, moments of enthusiasm, 
but also their silently leaning to the wall and leaving in the middle of the meeting can be 
analyzed in terms of a ritual or a style which they have developed on the basis of many 
experiences. It is not a "lack of interest", a "lack of initiative", or a "lack of education", 
but styles and rituals, in which practices of dominance and resistance interact in complex 
ways; rituals of rules and resistance (Beezley et al. 1994) form part of the culture of the 
state. 
This brings us to another point, namely that when officials present new government 
programs they think in terms of incorporated ejidatarios. In fact, ejidatarios are always 
already incorporated in official structures, but not in standard ways. For example, the big 
entrepreneurs among the ejidatarios have been quite skilled in establishing useful contacts 
with some bureaucrats and influential politicians in the region, who can give them the 
information and entrances they needed. Hence, these big entrepreneurs are often not 
enthusiastic about attending the meetings convened by officials who come to introduce new 
programs, as they have their own contacts. At the same time, ejidatarios live in a world that 
develops to a large degree outside the grip of the state bureaucracy. For example, the fact 
that ejidatarios do not show much interest in more "modern" and "advanced" forms of 
production, may be very frustrating for the SARH officials and only confirm their opinion 
that ejidatarios are backwards. However, when we take into account that many ejidatarios 
are migrants and that they may combine their ejido plot with several other sources of income, 
they should perhaps be labeled as extremely "modern". While officials may fantasize about 
high production in ejidos by joining several ejido plots, the ejidatarios generally prefer to 
combine their ejido plot with migration to Los Angeles. This "independent" and "distant" 
attitude of the ejidatarios frustrates the work of many officials: it makes the ejidatarios 
"uncontrollable". 
Imagining the State 
As has been shown, ejidatarios have a complicated and contradictory relation with the 
Mexican state. The state was their ally in the fight against the hacendaaos during the period 
of agrarian reform and it has also been the provider of all kinds of services (schools, water, 
electricity). But in other instances the state is viewed as a corrupt and violent enemy which 
is greatly feared and distrusted by the people. Hence, we have an image of the Mexican state 
as the protector and oppressor of the ejidatarios at the same time. Images of the state conjoin 
notions of evil with goodness. For that reason, the ejidatarios may be supportive and 
enthusiastic towards the Mexican president at one moment, and cynical and distrustful about 
bis speeches at another moment. Or they can laugh about themselves being deceived by the 
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democratic and liberalizing discourse of a president who later on proved to be one of the 
worst swindlers the country ever saw. The ejidatarios can be proud of being part of the 
project of the Mexican nation-state but at the same time they can criticize powerholders for 
their corruption and for squeezing the peasants. 
I have argued that the continuous theorizing about power and politics in society not only 
concerns a rationalization of actions but also an investment in the "idea of the state". This 
does not mean that practices of authority and control do not exist but that people's 
imaginations are important for what they think and decide to do. These imaginations which 
are constitutive of the culture of the state, are based upon a myriad of experiences and are 
mediated by a series of governmental techniques and by the media, education, and movies. 
The culture of the state is central to the operation of the bureaucracy as a hope-generating 
machine. It was shown that the hope-generating bureaucratic machine gives the message that 
everything is possible, that cases are never closed, and that things will be different from now 
on. This permeates all aspects of life and triggers powerful responses. However, rather than 
producing a certain rationality and coherence, the bureaucratic machine generates 
enjoyments, pleasures, fears, and expectations. Although people are never naive, during 
certain periods they can become inspired and enthusiastic about new programs and new 
openings that are offered to them. One peculiarity of the Mexican bureaucracy is precisely 
its ability, at certain points and in certain circumstances, to overcome people's skepticism 
and, indeed, entice them to start fantasizing again about new projects, hence recommencing 
a never-ending cycle of high expectations followed by disillusion and ironic laughter (cf. 
Beezley et al. 1994 and Torres 1994a). 
Interface situations (Long 1984, 1989) in which ejidatarios and officials deal with each 
other help to render possible these forms of imagination. Here we find most clearly the 
rituals of the state. Ejidatarios and bureaucrats are implicated in the construction of the idea 
of the state through processes of rationalization, speculation, and the construction of fantasies 
but also through processes of fetishization, that is the attribution to certain objects such as 
maps and documents with special powers. In this complex of desire and fantasy, inscription 
is very important. People develop a fetishism around certain official documents, even when 
they cannot "read" these documents according to official standards. The same can be said 
of bureaucrats who tend to reify the law, in spite of "knowing" that official procedures do 
not play a decisive role in the outcome of highly politicized land conflicts. In these processes, 
the "idea of the state" is objectivized and fixed in maps, documents, and other legal texts. 
However, we should be careful not to equate the strong influence of the culture of the state 
with a strong state-apparatus. The study of La Canoa precisely showed us that while the 
culture of the state may be strongly felt in many aspects of life, the state bureaucracy has not 
had much control over local organizing practices. 
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The Dividing Effects of the Bureaucratic Machine 
We saw in this book that personal relationships, rather than collective organizing, have been 
central to obtaining village projects, jobs, access to credit, protection from the police, 
important information, and so on. Yet, although these personal political networks may be 
successful for some, they create hard feelings among people who are "less well connected" 
with political circles and who therefore have less influence on, for example, the outcome of 
land conflicts or on village projects. For that reason, all government projects and government 
intervention is surrounded by gossip, speculation, complaints and criticism of "local" 
organizers. By privileging a few figures with good political networks, state intervention 
contributes to the creation of local divisions among people and the fostering of conspiracies. 
In this way we can conclude that state intervention itself tends to cause divisions and frustrate 
collective projects. Krotz points out that experiences with cooperatives in Mexico have shown 
that every intervention in a socially conflictual reality, such as rural Mexico, reveals, 
aggravates, and creates conflicts (Krotz et al. 1985: 36). I would argue, however, that the 
cause does not lie as such in the conflictual nature of rural Mexican society, but in the 
particular ways in which "local" people are approached by the bureaucratic rrachine as well 
as the sometimes disruptive nature of intervention itself. 
The fostering of divisions by the bureaucratic machine became especially clear in the case 
of the "lost land", when the ejidatarios had to deal with a continuous stream of contradictory 
messages from the state bureaucracy. One day they were told that the map was found and 
the next day that the map never existed. At one office they heard that a MAR engineer would 
arrive in the ejido tomorrow and another day that the engineer had disappeared because he 
was accused of corruption. As the ejidatarios work with several brokers and officials at the 
same time it is never clear why certain things are finally achieved or sabotaged. If something 
does not work out well, there are many people who can be blamed for it. Sometimes the 
officials and intermediaries deliberately create divisions by saying that some ejidatarios are 
leaking information to the enemy, or they blame one of the ejidatarios for giving false 
information. Several brokers made clear that they only wanted to work with one specific 
person of the ejido. In this way, the fighters for the "lost land" were entrapped in a world 
of speculation and conspiracy in which everybody blamed each other for things that went 
wrong. 
Gledhill points out that the essence of the post-revolutionary experience in Mexico is 
precisely the removal of initiative and bargaining power from the base. Even developments 
in state policy towards the ejidos, that might be considered "improvements" in a narrowly 
material sense, are increasingly negative from this point of view (Gledhill 1991: 30). In this 
sense, from the agrarian reform onwards, top-down and politically motivated forms of state 
intervention have had a disruptive and dividing influence. Aitken also argues that "the 
increased entrance of state institutions into local areas can create further fragmentation of 
communities as local disputes and problems can be mediated potentially through diverse 
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patrons within the political system" (Aitken 1997: 292). It is precisely this type of 
intervention by the state apparatus and the fabulous hopes and fantasies generated by the 
bureaucratic machine which frustrate collective local organizing and explain the so-called lack 
of unity at the local level. In the light of the foregoing it is ironic that it is precisely in 
bureaucratic circles that so much emphasis is put on the need for ejidatarios to organize 
themselves. Many officials blame the ejidatarios for being divided among themselves and for 
not showing any interest in their own development. Paradoxically, while on the one hand, 
state intervention fosters division in ejidos and villages, on the other hand officials and 
development workers blame the ejidatarios for not being more united. 
I always felt very uncomfortable when officials asked me to suggest new government 
programs for the ejido sector. After so many years of study, they felt that I should at least 
be able to formulate ideas for new development projects. However, I arrived at the 
conclusion that the problem was not a lack of good ideas or committed officials but the 
contradictory and divisive influence of the hope-generating machine. But how could I explain 
to these committed people that, in my view, any new government program tends to create 
division and contradiction? It was easier to explain to them that it is difficult to formulate 
general government programs when the government's aims with regard to ejido lands are 
different from those of the ejidatarios. Many officials accepted the point that while the 
success of state intervention is dependent on villagers' active and continuous involvement 
or "participation", many ejidatarios deploy deterritorialized livelihood strategies in which 
they combine their plot with income from migration to the United States. The issue, 
however, is how to devise strategies of organization that build upon existing organizing 
practices that are not coordinated by a center (a board, manager, or assembly) and which are 
not fixed to particular territories. This is a point to which I now turn. 
The Role of Organization and Education in Development Debates 
The image of the rural poor as "victims" of exploitation and lacking in organizational 
capacities is pervasive in much development literature, as are high expectation that new 
collective forms of organization can improve the situation of the poor (Esman and Uphoff 
1984, Korten 1987, Harris 1988, Curtis 1991). Within the various development discourses 
villagers and ejidatarios are depicted as "traditional", "unmotivated", or "apathetic" or, on 
the other hand, as "victims" of the pervasive and "corrupt" bureaucratic machine. In the best 
case they are seen as "opportunistic" and highly "self-interested" people unable to align 
themselves with a wider socio-political project. Harris, who discusses the role of NGOs for 
development projects, argues that as local organizations grow stronger "they will be able 
better to resist the pressures of corrupt bureaucracies" (Harris 1988: 8). He adds that those 
affected by poverty "must understand their needs, select a solution, agree on their 
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involvement and responsibilities and work out how to organize themselves" (ibid.: 9). 
Following this line of thought it is argued that development workers can "empower the poor" 
by helping them to develop better forms of organization. In these works "the stress is on the 
deficiencies of traditional institutions which people, treated as passive objects, are incapable 
of changing" (Hobart 1993: 12). Today local communities and local organizations are also 
given a special role in natural resource management. Many works on sustainable 
development, formulate solutions in terms of returning responsibility for the management of 
natural resources to local communities (Ghai D. and Vivian j . 1992, Berkes 1995, Baland 
and Platteau 1996). Together with these ideological notions of community and democratic 
organizing, we find a stress on education and consciousness raising in development 
discourses. As Brohman (1996) points out, for a growing number of anti-poverty workers 
education and "conscientization" are believed to be critical for instilling self-confidence 
among the poor and making them understand the causes of their problems (1996: 264). 
Although these works are based on a real concern for the position of the poor, they can 
be criticized for their unrealistic views on the relation between organizing and power and for 
their simplistic use of the notion of community. Firstly, these approaches tend to ignore the 
multi-dimensional differentiations among the poor or rural people themselves based on 
economic differences, gender, age, and ethnic identities. As Brohman argues, "the tendency 
within bottom-up developments projects has been to conceptualize communities in 
homogeneous terms" (Brohman 1996: 271). Also Leach et al. complain that "it is striking 
the degree to which simplistic notions of community are being reinvented in the context of 
practical efforts towards community-based sustainable development" (Leach et al. 1997: 11, 
see also Quarles van Ufford 1993 for a similar critique). In this book it has become clear that 
forms of community are always characterized by differentiation, struggles, and forms of 
domination. Instead of starting with some notion of community, I would therefore propose 
to focus on existing practices of organization within defined force fields. 
Secondly, even though several approaches claim to start from existing forms of 
organizing, they do not take into account forms of organizing which are not based on 
collective projects but are of a more fragmented, non-formal nature. For example, Curtis 
stresses the importance of organizations through which "people collectively advance their 
wealth and well-being" and "through which a major part of the value produced is shared 
either amongst the participants or more widely the community" (Curtis 1991:1). Although 
he claims to work from a "bottom-up view", he does not try to understand why in many 
situations people prefer to work in individual networks instead of collective projects, or why 
we can find villagers working in continuously changing constellations instead of in more 
enduring groups. However, as shown in this book, historically developed patterning in 
organizing practices often implies loose constellations of social networks, within trans-local 
social fields. Curtis does not take into account that more formalized collective actions may 
imply political dangers and risks, nor the fact that intervention itself may have a dividing 
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effect on people. No attention is paid either to the fact that people often have good reasons 
for adopting a wait and see attitude instead of making a "personal cost-benefit calculation" 
which shows whether "the benefits of the project outweigh the costs" (Curtis 1991: 30). The 
point is that people may choose different kinds of involvement and appropriation which 
change over time and which cannot be captured by a model based on so-called "rational 
decision-making". The general point of critique is that these works ignore existing fields of 
power and the capacity of the poor villagers to analyze their own situation and deploy forms 
of organizing which fit best in these contexts. By ignoring this capacity of the local people 
and by ignoring the logics behind existing organizing strategies, these development discourses 
tend to "disempower" the poor. 
In fact, the idea that new forms of organizing can make a dramatic difference to the lives 
of the poor is based on the notion of social and legal engineering: the belief that by changing 
rules one can change society. This is a dangerous belief. As Stiefel and Wolfe point out 
"processes of legal and institutional reform by themselves probably have little chance to 
sustain a democratic process and prevent new authoritarian structures from emerging" (Stiefel 
and Wolfe 1994: 200). All rules and procedures may be used and abused in many different 
ways as organizations are always embedded in wider force fields. As this book has shown, 
official rales and procedures may influence the development of organizing practices in many 
different and often unpredictable ways. Although rules and formal structures may influence 
established practices they can never control or transform them in planned ways (see also 
Benda Beckmann 1993, Long 1988, 1992, Long and van der Ploeg 1989). We could even 
argue that the patterning of organizing practices occurs as the side-effect of formal laws and 
formal structures which in effect are never applied as such. 
The stress on new forms of organization in development debates is accompanied by a 
stress on education and consciousness raising. During the research I found this emphasis also 
strongly present among officials and other people trying to work for the benefit of the 
ejidatarios. They said that the ejidatarios should develop their knowledge of official rules in 
order to fight a corrupt bureaucracy. There are several things that can be said about the 
possible value of education. On the one hand, it is certainly true that by learning the rales 
and procedures,, it is possible to develop one's capacities in "playing the game". Morgan 
points out that in "seeing organization - with its rewards of success, status, power, and 
influence - as a game to be played according to their own sets of unwritten rules, 
organizational game players often have a significant influence on the structure of power 
relations" (1986: 178). Ejidatarios with more nerve, more knowledge of the rules and better 
capacities in "playing the game" with officials, will be treated with more caution and will 
be less easily deceived than others. On the other hand, organizing is not only about acquiring 
more power by improving one's qualities in "innocent games". While for the legalization 
of illegal land sales in the village, one can build up experience and enhance one's capacities 
in dealing with officials, negotiating about transactions and learning the different languages 
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which can be used, in the case of land conflicts such as the "lost land", more technical, 
legal, or organizational knowledge and capacities will not fundamentally change the situation. 
Learning about the official rules and procedures does not change the existing power relations 
around serious land conflicts. We could even assert that we engage with a dangerous 
ideological fallacy when we argue that education can make a crucial difference. There is a 
danger in this belief of getting lost in a world of voluntaristic fantasies in which we ignore 
the political dimension of many developmental problems. 
"Modern" Organization versus Existing Organizing Practices in the Ejido 
When development workers or officials complain about "disorganization" or talk about "a 
lack of organization" in the ejido they in fact refer to the absence of organizing principles 
belonging to the ideological construct of the formal, "modern" organization with 
"transparent" procedures and mechanisms of accountability. I will criticize the assumptions 
underlying this ideological construct, and confront it with forms of ordering and 
accountability which have developed in the ejido La Canoa. 
Staying out of the Grips of the State Machine 
It is obvious that there are many ways in which people organize activities in their daily life. 
We saw, for example, the skills ejidatarios from the village have developed in organizing the 
crossing of the well guarded US border and mamtaining themselves in illegal circumstances 
in el Norte. For these matters no organizations are set up but networks are mobilized which 
provide crucial information, financial support, and practical help. However, the ways in 
which ejidatarios have also managed to circumvent the law with respect to land transfers is 
a clear indication that there is absolutely no lack of organizing skills and inventiveness. On 
the contrary, people have been very inventive and skillful in organizing different personal 
matters and in defending their own interests in their daily life. 
The above mentioned forms of organizing remain to a large degree outside the control 
of the state bureaucracy. According to Appadurai large residual spaces exist where the 
techniques of nationhood, directed towards spatial and social standardization, are likely to 
be either weak or contested (Appadurai 1997: 190). This points to a weakness in 
governmentality and indicates that there is considerable room to "exit" (Hirschman 1970) 
from the official system. Thus much organizing remains outside the control of the state and 
this can have important advantages for the people concerned. 
Although in development debates so-called informal or corrupt practices are considered 
to be detrimental to the poor, they can also provide them with a certain freedom and liberty 
in their actions. This is well illustrated by the way in which migrant villagers in La Canoa 
argue that there is much more freedom in Mexico than in the USA since in Mexico rules can 
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always be bent or "bought", whereas in the USA rules are applied much more strictly. 
Ejidatarios feel this strict application of rules as a restriction on their personal freedom. In 
this study it became clear that there were advantages especially for ejidatarios in remaining 
at a distance from the law and outside an effective controlling state machine. With respect 
to the individual ejido plots and the common lands, the ejidatarios and landless villagers 
acquired a high degree of autonomy. Despite a strong "presence of the state" in the field of 
individual ejido plots, there was little "control by the state", and the effects of intervention 
were minimal. 
The phenomenon that by avoiding incorporation into a bureaucratic organization, 
ejidatarios prevented themselves from becoming subjects controlled by the state, is also 
discussed by Krotz. He argues that the many illegal transactions with ejido land at the local 
level, made ejidatarios averse to any new formal form of organizing coming from outside 
which would restrict their freedom (Krotz et al. 1985: 24). This fear of more control from 
above also becomes evident when ejidatarios are reluctant to have their land plots registered 
and do not want to provide data on the amount of land and cattle they possess and maize they 
produce. They fear that information and registration will in the end lead to more control from 
above (for example, in the form of checks on land use and land transactions and taxes). 
Concerning the Difficulty of Autonomous Organization 
Although it is easily accepted that villagers are conscious of the risks involved in engaging 
the state bureaucratic machine, it is more difficult to see that villagers may be equally 
reluctant to become involved in "local" or "community based" organizations. Yet, villagers 
may have good reasons to be reluctant about involvement in any type of more formal 
organization. The point is that it seems impossible to think of any "village" or "community 
based" organization in which the state does not become involved in one way or the other. 
What is most striking "is the degree to which the state has become implicated in the minute 
texture of everyday life" (Gupta 1995: 375). As said, a strong presence of the state does not 
mean that there is much "state control" but often only that there is much "game playing" 
which indirectly affects organizing practices. Yet, this still means that local organizing 
initiatives are influenced by state law and bureaucracies. 
There are different ways in which the state influences local forms of organizing. For 
example, in the context of a state bureaucracy that has a history of establishing special 
contacts with influential well-placed people, it may be much wiser not to be organized in a 
formal "local" or "community-based" organization. There is a high risk that the leaders or 
representatives of these organizations will establish personal relations with the state 
bureaucracy and "there is in fact a danger that the elites may regroup and become re-
empowered" by the creation of village development committees (Singh 1988: 44). In this 
atmosphere it also seems very reasonable to be reluctant to put your money and energy in 
a local cooperative. So, although many development theories stress the importance of 
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"building self-reliant village organizations" (Poulton 1988: 32), there are many situations in 
which it can be important for people to remain outside more formalized forms of organizing, 
whether these are governmental, non-governmental, local, community based or whatever. 
Many people who have worked with peasant organizations in Mexico have explained the 
difficulties they encountered and many authors have tried to deal with the complexity of 
peasant organizing in Mexico (Esteva 1987, Foley 1990, Villarreal 1994). Esteva, who has 
considerable experience in working with peasants in Mexico, describes his frustrating 
experiences when he and others worked with ideas of empowerment of the peasants and local 
forms of organization. On the basis of his experience Esteva has distanced himself from 
second level organizations such as federations, unions, associations, and political parties with 
which he has had bitter experiences. Instead he tries to organize issue campaigns in concert 
with others through short meetings, well defined in time and space, for the exchange of ideas 
and experiences, or for specific "battles" that are shared (Esteva 1987: 148). 
These experiences with local organizing should be taken into account in the discussions 
about organization for development. Although in much of this literature a distinction is made 
between community based organizations, non-governmental organizations, and governmental 
agencies (Poulton and Harris 1988, Curtis 1991, Bebbington et al. 1993), in practice these 
differences are hard to maintain. For example, from a formal organization perspective, the 
ejido is an organization which is difficult to categorize. It is not a public sector institution, 
nor a private organization. It is a form of locally based organization imposed by the 
government, and subject to many laws and regulations. This ambivalence of the ejido being 
at the same time "a state apparatus of political control and an organ of peasant 
representation" (Fox and Gordillo 1989: 131) has always played an important role in the 
debate concerning the ejido. Yet, the ejido is just one of many organizations and "institutions 
which cannot easily be classified as governmental, non-governmental, local, etc. For that 
reason we should study the wider force fields in which organizing takes place and examine 
what relations with the state bureaucracy exist, rather than trying to distinguish (artificial) 
organizational categories. 
The Ideology of the Modern Organization 
The idea that "modern" forms of organizing work in the interest of the collectivity and in 
this way can "empower" the group is stimulated by the fact that many writers on 
organization define "organizations as groups of people who come together in pursuit of 
common goals" (Morgan 1986: 341). According to this line of thought it is argued that by 
introducing organizations with procedures which secure accountability and democratic forms 
of decision-making, the whole group is empowered, as people with formal responsibilities 
can be effectively controlled and the decision-making remains with the majority. Yet, the 
reality of organizing is different. Morgan points out that although "we are usually encouraged 
to think about organizations as rational enterprises pursuing goals that aspire to satisfy the 
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interests of all, there is much evidence to suggest that this view is more an ideology than a 
reality. Organizations are often used as instruments of domination that further the selfish 
interests of elites at the expense of others. And there is often an element of domination in 
all organizations" (1986: 274-275). Hence, collective and more formal organizations may 
also become important instruments of control and domination and do not necessarily lead to 
more power and freedom for the "excluded" or the "poor". 
At the same time, organizing practices which do not follow the rules of "modern" 
organization can show their own mechanisms of control and accountability. An important 
conclusion of the research on the ejido La Canoa is precisely that situations which at a first 
glance seem to be disorganized, like the ejido administration, can have strong organizing 
patterns. I also concluded that the lack or ineffectiveness of a decision-making body does not 
necessarily mean that there is a blatant abuse of power. We found that there is no center of 
control regarding ejido management in La Canoa. An ejido commissioner who has much 
autonomy in his decisions and does not render accounts of what he does, is easily labeled 
from a modernist point of view as an undemocratic situation. Yet, in La Canoa the autonomy 
of the commissioner only concerns minor matters and he does not have much influence on 
what is going on in important questions. 
The fact that no decisions are taken at ejido meetings, that the executive committee is not 
asked to render accounts, and that many ejido affairs are arranged in small loose 
constellations of people, can also be labeled as an example of an undemocratic form of 
organizing in which some people can easily abuse their position at the expense of the other 
ejido members. Yet, in La Canoa very effective means of accountability exist outside the 
formal structures. Although many things are not discussed at ejido meetings, people find out 
what is going on in the streets and other places. Commissioners can be criticized by fellow 
ejidatarios and called to account for the spending of the ejido money in many other settings. 
So, although meetings are often not held and although the general assembly is not the 
decision-making body in the ejido, there are other ways in which the ejidatarios check on 
what is going on and keep control over the executive committee. Effective ways of 
controlling the commissioner and stopping him in the case of abuse of power include, for 
example, the use of regional political networks, gossip, and the exclusion of his relatives 
from other village activities. The politics of honor also plays an important role in the room 
for manoeuvre that people create for themselves and in the way they are judged by others. 
Although Lupe, for example, as ejido treasurer spent a large amount of ejido money on a 
lawyer without the consent of the other ejidatarios, she was never asked to return the money. 
The other ejidatarios knew that she had not spent the money for her own profit and, although 
they disagreed with her, they did not want to cause her problems. Yet, Ricardo Garcia, as 
ejido commissioner, was stopped through political networks when he embezzled ejido money 
and used it for his own enterprises. 
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The Role of the Accountability Discourse of Organization 
Ejidatarios themselves also engage in discussions on "modernity" and the typical features of 
"modern" forms of organizing. I distinguished the "personal politics discourse of 
organization" and the "accountability discourse of organization". Both discourses are very 
common in the bureaucracy and government propaganda and can be found in the ejido as 
well. The personal politics discourse of organization provides a language for reflecting on 
the workings of power. It stresses that power is concentrated by corrupt politicians at the top 
and that people take formal responsibilities only for the sake of personal enrichment. The 
personal politics discourse can be used both as a form of social critique or as a way of 
justifying and rationalizing certain types of outcomes and social relations. The accountability 
discourse of organization, on the other hand, provides a language of order and control. It 
stresses the way in which organizations should work according to models of modern 
organization. When ejidatarios employ this discourse, they say that decisions should be taken 
at meetings by the ejido assembly, that the executive committee should publicly render 
accounts and that everybody should follow the official ejido rules. This discourse justifies or 
asks for certain forms of intervening in ongoing situations which are considered to be 
unacceptable. 
The accountability discourse of organization is only used when ejidatarios are unsatisfied 
with specific matters and want to "retake control". As long as the informal operations of 
small groups in the ejido work well, the other ejidatarios do not mind. Everybody knows that 
things are not achieved by formal forms of organizing but only through personalized 
relationships and nobody minds paying officials in balanced transactions. Yet, the 
accountability discourse is used when it becomes clear that the small group around the 
commissioner will not achieve the expected result. This was clear in the struggle for the "lost 
land". In that case the people who themselves had started working in small groups which 
decided to spend ejido money, started to refer to the "accountability discourse" when they 
lost influence in the small group or no longer agreed with the chosen strategies. For example, 
after having participated himself in these informal groups, the ejido commissioner Raul 
started stressing the need of formal forms of organizing when he did not support the actions 
of the group around Lupe anymore. Only then did Raul say that decisions should be taken 
at meetings and not by small groups of friends or members of the executive committee. 
Furthermore, other people who wanted things to happen in a different way suddenly started 
using this accountability discourse although they had favored working in informal groups in 
the beginning. So, the accountability discourse was used as a discursive weapon to retake 
control. This also happened in the case of the commons in which the ejidatarios were pitted 
against the landless villagers. Several ejidatarios stressed the need to follow the official rules 
and the official role of the ejido in the commons, as they hoped that this could help them 
against the landless people with plots in the commons. In their turn, the landless villagers 
fought the official rules with a discourse of moral rights and justice. 
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In conclusion, despite the absence of so-called transparent, democratic organizing 
mechanisms, in the ejido La Canoa there is no question of easy abuses of power or nepotism. 
We find strong forms of ordering with respect to control over resources which have 
developed over time. Only in the case of serious conflicts does the "playing of the formal 
game'' become important. The ejidatarios themselves also use the discourse of modern 
organization but only in the case of conflicts in which they hope that the formal structure and 
rules can be an effective weapon against their adversaries. 
Local Organization for the Management of the Commons 
The discussion on natural resource management and development is especially interesting for 
the situation of the commons of La Canoa. As was discussed in chapter six, these are large 
extensions of mountainous terrains which have become almost totally occupied and have been 
divided into individual plots which are treated as private property. According to government 
agencies, these lands show serious problems of erosion. After having read how the 
management of the commons in La Canoa takes place, it is obvious that the idea of devolving 
the responsibility of the commons to the local community would be meaningless. Although 
the ejido is formally responsible for the administration of the use of the commons, in practice 
the ejido management is powerless in the force field that has developed over time and which 
transcends the ejido and the locality. Landless families, ejidatarios in Los Angeles, political 
connections in Autlan, the forestry police, and the drug control police are all involved and 
try to get some control over different aspects of the commons. Hence, organizing practices 
are shaped within force fields that are deterritorialized and composed of shifting sets of 
actors. 
Fortunately, several people have criticized the unrealistic images of community and local 
organizations which dominate policy thinking and development programs for the management 
of natural resources (Fairhead and Leach 1995, Leach et al. 1997, Mosse 1997). In a study 
on deforestation in Guinea West Africa, Fairhead and Leach, for example, show that 
environmental management often depends less on community-level authorities and 
sociocultural organizations than on the sum of a much more diffuse set of relations: a 
constellation more than a structure (1995: 1027). In this constellation many elements play a 
role, such as different production patterns and commercialization possibilities. They point out 
that in one of the regions they studied there have been many social and economic changes, 
but that "these changes are rendered visible in the landscape largely through changing land 
use and management priorities, not through organizational 'breakdown' and vegetation 
degradation" (ibid.). Two elements in their analysis are interesting for the case of the 
common lands in La Canoa. First of all, that environmental management depends on a 
constellation, or in other words a force field, in which many elements play a role. Secondly, 
that changes in landscape and land use are not necessarily the result of an "organizational 
breakdown" or "organizational incapacities" but are more often the result of changes in the 
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socio-economic setting and the wider field of power in which organizing practices develop. 
What has happened with the commons in the case of La Canoa is not the result of the "lack 
of organization" at the local level or an "organizational breakdown" but is due to the 
dynamics of, what I would call, a force field which developed over the years and which 
transcends the locality, even though officially the management rests with the ejido. 
Practical implications 
Arguing that organizing processes are embedded in wider force fields, which involve 
complex webs of relationships and related modes of imagination and interpretation, does not 
mean that one cannot offer practical suggestions with respect to forms of organizing in these 
contexts. It only means that we have to be modest in our aims. In order to explain how 
studies of existing organizing practices can help us to develop strategies to support "local" 
organization I will discuss some general principles that one could follow in order to establish 
a project or support existing initiatives in La Canoa. These principles are based on the results 
of the study of the ejido and village projects discussed in this book. As I am talking in 
general terms, I can only identify some very broad principles. In doing so I follow Morgan's 
precept that an analytical scheme for the study or development of organizations should be 
seen "as a sensitizing or interpretive process rather than as a model or static framework" and 
should be able to "cope with ambiguity and paradox" (Morgan 1986: 342). Yet, as one will 
notice, even these broad principles in the analytical scheme are very different from what is 
suggested in many manuals on "empowerment" and "local organization for development" 
(definition of the target group, meetings to discuss problems and define common needs, 
training of the participants). Although I talk about a hypothetical case in which I, as an 
outsider, was asked to support or establish a local project, the case is not that theoretical. As 
discussed in chapter nine, I became involved in a local project for the internal ejido rules and 
the ejidatarios increasingly asked me to advise them on what to do. This made me think 
about the best strategies to follow in these situations. It must be added that the reason that 
some ejidatarios asked me to support them and asked me for advice on the best ways to 
operate was not because they considered me to have more "knowledge" about their situation 
than they had, but because they were aware of the fact that I had established networks within 
the bureaucracy which could be useful. 
In order to support a local project, the best thing would be to start with a small group 
of interested people. A larger group can be informed but it is probable that at the start only 
a small group will really be interested. Others will take the usual wait and see attitude and 
perhaps join at a later stage. According to the type of project, there will also be people 
against it (local wisdom: whatever you do, it will always go against the interest of some 
people). So, instead of trying to formulate a big formal project around collective interests, 
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it is preferable to start with a small initiative, with a few people. Depending on the type of 
project, one should "play the game of relations", by using influential contacts and different 
socio-political networks. This mode of operating through personal relations and networking 
in different directions is a central element of effective organizing. More generally we can 
argue that "the real effectiveness of organized efforts of the excluded depends to a large 
extent on the nature of their alliances with other social groups and, of course, on their 
relations with the state and its agents at the local and national level... the state and its agents 
at local and national levels remain key actors in the 'game of participation'" (Stiefel and 
Wolfe 1994: 204). In addition, I would argue that it is important to pay attention to the 
interpretative elements in these relationships. A good knowledge of the practices of 
interpretation and performances which constitute the culture of the state is necessary: one has 
to know how to deal with people, how to establish personal relationships with officials and 
representatives, how to do favors and reach agreements. To be successful one has to know 
the importance of organizing meals, parties, but also the sensibilities involved in nationalist, 
religious, and regional symbols and histories. However, one also should understand how to 
distance oneself from the fantasies created by the hope-generating machine which makes 
many promises but does not keep them. So, one has to develop ways of "playing the game" 
but keeping a certain distance at the same time. Once the project becomes more crystallized 
other people at the local level will automatically follow and participate. However, in my 
view, the links of the project towards the outside world need to be taken care of before one 
thinks in more detailed terms about the organizational forms at the local level. In this 
context, the elaboration of formal rules and official organization designs is not the most 
appropriate way to start. 
I will now give another example in order to show the practical implications of this 
approach towards organization. It has already been shown that many ejidatarios complain 
about their lack of control over the commons. One of the last serious problems was that of 
Refugio Sanchez who not only fenced large part of the commons and sold the pasture, but 
also invaded another terrain and confiscated a public path. Despite official ejido decisions in 
which the general assembly decided that he should leave the path and the land, and despite 
formal complaints at different offices in Autlan nothing had changed. This is a specific 
problem in which the majority of ejidatarios cannot deal with this one ejidatario and many 
feel powerless. It also shows that formal rules and "democratic" decisions are not sufficient 
to change unequal power relations. In order to tackle this problem seriously, one should 
again work through the informal channels and work according to the logic of already existing 
organizing practices. In this case, the most obvious way would be first to try to deal with the 
political side of the problem. As it is clear that Refugio has good connections with the police 
in Autlan, one should fight him in the political arena. In this case political connections at the 
regional level have to be cultivated and worked upon. Once this higher political support is 
assured, one could return to the mobilization of the people at the local level again and focus 
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on the formal part, by following formal administrative procedures. Past experiences have 
shown that ejidatarios will in the end be mobilized once they feel they have the support of 
higher levels and if the majority really want to tackle issues even if it involves people they 
are related to. However, again it would be an elaborate combination of outside political 
relations, local mobilization, and the following of the official procedures. 
So, one always has to study the principal resources at stake, the politically dominant 
actors and existing forms of ordering. The role played by the formal structures and 
procedures also has to be clear. Naturally, there are political influences of different orders. 
While the case of the "Malvinas" and probably of Refugio have serious costs, they are not 
impossible. Yet, with respect to the "lost land" of La Canoa and manifold other land 
conflicts in Mexico the situation is different. Here a degree of politicization is necessary, 
which would mean "a war of positions" which could have life-threatening consequences. 
In conclusion, I object to the uncritical use of the notion "modern", "democratic", 
"community based" organizational forms which are seen as the obvious solution to specific 
socio-political problems or for natural resource management. I argue that all forms of 
organizing develop in detenninate force fields which explains to a high degree the 
peculiarities of organizing practices. From this perspective I analyzed why in La Canoa 
practices of organizing acquire such loose and deterritorialized forms rather than adopting 
forms that are legally recognized (within communities, associations, etc.). While discourses 
of formal organization may be complicit with bureaucratic attempts to territorialize, and 
hence control, people's activities, villagers may prefer to embrace the opportunities created 
by increased globalization and deterritorialization. As existing organizing practices have 
important consequences for the implementation of new government programs or development 
projects, they have to be taken into account in the design of any new development project. 
Before assuming that new forms of organization can contribute to the solution of fundamental 
developmental problems we should first ask ourselves how existing organizing forms are 
embedded in wider fields of power and how they relate to the state bureaucracy and a given 
culture of the state. Then we should ask ourselves how the organizational forms which we 
have in mind would fit into these contexts. Furthermore, we should be modest in our aims 
and accept that there is no way to "control" the organizing process, not even by an external 
"specialist". 
This conclusion about organization for development can be summarized in seven points: 
(1) We often find organizing practices in the form of non formalized forms, such as different 
personal networks (family, friendship, compadrazgo), group-formations, individual 
alliances, ad-hoc constellations, and individual relations with officials or higher placed 
politicians. These organizing forms may be of a loose and deterritorialized nature. 
(2) When we study these apparently loosely structured organizing practices in relation to 
specific problems or resources over a longer period of time, we will discover certain 
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forms of patterning and regularities. This patterning can refer to the way in which access 
to resources is arranged, but also to forms of accountability, the way in which conflicts 
are dealt with, and so on. 
(3) These historically developed forms of patterning in organizing practices have to be 
analyzed in relation to the specific force fields in which organizing occurs. For that 
reason, we have to distinguish the central resources at stake, the different groups with 
specific positions and interests, and the role of the law, official institutions, and 
functionaries. We also have to realize that force fields generally transcend local and even 
national borders. 
(4) More often than not the patterning of organizing practices is of a decentered nature, 
which means that there is no single center of control and that there is no single group or 
organizational body which controls the organizing process. 
(5) The notion of modern, democratic organization which stresses public accountability and 
transparency is an ideological notion. Every type of organizing creates power differences 
and fosters new (or old) forms of domination. In fact, the patterning of organizing 
practices often develops as a side-effect of formal organizations and legal regulations and 
takes unintended forms. 
(6) If one wants to develop new or change existing forms of organizing to improve the 
position of certain groups, one first has to study the existing organizing practices and the 
force fields in which these have developed. 
(7) One has to be modest about the aims of such a project as force fields are made up of 
many different elements which are constantly in flux. This means that one may influence 
but can never "control" organizing processes. 
Notes 
1. Appadurai argues that there is an urgent need to focus on the cultural dynamics of what is now called 
"deterritorialization". According to him, the concept deterritorialization "applies not only to obvious 
examples such as transnational corporations and money markets but also to ethnic groups, sectarian 
movements, and political formations, which increasingly operate in ways that transcend specific territorial 
boundaries and identities" (Appadurai 1997: 49). 

Appendix 1 
Land Reform and Ejido Legislation in Mexico 
The Constitution of 1917 
Article 27 of the new Mexican Constitution of 1917 established the state's dominion over 
all land and water in the republic and defined the three principal forms of land tenure: small 
private property (pequena propiedad: constrained by maximum permitted landholding), 
ejidos, and agrarian communities. Article 27 formed the basis for the Mexican land reform. 
The Mexican agrarian law has been changed several times this century. However, the main 
characteristics of the ejido regime were not changed between 1917 and 1992. The agrarian 
law of 1917 offered Indian populations the procedure of restitution through which they could 
reclaim rights to lands that had been taken away from them in the past. If the restitution was 
awarded they could establish agrarian communities. However, in order to get their lands 
restituted the Indian communities had to prove their claim by official land titles. Indian 
communities who started the procedure of restitution of property by claiming the existence 
of former community rights to certain lands, frequently changed the petition into a request 
of endowment, once it became clear that they could not provide the necessary documents that 
would prove the existence of these former rights (Ibarra 1989, Zaragoza and Macias 1980). 
As a consequence, the establishment of ejidos became a much more common procedure than 
the creation of agrarian communities. To illustrate this point, between 1916 and 1934, 124 
agrarian communities were established as against 5,598 ejidos (Escarcega and Botey 1990: 
25). 
In the "modern ejido", that was established after the Mexican revolution, a group of 
landless villagers collectively received land which in most cases was subsequently subdivided 
on an individual basis. Apart from the parceled agricultural land, the ejidos received dry 
pasture lands and woodlands for collective use. According to the law, these common lands 
could not be divided into plots. These common lands generally formed the major part of the 
ejido, with an average of almost 77 per cent of the total area the ejido received (Reyes et al. 
1974: 458). Very few collective ejidos were established in which productive activities were 
carried out on a cooperative basis and land was not divided into individual plots. In some 
cases these collective ejidos divided the land into individual plots at a later stage. 1 
Procedures for the establishment of ejidos 
New institutions were established to implement the agrarian reform as laid down in the 
Constitution and agrarian law of 1917. The agrarian law specified the procedures to be 
followed by the petitioners, as well as the different government agencies in order to grant 
land to a community. The legal process of the Mexican agrarian reform, as well as the 
organizational structure and the budget of the land reform departments have been changed 
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frequently since then. The authorities in the land reform were: the President of the Republic, 
the State Governors, and the Military Heads. Furthermore, the following agencies were 
especially created: the National Agrarian Commission, a Local Agrarian Commission in 
every state and Special Execution Committees. The main institution that took care of agrarian 
affairs and the procuration of agrarian justice was renamed and reorganized several times 
since 1915. It was called successively; the National Agrarian Commission (Comisión 
National Agraria), the Agrarian Department (Departamento Agrario), the Department of 
Agrarian Affairs and Colonization (Departamento de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización) and 
finally the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (Secretaría de la Reforma Agraria). In 1992 article 
27 of the Mexican Constitution was changed again and together with the new agrarian law 
a new bureaucracy was introduced alongside the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the Office of 
the General Attorney for Agrarian Affairs (Procuraduría Agraria). In 1995 a political debate 
about the abolition of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform started. For the time being it 
continues to exist. 
The requirements for the establishment of an ejido were changed several times. The 
agrarian law of 1929 stipulated that only villages with at least 20 residents eligible to receive 
land, would be considered for the establishment of ejidos. (This concerns the Law of 
Restitution and Endowment of Lands and Water of 1929. I take this law as an example as 
this was a time in which many petitions for endowment of ejido land were filed.) On the 
other hand, state capitals and villages of more than 10,000 inhabitants did not have rights to 
form their own ejido (unless they had less than 200 people eligible for an ejido plot). 
Individuals were qualified to receive an ejido plot if they were Mexican, male, and at least 
16 years old. If they were married, there was no age limit. Women could only receive land 
if they were widows or family heads. Furthermore, the individuals applying for ejido lands 
should have lived in the village for at least six months prior to the request for endowment 
and make a living from agriculture. The agrarian law also established the minimum size of 
ejido plots. In the 1929 law the minimum size of the ejido parcel varied between three 
hectares of irrigated land and ten hectares of rainfed arable land of low quality. The ejido 
lands granted to the community had to be divided into equal plots by an engineer of the 
Agrarian Department. Afterward these plots were assigned to the different ejidatarios in a 
lottery. If the number of plots was insufficient for the number of people recognized to have 
agrarian rights, preference had to be given in the following order: 1) married with children; 
2) married without children; 3) single men older than 21 years; 4) single men between 16 
and 21 years old. However, it often happened within the ejido that the land was divided 
between many more people than were officially recognized as ejidatarios. In this way the 
individual plots were much smaller than the law had prescribed. 
The 1929 law also specified which landholdings could be expropriated. The property 
could be any public or private landholding within a seven kilometer radius of the center of 
the petitioning community which measured more than 300 hectares of rainfed land of regular 
quality, 180 hectares of rainfed land of good quality, or 150 hectares of irrigated lands. 
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Expansion grants were endowed in cases where an ejido did not have sufficient land to 
sustain the total number of eligible ejidatarios. In many cases ejidos were established by an 
endowment grant and at a later stage received one or two expansion grants. According to the 
1929 law the ejido had to wait until ten years after the endowment grant was awarded, before 
they could start the request for an expansion grant. Some years later this requirement was 
canceled and no time was required anymore between endowment and the request for 
expansion. Many ejidos wrote the petition for expansion immediately after the endowment 
had taken place. 
In the first period of land reform, the land for the constitution of ejidos and agrarian 
communities was mainly taken from the haciendas. Often several parts of the same hacienda 
were expropriated in order to satisfy the endowment and expansion needs of different 
petitioning villages. At a later stage, when population pressure became higher and it became 
difficult to find private land for expropriation, more and more unexploited national terrains 
were used for the establishment of new ejidos. Alongside the formation of ejidos and agrarian 
communities, small private properties were established. These properties were to a high 
degree the result of the division of the haciendas. First of all many hacendados themselves 
decided to divide their landholdings into smaller units that were put up for sale in order to 
avoid expropriation for agrarian reform. Secondly, large haciendas were often divided into 
smaller properties and registered under different names, while in practice they remained one 
unit of exploitation. 
One of the most severe problems of the agrarian reform was the question of 
mdemnization of the owners for the expropriation of their lands. In the beginning of the land 
reform the agrarian law stipulated that the expropriations would take place by mdemnization 
but without specifying the amount nor the installments of the payments. During the first 
period, the mdemnization was one of the factors that slowed the process of redistribution of 
the lands. Later on the law was made more specific on these points, but in reality 
hacendados were hardly ever indemnized. Successive governments proceeded with the 
agrarian distribution without bothering much about the question of payment of the lands. The 
landholders in their turn refused to accept money as this would have meant that they 
recognized the legitimacy of the expropriations, something they refused to accept (Reyes et 
al. 1974: 33-34). The ejidatarios who received the land, never have had to pay for it. The 
endowments and expansions, as well as the restitution of common lands have always been 
free. 
The small private property owners who did not own more land than legally permitted, 
could receive certificates that their properties could not be expropriated (certificados de 
inafectabilidad). The procedures to get this document were complex and lengthy. But they 
protected the landowner from expropriations. In 1978 only 15 per cent of all private property 
owners had a certificate that their property could not be expropriated. This was not only 
because of the lengthy and complicated procedures, but also due to the fact that many of the 
owners did not have property titles to the land, lacked maps of their land, or had other kinds 
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of legal problems. These owners did not want to spend large amounts of money on the 
regularization of their land (Zaragoza and Macias 1980: 485-486). 
The Mexican land reform has often been criticized for its long and complicated 
procedures, which offered the hacenaados ample opportunities to defend themselves and 
delay handing over of the land. Naturally, landowners tried to avoid expropriations by all 
possible means. An element, which illustrates the great implication that adrninistrative 
procedures may have for the outcome of agrarian processes, is the fact that the landless 
people themselves were obliged to take an active role in the request for land. An alternative 
process which might have produced an effective distribution of land in the shortest possible 
time - declaring the subjects to be benefited, the lands to be affected for distribution, and the 
distribution of the lands to the villages, whether they requested it or not- was never 
proposed. The other way has produced a very slow process of distribution (Zaragoza and 
Macias 1980: 18). Apart from the slowness of the process, some individuals or entire villages 
refused to request land for fear of the repercussions from the hacendados. Related to this, 
the individual requirements of the Mexican agrarian reform process have also caused many 
problems. In the 1920s and 1930s in many parts of the country, population centers did not 
meet the minimum legal number of individuals with rights to endowment, either because it 
were very small hamlets or because the people feared the threats by hacendados or priests. 
Under these circumstances, the first agrarian census frequently included individuals who did 
not meet the legally established conditions. For example, young people were included who 
were not yet 16 years old, the minimum legal age (Reyes et al. 1974: 436). 
Yet, as time went on, fear of the hacenaados waned and the rural population grew. As 
a consequence more and more landless people requested land and often there was no land 
available anymore for expropriation in the surroundings of the village. Even if there was land 
available, there was generally not nearly enough for the number of people in need of land. 
In this way, a growing number of people in the rural areas became "ejidatarios with reserve 
rights" (ejidatarios con derechos a salvo).1 These were peasants who were recognized as 
having individual agrarian rights and who formed part of an ejido village but for whom there 
was no land available either in the endowment or the expansion grant. The idea was that their 
rights to the land were acknowledged and that they would receive land plots as soon as more 
land became available. In reality most of them never received land. To give an idea about 
the size of this group of people: between 1915 and 1978, there were 834,410 ejidatarios 
officially registered at the Ministry of agrarian reform with "reserve rights" waiting for a 
plot in the future (Zaragoza and Macias 1980: 477). To address the problem of land scarcity 
in ejidos, the law offered the possibility of creating a new population center in another zone. 
Thus, people in the ejido who had not received land could proceed with a petition for land 
in another region. However, it was often difficult for people to leave their place of origin and 
abandon their family. Furthermore, land became scarce everywhere and the land that could 
be expropriated or was offered in other regions was often of bad quality. Of course, there 
were and still are extensive landholdings in Mexico on very good lands, but these are or have 
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been "untouchable" because of their owners' political connections. 
During the procedures for restitution, endowment, expansion, or the creation of new 
population centers, various steps had to be followed which involved the different agencies 
of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and also the State Governors and the Mexican President. 
At several points in the process requests for land and official decisions with respect to the 
requests (in the form of presidential resolutions) had to be published in the Diario Oficial de 
la Federación (Federal Gazette). Several maps also had to be made during the procedure for 
land endowment. First general maps in order to indicate the different large landholdings that 
were suitable for expropriation and to show the village that requested the land. At a later 
stage provisional maps were made on which the lands that would form the ejido were 
indicated. This map was used during the execution of the final resolution. After the land had 
finally been handed over a definitive map of the ejido had to be made, which legally 
recognized the ejido borders. Another important document for the legal recognition of the 
ejido lands was the acta de posesión y deslinde. In this document, the engineers described 
the exact route they had followed during the handing over of the land. 
One of the aspects that created most problems during the implementation of the land 
reform was the land survey and the mapping. The different maps that had to be elaborated 
at various stages of the process of expropriation and establishment of the ejidos were often 
not made or later appeared to be "wrong". For example, in many ejidos the final definitive 
map of their land which would clarify the legal situation of the ejido in relation to their 
neighbors, was never made. In 1976, out of a total of 23,561 ejidos, there were 5,000 
without a definitive map (Zaragoza and Maclas 1980: 461 and 485). Related to this 
phenomenon is the fact that many ejidos have an "overlap" as the same land of an hacienda 
was given to several ejidos. Apart from political reasons these phenomena often also had 
technical or practical causes, such as a lack of resources to send engineers out to do the 
measuring work or a shortage of educated engineers, who could do this job. Furthermore, 
the elaboration of a map of individual ejido plots, the final stage of the complicated process 
of endowment, was seldom carried out. In the great majority of ejidos, after having received 
the land, it was internally divided among the ejidatarios, without a map or formal registration 
of the different individual plots ever being made. 
The agrarian procedures in Mexico have also been criticized for the fact that the agency 
responsible for conflict settlement in agrarian matters fell under the Ministry of Agrarian 
Reform itself. There was no independent agency of conflict settlement. In the case of 
conflicts with the MAR, it was possible to take out an amparo against the MAR. The amparo 
is a constitutional guarantee for the protection of civil rights (the Mexican Habens Corpus). 
This is a provision of the Mexican Constitution which allows people to ask for the protection 
of the juridical system against the actions of a government authority. However, this often 
implied that the cases arrived at the office of judges who did not have any understanding of 
agrarian matters. Furthermore, this option was often only used to drag administrative 
procedures out for a long time in order to try to settle and negotiate the situation in the 
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meantime. In the 1920s the amparo was extensively used by hacendados in order to slow the 
agrarian reform and avoid expropriaton (Reyes et al. 191 A: 14). At a later stage, ejidatarios 
also started making use of this right when they thought they were victims of an injustice. To 
give an idea of the size of this phenomenon: between 1971 and 1976 more than 9,000 
proceedings against different actions by the MAR were lodged at the Supreme Court and 
other related courts (Zaragoza and Macias 1980: 459). 
Because of the many irregularities during the implementation of land reform, numerous 
problems and conflicts over land have since arisen. They have caused great uncertainty and 
problems in many ejidos in Mexico. These are often internal problems, but conflicts with 
neighboring ejidos or private landholders also abound. For that reason, many ejidatarios and 
ejidos have been struggling for many years to clarify their legal situation or have been 
claiming land that according to them belongs to the ejido but is in hands of other people. On 
the other hand, other ejidatarios, ejidos, or private landholders have done everything possible 
to maintain the status quo and not to clarify the legal situation. They have, instead, tried to 
stop the procedures and falsify documents in order to "legalize" their "illegal" situation. This 
has resulted in an enormous number of unresolved land disputes at the MAR, the famous 
rezago agrario (agrarian arrears or pending cases), which consists in thousands of unresolved 
land conflicts. 
Notes 
1. The establishment or abolition of a collectively administered ejido had to be agreed upon by 75 per cent 
of all the ejidatarios. Furthermore, it had to be supported by a technical study of the MAR and approved 
by the Mexican President (article 130 of the Agrarian Law). 
2. "Between 1940 and 1960 the number of Mexicans increased from 20 million to more than 35 million. Most 
of the newborn were in the countryside" (Hart 1986: 14). (Hart, I. (1986) Agrarian Reform. In: W. Raat 
and W. Beezley (eds) Twentieth-Century Mexico. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, pp. 
6-16) 
Appendix 2 
Central Actors and Political Divisions in La Canoa 
Filomeno Romero: 
The great grandfather of all Romeros in La Canoa and many other villagers. It is said that 
he arrived in La Canoa from another region. He was a rich landless cattle owner who 
established good relations with the hacendado of La Canoa. Filomeno supported the villagers 
in their struggle for the establishment of their ejido. 
Miguel Romero: 
One of the eight sons of don Filomeno and one of the founders of the ejido. He turned into 
a local boss after the establishment of the ejido and was ejido commissioner several times. 
He is held responsible for the problems with the "lost land" and the confiscation of file plots 
of several migrant ejidatarios. Miguel and some of his brothers are especially criticized for 
their control over ejido affairs and the way they used their position to get more land for 
themselves. 
Hector Romero: 
A cousin of Miguel Romero, who possesses a part of the "lost land". Hector lives in Autlan 
and belonged to influential political networks. He was head of the security police in Autlan. 
He was used by several people in La Canoa as an intermediary in cases of conflicts or when 
political influence was necessary. Among other things, he helped the ejido to stop Ricardo 
Garcia when he embezzled the ejido money which was intended for the building of the local 
school. Hect6r also made sure that the municipality in Autlan appointed as delegados in La 
Canao the men that the PRI - Romero network in La Canoa had decided upon. 
Lorenzo Romero: 
One of don Miguel's twenty children. Lorenzo was the fifth son of Miguel's first marriage. 
He was a police officer in Autlan and delegado in La Canoa. He has never been 
commissioner of the ejido, but has held several other ejido posts. During a long period he 
belonged to the PRI group in the village who decided who would become delegado of the 
village. 
Pedro Garcia: 
One of the men who is seen as founder of the ejido La Canoa. The Garcias became well-to-
do through the years. Pedro and his sons are above all criticized for their haughty cacique 
attitude towards other villagers and their exploitation of people working for them. 
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Ricardo Garcia: 
The youngest son of Pedro Garcia who became one of the richest ejidatarios. He also bought 
private property land and possesses a part of the "lost land". He is disliked by many people 
in the village because of his haughty attitude and the way he enriched himself at the expense 
of others. He caused a scandal in the village in the 1970s when he was ejido commissioner 
and embezzled ejido money which was collected for the building of a local school. In the 
village he and his family are rather isolated. He only gets along with some close relatives and 
people in Autlân. At the end of the 1980s he went bankrupt with the tomato cultivation. 
Since then he is in serious financial trouble and under the constant threat of having his 
properties seized. 
Manuel Pradera: 
A much respected ejidatario in La Canoa who was frequently asked by different people to 
accept a post in the ejido, but who always refused to take any formal responsibility. 
Although it is impossible to speak of clear factions in the village there are some broad 
division lines. At the risk of simplification I have used the labels the "establishment" and the 
"opposition" in chapters that deal with local politics. 
The "establishment": 
The ejidatarios who are most identified with the PRI networks and have had most control 
over the choice of delegados in the village during the time of the research: Lorenzo Romero, 
José Romero, Gustavo Romero. 
The "opposition": 
These men were often called the opposers, troublemakers, contraries or leftists by the 
"establishment". They were the only ejidatarios who during the time of my research used a 
discourse of cacicazgo and exploitation when talking about the bosses of the past. They were 
the ones who had been most active in the struggle for the "lost land" in former years. They 
had been members of different opposition parties. In the 1970s, several of them were 
member of the Communist Party: Roberto Sanchez, Iginio Nunez, Ramon Romero, Salvador 
Lagos. 
Appendix 3 
The Romero and Garcia Families 
Italics = female 
Bold = person who plays a role in the ethnography 
The Romeros 
I. Filomeno Romero x Emilia Topete 
Jesús 
Javier 
José 
Federico 
a. Andrés 
b.MigueI(ch2,5) 
Luisa 
Cecilia 
Luz María 
Pedro 
c. Julián 
La Andrés Romero x María Morena 
Esteban 
Sergio 
Inocencio 
Mario 
a. Ramón (ch 5,7,8) 
Víctor 
Diego 
Rosaría 
Faustino 
Francisco 
Joaquín 
Tomás 
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I.b. Miguel Romero x Engracia Jiménez 
Rosa 
Francisco 
Federica 
Miguel 
a. Lorenzo (ch 2,4) 
Soledad 
Estanislao 
b. José (ch 2,6) 
Emilio 
Ignacio 
Filomeno 
x Guadalupe Medina 
Teresa (ch 6,7) 
Ramón 
e. Juan 
Federico 
Lorena 
Victor 
José Luis 
Mario 
I.e. Julián Romero x Margarita Rivera 
Gustavo (ch 3 ,5 , 6) 
Pablo 
Virginia 
Samuel 
Rosa 
Josefina 
Macedonio 
Angela 
Francisco 
x María Jiménez 
Isabel 
Lb.a. Lorenzo Romero x María Lomelí (ch 4) 
Dolores (USA) 
Rubén (La Canoa) 
Javier (USA and La Canoa) 
Carmen (USA) 
Teresa (USA) 
Mariana (USA) 
Josefina (Tijuana) 
Adriana (Tijuana) 
Luz (USA) 
Carlos (USA and La Canoa) 
Vicente (USA) 
Yolanda (USA and La Canoa) 
I.b.b. José Romero x Soledad Lomelí 
Emilia 
Luisa 
Ismael 
Elvira 
Sergio 
Miriam (ch2) 
Inés 
Dolores Romero x Luis Ramos (USA) 8 children 
Rubén Romero x Rosa Duran (La Canoa) 5 children 
Javier Romero x Elena Figueroa (USA and La Canoa) 2 children 
Carlos Romero x Magdalena Juarez (USA and La Canoa) 1 child 
The Garcías 
I. José García x Delfina Vargas 
Raúl 
a. Juan 
La. Juan García x Hermelinda Lomelí 
José 
a. Rubén 
Aurora 
Esperanza 
Juan 
Elena 
Tomás 
Margarita 
b. Ricardo (ch 2,3,6) 
I.a.a Rubén García x Antonia Núñez 
Carlos 
Everardo 
Eloísa 
Josefina 
Vicente (ch 6,7) 
Antonia 
Gabriel 
José 
I.a.b. Ricardo García x Ignacio Topete 
Eva 
Ricardo 
María 
Juan (ch2) 
Ignacio 
Osear 
Miguel 
Sonia 
Patricia 
Elizabeth 
Laura 
Appendix 4 
Ejido Commissioners of La Canoa and the Planillas of the 1991 Elections 
Executive committee 1988 - 1991 
commissioner: 
secretary: 
treasurer: 
Executive Committee 
Gustavo Romero 
Mauro Bautista 
José Romero 
Substitutes 
Lorenzo Romero 
Gabriel Garcia 
Cristina Hernández 
commissioner: 
secretary: 
treasurer: 
Vigilance Committee 
Juan Alcázar 
Rafael Cosío 
Francisco Romero 
Substitutes 
Pablo Romero 
Francisco Pradera 
Ernesto Garcia 
credit: 
commercialization: 
social action: 
Salvador Lagos 
Ricardo García Jr. 
Esperanza Aviles 
Planillas at the elections for executive committee in 1991 
planilla 1 
commissioner: 
secretary: 
treasurer: 
Executive Committee 
Raúl Pradera 
Vicente García 
Guadalupe Medina 
Substitutes 
Iginio Nunez 
David Obregón 
Samuel Romero 
commissioner: 
secretary: 
treasurer: 
Vigilance Committee 
Roberto Sánchez 
Rolando Lomelí 
Francisco Pradera 
first planilla 2 
commissioner: 
secretary: 
treasurer: 
Executive Committee 
Juan Alcázar 
Ricardo García Jr. 
José Romero 
Substitutes 
others: Esteban Romero, Ignacio Romero, Francisco Pradera, Guadalupe Medina, Salvador Lagos 
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final planilla 2 
commissioner: 
secretary: 
treasurer: 
Executive Committee 
Juan Alcázar 
Ricardo García Jr. 
José Romero 
Substitutes 
Francisco Romero 
Esteban Romero 
Dorotea Romero 
commissioner: 
secretary: 
treasurer: 
Vigilance Committee 
Miguel Romero 
Abelardo Romero 
Virgilio Ramos 
There was no registration in the ejido of the different executive committees since the 
establishment of the ejido. Through ejido documents which were signed by the executive 
committee and through information provided by the ejidatarios, I could establish the 
following list of ejido commissioners. 
Efido commissioners of La Canoa 
1994- 1997 Ramón Romero 1964- 1967 Gustavo Romero 
1991 - 1994 Raúl Pradera 1961 - 1964 Gustavo Romero 
1988 - 1991 Gustavo Romero 1958- 1961 Daniel Fábregasf 
1985 - 1988 Ignacio Romero 1955 - 1958 Pablo Romerof 
1982 - 1985 Francisco Romero 1952- 1955 Daniel Fábregasf 
1979- 1982 Sergio Romerof 1949- 1952 Miguel Romerof 
replaced by Ramón Romero 1946- 1949 Epitacio Ramírezf 
1976- 1979 Macario Paz 1943 - 1956 Miguel Romerof 
1973 - 1976 Rubén García 1940- 1943 Epitacio Ramírezf 
1970- 1973 Ricardo García 
1967- 1970 Marcos Vargas 
Although it is tempting to draw conclusions on the basis of the fact that so many Romero 
men have been commissioner, this fact alone does not give much insight into local politics. 
The point is that the Romeros are in the majority in the village and among the Romeros there 
are ejidatarios of the "establishment" and ejidatarios of the "opposition" and ejidatarios who 
do not clearly belong to one or the other. Gustavo Romero has been three times 
commissioner, but unlike his uncle Miguel he is not criticized for dirty ejido politics. Despite 
his good contacts with regional influential men and despite him being one of the wealthiest 
men in the village, Gustavo never aspired to become a local boss and an intermediary in 
relation to the bureaucracy. 
Appendix 5 
Main Actors in the Struggle for the "Lost Land" in 1991-1995 
Initiators of the struggle under the presidency of Salinas and organizers of the planilla 
for the elections of the executive committee of the ejido of 1991 
main figures: 
Iginio Nunez, Salvador Lagos 
supported by: 
Ignacio Romero, Alberto Alcázar, Ignacio Alcázar and others 
winning executive committee: 
Raúl Pradera (commissioner), Vicente Garcia (secretary), Lupe Medina (treasurer) 
Reconfiguration of networks after some time of struggle for the "lost land" 
main figure: Lupe Medina maintains contacts with Father López and lawyer Salazar 
mainly supported by: Ramón Romero and Teresa 
People who are excluded: 
Iginio Nunez: because of his difficult attitude 
Salvador Lagos: decides to quit under pressure from his family 
Raúl Pradera (commissioner): does not believe in the recovery of the land anymore 
Vicente Garcia (secretary): remains loyal to his uncle Ricardo who possesses part of the "lost 
land" 
Brokers 
Father López: introduces the ejidatarios to the lawyer Salazar 
Licenciado Salazar: lawyer affiliated to the CNC Guadalajara 
Pablo: engineer of the Central Campesina Independiente (CCI) 
Antonio Macias: gate keeper at a MAR office in Mexico City, assistant of the head of the 
Liga de Comunidades Agrarias 
MAR Guadalajara and the engineers 
Pelayo: head of the MAR office in Guadalajara 
Ramirez: head of the engineers at the MAR office in Guadalajara 
Serrano: the first engineer who visits La Canoa, dies of cirrhosis 
Castañeda: the second engineer to visit La Canoa; works ostentsively on the side of the 
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pequeños propietarios, walks around with one of the daughters of the pequeños propietarios 
Morales: the third engineer to visit La Canoa, measures one of the fields of the "lost land" 
Important person in the past 
Macario Paz: ejido commissioner who was very active in the struggle for the "lost land" in 
the 1970s. During his term as commissioner the ejido worked with the Communist Party. 
Force 
Field 
Around 
Ch. Resources 
at Stake 
Central 
Actors 
Influence of 
Law and the 
Bureaucracy 
Organizing Practices Reflective talk 
Ideological 
Notions 
Consequences 
Inheritance 
ofejido 
plots; 
choice of 
heir 
4,5 • individual 
ejido plots 
• family 
members, 
close kin 
• little influence • parents: continuously putting out 
feelers to their children; their 
behavior (responsible, irresponsible, 
caring or not); their plans for the 
future; their capacities of being a 
worthy ejidatario 
• children: care creates rights and 
expectations 
• relations extend towards the USA 
• continuous speculation about 
inheritance, frequent change of heir 
• gender and 
generational 
ideologies, 
• ideology of the 
family 
• land as family 
patrimony 
• many problems, 
frictions and emotions 
within families 
surrounding 
inheritance decisions 
Recovery of 
the "Lost 
Land" 
7,8 • large areas of 
irrigated land 
• ejidatarios 
• pequeiios 
propietarios 
• officials 
• brokers 
• central role by 
offering endless 
openings and 
hopes 
• forming small changing constellations 
of people 
• working with many brokers at the 
same time 
» continuous "flows" of people and 
documents in different directions and 
between different cities 
• continuous 
speculation about, 
power, politics, 
corruption, and the 
Mexican President 
• ejidatarios fight a 
"lost battle" and are 
powerless 
Village 
projects 
3 • government 
resources 
• ejidatarios 
with good 
political 
connections 
• political elite 
in Autl&i 
• important as 
resources are 
channeled 
through 
bureaucratic 
channels 
• formation of individual political 
networks of a few of ejidatarios 
• cultivation of relations with 
influential people in Autlan 
• organization of village projects by a 
small group of ejidatarios 
• "ideology of the 
land" reflects 
frustration of 
landless villagers 
• much gossiping and 
complaining about 
village projects 
o dominance of village j 
projects by well-
connected ejidatarios 
o no "hegemonic" 
control; with loss of 
influential relations, 
people lose influence 
Renting out 
ofejido plots 
by migrants 
5 • individual 
ejido plots 
• migrant 
ejidatarios 
• other ejidata-
rios/villagers 
• ejido 
commissioner 
• MAR officials 
• strong influence 
of the law as a 
"distant threat" 
• law has never 
been applied 
• renting out of plots to people who can 
be "trusted" 
• much "legal game playing"; returning 
for the IUP meetings, paying the ejido 
land tax as proof of residence in the 
ejido; paying officials and 
commissioners 
• notions of trust in 
personal deals 
• ideology of 
individual 
responsibility 
• much illegal renting 
out of land by 
migrants 
• serious problems and 
tensions around 
renting arrangements 
Force 
Field 
Around 
Ch. Resources 
at Stake 
Central 
Actors 
Influence of 
Law and the 
Bureaucracy 
Organizing Practices Reflective talk 
Ideological 
Notions 
Consequences 
Sale ofejido 
plots 
5 • individual 
ejido plots 
• ejidatarios and 
relatives 
• other villagers 
• ejido 
commissioner 
• MAR officials 
• played a small 
role as a 
"distant threat" 
• law has never 
been applied 
• little control by 
the MAR 
• individual transactions based on trust 
and honor and on support by ejido 
commissioner and the ejido assembly 
• "legal game playing"; legalizing 
illegal transactions with the support of 
MAR officials 
• land as family 
patrimony 
• individual 
responsibility, 
• honor and trust 
• an active illegal ejido 
land market 
• much autonomy for 
the ejidatarios; buyers 
and sellers 
Management 
of the ejido 
6, 7, 
8,9 
• variable 
resources: 
• disputed urban 
plots; coamiles 
and esquilmo, 
etc. 
• ejido credit; 
ejido pasture 
• ejido 
commissioner 
• ejidatarios 
• regional 
political 
figures 
• only in the case 
of serious 
conflicts the 
formal legal 
procedures 
become 
important 
• commissioner operating with a high 
degree of autonomy 
• few meetings are held and no 
decisions are taken during meetings 
• meetings fulfill symbolic roles of 
inclusion and exclusion 
• matters are settled through personal 
political networks 
• indirect practices of accountability 
and control 
• continuous 
discussion about 
organization: the 
"accountability 
discourse" of 
organization versus 
the "personal 
politics" discourse 
of organization 
• no central ejido 
management 
• all forms of ejido 
property (land for 
houses, commons, 
arable land) have 
turned into a form of 
private property 
• resolution of conflicts 
at high social costs 
Access to 
common 
lands 
3,6 • common 
lands; 
coamil and 
esquilmo 
• ejidatarios 
• landless sons 
of ejidatarios 
• landless 
villagers who 
are not sons of 
ejidatarios 
• ejido 
commissioner 
• hardly any 
influence so far 
• individually asking permission of the 
commissioner 
• taking "free" land without asking 
permission 
• discussions on 
differing rights 
between 
ejidatarios, sons of 
ejidatarios, and 
landless villagers 
• use of discourse of 
"formal rights" 
versus discourse on 
"moral rights" and 
"social principles" 
of the Mexican 
revolution 
• common lands have 
turned into private 
property for 
ejidatarios as well as 
landless villagers 
• common lands have 
turned into a 
commodity which is 
used for speculation, 
passed on to children 
or sold 
• tensions are growing 
between ejidatarios 
and landless villagers 
Glossary 
banda popular music band 
birria traditional dish prepared with pork or goat meat 
casa ejidal ejido house; the building where the ejidatarios hold their meetings 
cerro mountainous terrain 
coamil term used for an intensive form of maize cultivation in the hills, as 
well as for the plot were this maize is sown 
coamilero peasants who borrow coamiles from the ejido 
comuneros members of a an agrarian community (comunidad) 
comunidad a form of collective land tenure which differs from the ejido and which 
was above all established by indigenous communities; the ejidatarios 
and villagers of La Canoa use the term comunidad to refer to the ejido 
corral yard near the house used for animals and cultivation of crops 
corrida bullfight 
cuadrilla work group organized for the cutting of the sugarcane 
esquilmos fields of the commons which are used for the herding of cattle 
lote a plot of land for the construction of a house 
licenciado title used for a university degree, but which is often used to refer to 
lawyers 
machete long knife used for cutting down weeds in the fields 
mariachi popular music characteristic of the state of Jalisco 
mezcal a distilled liquor made from the heart of agave plants 
monte hills with woodland 
pihata a pot of stone (often filled with sweets) which is broken with sticks 
plaza central square in town 
pozole special Mexican dish consisting of soup of cooked maize with pork 
rodeo a common form of diversion in rural villages in which young men try 
to stay as long as possible on the back of a bull 
taco a tortilla with some food in it 
tamales a traditional Mexican dish consisting of maize dough cooked within 
maize leaves often containing meat or sugar and fruits 
tortillas staple made from maize dough, similar to pancakes 
tortillerta shop where tortillas are made and sold 
Acronyms 
Aseguradora Nacional, Agrícola y Ganadera, S.A. (National 
Agricultural and Livestock Insurance Company which provided 
insurance subsidies for ejidatarios working with credits from 
BANRURAL) 
Banco Nacional de Crédito Rural (National Bank for Rural Credit) 
Central Campesina Independiente (Independent Peasant Confederation) 
Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos 
(Independent Farmworkers and Peasants' Confederation) 
Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Peasant Confederation, 
affiliated to PRI) 
Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (National Subsidized 
Staple Products Company) 
Fideicomisos Instituidos en Relación a la Agricultura (Second-
levelgovernment funding for agriculture) 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (National 
Institute for Statistics, Geography, and Informatics) 
Procuraduría Agraria (Attorney General's Office for Agrarian Affairs) 
Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party) 
Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democartic 
Revolution) 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party). 
Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo (Direct Agricultural Support 
Payments Programs) 
Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidales y Solares Urbanos 
(Ejidal Rights Certification Program) 
Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (National Solidarity Program) 
Registro Agrario Nacional (National Agrarian Registry) 
Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos (The former Ministry 
of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources) 
Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (National Solidarity Program) 
Secretaría de la Reforma Agraria/ Ministry of Agrarian Reform 
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Summary 
In the Name of the Land: Organization, Transnationalism 
and the Culture of the State in a Mexican Ejido 
This study is based on research carried out during several periods from mid 1991 to mid 
1995 in the ejido La Canoa in Jalisco, western Mexico, and in several government agencies. 
The study focuses in particular on the period between the 1930s and 1992 when the Mexican 
agrarian law was fundamentally changed. The last chapters of the book discuss the change 
of the agrarian law in 1992. 
The study shows how over the years organizing practices developed with respect to the 
access to ejido plots and the management of the ejido which differed from the prescriptions 
of the law. For example, the division of the arable plots, the selling of these plots, renting 
them out, or leaving them unused were all illegal practices which became common in ejidos 
throughout Mexico. It also became a common phenomenon that instead of the ejido 
assembly, in which all ejidatarios are represented, the head of the ejido, the commissioner, 
took decisions on his own. Likewise, the rules were also seldom applied in the resolution of 
land conflicts by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR). Land conflicts between ejidatarios 
and private land owners abound and many have never been resolved. In this study the 
conflict of the "lost land" is discussed. This concerns a conflict over land that officially 
belongs to the ejido La Canoa but which since the thirties has been in the hands of several 
private landholders 
In this book it its argued that the labeling of the above mentioned practices in a 
functionalist way as "disorganized" or "corrupt" forms part of modernist discourses of 
development and does not bring us any nearer to an understanding of these dynamics, nor 
to an insight into the precise role played by the official rules and formal institutions. It is 
argued that these practices are the result of active organizing by ejidatarios, as well as 
officials and other social actors. Furthermore, it is shown that in the myriad of activities 
which are labeled as "illegal", "disorganized", and "corrupt" we can also distinguish certain 
organizing patterns. For example, in chapter five it was shown that in the many "illegal" 
arrangements with ejido plots we can distinguish a certain pattern in the way these were 
organized and that in these arrangements other ejidatarios, officials of the MAR, the ejido 
commissioner, and the ejido assembly play specific roles. In chapter six a different form of 
patterning of organizing practices has been discussed. There it was shown, among other 
things, that the executive committee of the ejido never renders accounts of their activities at 
public ejido meetings, but that alternative forms of accountability exist and other effective 
mechanisms by which the ejidatarios control their executive committee. Namely, through 
informal channels, gossips, and regional political networks. In this context the ejido meetings 
have turned into arenas for bickering and confrontation and have developed symbolic roles 
396 
in distinguishing between "insiders" and "outsiders". At the same time the official ejido 
structure becomes important in the case of serious conflicts. Then the "formal game is 
played" together with the use of informal political pressures. 
It is argued that this structuring of organizing practices in unexpected and often 
"invisible" ways always occurs around the management of resources, and in relation to 
institutional settings. This book sets out the way that all forms of organizing take place in 
wider force fields. A force field is defined as a field of power and struggle between different 
social actors around certain resources or problems and around which certain forms of 
dominance, contention, and resistance may develop, as well as certain regularities and forms 
of ordering. The assumption is that all forms of organizing, even the most "private" or 
"illegal" ones, develop within fields of power. In this view, the patterning of organizing 
processes which we may find are not the result of a common understanding or normative 
agreement, but of the forces at play within the field. It has been shown that the development 
of forms of ordering in organizing practices is closely related to forms of exclusion of certain 
social categories. Different groups can be distinguished with differing roles, different access 
to resources, and differing rights. The concept of force field also helps us to analyze the 
precise role of the law and official procedures. 
The assumptions is that multiple force fields exist which develop their own dynamic and 
have different specific implications for the people involved. This means that in relation to 
certain resources and problems ejidatarios may develop a high degree of autonomy, while 
around others they have little "room for manoeuvre". The organizing practices around the 
arable plots in the ejido led to much autonomy for the ejidatarios, though the law, the 
bureaucratic procedures and the officials were always present as a "distant threat". On the 
other hand, the bureaucracy has been much less present in relation to organizing in the 
common lands. Around the commons ejidatarios and landless villagers have great autonomy 
to act without interference from the state bureaucracy. While, around the arable land and the 
commons the ejidatarios have developed a high degree of autonomy, around the "lost land" 
they obviously operate in a force field in which they are relatively powerless. There we find 
ejidatarios in a hopeless fight against private landowners. Hence, we cannot talk in a 
generalized way about the structural position of ejidatarios vis-a-vis regional elites, or about 
the nature of their relation with the Mexican state. This differs according to the resources and 
problems at stake. 
In this approach, social theorizing, reflexive talk, and story-telling by social actors are 
considered to be a central part of the organizing process. These dialogues reflect a continuous 
active engagement of social actors with the world around them. Furthermore, the creation 
and re-creation of stories are considered to be a way of ordering the world around us and of 
arriving at the best strategies to be followed in the organizing process. Organizing practices 
are always related to the production of meaning and in this book it has been shown how the 
organizing practices around different resources in specific force fields are accompanied by 
reflective talk, ideological notions, irony, and the production of multiple meanings through 
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imagination and the work of interpretation. These dialogues reflect forms of struggle, 
contention, and resistance in relation to existing organizing practices and relations of power. 
As has been shown in this book, ejidatarios have a complicated and contradictory relation 
with the Mexican state. The state was their ally in the fight against the hacendados during 
the period of agrarian reform and it has also been the provider of all kinds of services 
(schools, water, electricity). However, in other instances the state is viewed as a corrupt and 
violent enemy which is greatly feared and distrusted by the people. Hence, we have an image 
of the Mexican state as the protector and oppressor of the ejidatarios at the same time. 
Images of the state conjoin notions of evil with goodness. For that reason, the ejidatarios may 
be supportive and enthusiastic towards the Mexican President at one moment, and cynical and 
distrustful about his speeches at another moment. Or they can laugh about themselves being 
deceived by the democratic and liberalizing discourse of a president who later on proved to 
be one of the worst swindlers the country ever saw. The ejidatarios can be proud of being 
part of the Mexican nation-state project but at the same time they can criticize powerholders 
for their corruption and for their squeezing of the peasants. 
I have argued that the continuous theorizing about power and politics in society not only 
concerns a rationalization of actions but also an investment in the "idea of the state", in other 
words, an investment in the belief of the existence of a center of control. This does not mean 
that practices of authority and control do not exist but that people tend to look for a 
coherence and logic which does not exist. These imaginations which are constitutive of the 
"culture of the state", are based upon experiences and are mediated by a series of 
governmental techniques and by the media, education, and movies. The "culture of the state" 
is central to the operation of the bureaucracy as a "hope-generating machine". The "hope-
generating machine" gives the message that everything is possible, that cases are never 
closed, and that things will be different from now on. This permeates all aspects of life and 
triggers powerful responses. However, rather than producing a certain rationality and 
coherence, the bureaucratic machine generates enjoyments, pleasures, fears and expectations. 
Although people are never naive, during certain periods they can become inspired and 
enthusiastic about new programs and new openings that are offered to them. Yet, doubts 
never totally disappear. 
It is also argued that in this context of a decentered "hope-generating machine" without 
a clear center and coherence, brokers do often not play a role in effectively connecting 
ejidatarios to "the state", but play a role in the imagination of state power. By suggesting 
that they are the "right connection" to higher levels and to the "center of control" brokers 
contribute to the "idea of the state". In the same way, by searching for the "right 
connection" which can help them to resolve their problems, ejidatarios invest in the "idea 
of the state". Ejidatarios and bureaucrats are implicated in the cultural representation of the 
state through processes of rationalization, speculation, the construction of fantasies, etc. but 
also through processes of fetishization, that is the attribution to certain objects such as maps 
and documents with special powers. In this complex of desire and fantasy, inscription is very 
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important. People develop a fetishism around certain official documents, even when they 
cannot "read" these documents according to official standards. The same can be said of 
bureaucrats who tend to reify the law, in spite of "knowing" that official procedures do not 
play a central role in the outcome of highly politicized land conflicts. In these processes, the 
"idea of the state" is objectivized and fixed in maps, documents, and other legal texts. 
Hence, see a "re-enchantment of governmental techniques" as they acquire symbolic 
meanings beyond their administrative functions. 
Resumen 
En el Nombre de la Tierra: Organización, Transnacionalismo 
y la Cultura del Estado en un Ejido Mexicano 
Este estudio se basa en una investigación realizada durante varios períodos - desde mediados 
de 1991 hasta mediados de 1995 - en el ejido La Canoa en Jalisco, Occidente de México, y 
en distintas agencias gubernamentales. El ejido en México es un régimen de propiedad 
corporativo que fue instaurado después de la revolución. 
El ejido La Canoa fue fundado en 1938 y está compuesto por terrenos de cuatro 
haciendas expropiadas. Los terrenos comprenden parcelas agrícolas, tierras de uso común que 
no fueron divididas en parcelas individuales y un conjunto de lotes urbanos. Casi todas las 
familias en La Canoa recibieron una parcela individual y recibieron derechos de usar las 
tierras comunales. En el transcurso del tiempo la población del pueblo ha crecido fuertemente 
y actualmente la mayoría de las familias en la Canoa no posee parcelas agrícolas. Sin 
embargo si se permite el uso de las tierras comunales y la construcción de casas en el 
segmento urbano del ejido. La migración a los Estados Unidos es muy importante para la 
economía local y muchos pobladores permanecen temporalmente o definitivamente en Los 
Angeles. 
El estudio muestra cómo prácticas de organización se han desarrollado durante los años 
con respecto al acceso a parcelas ejidales y la administración del ejido, prácticas que difieren 
notablemente de lo que la ley prescribe. Por ejemplo, la división de parcelas agrícolas, la 
compra y venta de parcelas y el arrendamiento son prácticas ilegales comunes en muchos 
ejidos en México. Otro fenómeno común es que el comisario ejidal tome todas las decisiones 
personalmente sin consultar la asamblea ejidal. Similarmente, las reglas son aplicadas 
raramente en la resolución de conflictos por la tierra por la Secretaría de Reforma Agraria. 
Conflictos entre ejidatarios y pequeños propietarios (propietarios privados que pueden poseer 
grandes extensiones de tierra) abundan y muchos nunca han sido resueltos. En este estudio 
se analiza uno de estos conflictos, el de "la tierra perdida". Se trata de un conflicto por tierra 
que oficialmente pertenece al ejido de La Canoa pero que nunca le ha sido entregado y que 
desde los años treinta está en manos de varios pequeños propietarios. 
El argumento central del libro es que el etiquetamiento de estas prácticas de una manera 
funcionalista como "desorganizadas", o "corruptas", forma parte de un discurso modernista 
de desarrollo que nos impide entender el conjunto de dinámicas organizativas. Tampoco nos 
ayuda a entender cual es el papel preciso de las reglas oficiales y de las instituciones 
formales. En el estudio se muestra que estas prácticas son el resultado del accionar de un 
conjunto de actores: ejidatarios y pobladores no-ejidatarios, funcionarios gubernamentales y 
las élites regionales. También se analizan patrones de organización que surgen en actividades 
muchas veces denominadas como "ilegales", "desorganizadas" y "corruptas". Por ejemplo, 
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en el capítulo cinco se analiza el papel que ejidatarios, funcionarios de la Secretaría de 
Reforma Agraria, el comisario ejidal y la asamblea ejidal juegan en arreglos ilegales con 
parcelas ejidales. En el capítulo seis se analizan otros patrones de organización y se muestra 
que, entre otras cosas, la mesa directiva del ejido nunca rinde cuentas de sus actividades en 
asambleas ejidales y que existen otros mecanismos a través de los cuales ejidatarios controlan 
la mesa directiva. Este control se hace efectivo a través de canales informales de 
comunicación, rumores, y redes políticas regionales. En este contexto las asambleas ejidales 
se han convertido en arenas de confrontación y de riñas y adquieren un papel simbólico en 
la distinción entre ejidatarios y no-ejidatarios. Sin embargo, en el caso de conflictos serios 
la estructura oficial del ejido si adquiere gran importancia. En estos casos se sigue el "juego 
formal", en combinación con presiones políticas de tipo informal. 
Este ordenamiento de prácticas organizativas en formas no anticipadas y muchas veces 
"invisibles", siempre ocurre alrededor de ciertos recursos y en determinados contextos 
institucionales. Además se asume que todas las formas de organización, incluso las mas 
informales o ilegales, se desarrollan dentro de campos mas amplios de poder que en el libro 
denominamos campos de fuerza. Se define un campo de fuerza como un campo de poder y 
de lucha entre diferentes actores sociales alrededor de ciertos recursos y problemas y 
alrededor de los cuales ciertas formas de dominación, controversias y resistencia surgen, 
además de ciertas regularidades y formas de ordenamiento. En el estudio se analiza cómo el 
ordenamiento de prácticas organizativas en el ejido está estrechamente relacionado a patrones 
de diferenciación entre ejidatarios y de exclusión de otras categorías sociales. El concepto 
de campos de fuerza también es útil en el análisis del rol preciso de la ley y de los 
proc^imientos oficiales. 
Lo anterior significa que en relación a ciertos recursos y problemas ejidatarios pueden 
desarrollar un alto grado de autonomía, mientras que alrededor de otros solamente tienen un 
pequeño margen de maniobra. Las prácticas organizativas alrededor de las parcelas agrícolas 
en el ejido permiten un alto grado de autonomía para los ejidatarios, a pesar de que la ley, 
los procedimientos burocráticos y los funcionarios siempre están presentes como una 
"amenaza distante". Por otro lado, la burocracia ha estado mucho menos presente en relación 
a formas organizativas en las tierras de uso común. Alrededor de estas tierras los ejidatarios 
y los pobladores sin tierra mantienen mucha autonomía sin que se permita la interferencia 
de la burocracia estatal. Mientras que alrededor de las parcelas agrícolas y las tierras de uso 
común los ejidatarios han desarrollado un alto grado de autonomía, alrededor de la "tierra 
perdida" ellos obviamente operan en campos de fuerza en los que tienen poco poder. En ello 
encontramos a ejidatarios envueltos en una lucha sin esperanzas contra los pequeños 
propietarios. Podemos concluir que no se pueden hacer generalizaciones sobre la posición 
estructural de los ejidatarios en relación con otras categorías de propietarios o sobre sus 
relaciones con el estado Mexicano. Mucho depende de los recursos y problemas en juego. 
Dentro de esta perspectiva formas de teorización social y de narración reflectiva por parte 
de actores sociales son considerados como una parte central en el proceso de organización. 
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Estos diálogos reflejan un compromiso continuo y activo de los actores sociales con el mundo 
a su alrededor. Además, la creación y re-creación de historias es considerada como una 
forma de ordenar la realidad y de desarrollar estrategias de organización. Prácticas 
organizativas siempre están relacionadas con la producción de significados y en este libro se 
ha mostrado como las prácticas organizativas alrededor de diferentes recursos en campos de 
fuerza específicos están acompañados de narración reflectiva, de nociones ideológicas, ironía 
y la producción de múltiples significados por medio de formas de imaginación y de 
interpretación. Estos diálogos reflejan formas de lucha, disputas y formas de resistencia en 
relación con formas existentes de organización y relaciones de poder. 
Ejidatarios tienen una complicada y contradictoria relación con el estado Mexicano. El 
estado fue un aliado en la lucha contra los hacendados durante el período de reforma agraria 
y también ha realizado una serie de servicios (escuelas, agua, electricidad). Pero en otras 
instancias el estado es visto como un enemigo corrupto y violento, muy temido por la gente. 
Existe una imagen del estado Mexicano como simultáneamente el protector y opresor de los 
ejidatarios. Imágenes del estado combinan nociones de generosidad y maldad. Por esa razón 
los ejidatarios a veces asumen una actitud positiva y entusiasta hacia el Presidente Mexicano 
y en otros momentos se comportan de una manera cínica y reciben sus discursos con mucho 
recelo. Los ejidatarios pueden estar orgullosos de ser parte del proyecto de construcción del 
estado-nación Mexicano, pero al mismo tiempo pueden criticar a los poderosos por su 
corrupción y por explotar a los campesinos. 
He argumentado que la continua teorización sobre poder y política en la sociedad no 
solamente significa una racionalización de acción social pero también una inversión en la 
"idea del estado", en otras palabras, una inversión en la creencia sobre la existencia de un 
centro de control. Esto no significa que prácticas de autoridad y control no existan pero que 
los actores sociales tienden a buscar una cierta coherencia y lógica donde no está. Estas 
imaginaciones son constitutivas de "la cultura del estado" y están basadas en experiencias que 
son mediatizadas por una serie de técnicas de gobernabilidad y por los medios, la educación, 
y el cine. La cultura del estado juega un papel central en la operación de la burocracia como 
una "máquina generadora de esperanzas". La "máquina generadora de esperanzas" lanza 
mensajes comunicando que todo es posible, que los casos nunca se cierran totalmente y que 
las cosas siempre pueden cambiar. Sin embargo, en vez de producir una cierta racionalidad 
y coherencia, la máquina burocrática genera goces, placeres, temores y expectativas. Si bien 
la gente nunca es ingenua, en ciertos momentos pueden llenarse de entusiasmo e inspiración 
sobre nuevos programas desarrollo y nuevas aperturas ofrecidas por la máquina burocrática. 
Al mismo tiempo, el recelo nunca desaparece. 
En el libro se sostiene que debido a la existencia de esta máquina generadora de 
esperanzas sin un centro ni coherencia, intermediarios muchas veces no juegan un papel 
efectivo en conectar a los ejidatarios con el estado, pero mas bien tienen un rol en la 
imaginación del poder del estado. A través de sus ofrecimientos de hacer conexión con 
personajes en los mas altos niveles, y con los "centros de control" los intermediarios 
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contribuyen a la construcción de la "idea del estado". De la misma manera, por medio de 
la búsqueda de la "conexión acertada" que puede ayudar a resolver todos los problemas, los 
ejidatarios invierten en la "idea del estado". 
Ejidatarios y burócratas están implicados en la construcción de la "cultura del estado" 
por medio de procesos de racionalización, especulación, la construcción de fantasías, etc., 
pero también por medio de la construcción social de fetiches, es decir la atribución de 
poderes especiales a objetos como mapas y documentos. En este complejo de deseo y 
fantasía, inscripción es muy importante. Algo similar vemos en el caso de burócratas que 
tienden a reificar la ley, a pesar de "saber" que en conflictos altamente politizados 
alrededor de la tierra procedimientos oficiales no juegan un papel central. En estos procesos, 
la "idea del estado" es objetivizada e inscrita en mapas, documentos, y otros textos legales, 
en lo que podemos llamar un re-encanto de técnicas gubernamentales. 
Samenvatting 
In de Naam van het Land: Organisatie, Transnationalisme en de 
Cultuur van de Staat in een Mexicaanse ejido 
Deze studie is gebaseerd op onderzoek dat is uitgevoerd in verschillende perioden tussen 
1991 en 1995. Het onderzoek vond plaats in de ejido La Canoa, in Jalisco, west Mexico, en 
in verschillende overheidsinstanties. Het onderzoek richt zich op de ontwikkelingen die zich 
hebben voorgedaan in de Mexicaanse ejido tussen de jaren dertig en 1992. In de jaren dertig 
zijn de meeste ejidos in Mexico opgericht, terwijl in 1992 een belangrijke wijziging heeft 
plaatsgevonden in de Mexicaanse agrarische wet, waardoor de ejido vorm van land eigendom 
nu sterk lijkt op privaat land eigendom. In de laatste hoofdstukken van het boek wordt 
aandacht geschonken aan de invoering van deze nieuwe agrarische wet in 1992. 
De ejido La Canoa werd opgericht in 1938 door onteigening van stukken land van vier 
verschillende haciendas. Dit land bestond uit akkerbouw land wat meteen verdeeld werd in 
individuele percelen, bergachtig terrein wat volgens de wet in communaal gebruik moest 
blijven en niet individueel werd verdeeld (de commons), en een gebied dat bestemd was voor 
het bouwen van huizen. Vrijwel alle huishoudens in La Canoa ontvingen een individueel 
perceel akkerbouw land bij de oprichting van de ejido en ze konden vrij gebruik maken van 
de commons. In de loop der jaren is de bevolking van het dorp echter sterk gegroeid en 
tegenwoordig bezitten de meeste huishoudens in het dorp geen perceel akkerbouw land. Het 
wordt de landloze families echter wel toegestaan gebruik te maken van de commons en huizen 
te bouwen in het bebouwde deel van de ejido. Migratie naar de Verenigde Staten is zeer 
belangrijk voor de lokale economie en veel dorpelingen verblijven tijdelijk of definitief in 
Los Angeles. 
In dit boek wordt geanalyseerd hoe zich in de loop der jaren organisatie praktijken 
hebben ontwikkeld in de ejido met betrekking tot de toegang tot ejido land en het bestuur van 
de ejido. Hierbij is gekeken naar het beheer van de verschillende typen land (het akkerbouw 
land, percelen voor het bouwen van huizen, het bergachtige communale land) maar ook naar 
de rol van de ejido in de organisatie van dorps projecten, en de uitvoering van 
overheidsprogramma's die via de ejido werden georganiseerd (bijvoorbeeld krediet 
programma's voor de boeren). 
De praktijken die zich hebben ontwikkeld in de ejidos verschilden sterk van wat de wet 
voorschreef. Het verkopen of het voor langere tijd verpachten van ejido percelen was 
bijvoorbeeld verboden bij de wet, maar werd algemeen gebruik in veel ejidos in Mexico. Het 
was ook gebruikelijk dat besluiten aangaande de ejido niet op vergaderingen werden genomen 
(zoals de wet voorschreef), maar door de ejido commissaris (de officiële vertegenwoordiger 
van de ejido) alleen. Een andere ontwikkeling die zich heeft voorgedaan is dat met het 
toenemen van de druk op het land, ook de commons in toenemende mate verdeeld werden 
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in individuele percelen. Deze percelen in de bergen worden gebruikt voor een intensieve 
vorm van maïs verbouw en voor het houden van vee. Ook hier zien we dat het land in de 
praktijk geprivatiseerd raakt en dat, ondanks het verbod in de wet, percelen verkocht worden 
en vererfd. Verder is het algemeen bekend dat in het geval van land conflicten die opgelost 
moesten worden door het Ministerie van Land Hervorming, de wet ook vaak niet is 
toegepast. Er bestaan zeer veel land conflicten tussen ejidos en particuliere land eigenaren 
in Mexico en de meesten zijn nooit opgelost. In dit boek wordt één zo'n land conflict 
behandeld, namelijk het conflict van het "verloren land". Dit betreft een groot areaal land 
dat officieel tot de ejido La Canoa behoort, maar dat sinds de jaren dertig in de handen is 
van enkele particuliere land eigenaren. Ondanks jaren van strijd van de kant van La Canoa 
heeft het Ministerie van Land Hervorming het conflict niet opgelost. 
De hierboven genoemde praktijken met ejido land worden in de literatuur meestal 
afgedaan met de termen "corruptie", "chaos", en "desorganisatie". In dit boek wordt echter 
gesteld dat het op deze wijze etiketteren van bestaande praktijken niet bijdraagt tot een beter 
inzicht in de achterliggende dynamiek. Het plakken van dit soort etiketten helpt bijvoorbeeld 
niet om te bepalen wat de rol is geweest van de wet en de officiële procedures in deze 
ontwikkelingen. Deze studie laat zien dat ook al wordt de wet niet toegepast, ze vaak wel 
degelijk van invloed is. Ze bepaalt namelijk de onderhandelingspositie van de verschillende 
mensen die betrokken zijn bij illegale transacties. De agrarische wet en de ambtenaren 
hebben bovendien een grote rol gespeeld bij het legaliseren van illegale transacties in de 
ejido. In dit boek worden deze verschillende praktijken geanalyseerd en wordt gekeken wat 
de rol is geweest van lokale machtsrelaties, regionale machtsverhoudingen en de ambtenaren 
van het Ministerie van Land Hervorming. 
Deze studie laat zien dat als we een langere tijdsperiode nemen, of een groter aantal 
transacties bestuderen, we ook in activiteiten die als "corrupt", "gedesorganiseerd" en 
"chaotisch" bestempeld worden, bepaalde patronen kunnen ontdekken. In hoofdstuk vijf werd 
bijvoorbeeld aangetoond dat illegale land verkopen op zo'n manier werden georganiseerd dat 
de mensen in de transactie zo min mogelijk risico zouden lopen als de zaak later eventueel 
aangekaart zou worden. Hoofdstuk zes liet een andere patroon van organisatie praktijken 
zien. Daar werd aangetoond dat het uitvoerend comité van de ejido (commissaris, secretaris 
en penningmeester) nooit tijdens vergaderingen publiekelijk verslag doet van hun activiteiten, 
maar dat er andere wegen zijn waarlangs de ejidatarios hun uitvoerend comité in de gaten 
houden en tot de orde roepen als dat nodig is. Dit gebeurt namelijk via informele kanalen van 
informatie verschaffing, roddel, en regionale politieke netwerken. Op deze manier hebben 
de ejido vergaderingen een heel andere rol gekregen en zijn verworden tot arena's van 
gekibbel en confrontatie. De officiële ejido structuur wordt echter weer belangrijk wanneer 
er zich serieuze conflicten in de ejido voordoen. Dan wordt het "formele spel gespeeld" 
tezamen met het gebruik van informele vormen van politieke druk. 
In dit boek wordt een methodologie gebruikt die niet start vanuit de formele organisatie 
structuur, maar die zich concentreert op specifieke projecten, problemen, conflicten en 
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schaarse middelen. Het uitgangspunt is dat alle vormen van organisatie plaatsvinden in 
krachtenvelden. Een krachtenveld wordt gedefinieerd als een veld van macht en strijd tussen 
verschillende sociale actoren rond bepaalde schaarse middelen of problemen en waar omheen 
zich vormen van dominantie, strijd en verzet ontwikkelen, evenals bepaalde regelmatigheden 
en vormen van ordening. Binnen deze visie zijn de patronen die zich voordoen in het 
organisatie proces het resultaat van de krachten binnen het veld. Er wordt verondersteld dat 
de ontwikkeling van vormen van ordening in organisatie praktijken, samengaat met de 
uitsluiting van bepaalde sociale categorieën. Rond de strijd om schaarse middelen kunnen 
verschillende groepen onderscheiden worden met verschillende toegang en verschillende 
soorten rechten. In het geval van de commons in La Canoa zien we bijvoorbeeld dat door het 
steeds schaarser worden van dit land, ejidatarios, landloze zonen van ejidatarios en andere 
landloze dorpelingen zich steeds meer van elkaar gaan onderscheiden en op basis van 
verschillende gronden rechten op dit land gaan claimen. 
Deze studie laat zien dat er vele krachtenvelden bestaan die allemaal hun eigen dynamiek 
ontwikkelen. Dit betekent bijvoorbeeld dat in relatie tot bepaalde middelen en problemen de 
ejidatarios een hoge mate van autonomie hebben kunnen ontwikkelen, terwijl ze in relatie tot 
andere problemen en middelen heel weinig bewegingsruimte hebben. De organisatie 
praktijken die zich hebben ontwikkeld rond de individuele akkerbouw percelen in de ejido, 
hebben bijvoorbeeld geleid tot een grote mate van autonomie voor de ejidatarios. Er heeft 
zich door de jaren een (illegale) interne landmarkt ontwikkeld in de ejido waar de overheid 
vrijwel geen greep op had. In de praktijk was dit land in sterke mate geprivatiseerd. De wet, 
de officiële procedures en de functionarissen waren altijd echter wel aanwezig als een 
"dreiging op afstand", omdat ze zich met dit land bleven bemoeien en er verschillende 
procedures gevolgd werden door het Ministerie van Land Hervorming om het landgebruik 
in ejidos te controleren. In de commons daarentegen hebben de ejidatarios tezamen met de 
landloze dorpelingen een nog grotere autonomie ontwikkeld. Daar zien we ook een 
privatisering proces plaatsvinden, maar met nauwelijks enige invloed van de overheid. Met 
betrekking tot het "verloren land" opereren de ejidatarios echter in een krachtenveld waarin 
ze machteloos zijn. De ejidatarios zijn gedurende tientallen jaren in een hopeloze strijd 
verwikkeld tegen particuliere land eigenaren. Gedurende meer dan vijftig jaar hebben ze 
geprobeerd dit land terug te krijgen, maar zonder enig resultaat. Deze analyse van organisatie 
vormen in verschillende krachtenvelden laat zien dat we dus niet op een generaliserende 
manier kunnen praten over de structurele positie van de ejidatarios in relatie tot de regionale 
elite, of over de aard van hun relatie met de Mexicaanse staat. Deze relatie hangt af van de 
middelen en problemen die op het spel staan. 
In de benadering die is ontwikkeld in dit boek, worden het reflecteren op de dingen die 
gebeuren en het vertellen van verhalen beschouwd als een centraal onderdeel van het 
organisatie proces. Deze dialogen laten een constante actieve betrokkenheid zien van de 
mensen met de wereld om hen heen. Bovendien is de creatie van verhalen een manier om 
de wereld te ordenen en strategieën te ontwikkelen. Deze studie laat zien hoe de organisatie 
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praktijken rond verschillende schaarse middelen in specifieke krachtenvelden samengaan met 
kritische reflecties, ideologie, ironie, verbeelding en interpretatie. Deze dialogen laten 
vormen van strijd en verzet zien in relatie tot bestaande organisatie praktijken en 
machtsrelaties. 
In dit boek wordt ook de gecompliceerde relatie van de ejidatarios met de Mexicaanse 
staat geanalyseerd. Aan de ene kant was de staat hun bondgenoot in de strijd tegen de 
grootgrondbezitters in de periode van de land hervorming en heeft ze de mensen allerlei 
voorzieningen gegeven (scholen, water, elektriciteit). Maar in andere opzichten wordt de 
staat beschouwd als een corrupte en gewelddadige vijand die zeer gevreesd en gewantrouwd 
wordt door de mensen. Dit geeft een beeld van de Mexicaanse staat als tegelijkertijd de 
beschermer en de onderdrukker. Beelden van de staat verenigen het kwade met het goede. 
Daarom kunnen ejidatarios op het ene moment enthousiast zijn over de Mexicaanse president, 
en het op het andere moment cynisch en wantrouwend over zijn speeches. Of ze kunnen 
lachen om het feit dat ze zich zelf lieten bedriegen door de democratische propaganda van 
een president die later een grote oplichter bleek te zijn. De ejidatarios kunnen trots zijn dat 
ze deel uitmaken van het project van de Mexicaanse natie, maar tegelijkertijd kunnen ze de 
machthebbers bekritiseren om hun corruptie en uitbuiting van de kleine boeren. 
In dit boek wordt gesteld dat het continu theoretiseren over macht en politiek in alle lagen 
van de Mexicaanse bevolking te maken heeft met het gevoel van onmacht dat veel mensen 
voelen tegenover het ondoorzichtige staatsapparaat. Iedereen tracht aldoor te verklaren wat 
er aan de hand is en wie met wie aan het opereren is of wie achter bepaalde gebeurtenissen 
zit. Samenzwerings-theorieën tieren welig. In dit verband moet ook het opereren van de 
Mexicaanse bureaucratie worden geanalyseerd. In dit boek is de Mexicaanse bureaucratie 
getypeerd als een "hoop-genererende machine". Elke nieuwe president voert nieuwe 
programma's in en stopt de programma's van z 'n voorganger. De corruptie in bepaalde 
overheidskantoren krijgt de schuld van de problemen en deze instanties worden gesloten. 
Nieuwe overheidsorganisaties worden met veel enthousiasme opgericht en de functionarissen 
gaan met veel elan aan het werk. 
De bureaucratie biedt ook altijd talloze openingen als iemand iets wil doen. De 
bureaucratie zegt nooit nee. Dit komt duidelijk naar voren in het geval van de vele 
landconflicten die gedurende tientallen jaren niet zijn opgelost. Elke keer kan de 
bureaucratische machine van het Ministerie van Land Hervorming weer in beweging gezet 
worden. In het geval van het "verloren land" van La Canoa wordt keer op keer de hoop 
gegeven dat de zaak zal worden opgelost. Vele mensen dienen zich aan die precies weten te 
vertellen hoe de zaak aangepakt moet worden. In deze studie wordt echter gesteld dat de 
"bureaucratische machine" geen rationaliteit en coherentie produceert, maar hoop, vreugde, 
plezier, angst en verwachtingen. Hoewel de mensen na zoveel ervaringen in het verleden 
nooit naïef zijn, kunnen ze ' in bepaalde perioden toch geïnspireerd raken en enthousiast 
worden over nieuwe programma's en nieuwe mogelijkheden die hun geboden worden. 
In dit boek wordt het "idee van de staat" gedefinieerd als het geloof in het bestaan van 
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een centrum van controle. Dit betekent dat mensen de neiging hebben een coherentie en 
logica te zoeken die vaak niet bestaat. In deze context van een "hoop-generererende 
machine", zonder een duidelijk centrum en coherentie, dienen zich veel brokers aan die 
zeggen over de juiste connecties te beschikken om de zaak aan het rollen te krijgen. Door 
te suggereren dat zij de "goede connectie" hebben dragen de brokers bij aan dit "idee van 
de staat". Op dezelfde manier, investeren de ejidatarios in het "idee van de staat" wanneer 
ze zoeken naar de "goede connectie" die hun kan helpen de problemen op te lossen. Op deze 
manier spelen brokers vaak niet zozeer een rol in het effectief verbinden van ejidatarios met 
"de staat" of met "hogere niveaus" maar wel in de "verbeelding van de macht van de staat". 
In deze context van een ondoorzichtig bureaucratisch apparaat krijgen bepaalde objecten 
zoals kaarten, stempels, certificaten en officiële documenten vaak speciale krachten 
toebedeeld. Het zijn elementen waar mensen hun strijd op kunnen concentreren. In dit 
complex van verlangen en fantasie, wordt inscriptie heel belangrijk. Mensen ontwikkelen een 
fetisjisme rond bepaald documenten zelfs wanneer ze deze niet kunnen "lezen" volgens de 
administratieve standaard. Hetzelfde proces doet zich voor bij de ambtenaren die het belang 
benadrukken van het volgen van de regels en procedures terwijl ze tegelijkertijd vertellen dat 
in serieuze land conflicten de officiële procedures geen rol spelen. Overheidstechnieken 
krijgen symbolische betekenissen buiten hun administratieve functie om. 
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